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THE RAJPUT STATES AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

By

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FIRST EDITION : April, 1951

Price Rs. 12/8 only

Published by A. Mukherjee, 2, College Square, Calcutta—12.
Printed by B. N. Bose at Bose Press,
30, Brojo Mitter Lane, Calcutta.

PREFACE

I began my study of Rajput history more than twenty years ago. About ten years ago I took up one particular phase of Rajput history—British relations with the Rajput States up to 1818—for special study. An outline of this subject was given in my book, *Rajput Studies*, published in 1944. I also contributed several papers to *Journal of Indian History*, *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, *Indian Historical Quarterly* and *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*.

These scattered materials have been incorporated in Part II of the present work. An attempt has been made, for the first time, to give, on the basis of original sources (mostly unpublished documents preserved in National Archives of India), a connected account of the extension of British supremacy over Rajputana. In order to give the general reader a clear idea about the condition of the Rajput States towards the close of the 18th century I have thought it necessary to add brief accounts of their past history, with special reference to the vicissitudes of the Rajput-Maratha relations, which drove them to the arms of the British Government. No originality is claimed for these prefatory surveys, as they are admittedly based on secondary authorities. I am aware that no one who has no access to the documents preserved in the archives of the different Rajput States, which are not yet open to the public, can give a comprehensive and authentic account of Rajput Feudalism. I have incorporated in this volume my poor and imperfect survey of Rajput Feudalism and of the social, economic and administrative systems of the Rajput States in the hope that it will induce some student, to whom Rajput records may be available, to take up the study of Rajput institutions.

The stories which form the bulk of Tod's *Annals* are likely to be dismissed summarily as mere "opium-eaters' tales", but they are not altogether useless even from the critical historian's point of view. Tod himself seems to have been aware of their imperfections and inaccuracies, for he called his work *Annals and Antiquities*—and not *History*—of *Rajasthan*. The title of the book becomes significant if we compare it with the titles chosen for their works by contemporary writers like Grant Duff and Cunningham. Tod knew the historical importance of inscriptions and documents, to which he made many references in the course of his narrative, but it was not possible for him

PREFACE

to base his work on such unimpeachable sources: they were not available then in any quantity, and those which were available could not be correctly interpreted. Tod was, therefore, compelled to narrate those "tales" which the "opium-eaters" of his day could tell him. If those "tales" were not history in the proper sense, they could at least illustrate the character of the Rajputs. Tod wanted his countrymen to understand the Rajputs; how could they understand them if nothing was known about their character? Tod's work was, primarily, an introduction to Rajput character. From this point of view what really mattered was, not chronology, but tradition. It is as the greatest repository of Rajput traditions that Tod's work retains its value for the modern historian.

So far as the period covered in the present volume (*circa* 1790—1818) is concerned Tod's testimony is particularly valuable because it comes from a very well-informed and sympathetic contemporary observer. Unfortunately his references to the political history of Rajputana during this period are too brief. Either the sordid transactions of this period of decadence proved disgusting to a mind steeped in the bold romance of the half-forgotten past, or political expediency stood in the way of giving the public a fuller narrative of contemporary events.

Unlike other contemporary British writers on Indian history Tod was interested in things other than mere political history. He has left for us many important details on the geography, economic condition, social condition and administration of the Rajput States. Those portions of his work which deal with these matters have unimpeachable evidentiary value, for these were based on his own observations and on documents examined by him. They indicate a freshness of outlook and an "enlarged" conception of history which were altogether absent in India in Tod's days.

In Part I of this volume I have reprinted copious extracts from the *Annals*, partly to show that Tod did not merely repeat "opium-eaters' tales", partly to invite the attention of students of Rajput history to some important but sadly neglected aspects of their subject. Omissions from Tod's text have been indicated at their proper places, and some new foot notes—those marked with asterisks—have been added.

A. C. BANERJEE

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PART I
EXTRACTS FROM TOD

I

SKETCH OF A FEUDAL SYSTEM IN RAJASTHAN¹

CHAPTER I

Introduction.—Existing condition of Rajasthan.—General resemblance between the ancient systems of Asia and Europe.—Noble origin of the Rajput race.—Rathors of Marwar.—Kachhwahas of Ambar.—Sesodias of Mewar.—Gradation of Ranks.—Revenues and rights of the Crown.—Barar.—Khar Lakar.

It is more than doubtful whether any code of civil or criminal jurisprudence ever existed in any of these principalities;² though it is certain that none is at this day discoverable in their archives. But there is a martial system peculiar to these Rajput States, so extensive in its operation as to embrace every object of society. This is so analogous to the ancient feudal system of Europe, that I have not hesitated to hazard a comparison between them, with reference to a period when the latter was yet imperfect. Long and attentive observation enables me to give this outline of a system, of which there exists little written evidence. Curiosity originally, and subsequently a sense of public duty (lest I might be a party to injustice), co-operated in inducing me to make myself fully acquainted with the minutiae of this traditionary theory of government; and incidents, apparently trivial in themselves, exposed parts of a widely-extended system, which, though now disjointed, still continue to regulate the actions of extensive communities, and lead to the inference, that at one period it must have attained a certain degree of perfection.

Many years have elapsed³ since I first entertained these opinions, long before any connection existed between these States and the British Government; when their geography was little known to us, and their history still less so. At that period I frequently travelled amongst them for amusement, making these objects subservient thereto, and laying the result freely before my Government. I had abundant sources of intelligence to guide me in forming my analogies; Montesquieu, Hume, Millar, Gibbon⁴: but I sought only general resemblances and lineaments

¹Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 153-245.

²States of Rajputana.

³Tod's *Rajasthan* was published between 1829 and 1832.

⁴Vol. III, *Miscellaneous Works*.

similar to those before me. A more perfect, because more familiar picture, has since appeared by an author,¹ who has drawn aside the veil of mystery which covered the subject, owing to its being till then but imperfectly understood. I compared the features of Rajput society with the finished picture of this eloquent writer, and shall be satisfied with having substantiated the claim of these tribes to participation in a system, hitherto deemed to belong exclusively to Europe. I am aware of the danger of hypothesis, and shall advance nothing that I do not accompany by incontestable proofs.

The leading features of government amongst semi-barbarous hordes or civilized independent tribes must have a considerable resemblance to each other. In the same stages of society, the wants of men must everywhere be similar, and will produce the analogies which are observed to regulate Tatar hordes or German tribes, Caledonian clans, the Rajput *Kula* (race), or Jareja *Bhayyad* (brotherhood). All the countries of Europe participated in the system we denominate feudal ; and we can observe it, in various degrees of perfection or deterioration, from the mountains of Caucasus to the Indian Ocean. But it requires a persevering toil, and more discriminating judgment than I possess, to recover all these relics of civilization : yet though time, and still more oppression, have veiled the ancient institutions of Mewar, the mystery may be penetrated, and will discover parts of a system worthy of being rescued from oblivion.

Maratha cunning, engrafted on Mahomedan intolerance, had greatly obscured these institutions. The nation itself was passing rapidly away : the remnant which was left had become a matter of calculation, and their records and their laws partook of this general decay. The nation may recover ; the physical frame may be renewed ; but the *morale* of the society must be recast. In this chaos a casual observer sees nothing to attract notice ; the theory of government appears, without any of the dignity which now marks our regular system. Whatever does exist is attributed to fortuitous causes—to nothing systematic : no fixed principle is discerned, and none is admitted ; it is deemed a mechanism without a plan. This opinion is hasty. Attention to distinctions, though often merely nominal, will aid us in discovering the outlines of a picture which must at some period have been more

¹ Hallam's *Middle Ages*.

finished ; when real power, unrestrained by foreign influence, upheld a system, the plan of which was original. It is in these remote regions, so little known to the western world, and where original manners lie hidden under those of the conquerors, that we may search for the germs of the constitutions of European States.¹ A contempt for all that is Asiatic too often marks our countrymen in the East : though at one period on record the taunt might have been reversed.

In remarking the curious coincidence between the habits, notions, and Governments of Europe in the Middle Ages, and those of Rajasthan, it is not absolutely necessary we should conclude that one system was borrowed from the other ; each may, in truth, be said to have the patriarchal form for its basis. I have sometimes been inclined to agree with the definition of Gibbon, who styles the system of our ancestors the offspring of chance and barbarism. "Le systeme feodal, assemblage monstrueux de tant de parties que le tems et l'hazard ont reunies, nous offre un objet tres complique ; pour l'etudier il faut le decomposer."² This I shall attempt.

The form, as before remarked, is truly patriarchal in these States, where the greater portion of the vassal chiefs, from the highest of the sixteen peers to the holders of a *chursa*³ of land, claim affinity in blood to the sovereign.⁴

The natural seeds are implanted in every soil, but the tree did not gain maturity except in a favoured aspect. The perfection of the system in England is due to the Normans, who brought it from Scandinavia, whither it was probably conveyed by Odin and the Sacasenæ, or by anterior migrations, from Asia ; which would coincide with Richardson's hypothesis, who contends that it was introduced from Tatary. Although speculative reasoning

*¹ An extract quoted from M. St. Martin's *Discours sur l' Origine et l' Histoire des Arsacides* omitted.

² Gibbon, *Miscell.*, Vol. iii. *Du gouvernement feodal.*

³ A 'skin or hyde.' Millar (Chap. V, p. 85) defines a 'hyde of land,' the quantity which can be cultivated by a single plough. A *chursa*, 'skin or hyde' of land, is as much as one man can water ; and what one can water is equal to what one plough can cultivate. If irrigation ever had existence by the founders of the system, we may suppose this is the meaning of the term which designated a *knight's fee*. It may have gone westward with emigration.

⁴ *Bapji*, 'sire,' is the appellation of royalty, and, strange enough, whether to male or female ; while its offsets, which form a numerous branch of vassals, are called *babas*, 'the infants.'

forms no part of my plan, yet when I observe analogy on the subject in the customs of the ancient German tribes, the Franks or Gothic races, I shall venture to note them. Of one thing there is no doubt—knowledge must have accompanied the tide of migration from the east : and from higher Asia emerged the Asi, the Chatti, and the Cimbric Lombard, who spread the system in Scandinavia, Friesland, and Italy.

“It has been very common,” says the enlightened historian of the Feudal System in the Middle Ages, “to seek for the origin of feuds, or at least for analogies to them, in the history of various countries : but though it is of great importance to trace the similarity of customs in different parts of the world, we should guard against seeming analogies, which vanish away when they are closely observed. It is easy to find partial resemblances to the feudal system. The relation of patron and client in the republic of Rome has been deemed to resemble it, as well as the barbarians and veterans who held frontier lands on the tenure of defending them and the frontier ; but they were bound not to an individual, but to the State. Such a resemblance of fiefs may be found in the Zamindars of Hindustan and the Timariots of Turkey. The clans of the Highlanders and Irish followed their chieftain into the field : but their tie was that of imagined kindred and birth, not the spontaneous compact of vassalage.”¹

I give this at length to shew, that if I still persist in deeming the Rajput system a pure relation of feuds, I have before my eyes the danger of seeming resemblances. But grants, deeds, charters, and traditions, copies of all of which will be found in the Appendix, will establish my opinions. I hope to prove that the tribes in the northern regions of Hindustan did possess the system, and that it was handed down, and still obtains, notwithstanding seven centuries of paramount sway of the Mughal and Pathan dynasties, altogether opposed to them except in this feature of government, where there was an original similarity. In some of these States—those least affected by conquest—the system remained freer from innovation. It is, however, from Mewar chiefly that I shall deduce my examples, as its internal rule was less influenced by foreign policy, even to the period at which the imperial power of Delhi was on the decline.

As in Europe, for a length of time, traditionary custom was the only regulator of the rights and tenures of this system, vary-

¹ Hallam's *Middle Ages*, Vol. I, p. 200.

ing in each State, and not unfrequently (in its minor details) in the different provinces of one State, according to their mode of acquisition and the description of occupants when acquired. It is from such circumstances that the variety of tenure and customary law proceeds. To account for this variety, a knowledge of them is requisite; nor is it until every part of the system is developed that it can be fully understood. The most trifling cause is discovered to be the parent of some important result. If ever these were embodied into a code (and we are justified in assuming such to have been the case), the varied revolutions which have swept away almost all relics of their history were not likely to spare these. Mention is made of several princes of the house of Mewar who legislated for their country; but precedents for every occurring case lie scattered in formulas, grants, and traditionary sayings. The inscriptions still existing on stone would alone, if collected, form a body of laws sufficient for an infant community, and these were always first committed to writing, and registered ere the column was raised. The seven centuries of turmoil and disaster, during which these States were in continual strife with the foe, produced many princes of high intellect as well as valour. Sanga Rana, and his antagonist, Sultan Babur, were revivd in their no less celebrated grandsons, the great Akbar and Rana Pratap: the son of the latter, Amar, the foe of Jahangir, was a character of whom the proudest nation might be vain.

The pen has recorded, and tradition handed down, many isolated fragments of the genius of these Rajput princes, as statesmen and warriors, touching the political division, regulations of the aristocracy, and commercial and agricultural bodies. Sumptuary laws, even, which append to a feudal system, are to be traced in these inscriptions: the annulling of monopolies and exorbitant taxes; the regulation of transit duties; prohibition of profaning sacred days by labour; immunities, privileges, and charters to trades, corporations, and towns; such as would, in climes more favourable to liberty, have matured into a league, or obtained for these branches a voice in the councils of the State. My search for less perishable documents than parchment when I found the cabinet of the prince contained them not, was unceasing; but though the bigoted Mahomedan destroyed most of the traces of civilization within his reach, perseverance was rewarded with a considerable number. They are at least matter

of curiosity. They will evince that monopolies and restraints on commerce were well understood in Rajwara, though the doctrines of political economy never gained footing there. The setting up of these engraved tablets or pillars, called *Seoras*,¹ is of the highest antiquity. Every subject commences with invoking the sun and moon as witnesses, and concludes with a denunciation of the severest penalties on those who break the spirit of the imperishable bond. Tablets of an historical nature I have of twelve and fourteen hundred years' antiquity, but of grants of land or privileges about one thousand years is the oldest. Time has destroyed many, but man more. They became more numerous during the last three centuries, when successful struggles against their foes produced new privileges, granted in order to recall the scattered inhabitants. Thus one contains an abolition of the monopoly of tobacco;² another, the remission of tax on printed cloths, with permission to the country manufacturers to sell their goods free of duty at the neighbouring towns. To a third, a mercantile city, the abolition of war contributions,³ and the establishment of its internal judicial authority. Nay, even where good manners alone are concerned, the law-giver appears, and with an amusing simplicity:⁴ "From the public feast none shall attempt to carry any thing away." "None shall eat after sunset," shews that a Jain obtained the edict. To yoke the bullock or other animal for any work on the sacred *Amavas*,⁵ is also declared punishable. Others contain revocations of vexatious fees to officers of the crown; "of beds and quilts;"⁶ "the seizure of the carts, implements, or cattle of the husbandmen,"⁷—the sole boon in our own *Magna Carta* demanded for the husbandman. These and several others, of which copies are annexed, need not be repeated. If even from such memoranda a sufficient number could be collected of each prince's reign up to the olden time, what more could we desire to enable us to judge of the genius of their princes, the wants and habits of the people, their acts and occupations? The most

¹ Sanskrit, *Sula*.

² See Appendix, No. XII.

³ See Appendix, No. XIII.

⁴ See Appendix, No. XIV.

⁵ 'Full moon.'—See Appendix, No. XIII.

⁶ It is customary, when officers of the Government are detached on service, to exact from the towns where they are sent both bed and board.

⁷ Seized for public service, and frequently to exact a composition in money.

ancient written customary law of France is A.D. 1088,¹ at which time Mewar was in high prosperity ; opposing, at the head of a league far more powerful than France could form for ages after, the progress of revolution and foreign conquest.² Ignorance, sloth, and all the vices which wait on and result from continual oppression in a perpetual struggle for existence of ages' duration, gradually diminished the reverence of the inhabitants themselves for these relics of the wisdom of their forefathers. In latter years, they so far forgot the ennobling feeling and respect for "the stone which told" their once exalted condition, as to convert the materials of the temple in which many of these stood into places of abode. Thus many a valuable relic is built up in the castles of their barons, or buried in the rubbish of the fallen pile.

We have, however, the books of grants to the chiefs and vassals, and also the grand rent-roll of the country. These are of themselves valuable documents. Could we but obtain those of remoter periods, they would serve as a commentary on the history of the country, as each contains the detail of every estate, and the stipulated service, in horse and foot, to be performed for it. In later times, when turbulence and disaffection went unpunished, it was useless to specify a stipulation of service that was nugatory ; and too often the grants contained but the names of towns and villages, and their value ; or if they had the more general terms of service, none of its details.³ From all these, however, a sufficiency of customary rules could easily be found to form the written law of fiefs in Rajasthan. In France, in the sixteenth century, the variety of these customs amounted to two hundred and eighty-five, of which only sixty⁴ were of great importance. The number of consequence in Mewar which have come to my observation is considerable, and the most important will be given in the Appendix. Were the same plan pursued there as in that ordinance which produced the laws of *Pays Coutumiers*⁵ of

¹ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 197.

² This is quite wrong. The ruler of Mewar at that time was Bejoy Singh : epigraphic evidence shows that he ruled at least from 1083 A.D. to 1116 A.D. There was then no question of "opposing.....the progress of revolution and foreign conquest."

³ Some of these, of old date, I have seen three feet in length.

⁴ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 199.

⁵ Hallam notices these laws by this technical phrase.

France, *viz.* ascertaining those of each district, the materials are ready.

Such a collection would be amusing, particularly if the traditionary were added to the engraved laws. They would often appear jejune, and might involve contradictions; but we should see the wants of the people; and if ever our connection (which God forbid!) should be drawn closer, we could then legislate without offending national customs or religious prejudices. Could this, by any instinctive impulse or external stimulus, be effected by themselves, it would be the era of their emersion from long oppression, and might lead to better notions of government, and consequent happiness to them all.

Noble Origin of the Rajput Race.—If we compare the antiquity and illustrious descent of the dynasties which have ruled, and some which continue to rule, the small sovereignties of Rajasthan, with many of celebrity in Europe, superiority will often attach to the Rajput. From the most remote periods we can trace nothing ignoble, nor any vestige of vassal origin. Reduced in power, circumscribed in territory, compelled to yield much of their splendour and many of the dignities of birth, they have not abandoned an iota of the pride and high bearing arising from a knowledge of their illustrious and regal descent. On this principle the various revolutions in the Rana's family never encroached; and the mighty Jahangir himself, the Emperor of the Mughals, became, like Cæsar, the commentator¹ of the history of the tribe of Sesodia.² The potentate of the twenty-two Satrapies of Hind³ dwells with proud complacency on this Rajput king having made terms with him. He praises heaven, that what his immortal ancestor Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, failed to do, the project in which Humayun had also failed, and in which the illustrious Akbar, his father, had but partial success, was reserved for him.⁴ It is pleasing to peruse in the commentaries of these conquerors, Babur⁵ and

^{*1} Although Jahangir's *Memoirs* contains some references to the defeat and sub-mission of Amar Singh, it is quite wrong to describe that Emperor as "the commentator of the history of the tribe of Sesodia."

² Sesodia is the last change of name which the Rana's race has undergone. It was first Suryavansa, then Grahilot or Guhilot, Aharya, and Sesodia. These changes arise from revolutions and local circumstances.

^{*3} In Jahangir's reign the number of "Satrapies of Hind" was less than 22.

^{*4} *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, trans. Rogers and Beveridge, pp. 70, 256, 259, 260, 272 ff.

^{*5} Regarding Rana Sangram Singh Babur says in his *Memoirs* that "not

Jahangir, their sentiments with regard to these princes. We have the evidence of Sir Thomas Roe, the ambassador of Elizabeth¹ to Jahangir, as to the splendour of this race : it appears throughout their annals and those of their neighbours.

Rathors of Marwar.—The Rathors can boast a splendid pedigree ; and if we cannot trace its source with equal certainty to such a period of antiquity as the Rana's, we can, at all events, shew the Rathor monarchs wielding the sceptre at Kanauj, at the time the leader of an unknown tribe of the Franks was paving the way towards the foundation of the future kingdom of France. Unwieldy greatness caused the sudden fall of Kanauj in the twelfth century, of which the existing line of Marwar is a renovated scion.²

Kachhwahas of Ambar.—Ambar is a branch of the once illustrious and ancient Nishada, now Narwar, which produced the ill-fated prince whose story³ is so interesting. Revolution and conquest compelled them to quit their ancestral abodes. Hindustan was then divided into no more than four great kingdoms. By Arabian⁴ travellers we have a confused picture of these States. But all the minor States, now existing in the west, arose about the period when the feudal system was approaching maturity in France and England.⁵

The others are less illustrious, being the descendants of the great vassals of their ancient kings.

Sesodias of Mewar.—Mewar exhibits a marked difference from all the other States in her policy and institutions. She was an old-established dynasty when these renovated scions were in

one of all the exalted sovereigns of this wide realm, such as the Sultan of Delhi, the Sultan of Gujarat, and the Sultan of Mandu, could cope with this evil-dispositioned one, without the help of other pagans ; one and all they caioled him and temporized with him." (Beveridge, pp. 561-562).

¹ Sir Thomas Roe was sent by James I, not by Elizabeth.

² The theory that the Rathors were descended from the Gahadavalas of Kanauj is supported by the Bithu inscription of Seha. (See *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XL., pp. 181 ff.). No "Rathor monarch," however, "wielded the sceptre at Kanauj, at the time the leader of an unknown tribe of the Franks was paving the way towards the foundation of the future Kingdom of France." "The sudden fall of Kanauj in the twelfth century" was due, not to "unwieldy greatness," but to the invasion of Muhammad Ghori.

³ Nala and Damayanti.

⁴ *Relations anciennes des Voyageurs*, par Renaudot.

⁵ All the statements in this paragraph are inaccurate. For the early history of the Kachhwahas see article by G. C. Roy Choudhuri in *B. C. Law Volume*.

embryo. We can trace the losses of Mewar, but with difficulty her acquisitions ; while it is easy to note the gradual aggrandizement of Marwar and Ambar, and all the minor States. Marwar was composed of many petty States, whose ancient possessions formed an allodial vassalage under the new dynasty. A superior independence of the control of the prince arises from the peculiarity of the mode of acquisition ; that is, with rights similar to the allodial vassals of the European feudal system.

The poorest Rajput of this day retains all the pride of ancestry, often his sole inheritance : he scorns to hold the plough, or to use his lance but on horseback. In these aristocratic ideas he is supported by his reception amongst his superiors, and the respect paid to him by his inferiors. The honours and privileges, and the gradations of rank, amongst the vassals of the Rana's house, exhibit a highly artificial and refined state of society. Each of the superior rank is entitled to a banner, kettle-drums preceded by heralds and silver maces, with peculiar gifts and personal honours, in commemoration of some exploit of their ancestors.

The martial Rajputs are not strangers to armorial bearings,¹ now so indiscriminately used in Europe. The great banner of Mewar exhibits a golden sun on a crimson field : those of the chiefs bear a dagger. Ambar displays the *panchranga*, or five-coloured flag. The lion rampant on an argent field is extinct with the estate of Chanderi.²

In Europe these customs were not introduced till the period of the Crusades, and were copied from the Saracens ; while the use of them amongst the Rajput tribes can be traced to a period anterior to the war of Troy. In the Mahabharat, or great war, twelve hundred years before Christ, we find the hero Bhishma

¹ It is generally admitted that armorial bearings were little known till the period of the Crusades, and that they belong to the east. The twelve tribes of Israel were distinguished by the animals on their banners, and the sacred writings frequently allude to the "Lion of Judah." The peacock was a favourite armorial emblem of the Rajput warrior ; it is the bird sacred to their Mars (Kumara), as it was to Juno, his mother, in the west. The feather of the peacock decorates the turban of the Rajput and the warrior of the Crusade, adopted from the Hindu through the Saracens. [* A quotation from *Dict. de l'ancien Regime* omitted.]

² I was the first European who traversed this wild country, in 1807, not without some hazard. It was then independent : about three years after it fell a prey to Sindhia.

exulting over his trophy, the banner of Arjuna, its field adorned with the figure of the Indian Hanuman.¹

These emblems had a religious reference amongst the Hindus, and were taken from their mythology, the origin of all devices.

Every royal house has its palladium, which is frequently borne to battle at the saddle-bow of the prince. Rao Bhima Hara, of Kotah, lost his life and protecting deity together. The late celebrated Khichi² leader, Jai Singh, never took the field without the god before him. "Victory to Bajrang" was his signal for the charge so dreaded by the Maratha, and often has the deity been sprinkled with his blood and that of the foe.

Their ancestors, who opposed Alexander, did the same, and carried the images of Hercules (*Baldeva*) at the head of their array.

The custom (says Arrian) of presenting banners as an emblem of sovereignty over vassals, also obtained amongst the tribes of the Indus when invaded by Alexander. When he conquered the Sacæ and tribes east of the Caspian, he divided the provinces amongst the princes of the ancient families, for which they paid homage, engaged to serve with a certain quota of troops, and received from his own hand a banner; in all of which he followed the customs of the country. But in these we see only the outline of the system; we must descend to more modern days to observe it more minutely. A grand picture is drawn of the power of Mewar, when the first grand irruption of the Mahomedans occurred in the first century of their era; when "a hundred³ Kings, its allies and dependents, had their thrones raised in Chitor," for its defence and their own individually, when a new religion, propagated by the sword of conquest, came to enslave these realms.⁴ This invasion was by Sind and Makran; for it was half a century later ere "the light" shone from the heights of Pamir⁵ on the plains of the Jumna and Ganges.

From the commencement of this religious war in the mountains westward of the Indus, many ages elapsed ere the

¹ The monkey-deity.

² The Khichis are a branch of the Chauhans, and Khichiwarra lies east of Haravati.

³ See Annals of Mewar, and note from D'Anville.

⁴ This statement is quite wrong.

⁵ The Pamir range is a grand branch of the Indian Caucasus. Chand, the bard, designates them as the "Parbat Pat Pamir," or Pamir, Lord of Mountains. From Pahar and Pamir the Greeks may have compounded Paropanisos, in which was situated the most remote of the Alexandrias.

'King of the Faith' obtained a seat on the throne of Yudhisthira. Chand, the bard, has left us various valuable memorials of this period, applicable to the subject historically as well as to the immediate topic. Visaldeva, the monarch whose name appears on the pillar of victory at Delhi, led an army against the invader, in which, according to the bard, "the banners of eighty-four princes were assembled." The bard describes with great animation the summons sent for this magnificent feudal levy from the heart of Antarbedi¹ to the shores of the western sea, and it coincides with the record of his victory, which most probably this very army obtained for him. But no finer picture of feudal manners exists than the history of Prithviraja, contained in Chand's poem. It is surprising that this epic should have been allowed so long to sleep neglected: a thorough knowledge of it, and of others of the same character, would open many sources of new knowledge, and enable us to trace many curious and interesting coincidences.²

In perusing these tales of the days that are past, we should be induced to conclude that the *Kuriltai* of the Tatars, the *Chaugan* of the Rajput, and the *Champ de Mars* of the Frank, had one common origin.

Caste has for ever prevented the inferior classes of society from being incorporated with this haughty noblesse. Only those of pure blood in both lines can hold fiefs of the crown. The highest may marry the daughter of a Rajput, whose sole possession is a '*skin of land*':³ the sovereign himself is not degraded by such alliance. There is no moral blot, and the operation of a law like the Salic would prevent any political evil resulting therefrom. Titles are granted, and even fiefs of office, to ministers and civil servants not Rajputs: they are, however, but official, and never confer hereditary right. These official fiefs may have

¹ The space between the grand rivers Ganges and Jumna, well known as the Doab.

² Domestic habits and national manners are painted to the life, and no man can well understand the Rajput of yore, who does not read these.

Those were the days of chivalry and romance, when the assembled princes contended for the hand of the fair, who chose her own lord, and threw to the object of her choice, in full court, the *bar-mala*, or garland of marriage. Those were the days which the Rajput yet loves to talk of, when the glance of an eve weighed with a sceptre; when three things alone occupied him: his horse, his lance, and his mistress; for she is but the third in his estimation. after all: to the two first he owed her.

³ *Charsa*, a 'hide or skin.'

originally arisen, here and in Europe, from the same cause ; the want of a circulating medium to pay the offices. The Mantris¹ of Mewar prefer estates to pecuniary stipend, which gives more consequence in every point of view. All the higher offices—as cup-bearer, butler, stewards of the house-hold, wardrobe, kitchen, master of the horse—all these are enumerated as ministerialists² at the court of Charlemagne in the dark ages of Europe, and of whom we have the duplicates. These are what the author of the Middle Ages designates as “improper feuds.”³ In Mewar the prince’s architect, painter, physician, bard, genealogist, heralds, and all the generation of the foster-brothers, hold lands. Offices are hereditary in this patriarchal government ; their services personal. The title even appends to the family, and if the chance of events deprive them of the substance, they are seldom left destitute. It is not uncommon to see three or four with the title of *Pradhan* or premier.⁴

But before I proceed further in these desultory and general remarks, I shall commence the chief details of the system as described in times past, and, in part, still obtaining in the principality of the Rana of Mewar. As its geography and distribution are fully related in their proper place,⁵ I must refer the reader to that for a preliminary understanding of its localities.

The local disposition of the estates was admirably contrived. Bounded on three sides, the south, east, and west, by marauding barbarous tribes of Bhils, Mers, and Minas, the circumference of this circle was sub-divided into estates for the chiefs, while the *khalisa*, or fiscal land, the best and richest, was in the heart of the country, and consequently well protected.

It appears doubtful whether the *khalisa* lands amounted to one-fourth of those distributed in grant to the chiefs. The value of the crown demesne as the nerve and sinew of sovereignty, was well known by the former heads of this house. To obtain any

¹ ‘Ministers,’ from *Mantra*, ‘mystification.’

² It is probably of Teutonic origin, and akin to ‘*Mantri*,’ which embraces all the ministers and councillors of royalty. (Hallam, p. 195.)

³ Hallam, p. 193.

⁴ One I know, in whose family the office has remained since the period of Prithviraja, who transferred his ancestor to the service of the Rana’s house seven hundred years ago. He is not merely a nominal hereditary minister, for his uncle actually held the office ; but in consequence of having favoured the views of a pretender to the crown, its active duties are not entrusted to any of the family.

⁵ See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 1-22, 553-554 ; Vol. II, pp. 760-914.

portion thereof was the reward of important services ; to have a grant of few acres near the capital for a garden was deemed a high favour ; and a village in the amphitheatre or valley, in which the present capital is situated, was the *ne plus ultra* of recompense. But the lavish folly of the present prince,¹ out of this tract, twenty-five miles in circumference, has not preserved a single village in his *khalisa*.

By this distribution, and by the inroads of the wild tribes in the vicinity, or of Mughals and Marathas, the valour of the chiefs was kept in constant play.

The country was partitioned into districts, each containing from fifty to one hundred towns and villages, though sometimes exceeding that proportion. The great number of *Chaurasis*² leads to the conclusion that portions to the amount of eighty-four had been the general sub-division. Many of these yet remain : as the '*Chaurasi*' of Jahajpur and of Kumbhalmer : tantamount to the old 'hundreds' of our Saxon ancestry. A circle of posts was distributed, within which the quotas of the chiefs attended, under "the Faujdar of the *Sima*" (*vulgo* Sim), or commander of the border. It was found expedient to appoint from court this lord of the frontier, always accompanied by a portion of the royal insignia, standard, kettle-drums, and heralds and being generally a civil officer, he united to his military office the administration of justice.³ The higher vassals never attended personally at these posts, but deputed a confidential branch of their family, with the quota required. For the government of the districts there were conjoined a civil and a military officer : the latter generally a vassal of the second rank. Their residence was the chief place of the district, commonly a stronghold.

The division of the chiefs into distinct grades shews a highly artificial state of society.

1st Class. We have the sixteen, whose estates were from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand rupees and upwards, of yearly rent. These appear in the presence only on special invitation,

¹ Bhim Singh, 1778—1828.

² The numeral eighty-four.

³ Now each chief claims the right of administering justice in his own domain, that is, in civil matters ; but in criminal cases they ought not, without the special sanction of the crown. Justice, however, has long been left to work its own way, and the self-constituted tribunals, the *panchayats*, sit in judgment in all cases where property is involved.

upon festivals and solemn ceremonies, and are the hereditary councillors of the crown.¹

2nd Class, from five to fifty thousand rupees. Their duty is to be always in attendance. From these, chiefly, *Faujدارs* and military officers are selected.

3rd Class is that of *Gol*, holding lands chiefly under five thousand rupees, though by favour they may exceed this limit. They are generally the holders of separate villages and portions of land, and in former times they were the most useful class to the prince. They always attended on his person, and indeed formed his strength against any combination or opposition of the higher vassals.

4th Class. The offshoots of the younger branches of the Rana's own family, within a certain period, are called the *babas*, literally 'infants,' and have appanages bestowed on them. Of this class are Shahpura and Banera; too powerful for subjects. They hold on none of the terms of the great clans, but consider themselves at the disposal of the prince. These are more within the influence of the crown. Allowing adoption into these houses, except in the case of near kindred, is assuredly an innovation: they ought to revert to the crown, failing immediate issue, as did the great estate of Bhainsrorgarh, two generations back.

From these to the holder of a *chursa*, or hide of land, the peculiarity of tenure and duties of each will form a subject for discussion.

Revenues and Rights of the Crown.—I need not here expatiate upon the variety of items which constitute the revenues of the prince, the details of which will appear in their proper place. The land-tax in the *khalisa* demesne is, of course, the chief source of supply; the transit duties on commerce and trade, and those of the larger towns and commercial marts, rank next. In former times more attention was paid to this important branch of income, and the produce was greater because less shackled. The liberality on the side of the crown was only equalled by the integrity of the merchant, and the extent to which it was carried would imply an almost Utopian degree of perfection in their mutual qualities of liberality and honesty; the one, perhaps, generating the other. The remark of a merchant recently, on the vexatious train of duties and espionage attending their collection, is not

¹ See Appendix, No. XX.

merely figurative : "our ancestors tied their invoice to the horns of the oxen¹ at the first frontier post of customs, and no intermediate questions were put till we passed to the opposite or sold our goods, when it was opened and payment made accordingly ; but now every town has its rights." It will be long ere this degree of confidence is restored on either side : extensive demand on the one is met by fraud and evasion on the other, though at least one-half of these evils have already been subdued.

The mines were very productive in former times, and yielded several lacs to the princes of Mewar.² The rich tin mines of Jawara produced at one time a considerable proportion of silver. Those of copper are abundant as is also iron on the now alienated domain on the Chambal ; but lead least of all.³

The marble quarries also added to the revenue ; and where there is such a multiplicity of sources, none are considered too minute to be applied in these necessitous times.

Barar.—*Barar* is an indefinite term for taxation, and is connected with the thing taxed : as *ghanim*⁴-*barar*, 'war-tax' ; *ghar ginti*⁵-*barar*, 'house-tax' ; *hal-barar*, 'plough-tax' ; *neota-barar*, 'marriage-tax', and others, both of old and new standing. The war-tax was a kind of substitute for the regular mode of levying the rents on the produce of the soil ; which was rendered very difficult during the disturbed period, and did not accord with the wants of the prince. It is also a substitute in those mountainous regions for the *jarib*,⁶ where the produce bears no proportion to the cultivated surface ; sometimes from poverty of soil, but often from the reverse, as in Kumbhalmer, where the choicest crops are produced on the cultivated terraces, and on the sides of its mountains which abound with springs, yielding the richest canes and

¹ Oxen and carts are chiefly used in the *Tandas*, or caravans, for transportation of goods in these countries ; camels further to the north.

² See *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. I, pp. 63 ff.

³ The privilege of coining is a reservation of royalty. No subject is allowed to coin gold or silver, though the Salumbar chief has on sufferance a copper currency. The mint was a considerable source of income, and may be a gain when confidence is restored and a new currency introduced. The Chitor rupee is now thirty-one per cent. inferior to the old Bhilara standard, and there was one struck at the capital even worse, and very nearly as bad as the *moneta nigra* of Philip the Fair of France, who allowed his vassals the privilege of coining it.

* See Webb, *Currencies of the Hindu States of Rajputana*.

⁴ Enemy.

⁵ Numbering of houses.

⁶ A measure of land.

cottons, and where experiment has proved that four crops can be raised in the same patch of soil within the year.

The offering on confirmation of estates (or fine on renewal) is now, though a very small, yet still one source of supply ; as is the annual and triennial payment of the quit-rents of the *Bhumia* chiefs. Fines in composition of offences may also be mentioned ; and they might be larger, if more activity were introduced in the detection of offenders.

These Governments are mild in the execution of the laws ; and a heavy fine has more effect (especially on the hill tribes) than the execution of the offender, who fears death less than the loss of property.

Khar-Lakar.—The composition for 'wood and forage' afforded a considerable supply. When the princes of Mewar were oftener in the tented field than in the palace, combating for their preservation, it was the duty of every individual to store up wood and forage for the supply of the prince's army. What originated in necessity was converted into an abuse and annual demand. The towns also supplied a certain portion of provisions : where the prince halted for the day these were levied on the community ; a goat or sheep from the shepherd, milk and flour from the farmer. The maintenance of these customs is observable in taxes, for the origin of which it is impossible to assign a reason without going into the history of the period ; they scarcely recollect the source of some of these themselves. They are akin to those known under the feudal tenures of France, arising from exactly the same causes, and commuted for money payments : such as the *droit de giste et de chevauche*.¹ Many also originated in the perambulations of these princes to visit their domains ;² a black year in the calendar to the chief and the subject. When he honoured the chief by a visit, he had to present horses and arms, and to entertain his prince, in all which honours the cultivators and merchants had to share.

The duties on the sale of spirits, opium, tobacco, and even to a share of the garden-stuff, affords also modes of supply.³

¹ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 232.

² Hume describes the necessity for our earlier kings making these tours to consume the produce, being in kind. So it is in Mewar ; but I fancy the supply was always too easily convertible into circulating medium to be the cause there.

³ See Appendix, No. X.

CHAPTER II

Legislative Authority.—Rozina.—Military Service.— Inefficiency of this form of Government.

Legislative Authority.—During the period still called “the good times of Mewar,” the prince, with the aid of his civil council, the four ministers of the crown and their deputies, promulgated all the legislative enactments in which the general rights and wants of the community were involved. In these the martial vassals or chiefs had no concern : a wise exclusion, comprehending also their immediate dependents, military, commercial, and agricultural. Even now, the little that is done in these matters is effected by the civil administration, though the Rajput *Pradhans* have been too apt to interfere in matters from which they ought always to be kept aloof, being ever more tenacious of their own rights than solicitous for the welfare of the community.

The neglect in the legislation of late years was supplied by the self-constituted tribunals, the useful *panchayats*, of which enough has been said to render further illustration unnecessary. Besides the resident ruler of the district, who was also a judicial functionary, there was, as already stated, a special officer of the Government in each frontier Thana, or garrison post. He united the triple occupation of embodying the quotas, levying the transit duties, and administering justice, in which he was aided at the *chabutra*¹ or *court*, by assembling the *Chauthias* or assessors of justice. Each town and village has its *chauthia*, the members of which are elected by their fellow-citizens, and remain as long as they conduct themselves impartially in disentangling the intricacies of complaints preferred to them.

They are the aids to the *Nagar Seth*, or chief magistrate, an hereditary office in every large city in Rajasthan. Of this *chauthia* the Patel and Patwari are generally members. The former of these, like the *Dasaundhi* of the Marathas, resembles in his duties the *decanus* of France and the tithing-man in England. The *chauthia* and *panchayat* of these districts are analogous to the assessors of justice called *scabini*² in France, who held the office by election or the concurrence of the people. But these are the

¹ Literally ‘terrace,’ or ‘altar.’

² They were considered a sort of jury, bearing a close analogy to the *judices selecti*, who sat with the prætor in the tribunal of Rome.—Hallam.

special and fixed council of each town ; the general *panchayats* are formed from the respectable population at large, and were formerly from all classes of society.

The *chabutras*, or terraces of justice, were always established in the *khalisa*, or crown demesne. It was deemed a humiliating intrusion if they sat within the bounds of a chief. To 'erect the flag' within his limits, whether for the formation of defensive posts or the collection of duties, is deemed a gross breach of his privileged independence, as to establish them within the walls of his residence would be deemed equal to sequestration. It often becomes necessary to see justice enforced on a chief or his dependent, but it begets eternal disputes and disobedience, till at length they are worried to compliance by *rozina*.

Rozina.—When delay in these matters, or to the general commands of the prince, is evinced, an officer or herald is deputed with a party of four, ten, or twenty horse or foot, to the fief of the chief, at whose residence they take up their abode ; and carrying, under the seal, a warrant to furnish them with specified daily (*rozina*) rations, they live at free quarters till he is quickened into compliance with the commands of the prince. This is the only accelerator of the slow movements of a Rajput chieftain in these days, whether for his appearance at court or the performance of an act of justice. It is often carried to a harassing excess, and causes much complaint.

In cases regarding the distribution of justice or the internal economy of the chiefs' estates, the Government officers seldom interfere. But of their *panchayats* I will only remark, that their import amongst the vassals is very comprehensive ; and when they talk of the '*panch*,' it means the 'collective wisdom.' In the reply to the remonstrance of the Deogarh vassals,¹ the chief promises never to undertake any measure without their deliberation and sanction.

On all grand occasions where the general peace or tranquillity of the Government is threatened, the chiefs form the council of the sovereign. Such subjects are always first discussed in the domestic councils of each chief ; so that when the *witenagemot* of Mewar was assembled, each had prepared himself by previous discussion, and was fortified by abundance of advice.

To be excluded the council of the prince is to be in utter disgrace. These grand divans produce infinite speculation, and the

¹ See Appendix, No. III.

ramifications which form the opinions are extensive. The council of each chief is, in fact, a miniature representation of the sovereign's. The greater sub-vassals, his civil *pradhan*, the mayor of the household, the *purohit*,¹ the bard, and two or three of the most intelligent citizens, form the minor councils, and all are separately deliberating while the superior court is in discussion. Thus is collected the wisdom of the magnates of Rajwara.

Military Service.—In Mewar, during the days of her glory and prosperity, fifteen thousand horse, bound by the ties of fidelity and service, followed their prince into the field, all supported by lands held by grant; from the chief who headed five hundred of his own vassals, to the single horseman.

Knight's Fee or Single Horsemen.—A knight's fee in these States varies. For each thousand rupees of annual rent, never less than two, and generally three horsemen were furnished; and sometimes three horse and three foot soldiers, according to the exigencies of the times when the grant was conferred. The different grants² appended will shew this variety, and furnish additional proof that this, and all similar systems of policy, must be much indebted to chance for the shape they ultimately take. The 'knight's fee, when William the Conqueror partitioned England into sixty thousand such portions, from each of which a soldier's service was due, was fixed at £20. Each portion furnished its soldier or paid escuage. The knight's fee of Mewar may be said to be two hundred and fifty rupees, or about £30.

Limitations of Service.—In Europe, service was so restricted, that the monarch had but a precarious authority. He could only calculate upon forty days' annual service from the tenant of a knight's fee. In Rajasthan it is very different: "at home and abroad, service shall be performed when demanded": such is the condition of the tenure.

For state and show, a portion of the greater vassals³ reside at the capital for some months, when they have permission to retire to their estates, and are relieved by another portion. On the grand military festival the whole attend for a given time; and when the prince took the field, the whole assembled at their own charge; but if hostilities carried them beyond the frontier they were allowed certain rations.

¹ Family priest.

² See Appendix, Nos. IV, V, and VI.

³ See Appendix, No. XX, Art. 6; the treaty between the chiefs and his vassals defining service.

Escuage or Scutage.—Escuage or scutage, the phrase in Europe to denote the amercement¹ for non-attendance, is also known and exemplified in deeds. Failure from disaffection, turbulence, or pride, brought a heavy fine; the sequestration of the whole or part of the estate.² The princes of these States would willingly desire to see escuage more general. All have made this first attempt towards an approximation to a standing army: but, though the chiefs would make compensation to get rid of some particular service, they are very reluctant to renounce lands, by which alone a fixed force could be maintained. The rapacity of the court would gladly fly to scutages, but in the present impoverished state of the fiefs, such if injudiciously levied would be almost equivalent to resumption; but this measure is so full of difficulty as to be almost impracticable.

Inefficiency of this Form of Government.—Throughout Rajasthan the character and welfare of the States depend on that of the sovereign: he is the main spring of the system—the active power to set and keep in motion all these discordant materials; if he relax, each part separates, and moves in a narrow sphere of its own. Yet will the impulse of one great mind put the machine in regular movement, which shall endure during two or three imbecile successors, if no fresh exterior force be applied to check it. It is a system full of defects; yet we see them so often balanced by virtues, that we are alternately biassed by these counteracting qualities: loyalty and patriotism, which combine a love of the institutions, religion, and manners of the country, are the counterpoise to systematic evil. In no country has the system ever proved efficient. It has been one of eternal excitement and irregular action; inimical to order, and the repose deemed necessary after conflict for recruiting the national strength. The absence of an external foe was but the signal for disorder within, which increased to a terrific height in the feuds of the two great rival factions of Mewar, the clans of Chundawat³ and Saktawat,⁴ as the weakness of the

¹ Appendix, No. XVI.

² Both of which I have witnessed.

³ A clan called after Chunda, eldest son of an ancient Rana, who resigned his birthright.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 323-328.

⁴ Sakta was the son of Rana Udai Singh, founder of Udaipur, or Oodipur. The feuds of these two clans, like those of the Armagnacs and Bourguignons, "qui couvrirent la France d'un crepe sanglant," have been the destruction of Mewar. It requires but a change of names and places, while reading the one, to understand perfectly the history of the other.

prince augmented by the abstraction of his personal domain, and the diminution of the services of the third class of vassals (the *Gol*), the personal retainers of the crown ; but when these feuds broke out, even with the enemy at their gates, it required a prince of great nerve and talent to regulate them. Yet is there a redeeming quality in the system, which, imperfect as it is, could render such perilous circumstances but the impulse to a rivalry of heroism.¹

It was a nice point to keep these clans poised against each other : their feuds were not without utility, and the tact of the prince frequently turned them to account. One party was certain to be enlisted on the side of the sovereign, and this alone counter-balanced the evil tendencies before described. To this day it has been a perpetual struggle for supremacy ; and the epithets of "loyalist" and "traitor" have been alternating between them for centuries, according to the portion they enjoyed of the prince's favour, and the talents and disposition of the heads of the clans to maintain their predominance at court. The Saktawats are weaker in numbers, but have the reputation of greater bravery and more genius, than their rivals. I am inclined, on the whole, to assent to this opinion ; and the very consciousness of this reputation must be a powerful incentive to its preservation.

When all these Governments were founded and maintained on the same principle, a system of feuds, doubtless, answered very well ; but it cannot exist with a well-constituted monarchy. Where individual will controls the energies of a nation, it must eventually lose its liberties. To preserve their power, the princes of Rajasthan surrendered a portion of theirs to the emperors of Delhi. They made a nominal surrender to him of their kingdoms receiving them back with a sanad, or grant, renewed on each lapse : thereby acknowledging him as lord paramount. They received, on these occasions, the khilat of honour and investiture, consisting of elephants, horses, arms, and jewels ; and to their hereditary title of 'prince' was added by the emperor, one of dignity, *mansab*.² Besides this acknowledgment of supremacy, they offered *nazuran*³ and homage, especially on the festival of Nauroz (the new year), engaging to attend the royal presence

*¹ A story of Chundawat-Saktawat rivalry omitted. See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 175-177. Three footnotes relating to that story omitted.

*² Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*.

³ Fine of relief.

when required, at the head of a stipulated number of their vassals. The emperor presented them with a royal standard, kettle-drums, and other insignia, which headed the array of each prince. Here we have all the chief incidents of a great feudal sovereignty. Whether the Tatar sovereigns borrowed the customs from their princely vassals, or brought them from the highlands of Asia, from the Oxus and Jaxartes, whence, there is little doubt, many of these *Sachha* Rajputs originated, shall be elsewhere considered.

The splendour of such an array, whether in the field or at the palace, can scarcely be conceived. Though Humayun had gained the services of some of the Rajput princes, their aid was uncertain. It was reserved for his son, the wise and magnanimous Akbar, to induce them to become at once the ornament and support of his throne. The power which he consolidated, and knew so well to wield, was irresistible; while the beneficence of his disposition, and the wisdom of his policy, maintained what his might conquered. He felt that a constant exhibition of authority would not only be ineffectual but dangerous, and that the surest hold on their fealty and esteem would be the giving them a personal interest in the support of the monarchy.

He determined to unite the pure Rajput blood to the scarcely less noble stream which flowed from Aghuz Khan, through Jenghiz, Timur, and Babur, to himself, calculating that they would more readily yield obedience to a prince who claimed kindred with them, than to one purely Tatar; and that, at all events, it would gain the support of their immediate kin, and might in the end become general. In this supposition he did not err. We are less acquainted with the obstacles which opposed his first success, than those he subsequently encountered: *one* of which neither he nor his descendants *ever* overcame in the family of Mewar, who could never be brought to submit to such alliance.¹

Akbar thus gained a double victory, securing the good opinions as well as the swords of these princes in his aid. A judicious perseverance would have rendered the throne of Timur immovable, had not the tolerant principles and beneficence of Akbar, Jahangir, and Shah Jahan, been lost sight of by the bigoted and blood-thirsty Aurangzeb; who, although while he lived his commanding genius wielded the destinies of this immense empire at pleasure, alienated the affections, by insulting the pre-

¹ Several paragraphs and footnotes relating to Mughal-Rajput marriages omitted. See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 178-180.

judices, of those who had aided in raising the empire to the height on which it stood. This affection withdrawn, and the weakness of Farrukhsiyar substituted for the strength of Aurangzeb, it fell and went rapidly to pieces. Predatory warfare and spoliation rose on its ruins. The Rajput princes, with a short-sighted policy, at first connived at, and even secretly invited the tumult; not calculating on its affecting their interests. Each looked to the return of ancient independence, and several reckoned on great accession of power. Old jealousies were not lessened by the part which each had played in the hour of ephemeral greatness; and the prince of Mewar, who preserved his blood uncontaminated, though with loss of land, was at once an object of respect and envy to those who had forfeited the first pretensions¹ of a Rajput. It was the only ovation the Sesodia² had to boast for centuries of oppression and spoliation, whilst their neighbours were basking in court favour. The great increase of territory of these princes nearly equalled the power of Mewar, and the dignities thus acquired from the sons of Timur, they naturally wished should appear as distinguished as his ancient title. Hence, while one inscribed on his seal "the exalted in dignity, a prince amongst princes, and king of kings,"³ the prince of Mewar preserved his royal simplicity in 'Maha-Rana Bhim Singh, son of Arsi.' But this is digression.

It would be difficult to say what would be the happiest form of Government for these States without reference to their neighbours. Their own feudal customs would seem to have worked well. The experiment of centuries has secured to them political existence, while successive dynasties of Afghans and Mughals, during eight hundred years, have left but the wreck of splendid names. Were they to become more monarchical, they would have every thing to dread from unchecked despotism, over which even the turbulence of their chiefs is a salutary control.

¹ See, in the Annals of Mewar, the letter of Rai Singh of Bikaner (who had been compelled to submit to this practice), on hearing that Rana Pratap's reverses were likely to cause a similar result. It is a noble production, and gives the character of both.

* In the Annals of Mewar Tod says that the letter was written by Prithviraj, the younger brother of Rai Singh. See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 399-400.

² The tribe to which the princes of Mewar belonged.

* See Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1752.

³ *Raja Rajeswara*, the title of the prince of Marwar: the prince of Ambar, *Raja Rajendra*.

Were they somewhat more advanced towards prosperity, the crown demesne redeemed from dissipation and sterility, and the chiefs enabled to bring their quotas into play for protection and police, recourse should never be had to bodies of mercenary troops, which practice, if persevered in, will inevitably change their present form of government. This has invariably been the result, in Europe as well as Rajasthan, else why the dread of standing armies ?

Escuage is an approximating step. When Charles VII of France¹ raised his companies of ordnance, the basis of the first national standing army ever embodied in Europe, a tax called '*taille*' was imposed to pay them, and Guienne rebelled. Kotah is a melancholy instance of subversion of the ancient order of society. Mewar made the experiment from necessity sixty years ago, when rebellion and invasion conjoined ; and a body of Sindhis were employed, which completed their disgust, and they fought with each other till almost mutually exterminated, and till all faith in their prince was lost. Jaipur had adopted this custom to a greater extent ; but it was an ill-paid band, neither respected at home nor feared abroad. In Marwar the feudal compact was too strong to tolerate it, till Pathan predatory bands, prowling amidst the ruins of Mughal despotism, were called in to partake in each family broil ; the consequence was the weakening of all, and opening the door to a power stronger than any, to be the arbiter of their fate.

General Duties of the Pattawat, or Vassal Chief of Rajasthan.—"The essential principle of a fief was a mutual contract of support and fidelity. Whatever obligations it laid upon the vassal of service to his lord, corresponding duties of protection were imposed by it on the lord towards his vassal. If these were transgressed on either side, the one forfeited his land, the other his signiory or rights over it."²

In this is comprehended the very foundation of feudal policy, because in its simplicity we recognize first principles involving mutual preservation. The best commentary on this definition of simple truth will be the sentiments of the Rajputs themselves in two papers : one containing the opinions of the chiefs of Marwar on the reciprocal duties of sovereign and vassal ;³ the other, those

¹ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 117.

² Hallam, Vol. I, p. 173.

³ See Appendix, No. 1.

of the sub-vassals of Deogarh, one of the largest fiefs in Rajasthan, of their rights, the infringement of them, and the remedy.¹

If, at any former period in the history of Marwar, its prince had thus dared to act, his signiory and rights over it would not have been of great value ; his crown and life would both have been endangered by these turbulent and determined vassals. How much is comprehended in that manly, yet respectful sentence : " If he accepts our services, then is he our prince and leader ; if not, but our equal, and we again his brothers, claimants of and laying claim to the soil."

In the remonstrance of the sub-vassals of Deogarh, we have the same sentiments on a reduced scale. In both we have the ties of blood and kindred, connected with and strengthening national policy. If a doubt could exist as to the principle of fiefs being similar in Rajasthan and in Europe, it might be set at rest by the important question long agitated by the feudal lawyers in Europe, " whether the vassal is bound to follow the standard of his lord against his own kindred or against his sovereign " : which in these States is illustrated by a simple and universal proof. If the question were put to a Rajput to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or his sovereign, the reply would be, *Rajka malik wuh, pat² ka malik yih* : ' He is the sovereign of the State, but this is my head ' : an ambiguous phrase, but well understood to imply that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards.

This will appear to militate against the right of remonstrance (as in the case of the vassals of Deogarh), for they look to the crown for protection against injustice ; they annihilate other rights by admitting appeal higher than this. Every class looks out for some resource against oppression. The sovereign is the last applied to on such occasions, with whom the sub-vassal has no bond of connection. He can receive no favour, nor perform any service, but through his own immediate superior : and presumes not to question (in cases not personal to himself) the propriety of his chief's actions, adopting implicitly his feelings and resentments. The daily familiar intercourse of life is far too engrossing to allow him to speculate, and with his lord he lives a patriot or dies a traitor. In proof of this, numerous instances could be given of

¹ See Appendix, Nos. II and III.

² *Pat* means 'head,' 'chief,' also, 'board,' 'throne'—like *takht*, in Persian.

whole clans devoting themselves to the chief against their sovereign;¹ not from the ties of kindred, for many were aliens to blood; but from the ties of duty, gratitude, and all that constitutes clannish attachment, superadded to feudal obligation. The sovereign, as before observed, has nothing to do with those vassals not holding directly from the crown; and those who wish to stand well with their chiefs, would be very slow in receiving any honours or favours from the general fountain-head. The Deogarh chief sent one of his sub-vassals to court on a mission: his address and deportment gained him favour, and his consequence was increased by a seat in the presence of his sovereign. When he returned, he found this had lost him the favour of his chief, who was offended, and conceived a jealousy both of his prince and his servant. The distinction paid to the latter was, he said, subversive of his proper authority, and the vassal incurred by his vanity the loss of estimation where alone it was of value.

Obligations of a Vassal.—The attempt to define all the obligations of a vassal would be endless: they involve all the duties of kindred in addition to those of obedience. To attend the court of his chief; never to absent himself without leave; to ride with him a-hunting; to attend him at the court of his sovereign or to war, and even give himself as a hostage for his release; these are some of the duties of a vassal.

CHAPTER III

Feudal Incidents.—Duration of Grants.

Feudal Incidents.—I shall now proceed to compare the more general obligations of vassals, known under the term of 'Feudal Incidents' in Europe, and shew their existence in Rajasthan. These were six in number:—1. reliefs; 2. fines of alienation; 3. escheats; 4. aids; 5. wardship; 6. marriage.

Relief.—The first and most essential mark of a feudal relation exists in all its force and purity here: it is a perpetually recurring mark of the source of the grant, and the solemn renewal of the pledge which originally obtained it. In Mewar it is a virtual and

¹ The death of the chief of Nimaj, in the Annals of Marwar, and Sheogarh Feud, in the Personal Narrative, Vol. II.

bona fide surrender of the fief and renewal thereof. It is thus defined in European polity : "A relief¹ is a sum of money due from every one of full age taking a fief by descent." It was arbitrary, and the consequent exactions formed a ground of discontent ; nor was the tax fixed till a comparatively recent period.

By *Magna Carta* reliefs were settled at rates proportionate to the dignity of the holder.² In France the relief was fixed by the customary laws at one year's revenue.³ This last has long been the settled amount of *nazarana*, or fine of relief, in Mewar.

On the demise of a chief, the prince immediately sends a party, termed the *sabti* (sequestrator), consisting of a civil officer and a few soldiers, who take possession of the estate in the prince's name. The heir sends his prayer to court to be installed in the property, offering the proper relief. This paid, the chief is invited to repair to the presence, when he performs homage, and makes protestations of service and fealty ; he receives a fresh grant, and the inauguration terminates by the prince girding him with a sword, in the old forms of chivalry. It is an imposing ceremony, performed in a full assembly of the court, and one of the few which has never been relinquished. The fine paid, and the brand buckled to his side, a steed, turban, plume, and dress of honour given to the chief, the investiture⁴ is complete ; the sequestrator returns to court, and the chief to his estate, to receive the vows and congratulations of his vassals.

In this we plainly perceive the original power (whether exercised or not) of resumption. On this subject more will appear in treating of the duration of grants. The *khang bandhai*, or 'binding of the swords,' is also performed when a Rajput is

*¹ A quotation from *Dict. de l'anc. Regime* omitted.

² *Viz.* "the heir or heirs of an earl, for an entire earldom, one hundred pounds ; the heir or heirs of a baron, for an entire barony, one hundred marks ; the heir or heirs of a knight, for a whole knight's fee, one hundred shillings at most."—Art. III, *Magna Carta*.

*³ A quotation from *L'Esprit des Loix* omitted.

⁴ That symbolic species of investiture denominated 'improper investiture,' the delivery of a turf, stone, and wand, has its analogies amongst the mountaineers of the Aravalli. The old baron of Bednor, when the Mer villages were reduced, was clamorous about his feudal rights over those wild people. It was but the point of honour. From one he had a hare, from another a bullock, and so low as a pair of sticks which they use on the festivals of the *Holi*. These marks of vassalage come under the head of 'petite serjanterie' (petit sericantry) in the feudal system of Europe. (See Art. XLI. of *Magna Carta*.)

fit to bear arms, as amongst the ancient German tribes, when they put into the hands of the aspirant for fame a lance. Such are the substitutes for the *toga virilis* of the young Roman. The Rana himself is thus ordained a knight by the first of his vassals in dignity, the chief of Salumbar.

Renunciation of Reliefs.—In the demoralization of all those States, some of the chiefs obtained renunciation of the fine of relief, which was tantamount to making a grant in perpetuity, and annulling the most overt sign of paramount sovereignty. But these and many other important encroachments were made when little remained of the reality, or when it was obscured by a series of oppressions unexampled in any European State.

It is in Mewar alone, I believe, of all Rajasthan, that these marks of fealty are observable to such an extent. But what is remarked elsewhere upon the fiefs being moveable, will support the doctrine of resumption though it might not be practised: a prerogative may exist without its being exercised.

Fine of Alienation.—Rajasthan never attained this refinement indicative of the dismemberment of the system; so vicious and self-destructive a notion never had existence in these States. Alienation does not belong to a system of fiefs: the lord would never consent to it, but on very peculiar occasions.

In Cutch, amongst the Jareja¹ tribes, sub-vassals may alienate their estates; but this privilege is dependent on the mode of acquisition. Perhaps the only knowledge we have in Rajasthan of alienation requiring the sanction of the lord paramount, is in donations for pious uses: but this is partial. We see in the remonstrance of the Deogarh vassals the opinion they entertained of their lord's alienation of their sub-fees to strangers, and without the Rana's consent; which, with a similar train of conduct, produced sequestration of his fief till they were re-inducted.

Tenants of the Crown may Alienate.—The agricultural tenants, proprietors of land held of the crown, may alienate their rights upon a small fine, levied merely to mark the transaction. But the tenures of these non-combatants and the holders of fees are entirely distinct, and cannot here be entered on, further than to say that the agriculturist is, or was, the proprietor of the soil; the chief, solely of the tax levied thereon. But in Europe the

¹ Jareja is the title of the Rajput race in Cutch; they are descendants of the Yadus, and claim from Krishna. In early ages they inhabited the tracts on the Indus and in Seistan.

alienation of the *feudum paternum* was not good without the consent of the kindred in the line of succession.¹ This would involve sub-infeudation and frerage, which I shall touch on distinctly, many of the troubles of these countries arising therefrom.

Escheats and Forfeitures.—The fiefs which were only to descend in lineal succession, reverted to the crown on failure of heirs, as they could not be bequeathed by will. This answers equally well for England as for Mewar. I have witnessed escheats of this kind, and foresee more, if the pernicious practice of unlimited adoption do not prevent the Rana from regaining lands, alienated by himself at periods of contention. Forfeitures for crimes must of course occur, and these are partial or entire, according to the delinquency.

In Marwar, at this moment, nearly all the representatives of the great fiefs of that country are exiles from their homes : a distant branch of the same family, the prince of Idar, would have adopted a similar line of conduct but for a timely check from the hand of benevolence.²

There is, or rather was, a class of lands in Mewar appended to the crown, of which it bestowed life-rents on men of merit. These were termed *Chhorutar*, and were given and taken back, as the name implies ; in contradistinction to grants which, though originating in good behaviour, not only continued for life but descended in perpetuity. Such places are still so marked in the rent-roll, but they are seldom applied to the proper purpose.

Aids.—Aids, implying 'free gifts,' or 'benevolences,' as they were termed in a European code, are well known. The *barar* (war-tax) is well understood in Mewar, and is levied on many occasions for the necessities of the prince or the head of a clan. It is a curious fact, that the *dasaundh*, or 'tenth,' in Mewar, as in Europe, was the stated sum to be levied in periods of emergency or danger. On the marriage of the daughters of the prince, a benevolence or contribution was always levied : this varied. A few years ago, when two daughters and a grand-daughter were married to the princes of Jaisalmir, Bikaner, and Kishangarh, a schedule of one-sixth, to portion the three, was made out ; but it did not realize above an eighth. In this aid the civil officers

¹ Wright on Tenures, *apud* Hallam, Vol. I, p. 185.

² The Hon. Mr. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay. As we prevented the spoliation of Idar by the predatory powers, we are but right in seeing that the head does not become the spoliator himself, and make these brave men "wish any change but that which we have given them."

of Government contribute equally with others. It is a point of honour with all to see their sovereign's daughters married, and for once the contribution merited the name of benevolence.

But it is not levied solely from the coffers of the rich ; by the chiefs it is exacted of their tenantry of all classes, who, of course, wish such subjects of rejoicing to be of as rare occurrence as possible.

"These feudal aids are deserving of our notice as the commencement of taxation, of which they long answered the purpose, till the craving necessities and covetous policy of kings established for them more durable and onerous burthens."¹

The great chiefs, it may be assumed, were not backward, on like occasions, to follow such examples, but these gifts were more voluntary. Of the details of aids in France we find enumerated, "paying the relief to the suzerain on taking possession of his lands ;"² and by *Magna Carta* our barons could levy them on the following counts : to make the baron's eldest son a knight, to marry his eldest daughter, or to redeem his person from captivity. The latter is also one occasion for the demand in all these countries. The chief is frequently made prisoner in their predatory invasions, and carried off as a hostage for the payment of a war contribution. Everything disposable is often got rid of on an occasion of this kind. *Cœur de Lion* would not have remained so long in the dungeons of Austria had his subjects been Rajputs.

In Ambar the most extensive benevolence, or *barar*,³ is on the marriage of the Rajkumar, or heir-apparent.

Wardship.—This does exist, to foster the infant vassal during minority ; but often terminating, as in the system of Europe, in the nefarious act of defrauding a helpless infant, to the pecuniary benefit of some court favourite. It is accordingly here undertaken occasionally by the head of the clan ; but two strong recent instances brought the dark ages, and the purchase of wardships for the purpose of spoliation, to mind. The first was in the Deogarh chief obtaining by bribe the entire management of the lands of Sangramgarh, on pretence of improving them for the infant, Nahar Singh, whose father was incapacitated by derangement. Nahar was a junior branch of the clan *Sangawat*, a subdivision of the Chundawat clan, both Sesodias of the Rana's blood.

¹ Hallam.

² Ducange, *apud* Hallam.

³ *Barar* is the generic name for taxation.

The object, at the time, was to unite them to Deogarh, though he pleaded duty as head of the clan. His nomination of young Nahar as his own heir gives a colouring of truth to his intentions; and he succeeded, though there were nearer of kin, who were set aside (at the wish of the vassals of Deogarh and with the concurrence of the sovereign) as unfit to head them or serve him.

Another instance of the danger of permitting wardships, particularly where the guardian is the superior in clanship and kindred, is exemplified in the Kalyanpur estate in Mewar. That property had been derived from the crown only two generations back, and was of the annual value of ten thousand rupees. The mother having little interest at court, the Salumbar chief, by bribery and intrigue, upon paying a fine of about one year's rent, obtained possession—ostensibly to guard the infant's rights; but the falsehood of this motive was soon apparent. There were duties to perform on holding it which were not thought of. It was a frontier post, and a place of rendezvous for the quotas to defend that border from the incursions of the wild tribes of the south-west. The Salumbar chief, being always deficient in the quota for his own estate, was not likely to be very zealous in his muster-roll for his ward's, and complaints were made which threatened a change. The chief of Chawand was talked of as one who would provide for the widow and minor, who could not perform the duties of defence.

The sovereign himself often assumes the guardianship of minors; but the mother is generally considered the most proper guardian for her infant son. All others may have interests of their own; she can be actuated by his welfare alone. Custom, therefore, constitutes her the guardian; and with the assistance of the elders of the family, she rears and educates the young chief till he is fit to be girded with the sword.¹

The *Faujdar*, or military manager, who frequently regulates the household as well as the sub-divisions of the estate, is seldom of the kin or clan of the chief: a wise regulation, the omission of which has been known to produce, in these *maires du palais* on a small scale, the same results as will be described in the larger. This officer, and the civil functionary who transacts all the pecuniary concerns of the estate, with the mother and her family, are always considered to be the proper guardians of the

¹ The charter of Henry I. promises the custody of heirs to the mother or next of kin.—Hallam, Vol. II, p. 429.

minor. "Blood which could not inherit" was the requisite for a guardian in Europe,¹ as here; and when neglected, the results are in both cases the same.

Marriage.—Refinement was too strong on the side of the Rajput to admit this incident, which, with that of wardship (both partial in Europe), illustrated the rapacity of the feudal aristocracy. Every chief, before he marries, makes it known to his sovereign. It is a compliment which is expected, and is besides attended with some advantage, as the prince invariably confers presents of honour, according to the station of the individual.

No Rajput can marry in his own clan; and the incident was originated in the Norman institutes, to prevent the vassal marrying out of his class, or amongst the enemies of his sovereign.²

Thus, setting aside marriage (which even in Europe was only partial and local) and alienation, four of the six chief incidents marking the feudal system are in force in Rajasthan, *viz.* relief, escheats, aids, and wardships.

Duration of Grants.—I shall now endeavour to combine all the knowledge I possess with regard to the objects attained in granting lands, the nature and durability of these grants, whether for life and renewable, or in perpetuity. I speak of the rules as understood in Mewar. We ought not to expect much system in what was devoid of regularity, even according to the old principles of European feudal law, which, though now reduced to some fixed principles, originated in, and was governed by, fortuitous circumstances; and after often changing its character, ended in despotism, oligarchy, or democracy.

There are two classes of Rajput landholders in Mewar, though the one greatly exceeds the other in number. One is the *Girasia Thakur*, or lord; the other the *Bhumia*. The *Girasia* chieftain is he who holds (*giras*) by grant (*patta*) of the prince for which he performs service with specified quotas at home and abroad, renewable at every lapse, when all the ceremonies of resumption,³ the fine of relief,⁴ and the investiture take place.

The *Bhumia* does not renew his grant, but holds on prescriptive possession. He succeeds without any fine, but pays a small annual quit-rent, and can be called upon for local service in the

¹ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 190.

² Crooke says: "The rule of tribal exogamy, whatever may be its origin, is much more primitive than the author supposed." (Vol. I, p. 190).

³ *Zabti*, 'sequestration.'

⁴ *Nazarana*.

district which he inhabits for a certain period of time. He is the counterpart of the allodial proprietor of the European system, and the real 'zamindar' of these principalities. Both have the same signification; from *bhum* and *zamin*, 'land': the latter is an exotic of Persian origin.

Girasia.—*Girasia* is from *giras*, 'a subsistence'; literally and familiarly, 'a mouthful.' Whether it may have a like origin with the Celtic word *gwas*,¹ said to mean 'a servant,'² and whence the word vassal is derived, I shall leave to etymologists to decide, who may trace the resemblance to the *girasia*, the vassal chieftain of the Rajputs. All the chartularies or *pattas*³ commence, "To..... *giras* has been ordained."

Whether resumable.—it has always been a subject of doubt whether grants were resumable at pleasure, or without some delinquency imputable to the vassal. Their duration in Europe was, *at least*, the life of the possessor, when they reverted⁴ to the fisc. The whole of the ceremonies in cases of such lapse are decisive on this point in Mewar. The right to resume, therefore, may be presumed to exist; while the non-practice of it, the formalities of renewal being gone through, may be said to render the right a dead letter. But to prove its existence I need only mention, that so late as the reign of Rana Sangram,⁵ the fiefs of Mewar were actually moveable; and little more than a century and a half has passed since this practice ceased. Thus a Rathor would shift, with family, chattels, and retainers, from the north into the wilds of Chappan;⁶ while the Saktawat relieved would occupy the plains at the foot of the Aravalli;⁷ or a Chundawat would exchange his abode on the banks of the Chambal with a

¹ It might not be unworthy of research to trace many words common to the Hindu and the Celt: or to inquire whether the Kimbri, the Juts or Getae, the Sacasena, the Chatti of the Elbe and Climbric Chersonese, and the ancient Britons, did not bring their terms with their bards and *vates* (the Bhats and Bardais) from the highland of Scythia east of the Caspian, which originated the nations common to both, improved beyond the Wolga and the Indus.

² Hallam, Vol. I, p. 155.

³ *Patta*, a 'patent' or 'grant': *Pattawat*, 'holder of the fief or grant.'

⁴ Montesquieu, chap. xxv., liv., xxxi.

⁵ Ten generations ago.

⁶ The grand mountainous and woody region to the south-west, dividing Mewar from Gujarat.

⁷ The grand chain dividing the western from the central States of Rajasthan.

Paramara or Chauhan from the table-mountain, the eastern boundary of Mewar.¹

Since these exchanges were occurring, it is evident the fiefs (*pattas*) were not grants in perpetuity. This is just the state of the benefices in France at an early period, as described by Gibbon, following Montesquieu: "Les benefices etoient amovibles; bientot ils les rendirent perpetuels, et enfin hereditaires."² This is the precise gradation of fiefs in Mewar; moveable, perpetual, and then hereditary. The sons were occasionally permitted to succeed their fathers;³ an indulgence which easily grew into a right, though the crown had the indubitable reversion. It is not, however, impossible that these changes⁴ were not of ancient authority, but arose from the policy of the times to prevent infidelity.

We ought to have a high opinion of princes who could produce an effect so powerful on the minds of a proud and turbulent nobility. The son was heir to the title and power over the vassals' personals and moveables, and to the allegiance of his father, but to nothing which could endanger that allegiance.

A proper apportioning and mixture of the different clans was another good result to prevent their combinations in powerful families, which gave effect to rebellion, and has tended more than external causes to the ruin which the State of Mewar exhibits.

Throughout the various gradations of its nobility, it was the original policy to introduce some who were foreign in country and blood. Chiefs of the Rathor, Chauhan, Paramara, Solanki, and Bhatti tribes were intermingled. Of these several were lineal descendants of the most ancient races of the kings of Delhi and

¹ Such changes were triennial; and, as I have heard the prince himself say, so interwoven with their customs was this rule that it caused no dissatisfaction; but of this we may be allowed at least to doubt. It was a perfect check to the imbibing of local attachment; and the prohibition against erecting forts for refuge or defiance, prevented its growth if acquired. It produced the object intended, obedience to the prince, and unity against the restless Mughal. Perhaps to these institutions it is owing that Mewar alone never was conquered by the kings during the protracted struggle of seven centuries; though at length worried and worn out, her power expired with their's, and predatory spoliation completed her ruin.

² Gibbon, *Misc. Works*, Vol. iii., p. 189; *Sur le systeme feodal surtout en France*.

³ Hallam, quoting Gregory of Tours; the picture drawn in A.D. 595.

⁴ "Fiefs had partially become hereditary towards the end of the first race: in these days they had not the idea of an 'unalienable fief.'" Montesquieu, Vol. ii., p. 431. The historian of the Middle Ages doubts if ever they were resumable at pleasure, unless from delinquency.

Anhilwara Patan ;¹ and from these in order to preserve the purity of blood, the princes of Mewar took their wives, when the other princes of Hind assented to the degradation of giving daughters in marriage to the emperors of Delhi. The princes of Mewar never yielded in this point, but preserved their ancient manners amidst all vicissitudes. In like manner did the nobles of the Rana's blood take daughters from the same tribes ; the interest of this foreign race was therefore strongly identified with the general welfare, and on all occasions of internal turmoil and rebellion they invariably supported their prince. But when these wise institutions were overlooked, when the great clans increased and congregated together, and the crown demesne was impoverished by prodigality, rebellions were fostered by Maratha rapacity, which were little known during the lengthened paramount sway of the kings of Delhi. This foreign admixture will lead us to the discussion of the different kinds of grants : a difference, perhaps, more nominal than real, but exhibiting a distinction so wide as to imply grants resumable and irresumable.

Kala Pattas.—It is elsewhere related that two great clans, descendants of the Ranas Rai Mal and Udai Singh, and their numerous scions, forming sub-divisions with separate titles or patronymics, compose the chief vassalage of this country.

Chundawat and Saktawat are the stock ; the former is subdivided into ten, the latter into about six clans. Rajputs never intermarry with their own kin : the prohibition has no limit ; it extends to the remotest degree. All these clans are resolvable into the generic term of 'the race' or *Kula* Sesodia. A Sesodia man and woman cannot unite in wedlock—all these are therefore of the blood royal ; and the essayists on population would have had a fine field in these quarters a century ago, ere constant misery had thinned the country, to trace the numerous progeny of Chunda and Sakta in the *Genesis*² of Mewar. The Bhat's genealogies would still, to a certain extent, afford the same means.

Descent gives a strength to the tenure of these tribes which the foreign nobles do not possess ; for although, from all that has been said, it will be evident that a right of reversion and resumption existed (though seldom exercised, and never but in cases of

¹ The Nahlwara of D'Anville and the Arabian travellers of the eighth century, the capital of the Balhara kings.

² *Janam*, 'birth' ; *es*, 'lord' or 'man.'

crime), yet the foreigner had not this strength in the soil, even though of twenty generations' duration. The epithet of *kala patta*, or 'black grant' attaches to the foreign grant, and is admitted by the holder, from which the kinsman thinks himself exempt. It is virtually a grant resumable; nor can the possessors feel that security which the other widely affiliated aristocracies afford. When, on a recent occasion, a revision of all the grants took place, the old ones being called in to be renewed under the sign-manual of the reigning prince, the minister himself visited the chief of Salumbar, the head of the Chundawats, at his residence at the capital, for this purpose. Having become possessed of several villages in the confusion of the times, a perusal of the grant would have been the means of detection; and on being urged to send to his estate for it, he replied, pointing to the palace, "My grant is in the foundation of that edifice": an answer worthy of a descendant of Chunda, then only just of age. The expression marks the spirit which animates this people, and recalls to mind the well-known reply of our own Earl Warrenne, on the very same occasion, to the *quo warranto* of Edward: "By their swords my ancestors obtained this land, and by mine will I maintain it."

Hence it may be pronounced that a grant of an estate is for the life of the holder, with inheritance for his offspring in lineal descent or adoption, with the sanction of the prince, and resumable for crime or incapacity:¹ this reversion and power of resumption being marked by the usual ceremonies on each lapse of the grantee, of sequestration (*zabti*), of relief (*nazarana*), of homage and investiture of the heir. Those estates held by foreign nobles differ not in tenure; though, for the reasons specified, they have not the same grounds of security as the others, in whose welfare the whole body is interested, feeling the case to be their own: and their interests, certainly, have not been so consulted since the rebellions of S. 1822,² and subsequent years. Witness the Chauhans of Bedla and Kotharia (in the Udaipur valley), and the Paramars of the plateau of Mewar, all chiefs of the first rank.

The difficulty and danger of resuming an old-established grant in these countries are too great to be lightly risked. Though in all these estates there is a mixture of foreign Rajputs, yet the blood of the chief predominates; and these must have a leader of their

¹ A quotation from *L'Esprit des Loix* omitted.

² 1766 A.D.

own, or be incorporated in the estates of the nearest of kin. This increase might not be desirable for the crown, but the sub-vassals cannot be turned adrift ; a resumption therefore in these countries is widely felt, as it involves many. If crime or incapacity render it necessary, the prince inducts a new head of that blood ; and it is their pride, as well as the prince's interest, that a proper choice should be made. If, as has often occurred, the title be abolished, the sub-vassals retain their sub-infeudations, and become attached to the crown.

Many estates were obtained, during periods of external commotion, by threats, combination, or the avarice of the prince—his short-sighted policy, or that of his ministers—which have been remedied in the late re-organization of Mewar ; where, by retrograding half a century, and bringing matters as near as possible to the period preceding civil dissension, they have advanced at least a century towards order.

Bhumia, the Allodial Proprietor.—It is stated in the historical annals of this country, that the ancient clans, prior to Sanga Rana,¹ had ceased, on the rising greatness of the subsequent new division of clans, to hold the higher grades of rank ; and had, in fact, merged into the general military landed proprietors of this country under the term '*bhumia*,' a most expressive and comprehensive name, importing absolute indentity with the soil : *bhum* meaning 'land,' and being far more expressive than the new-fangled word, unknown to Hindu India, of *Zamindar*, the 'landholder' of Mahomedan growth. These *Bhumias*, the scions of the earliest princes, are to be met with in various parts of Mewar ; though only in those of high antiquity, where they were defended from oppression by the rocks and wilds in which they obtained a footing ; as in Kumbhalmer, the wilds of Chappan, or plains of Mandalgarh, long under the kings, and where their agricultural pursuits maintained them.

Their clannish appellations, Kumbhawat, Lunawat, and Ranawat, distinctly show from what stem and when they branched off ; and as they ceased to be of sufficient importance to visit the court on the new and continually extending ramifications, they took to the plough. But while they disdained not to derive a subsistence from labouring as husbandmen, they never abandoned their arms ; and the *Bhumia*, amid the crags of the

¹Contemporary and opponent of Sultan Babur.

alpine Aravalli where he pastures his cattle or cultivates his fields, preserves the erect mien and proud spirit of his ancestors, with more tractability, and less arrogance and folly, than his more courtly but now widely separated brethren, who often make a jest of his industrious but less refined qualifications.¹ Some of these yet possess entire villages, which are subject to the payment of a small quit-rent : they also constitute a local militia, to be called in by the governor of the district, but for which service they are entitled to rations or *peti*.² These, the allodial³ tenantry of our feudal system, form a considerable body in many districts, armed with matchlock, sword, and shield. In Mandalgarh, when their own interests and the prince's unite (though the rapacity of governors, pupils of the Maratha and other predatory schools, have disgusted these independents), four thousand *Bhumias* could be collected. They held and maintained without support the important fortress of that district, during half a century of turmoil, for their prince. Mandalgarh is the largest district of Mewar, and in its three hundred and sixty towns and villages, many specimens of ancient usage may be found. The Solanki held largely here in ancient days, and the descendant of the princes of Patan still retains his *Bhum* and title of Rao.⁴

¹ Many of them taking wives from the degraded but aboriginal races in their neighbouring retreats, have begot a mixed progeny, who, in describing themselves, unite the tribes of father and mother.

² Literally, 'a belly-full.'

³ Allodial property is defined (Hallam, Vol. i, p. 144) as "land which had descended by inheritance, subject to no burthen but public defence. It passed to all the children equally ; in failure of children, to the nearest kindred." Thus it is strictly the *Miras* or *Bhum* of the Rajputs : inheritance, patrimony. In Mewar it is divisible to a certain extent ; but in Cutch, to infinity : and is liable only to local defence. The holder of *bhum* calls it his *Adyapi*, i.e. of old, by prescriptive right ; not by written deed.

Montesquieu, describing the conversion of allodial estates into fiefs, says, "These lands were held by Romans or Franks (i.e. freemen) not the king's vassals," viz. lands exterior and anterior to the monarchy. We have Rathor, Solanki, and other tribes, now holding *bhum* in various districts, whose ancestors were conquered by the Sesodias, but left in possession of small portions insufficient to cause jealousy. Some of these may be said to have converted their lands into fiefs, as the Chauhan lord of—, who served the Salumbar chief.

⁴ Amidst ruins overgrown with forest, I discovered on two tables of stone the genealogical history of this branch, which was of considerable use in elucidating that of Anhilwara, and which corresponded so well with the genealogies of a decayed bard of the family, who travelled the country for a subsistence, that I feel assured they formerly made good use of these marble records.

All this feudal militia pay a quit-rent to the crown, and perform local but limited service on the frontier garrison ; and upon invasion,¹ when the *Kher* is called out, the whole are at the disposal of the prince on furnishing rations only. They assert that they ought not to pay this quit-rent and perform service also ; but this may be doubted, since the sum is so small. To elude it, they often performed service under some powerful chief, where faction or court interest caused it to be winked at. To serve without a *patta* is the great object of ambition. *Ma ka bhum*, 'my land,' in their Doric tongue, is a favourite phrase.²

Circumstances have concurred to produce a resemblance even to the refined fiction of giving up their allodial property to have it conferred as a fief. But in candour it should be stated, that the only instances were caused by the desire of being revenged on the immediate superiors of the vassals. The Rathor chief of Dabla held of his superior, the Raja of Bancra, three considerable places included in the grant of Banera. He paid homage, an annual quit-rent, was bound to attend him personally to court, and to furnish thirty-five horse in case of an invasion. During the troubles, though perfectly equal to their performance, he was remiss in all these duties. His chief, with returning peace, desired to enforce the return to ancient customs, and his rights so long withheld ; but the Rathor had felt the sweets of entire independence, and refused to attend his summons. To the warrant he replied, "his head and Dabla were together ;" and he would neither pay the quit-rent nor attend his court. This refractory spirit was reported to the Rana ; and it ended in Dabla being added to the fisc, and the chief's holding the rest as a vassal of the Rana, but only to perform local service. There

¹ See Appendix, Nos. XVI, and XVII.

² I was intimately acquainted with, and much esteemed, many of these *Bhumia* chiefs—from my friend Paharji (the rock), Ranawat of Amargarh, to the Kumbhawat of Sesoda on the highest point, lord of the pass of the Aravalli ; and even the mountain lion, Dungar Singh, who bore amongst us, from his old raids, the familiar title of Roderic Dhu. In each situation I have had my tents filled with them ; and it was one of the greatest pleasures I ever experienced, after I had taken my leave of them, perhaps for ever, crossed the frontiers of Mewar, and encamped in the dreary pass between it and Marwar, to find that a body of them had been my guards during the night. This is one of the many pleasing recollections of the past. Fortunately for our happiness, the mind admits their preponderance over opposite feelings. I had much to do in aiding the restoration of their past condition ; leaving, I believe, as few traces of error in the mode as could be expected, where so many conflicting interests were to be reconciled.

are many other petty free proprietors on the Banera estate, holding from small portions of land to small villages ; but the service is limited and local, in order to swell the chief's miniature court. If they accompany him, he must find rations for them and their steeds.

So cherished is this tenure of *Bhum*, that the greatest chiefs are always solicitous to obtain it, even in the villages wholly dependent on their authority : a decided proof of its durability above common grants.

The various modes in which it is acquired, and the precise technicalities which distinguished its tenure, as well as the privileges attached to it, are fully developed in translations of different deeds on the subject.¹

Rajas of Banera and Shahpura.—We have also, amongst the nobility of Mewar, two who hold the independent title of prince or Raja, one of whom is by far too powerful for a subject. These are the Rajas of Banera and Shahpura, both of the blood royal. The ancestor of the first was the twin-brother of Rana Jai Singh ; the other, a Ranawat, branched off from Rana Udai Singh.

They have their grants renewed, and receive the khilat of investiture ; but they pay no relief, and are exempt from all but personal attendance at their prince's court, and the local service of the district in which their estates are situated. They have hitherto paid but little attention to their duties, but this defect arose out of the times. These lands lying most exposed to the imperial head-quarters at Ajmer, they were compelled to bend to circumstances, and the kings were glad to confer rank and honour on such near relations of the Rana's house. He bestowed on them the titles of Raja, and added to the Shahpura chief's patrimony a large estate in Ajmer, which he now holds direct of the British Government, on payment of an annual tribute.

Form and Substance of Grant.—To give a proper idea of the variety of items forming these chartularies, I append several² which exhibit the rights, privileges, and honours, as well as the sources of income, while they also record the terms on which they are granted. Many royalties have been alienated in modern times by the thoughtless prodigality of the princes ; even the grand mark of vassalage, the fine of relief, has been forgiven to one or two individuals ; portions of transit duties, tolls on ferries, and other

¹ See Appendix.

² See Appendix, Nos. IV, V, VI.

seignorial rights ; coining copper currency ; exactions of every kind, from the levy of toll for night protection of merchandize and for the repairs of fortifications, to the share of the depredations of the common robber, will sufficiently shew the demoralization of the country.

Division of Pattas, or Sub-infeudation.—Many years ago, when the similarity of the systems first struck my attention, I took one of the grants or *pattas* of a great vassal of Jaipur, and dissected it in all its minutia, with the aid of a very competent authority who had resided as one of the managers of the chief. This document, in which the sub-division of the whole clan is detailed, materially aided me in developing the system.

The court and the household economy of a great chieftain is a miniature representation of the sovereign's : the same officers, from the *pradhan*, or minister, to the cup-bearer (*paniyari*) as well as the same domestic arrangements. He must have his *shish-mahal*,¹ his *bari-mahal*,² and his *mandir*,³ like his prince. He enters the *dari-sala*, or carpet hall, the minstrel⁴ preceding him rehearsing the praises of his family ; and he takes his seat on his throne, while the assembled retainers, marshalled in lines on the right and left, simultaneously exclaim, "Health to our chief !" which salutation he returns by bowing to all as he passes them. When he is seated, at a given signal they all follow the example, and shield rattles against shield as they wedge into their places.

We have neither the kiss nor individual oaths of fidelity administered. It is sufficient, when a chief succeeds to his patrimony, that his '*an*'⁵ is proclaimed within his *sim* or boundary. Allegiance is as hereditary as the land : "I am your child ; my head and sword are yours, my service is at your command." It is a rare thing for a Rajput to betray his Thakur, while the instances of self-devotion for him are innumerable : many will be seen interspersed in these papers. Base desertion, to their honour be it said, is little known, and known only to be execrated. Fidelity to the chief, "*Swami Dharma*," is the climax of all the virtues. The Rajput is taught from his infancy, in the song of

¹ Mirror apartments.

² Gardens on the terrace within the palace.

³ Private temple of worship.

⁴ Dholi.

⁵ *An* is the oath of allegiance. Three things in Mewar are royalties a subject cannot meddle with : 1. *An*, or oath of allegiance ; 2. *Dan*, or transit dues on commerce ; 3. *Kan*, or mines of the precious metals.

the bard, to regard it as the source of honour here, and of happiness hereafter. The poet Chand abounds with episodes on the duty and beauty of fidelity ; nor does it require a very fervid imagination to picture the affections which such a life is calculated to promote, when the chief is possessed of the qualities to call them forth. . At the chase his vassals attend him : in the covert of the forest, the ground their social board, they eat their repast together, from the venison or wild boar furnished by the sport of the day ; nor is the cup neglected. They are familiarly admitted at all times to his presence, and accompany him to the court of their mutual sovereign. In short, they are inseparable.¹

Their having retained so much of their ancient manners and customs, during centuries of misery and oppression, is the best evidence that those customs were rivetted to their very souls. The Rajput of character is a being of the most acute sensibility ; where honour is concerned, the most trivial omission is often ignorantly construed into an affront.

In all the large estates, the chief must provide for his sons or brothers, according to his means and the number of immediate descendants. In an estate of sixty to eighty thousand rupees of annual rent, the second brother might have a village of three to five thousand of rent. This is his patrimony (*bapota*) : he besides pushes his fortune at the court of his sovereign or abroad. Juniors share in proportion. These again subdivide, and have their little circle of dependents. Each new family is known by the name of the founder conjoined to that of his father and tribe : *Man Meghsinghot Saktawat* ; that is, 'Man, family of Megh, tribe Saktawat.' The sub-divisions descend to the lowest denomination.

Charsa.—*Charsa*, a 'hide of land,' or about sufficient to furnish an equipped cavalier. It is a singular coincidence, that the term for the lowest sub-division of land for military service should be the same amongst the Rajputs as in the English system. Besides being similar in name, it nearly corresponds in actual quantity. From the beginning of the Anglo-Saxon government the land was divided into hides, each comprehending what could be cultivated

¹ I rather describe what they were, than what they are. Contentions and poverty have weakened their sympathies and affections ; but the mind of philanthropy must hope that they will again become what they have been.

by a single plough.¹ Four hides constituted one knight's fee,² which is stated to be about forty acres. The *Charsa* may have from twenty-five to thirty bighas; which are equal to about ten acres,—the Saxon hide.

For what these minor vassals held to be their rights on the great *pattawats*, the reader is again referred to the letter of protest of the inferior *pattawats* of the Deogarh estate—it may aid his judgment; and it is curious to observe how nearly the subject of their prayer to the sovereign corresponded with the edict of Conrad of Italy,³ in the year 1037, which originated in disagreements between the great lords and their vassals on the subject of sub-infeudations.

The extent to which the sub-division before-mentioned is carried in some of the Rajput States, is ruinous to the protection and general welfare of the country. It is pursued in some parts till there is actually nothing left sufficiently large to share, or to furnish subsistence for one individual: consequently a great deprivation of services to the State ensues. But this does not prevail so much in the larger principalities as in the isolated tributary Thakurats or lordships scattered over the country; as amongst the Jarejas of Cutch, the tribes in Kathiawar, and the small independencies of Gujarat bordering on the greater western Rajput States. This error in policy requires to be checked by supreme authority, as it was in England by *Magna Carta*,⁴ when the barons of those days took such precautions to secure their own seigniorial rights.

The system in these countries of minute sub-division of fiefs is termed *bhavyad*,⁵ or brotherhood, synonymous to the tenure by frerage of France, but styled only an approximation to sub-infeudation.⁶ "Give me my *bat* (share)," says the Rajput, when

¹ Millar's *Historical View of the English Government*, p. 85.

² Hume. *Hist. of England*, Appendix 2d, Vol. ii. p. 291.

³ "1. That no man should be deprived of his fief, whether held of the emperor or mesne lord, but by the laws of the empire and judgment of his peers.—2. That from such judgment the vassal might appeal to his sovereign.—3. That fiefs should be inherited by sons and their children, or in their failure by brothers, provided they were *feuda paterna*, such as had descended from the father.—4. That the lord should not alienate the fief of his vassal without his consent."

⁴ By the revised statute "*Quia emptores*," of Edw. I., which forbids it in excess, under penalty of forfeiture.—Hallam, Vol. I, p. 184.

⁵ *Bhavyad*, 'frerage.'

⁶ Hallam, Vol. i, p. 186.

he attains to man's estate, 'the *bat* of the *bhayyad*,' the portion of the frerage; and thus they go on clipping and paring till all are impoverished. The 'customs' of France¹ preserved the dignities of families and the indivisibility of a feudal homage, without exposing the younger sons of a gentleman to beggary and dependence. It would be a great national benefit if some means could be found to limit this sub-division, but it is an evil difficult of remedy. The divisibility of the Cutch and Kathiawar frerage, carried to the most destructive extent, is productive of litigation, crime, and misery. Where it has proper limits it is useful; but though the idea of each rood supporting its man is very poetical, it does not and cannot answer in practice. Its limit in Mewar we would not undertake to assert, but the vassals are careful not to let it become too small; they send the extra numbers to seek their fortunes abroad. In this custom, and the difficulty of finding *dæjas*, or dowers, for their daughters, we have the two chief causes of infanticide amongst the Rajputs, which horrible practice was not always confined to the female.

The author of the Middle Ages exemplifies ingeniously the advantages of sub-infeudation, by the instance of two persons holding one knight's fee; and as the lord was entitled to the service of one for forty days, he could commute it for the joint service of the two for twenty days each. He even erects as a maxim on it, that "whatever opposition was made to the rights of sub-infeudation or frerage, would indicate decay in the military character, the living principle of feudal tenure;"² which remark may be just where proper limitation exists, before it reaches that extent when the impoverished vassal would descend to mend his shoes instead of his shield. Primogeniture is the corner-stone of feudality, but this unrestricted sub-infeudation would soon destroy it.³ It is strong in these States; its rights were first introduced by the Normans from Scandinavia. But more will appear on this subject and its technicalities, in the personal narrative of the author.

¹ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 186.

² Hallam, Vol. i, p. 186.

³ A quotation from *Dict. de l' Ancien Regime* omitted.

CHAPTER IV.

Rakhwali—Servitude—Busai—Gola and Das—Private Feuds and Composition—Rajput Pradhans or Premiers.

Rakhwali—I now proceed to another point of striking resemblance between the system of the east and west, arising from the same causes—the unsettled state of society, and the deficiency of paramount protection. It is here called *rakhwali*,¹ or ‘preservation’; the *salvamenta* of Europe.² To a certain degree it always existed in these States; but the interminable predatory warfare of the last half century increased it to so frightful an extent, that superior authority was required to redeem the abuses it had occasioned. It originated in the necessity of protection; and the modes of obtaining it, as well as the compensation when obtained, were various. It often consisted of money or kind on the reaping of each harvest; sometimes in a multiplicity of petty privileges and advantages, but the chief object was to obtain *bhum*: and here we have one solution of the constituted *bhumia*,³ assimilating, as observed, to the allodial proprietor. *Bhum* thus obtained is irrevocable; and in the eager anxiety for its acquisition, we have another decided proof of every other kind of tenure being deemed resumable by the crown.

It was not unfrequent that application for protection was made to the nearest chief by the tenants of the fisc; a course eventually sanctioned by the Government, which could not refuse assent where it could not protect. Here then, we revert to first principles: and ‘seigniorial rights’ may be forfeited when they cease to yield that which ought to have originated them, *viz.* benefit to the community. Personal service at stated periods, to aid in the agricultural⁴ economy of the protector, was sometimes stipulated, when the husbandmen were to find implements and cattle,⁵ and

¹ See Appendix, Nos. VII, VIII, and IX.

² This is the ‘*sauvement ou vingtain*’ of the French system: there it ceased with the cause.

* A quotation from *Dict. de l’Ancien Regime* omitted.

³ The chief might lose his *patta* lands, and he would then dwindle down into the *bhumia* proprietor, which title only lawless force could take from him. See Appendix, No. IX.

⁴ See Appendix, No. X, Art. 2d.

⁵ This species would come under the distinct term of *Hydages due* by

to attend whenever ordered. The protected calls the chief 'patron'; and the condition may not unaptly be compared to that of personal commendation,¹ like *salvamenta*, founded on the disturbed state of society. But what originated thus, was often continued and multiplied by avarice and the spirit of rapine, which disgraced the Rajput of the last half century, though he had abundance of apologies for 'scouring the country.' But all *salvamenta* and other marks of vassalage, obtained during these times of desolation, were annulled in the settlement which took place between the Rana and his chiefs, in A. D. 1818.²

But the crown itself, by some singular proceeding, possesses, or did possess, according to the *Patta Bahi* or Book of Grants, considerable *salvamenta* right, especially in the districts between the new and ancient capitals, in sums of from twenty to one hundred rupees in separate villages.

To such an extent has this *rakhwali*³ been carried when protection was desired, that whole communities have ventured

soccage vassals, who in return for protection supplied carriages and work.—Hume, Vol. II, p. 308.

¹ Hallam, Vol. i, p. 169.

² In indulging my curiosity on this subject, I collected some hundred engagements, and many of a most singular nature. We see the chieftain stipulating for fees on marriages; for a dish of the good fare at the wedding feast, which he transfers to a relation of his district if unable to attend himself; portions of fuel and provender; and even wherewithal to fill the wassail cup in his days of merriment. The Rajput's religious notions are not of so strict a character as to prevent his even exacting his *rakhwali* dues from the church lands, and the threat of slaughtering the sacred flock of our Indian Apollo has been resorted to, to compel payment when withheld. Nay, by the chiefs it was imposed on things locomotive: on caravans, or Tandas of merchandize, wherever they halted for the day, *rakhwali* was demanded. Each petty chief through whose district or patch of territory they travelled, made a demand, till commerce was dreadfully shackled; but it was the only way in which it could be secured. It was astonishing how commerce was carried on at all; yet did the cloths of Dacca and the shawls of Kashmir pass through all such restraints, and were never more in request. Where there is demand no danger will deter enterprize; and commerce flourished more when these predatory armies were rolling like waves over the land, than during the succeeding halcyon days of pacification.

³ The methods by which the country is brought under this tax is as follows:—"When the people are almost ruined by continual robberies and plunders, the leader of the band of thieves, or some friend of his, proposes that, for a sum of money annually paid, he will keep a number of men in arms to protect such a tract of ground, or as many parishes as submit to the contribution. When the terms are agreed upon he ceases to steal, and thereby the contributors are safe: if any one refuse to pay, he is immediately plundered. To colour all this villainy, those concerned in

their liberty, and become, if not slaves, yet nearly approaching the condition of slaves, to the protector. But no common visitation ever leads to an evil of this magnitude. I mention the fact merely to show that it does exist ; and we may infer that the chief, who has become the arbiter of the lives and fortunes of his followers, must have obtained this power by devoting all to their protection. The term thus originated, and probably now (with many others) written for the first time in English letters in this sense, is *Basai*.

Basai—Slavery is to be found in successive stages of society of Europe ; but we have no parallel in Rajwara (at least in name) to the agricultural serfs and *villeins* of Europe ; nor is there any intermediate term denoting a species of slavery between the *Gola*¹ of the Hindu chief's household and the free Rajput, but the singular one of *basai*, which must be explained, since it cannot be translated. This class approximates closely to the *tributarii* and *coloni*, perhaps to the *servi*, of the Salic Franks, "who were cultivators of the earth, and subject to residence upon their master's estate, though not destitute of property or civil right."² Precisely the condition of the cultivator in Haravati, who now tills for a task-master the fields he formerly owned, degraded to the name of *hali*,³ a ploughman.

"When small proprietors," says Hallam, "lost their lands by mere rapine, we may believe their liberty was hardly less endangered." The *hali* of Haravati knows the bitter truth of this inference, which applies to the subject immediately before us, the *basai*. The portion of liberty the latter has parted with, was not originally lost through compulsion on the part of the protector, but from external violence, which made this desperate remedy necessary. Very different from the *hali* of Kotah, who is servile though without the title—a serf in condition but without the patrimony ; compelled to labour for subsistence on the land he once owned ; chained to it by the double tie of debt and strict police ;

the robberies pay the tax with the rest ; and all the neighbourhood must comply or be undone. This is the case (among others) with the whole low country of the shire of Ross."—Extract from Lord Lovat's Memorial to George I. on the state of the Highlands of Scotland, in A.D. 1724.

¹ In Persian *ghulam*, literally 'slave ;' evidently a word of the same origin with the Hindu *gola*.

* Crooke says : "The words have no connection." (Vol. I, p. 206).

² Hallam, Vol. I, p. 217.

³ From *hal*, 'a plough'. *Syl* is 'a plough' in Saxon. (Turner's *Anglo-Saxons*.) The *h* and *s* are permutable throughout Rajwara. In Marwar, *Salim Singh* is pronounced *Halim Hing*.

and if flight were practicable, the impossibility of bettering his condition from the anarchy around would render it unavailing. This is not the practice under the patriarchal native Government, which, with all its faults, retains the old links of society, with its redeeming sympathies; but springs from a *maire du palais*, who pursued an unfeeling and mistaken policy towards this class of society till of late years. Mistaken ambition was the origin of the evil; he saw his error, and remedied it in time to prevent further mischief to the State. This octogenarian ruler, Zalim Singh of Kotah, is too much of a philosopher and politician to let passion overcome his interests and reputation; and we owe to the greatest despot a State ever had, the only regular charter which at present exists in Rajasthan, investing a corporate body with the election of their own magistrates and the making of their own laws, subject only to confirmation; with all the privileges which marked in the outset the foundation of the free cities of Europe and that of boroughs in England.

It is true that, in detached documents, we see the spirit of these institutions existing in Mewar, and it is as much a matter of speculation, whether this wise ruler promulgated this novelty as a trap for good opinions, or from policy and foresight alone: aware, when all around him was improving, from the shackles of restraint being cast aside, that his retention of them must be hurtful to himself. Liberality in this exigence answered the previous purpose of extortion. His system, even then, was good by comparison: all around was rapine, save in the little oasis kept verdant by his skill, where he permitted no other oppression than his own.

This charter is appended¹ as a curiosity in legislation, being given thirty years ago. Another, for the agriculturalists' protection, was set up in A. D. 1821. No human being prompted either; though the latter is modelled from the proceedings in Mewar, and may have been intended, as before observed, to entrap applause.

In every district of Haravati the stone was raised to record this ordinance.

Gola—Das—(Slaves).—Famine in these regions is the great cause of loss of liberty: thousands were sold in the last great famine. The predatory system of the Pindaris and mountain

¹ See Appendix, No. XI.

tribes aided to keep it up. Here, as amongst the Franks, freedom is derived through the mother. The offspring of a *goli*¹ or *dasi* must be a slave. Hence the great number of *golas* in Rajput families, whose illegitimate offspring are still adorned in Mewar, as our Saxon slaves were of old, with a silver ring round the left ankle, instead of the neck. They are well treated, and are often amongst the best of the military retainers;² but are generally esteemed in proportion to the quality of the mother, whether Rajputni, Moslem, or of the degraded tribes; they hold confidential places about the chiefs of whose blood they are. The great-grandfather of the late chief of Deogarh used to appear at court with three hundred *golas*³ on horseback in his train, the sons of Rajputs, each with a gold ring round his ankle: men whose lives were his own. This chief could then head two thousand retainers, his own vassals.⁴

Tacitus describes the baneful effects of gambling amongst the German tribes, as involving personal liberty; their becoming slaves, and being subsequently sold by the winner. The Rajput's passion for gaming, as remarked in the history of the tribes, is strong; and we can revert to periods long anterior to Tacitus, and perhaps before the woods of Germany were peopled with the worshippers of Tuisto, for the antiquity of this vice amongst the Rajput warriors, presenting a highly interesting picture of its pernicious effects. Yudhishthira having staked and lost the throne of India to Duryodhana, to recover it hazarded the beautiful and virtuous Draupadi. By the loaded dice of his foe she became the *goli* of the Kaurava, who, triumphing in his pride, would have unveiled her in public; but the deity presiding over female modesty preserved her from the rude gaze of the assembled host; the miraculous scarf lengthened as he withdrew it, till tired, he desisted at the instance of superior interposition. Yudhishthira, not satisfied with this, staked twelve years of his personal liberty, and became an exile from the haunts of Kalindi, a wanderer in the wilds skirting the distant ocean.

¹ Female slave.

² See Appendix, No. XIX.

³ The reader of Dow's translation of Ferishta may recollect that when Qutb-ud-din was left the viceroy of the conqueror, he is made to say, "he placed one *Gola* upon the throne of Ajmer;" mistaking this appellation of the natural brother of the last Hindu sovereign for a proper name. He is mentioned by the bard Chand in his exploits of Prithviraja.

⁴ I have often received the most confidential messages, from chiefs of the highest rank, through these channels.

The illegitimate sons of the Rana are called *das*, literally 'slave': they have no rank, though they are liberally provided for. *Basai* signifies 'acquired slavery'; in contradistinction to *gola*, 'an hereditary slave.' The *gola* can only marry a *goli*: the lowest Rajput would refuse his daughter to a son of the Rana of this kind. The *basai* can redeem¹ his liberty: the *gola* has no wish to do so, because he could not improve his condition nor overcome his natural defects. To the *basai* nothing dishonourable attaches: the class retain their employments and caste, and are confined to no occupation, but it must be exercised with the chief's sanction. Individuals reclaimed from captivity, in gratitude have given up their liberty: communities, when this or greater evils threatened, have done the same for protection of their lives, religion, and honour. Instances exist of the population of towns being in this situation. The greater part of the inhabitants of the estate of Bijolli are the *basai* of its chief, who is of the Paramara tribe: they are his subjects; the Rana, the paramount lord, has no sort of authority over them. Twelve generations have elapsed since his ancestor conducted this little colony into Mewar, and received the highest honours and a large estate on the plateau of its border, in a most interesting country.²

The only badge denoting the *basai* is a small tuft of hair on the crown of the head. The term interpreted has nothing harsh in it, meaning 'occupant, dweller, or settler.' The numerous towns in India called *Basai* have this origin: chiefs abandoning their ancient haunts, and settling³ with all their retainers and chattels in new abodes. From this, the town of Basai near Tonk (Rampura) derived its name, when the Solanki prince was compelled to abandon his patrimonial lands in Gujarat; his subjects of all classes accompanying him voluntarily, in preference to submitting to foreign rule. Probably the foundation of Bijolli was similar; though only the name of Basai now attaches to the inhabitants. It is not uncommon, in the overflowing of gratitude,

¹ The *das* or 'slave' may hold a fief in Rajasthan, but he never can rise above the condition in which this defect of birth has placed him.

* A quotation from *Dict. de l'ancien Regime* omitted.

² I could but indistinctly learn whether this migration, and the species of paternity here existing, arose from rescuing them from Tatar invaders or from the calamity of famine.

³ *Basna*, 'to settle.'

⁴ I had the happiness to be the means of releasing from captivity some young chiefs, who had been languishing in Maratha fetters as hostages

Private Feuds,—Composition.—In a state of society such as these sketches delineate where all depends on the personal character of the sovereign, the field for the indulgence of the passions, and especially of that most incident to the uncontrollable habits of such races—revenge—must necessarily be great. Private feuds have tended, with the general distraction of the times, to desolate this country. Some account of their mode of prosecution, and the incidents thence arising, cannot fail to throw additional light on the manners of society, which during the last half century were fast receding to a worse than semi-barbarous condition, and, aided by other powerful causes, might have ended in entire annihilation. The period was rapidly advancing, when this fair region of Mewar, the garden of Rajasthan, would have reverted to its primitive sterility. The tiger and the wild boar had already become inmates of the capital, and the bats flitted undisturbed in the palaces of her princes. The ante-courts, where the chieftains and their followers assembled to grace their prince's cavalcade, were over-grown with dank shrubs and grass, through which a mere footpath conducted the 'descendant of a hundred kings' to the ruins of his capital.

In these principalities the influence of revenge is universal. Not to prosecute a feud is tantamount to an acknowledgment of self-degradation; and, as in all countries where the laws are insufficient to control individual actions or redress injuries, they have few scruples as to the mode of its gratification. Hence feuds are entailed with the estates from generation to generation. To sheathe the sword till 'a feud is balanced' (their own idiomatic expression), would be a blot never to be effaced from the escutcheon.

In the Hindu word which designates a feud we have another of those striking coincidences in terms to which allusion has already been made: *vair* is 'a feud,' *vairi*, 'a foe.' The Saxon term for the composition of a feud, *wergild*, is familiar to every

for the payment of a war contribution. One of them, a younger brother of the Purawat division, had a mother dying to see him; but though he might have taken her house in the way, a strong feeling of honour and gratitude made him forego this anxious visit: "I am your Rajput, your *gola*, your *basai*." He was soon sent off to his mother. Such little acts, mingling with public duty, are a compensation for the many drawbacks of solitude, gloom, and vexation, attending such situations. They are no sinecures or beds of roses—ease, comfort, and health, being all subordinate considerations.

man. In some of these States the initial vowel is hard, and pronounced *bair*. In Rajasthan, *bair* is more common than *vair*, but throughout the south-west *vair* only is used. In these we have the original Saxon word *war*,¹ the French *guer*. The Rajput *wergild* is land or a daughter to wife. In points of honour the Rajput is centuries in advance of our Saxon forefathers, who had a legislative remedy for every bodily injury, when each finger and toe had its price.² This might do very well when the injury was committed on a hind, but the Rajput must have blood for blood. The monarch must be powerful who can compel acceptance of the compensation, or *mund-kuti*.³

The prosecution of a feud is only to be stopped by a process which is next to impracticable; namely, by the party injured volunteering forgiveness, or the aggressor throwing himself as a suppliant unawares on the clemency of his foe within his own domains: a most trying situation for each to be placed in, yet not unexampled, and revenge in such a case would entail infamy. It was reserved for these degenerate days to produce such an instance.⁴

Avowal of error and demand of forgiveness, with the offer of a daughter in marriage, often stop the progress of a feud, and might answer better than appearing as a suppliant, which requires great delicacy of contrivance.⁵

¹ Gilbert on *Tenures*, art. 'Warranty,' p. 169.

² "The great toe took rank as it should be, and held to double the sum of the others, for which ten scillinga was the value without the nail, which was thirty scealta to boot."—Turner's *Anglo-Saxons*, Vol. II, p. 133.

³ Appendix, No. XVIII. The laws of composition were carried to a much greater extent amongst the Hindu nations than even amongst those of the Anglo-Saxons, who might have found in Manu all that was ever written on the subject, from the killing of a Brahmin by design to the accidental murder of a dog. The Brahmin is four times the value of the soldier, eight of the merchant, and sixteen times of the Sudra. "If a Brahmin kill one of the soldier caste (without malice), a bull and one thousand cows is the fine of expiation. If he slays a merchant, a bull and one hundred cows is the fine. If a Sudra or lowest class, ten white cows and a bull to the priest is the expiation." Manu legislated also for the protection of the brute creation, and if the priest by chance kills a cat, a frog, a dog, a lizard, an owl, or a crow, he must drink nothing but milk for three days and nights, or walk four miles in the night.—*Vide Institutes of Manu*, edited by that able orientalist, Professor Houghton.

⁴ The story of the Amargarh-Shahpura feud (with the relevant foot-notes) omitted. See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 212-214.

⁵ The Bundi feud with the Rana is still unappeased, since the predecessor of the former slew the Rana's father. It was an indefensible act, and the Bundi prince was most desirous to terminate it. He had no daughter

Border¹ disputes are most prolific in the production of feuds, and the Rajput lord-marchers have them entailed on them as their estates.

The border chiefs of Jaisalmer and Bikaner carry this to such extent, that it often involves both States in hostilities. The *vair* and its composition in Mandalgarh² will, however, suffice for the present to exemplify these things.

Rajput Pradhans or Premiers.—It would not be difficult, amongst the *Majores Domus Regiae* of these principalities, to find parallels to the *Maires du Palais* of France. Imbecility in the chief, whether in the east or west, must have the same consequences; and more than one State in India will present us with the joint appearance of the phantom and the substance of royalty. The details of personal attendance at court will be found elsewhere. When not absent on frontier duties, or by permission at their estates, the chiefs resided with their families at the capital; but a succession of attendants was always secured, to keep up its splendour and perform personal service at the palace. In Mewar, the privileges and exemptions of the higher class are such, as to exhibit few of the marks of vassalage observable at other courts. Here it is only on occasion of particular festivals and solemnities that they ever join the prince's cavalcade, or attend at court. If full attendance is required, on the reception of ambassadors, or in discussing matters of general policy, when they have a right to hear and advise as the hereditary council (*panchayat*) of the State, they are summoned by an officer, with the prince's *juhar*,³ and his request. On grand festivals the great *nagaras*, or kettle-drums, beat at three stated times; the third is the signal for the chief to quit his abode and mount his steed. Amidst all these privileges, when it were almost difficult to distinguish between the prince and his great chiefs, there are occasions well understood

to offer, and hinted a desire to accompany me *incog.* and thus gain admission to the presence of the Rana. The benevolence and generosity of this prince would have insured him success; but it was a delicate matter, and I feared some exposure from any arrogant hot-headed Rajput ere the scene could have been got up. The Raja Bishan Singh of Bundi is since dead; a brave and frank Rajput; he has left few worthier behind. His son, yet a minor, promises well. The protective alliance, which is to turn their swords into ploughshares, will prevent their becoming foes; but they will remain sulky border-neighbours, to the fostering of disputes and the disquiet of the merchant and cultivator.

¹ Sim—Kankar.

² See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 212-213.

³ A salutation, only sent by a superior to an inferior.

by both, which render the superiority of the former apparent : one occurs in the formalities observed on a lapse ; another, when at court in personal service, the chief once a week mounts guard at the palace with his clan. On these occasions the vast distance between them is seen. When the chief arrives in the grand court of the palace with his retainers, he halts under the balcony till intimation is given to the prince, who from thence receives his obeisance and duty. This over, he retires to the great *darikhana*, or hall of audience, appropriated for these ceremonies, where carpets are spread for him and his retainers. At meals the prince sends his compliments, requesting the chief's attendance at the *rasora*¹ or 'feasting hall,' where with other favoured chiefs he partakes of dinner with the prince. He sleeps in the hall of audience, and next morning with the same formalities takes his leave. Again, in the summons to the presence from their estates, instant obedience is requisite. But in this, attention to their rank is studiously shewn by *ruqa*, written by the private secretary, with the sign-manual of the prince attached, and sealed with the private finger-ring. For the inferior grades, the usual seal of State entrusted to the minister is used.

But these are general duties. In all these States some great court favourite, from his talents, character, or intrigue, holds the office of Premier. His duties are proportioned to his wishes, or the extent of his talents and ambition ; but he does not interfere with the civil administration, which has its proper minister. They, however, act together. The Rajput Premier is the military minister, with the political government of the fiefs ; the civil minister is never of this caste. Local customs have given various appellations to this officer. At Udaipur he is called *bhanjgarh* ; at Jodhpur, *pradhan* ; at Jaipur (where they have engrafted the term used at the court of Delhi) *musahib* ; at Kotah, *kiladar*, and *dewan* or regent. He becomes a most important personage, as dispenser of the favours of the sovereign. Through him chiefly all requests are preferred, this being the surest channel to success. His influence, necessarily, gives him unbounded authority over the military classes, with unlimited power over the inferior officers of the State. With a powerful body of retainers always at his

¹ The kitchen is large enough for a fortress, and contains large eating halls. Food for seven hundred of the prince's court is daily dressed. This is not for any of the personal servants of the prince, or female establishments ; all these are separate.

command, it is surprising we have not more frequently our 'mayors of Burgundy and Dagoberts,'¹ our 'Martels and Pepins,' in Rajasthan.

We have our hereditary Rajput Premiers in several of these States : but in all, the laws of succession are so regulated, that they could not usurp the throne of their prince, though they might his functions.

When the treaty was formed between Mewar and the British Government, the ambassadors wished to introduce an article of guarantee of the office of *Pradhan* to the family of the chief noble of the country, the Rawat of Salumbar. The fact was, as stated, that the dignity was hereditary in this family ; but though the acquisition was the result of an act of virtue, it had tended much towards the ruin of the country, and to the same cause are to be traced all its rebellions.

The ambassador was one of the elders of the same clan, being the grand uncle of the hereditary *Pradhan*. He had taken a most active share in the political events of the last thirty years, and had often controlled the councils of his prince during this period, and actually held the post of Premier himself when stipulating for his minor relative. With the ascendancy he exercised over the prince, it may be inferred that he had no intention of renouncing it during his life-time ; and as he was educating his adopted heir to all his notions of authority, and initiating him in the intrigues of office, the guaranteed dignity in the head of his family would have become a nonentity,² and the Ranas would have been governed by the deputies of their mayors. From both those evils the times have relieved the prince. The crimes of Ajit had made

*¹ The story of Dagobert and his successors omitted.

² So many sudden deaths had occurred in this family, that the branch in question (Ajit Singh's) were strongly suspected of 'heaping these mortal murders on their crown', to push their elders from their seats. The father of Padma, the present chief, is said to have been taken off by poison ; and Pahar Singh, one generation anterior, returning grievously wounded from the battle of Ujjain, in which the southrons first swept Mewar, was not permitted to recover. The mother of the present young chief of the Jhala tribe of the house of Gogunda, in the west, was afraid to trust him from her sight. She is a woman of great strength of mind and excellent character, but too indulgent to an only son. He is a fine bold youth, and, though impatient of control, may be managed. On horseback with his lance, in chase of the wild boar, a more resolute cavalier could not be seen. His mother, when he left the estate alone for court, which he seldom did without her accompanying him, never failed to send me a long letter, beseeching me to guard the welfare of her son. My house was his great resort ; he delighted to pull over my books, or go fishing or riding with me.

his dismissal from office a point of justice, but imbecility and folly will never be without 'mayors.'

When a Rana of Udaipur leaves the capital, the Salumbar chief is invested with the government of the city and charge of the palace during his absence. By his hands the sovereign is girt with the sword, and from him he receives the mark of inauguration on his accession to the throne. He leads, by right, the van in battle ; and in case of the siege of the capital, his post is the *suraj-pol*,¹ and the fortress which crowns it, in which this family had a handsome palace, which is now going fast to decay.

It was the predecessor of the present chief of Salumbar who set up a pretender and the standard of rebellion ; but when foreign aid was brought in, he returned to his allegiance and the defence of the capital. Similar sentiments have often been awakened in patriotic breasts, when roused by the interference of foreigners in their internal disputes. The evil entailed on the State by these hereditary offices will appear in its annals.

In Marwar the dignity is hereditary in the house of Awa ; but the last brave chief who held it became the victim of a revengeful and capricious sovereign,² who was jealous of his exploits ; and dying, he bequeathed a curse to his posterity who should again accept the office. It was accordingly transferred to the next in dignity, the house of Asop. The present chief, wisely distrusting the prince whose reign has been a series of turmoils, has kept aloof from court. When the office was jointly held by the chiefs of Nimaj and Pokaran, the tragic end of the former afforded a fine specimen of the prowess and heroism of the Rathor Rajput. In truth, these *Pradhans* of Marwar have always been mill-stones round the necks of their princes ; an evil interwoven in their system when the partition of estates took place amidst the sons of Jodha in the infancy of this State. It was, no doubt, then deemed politic to unite to the interests of the crown so powerful a branch, which when combined could always control the rest ; but this gave too much equality.

Deo Singh, the great-grandfather of the Pokaran chief alluded to, used to sleep in the great hall of the palace with five hundred of his clan around him. "The throne of Marwar is in the sheath

¹ *Surya*, 'sun ;' and *pol*, 'gate.' *Poliya*, a porter.

² "The *cur* can bite," the reply of this chief, either personally, or to the person who reported that his sovereign so designated him; was never forgiven.

of my dagger," was the repeated boast of this arrogant chieftain. It may be anticipated that either he or his sovereign would die a violent death. The lord of Pokaran was entrapped, and instant death commanded; yet with the sword suspended over his head, his undaunted spirit was the same as when seated in the hall, and surrounded by his vassals. "Where, traitor, is now the sheath that holds the fortunes of Marwar?" said the prince. The taunt recoiled with bitterness when he loftily replied, "With my son at Pokaran I have left it." No time was given for further insult; his head rolled at the steps of the palace; but the dagger of Pokaran still haunts the imaginations of these princes, and many attempts have been made to get possessed of their stronghold on the edge of the desert.¹ The narrow escape of the present chief will be related hereafter, with the sacrifice of his friend and co-adjutor, the chief of Nimaj.²

In Kotah and Jaisalmer the power of the ministers is supreme. We might describe their situation in the words of Montesquieu. "The Pepins kept their princes in a state of imprisonment in the palace, shewing them once a year to the people. On this occasion they made such ordinances as were directed by the mayor; they also answered ambassadors, but the mayor framed the answer."³

Like those of the Merovingian race, these puppets of royalty in the east are brought forth to the *Champ de Mars* once a year, at the grand military festival, the Dasahra. On this day, presents provided by the minister are distributed by the prince. Allowances for every branch of expenditure are fixed, nor has the prince the power to exceed them. But at Kotah there is nothing parsimonious, though nothing superfluous. On the festival of the birth of Krishna, and other similar feasts, the prince likewise appears abroad, attended by all the insignia of royalty. Elephants with standards precede; lines of infantry and guns are drawn up; while a numerous cavalcade surrounds his person. The son of the minister⁴ sometimes condescends to accompany his prince on horseback; nor is there anything wanting to magnificence, but the power to control or alter any part of it. This failing, how humiliating to a proud mind, acquainted with the history of his ancestors and imbued with a portion of their spirit, to be thus

¹ His son, Sabal Singh, followed in his footsteps, till an accidental cannonshot relieved the terrors of the prince.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 818-820.

³ *L'Esprit des Loix*, Chap. VI, liv. 31.

⁴ Zalim Singh.

muzzled, enchained, and rendered a mere pageant of State! This chain would have been snapped, but that each link has become adamantine from the ties this ruler has formed with the British Government. He has well merited our protection; though we never contemplated to what extent the maintenance of these ties would involve our own character. But this subject is connected with the history of an individual who yields to none of the many extraordinary men whom India has produced, and who required but a larger theatre to have drawn the attention of the world. His character will be further elucidated in the Annals of Haravati.

CHAPTER V

Adoption.—Reflections upon the subjects treated.

Adoption.—The hereditary principle, which perpetuates in these estates their virtues and their vices, is also the grand preservative of their political existence and national manners: it is an imperishable principle, which resists time and innovation: it is this which made the laws of the Medes and Persians, as well as those of the Rajputs, unalterable. A chief of Mewar, like his sovereign, never dies: he disappears to be regenerated. "*Le roi est mort, vive le roi!*" is a phrase, the precise virtue of which is there well understood. Neither the crown nor the greater fiefs are ever without heirs. Adoption is the preservative of honours and titles; the great fiefs of Rajasthan can never become extinct. But, however valuable this privilege, which the law of custom has made a right, it is often carried to the most hurtful and foolish extent. They have allowed the limit which defined it to be effaced, and each family, of course, maintains a custom, so soothing to vanity, as the prospect of having their names revived in their descendants. This has resulted from the weakness of the prince and the misery of the times. Lands were bestowed liberally which yielded nothing to their master, who, in securing a nominal obedience and servitude, had as much as the times made them worth when given; but with returning prosperity and old customs, these great errors have become too visible. Adoptions are often made during the life of the incumbent when without prospect of issue. The chief and, his wife first agitate the subject

in private ; it is then confided to the little council of the fief, and when propinquity and merit unite, they at once petition the prince to confirm their wishes, which are generally acceded to. So many interests are to be consulted on this occasion, that the blind partiality of the chief to any particular object is always counterpoised by the elders of the clan, who must have a pride in seeing a proper Thakur¹ at their head, and who prefer the nearest of kin, to prevent the disputes which would be attendant on neglect in this point.

On sudden lapses, the wife is allowed the privilege, in conjunction with those interested in the fief, of nomination, though the case is seldom left unprovided for : there is always a presumptive heir to the smallest sub-infeudation of these estates. The wife of the deceased is the guardian of the minority of the adopted.

The chief of Deogarh, one of the sixteen Omras² of Mewar, died without issue. On his death-bed he recommended to his wife and chiefs Nahar Singh for their adoption. This was the son of the independent chieftain of Sangramgarh, already mentioned. There were nearer kin, some of the seventh and eighth degrees, and young Nahar was the eleventh. It was never contemplated that the three last gigantic³ chieftains of Deogarh would die without issue, or the branches, now claimants from propinquity, would have been educated to suit the dignity ; but being brought up remote from court, they had been compelled to seek employment where obtainable, or to live on the few acres to which their distant claim of birth restricted them. Two of these, who had but the latter resource to fly to, had become mere boors ; and of two who had sought service abroad by arms, one was a cavalier in the retinue of the prince, and the other a hanger-on about court : both dissipated and unfitted, as the frerage asserted, "to be the chieftains of two thousand Rajputs, the sons of one father."⁴ Much interest and intrigue were carried on for one of these, and he was supported

¹ As in Deogarh.

² Plural of Amir, a chief.

³ Gokul Das, the last chief, was one of the finest men I ever beheld in feature and person. He was about six feet six, perfectly erect, and a Hercules in bulk. His father at twenty was much larger, and must have been nearly seven feet high. It is surprising how few of the chiefs of this family died a natural death. It has produced some noble Rajputs.

⁴ *Eḱ bap ḱa beta.*

by the young prince and a faction. Some of the senior *Pattawats* of Deogarh are men of the highest character, and often lamented the sombre qualities of their chief, which prevented the clan having that interest in the State to which its extent and rank entitled it. While these intrigues were in their infancy, they adopted a decided measure; they brought home young Nahar from his father's residence, and "bound round his head the turban of the deceased." In his name the death of the late chief was announced. It was added, that he hoped to see his friends after the stated days of '*matam*' or mourning; and he performed all the duties of the son of Deogarh, and lighted the funeral pyre.

When these proceedings were reported, the Rana was highly and justly incensed. The late chief had been one of the rebels of S. 1848;¹ and though pardon had been granted, yet this revived all the recollection of the past, and he felt inclined to extinguish the name of Sangawat.²

In addition to the common sequestration, he sent an especial one with commands to collect the produce of the harvest then reaping, charging the sub-vassals with the design of overturning his lawful authority. They replied very submissively, and artfully asserted that they had only given a son to Gokul Das, not an heir to Deogarh; that the sovereign alone could do this, and that they trusted to his nominating one who would be an efficient leader of so many Rajputs in the service of the Rana. They urged the pretensions of young Nahar, at the same time leaving the decision to the sovereign. Their judicious reply was well supported by their ambassador at court, who was the bard of Deogarh, and had recently become, though *ex-officio*, physician to the prince.³ The point was finally adjusted, and Nahar was brought to court, and invested with the sword by the hand of the sovereign, and he is now lord of Deogarh Madri, one of the richest and most powerful fiefs⁴ of Mewar. Madri was the ancient name of the

¹ A.D. 1792.

² That of the clan of Deogarh.

³ Apollo is the patron both of physicians and poets; and though my friend Amar does not disgrace him in either calling, it was his wit, rather than his medical degree, that maintained him at court. He said it was not fitting that the sovereign of the world should be served by clowns or opium-eaters: and that young Nahar, when educated at court under the Rana's example, would do credit to the country: and what had full as much weight as any of the bard's arguments was, that the fine of relief on the *Talwar Bandhai* (or girding on of the sword) of a lac of rupees, should be immediately forthcoming.

⁴ *Patta*.

estate ; and Sangramgarh, of which Nahar was the heir, was severed from it, but by some means had reverted to the crown, of which it now holds. The adoption of Nahar by Gokul Das leaves the paternal estate without an immediate heir ; and his actual father being mad, if more distant claims are not admitted, it is probable that Sangramgarh will eventually revert to the fisc.

Reflections.—The system of feuds must have attained considerable maturity amongst the Rajputs, to have left such traces, notwithstanding the desolation that has swept the land : but without circumspection, these few remaining customs will become a dead letter. Unless we abstain from all internal interference, we must destroy the links which connect the prince and his vassals ; and, in lieu of a system decidedly imperfect, we should leave them none at all, or at least not a system of feuds, the only one they can comprehend. Our friendship has rescued them from exterior foes, and time will restore the rest. With the dignity and establishments of their chiefs, ancient usages will revive ; and *nazarana* (relief), *kharg bundhai* (investiture), *dasaundh* (aids or benevolence, literally 'the tenth'), and other incidents, will cease to be mere ceremonies. The desire of every liberal mind, as well as the professed wish of the British Government, is to aid in their renovation, and this will be best effected by not meddling with what we but imperfectly understand.¹

We have nothing to apprehend from the Rajput States if raised to their ancient prosperity. The closest attention to their history proves beyond contradiction, that they were never capable of uniting, even for their own preservation : a breath, a scurrilous stanza of a bard, has severed their closet confederacies. No national head exists amongst them as amongst the Marathas ; and each chief being master of his own house and followers, they are individually too weak to cause us any alarm.

No feudal Government can be dangerous as a neighbour : for

¹ Such interference, when inconsistent with past usage and the genius of the people, will defeat the very best intentions. On the grounds of policy and justice, it is alike incumbent on the British Government to secure the maintenance of their present form of Government, and not to repair, but to advise the repairs of the fabric, and to let their own artists alone be consulted. To employ ours, would be like adding a Corinthian capital to a column of Ellora, or replacing the mutilated statue of Baldeva with a limb from the Hercules Farnese.

To have a chain of prosperous independent States on our only exposed frontier, the north-west, attached to us from benefits, and the moral conviction that we do not seek their overthrow, must be a desirable policy.

defence, it has in all countries been found defective ; and for aggression, totally inefficient. Let there exist between us the most perfect understanding and identity of interests ; the foundation-step to which is to lessen or remit the galling, and to us contemptible tribute, now exacted, enfranchise them from our espionage and agency, and either unlock them altogether from our dangerous embrace, or let the ties between us be such only as would ensure grand results : such as general commercial freedom and protection, with treaties of friendly alliance. Then, if a Tatar or a Russian invasion threatened our eastern empire, fifty thousand Rajputs would be no despicable allies.

Let us call to mind what they did when they fought for Aurangzeb : they are still unchanged, if we give them the proper stimulus. Gratitude, honour, and fidelity, are terms which at one time were the foundation of all the virtues of a Rajput. Of the theory of these sentiments he is still enamoured ; but, unfortunately for his happiness, the times have left him but little scope for the practice of them. Ask a Rajput which is the greatest of crimes? He will reply '*gunchhor*', 'forgetfulness of favours.' This is his most powerful term for ingratitude. Gratitude with him embraces every obligation of life, and is inseparable from *swamidharma*, 'fidelity to his lord.' He who is wanting in these is not deemed fit to live, and is doomed to eternal pains in Pluto's¹ realm hereafter.²

"It was a powerful feeling," says an historian³ who always identifies his own emotions with his subject, "which could make the bravest of men put up with slights and ill-treatment at the hand of their sovereign, or call forth all the energies of discontented exertion for one whom they never saw, and in whose character there was nothing to esteem. Loyalty has scarcely less tendency to refine and elevate the heart than patriotism itself." That these sentiments were combined, the past history of the Rajputs will shew ;⁴ and to the strength of these ties do they owe

¹ *Yamaloka*.

² The *gunchhor* (ungrateful) and *satchhor* (violator of his faith) are consigned, by the authority of the bard, to sixty thousand years' residence in hell. Europeans, in all the pride of mastery, accuse the natives of want of gratitude, and say their language has no word for it. They can only know the *namak-haram* of the Ganges. *Gunchhor* is a compound of powerful import, as ingratitude and infidelity are the highest crimes. It means, literally, "abandoner (from *chhorna*, 'to quit') of virtue (*gun*)."

³ Hallam, Vol. I, p. 323.

⁴ Of the effects of loyalty and patriotism combined, we have splendid examples in Hindu history and tradition. A more striking instance could

their political existence, which has outlived ages of strife. But for these, they would have been converts and vassals to the Tatars, who would still have been enthroned in Delhi. Neglect, oppression, and religious interference, sunk one of the greatest monarchies of the world ;¹ made Shivaji a hero, and converted the peaceful husbandman of the Kistna and Godavari into a brave but rapacious soldier.

We have abundant examples, and I trust need not exclaim with the wise minister of Akbar, "Who so happy as to profit by them?"²

The Rajput, with all his turbulence, possesses in an eminent degree both loyalty and patriotism ; and though he occasionally exhibits his refractory spirit to his father and sovereign,³ we shall see of what he is capable when his country is threatened with dismemberment, from the history of Mewar and the reign of Ajit Singh of Marwar. In this last we have one of the noblest examples history can afford of unbounded devotion. A prince, whom not a dozen of his subjects had ever seen, who had been concealed from the period of his birth throughout a tedious minority to avoid the snares of a tyrant,⁴ by the mere magic of a name kept the discordant materials of a great feudal association in subjection, till, able to bear arms, he issued from his concealment to head these devoted adherents, and reconquer what they had so long struggled to maintain. So glorious a contest, of twenty years' duration, requires but an historian to immortalize

scarcely be given than in the recent civil distractions at Kotah, where a mercenary army raised and maintained by the Regent, either openly or covertly declared against him, as did the whole feudal body to a man, the moment their young Prince asserted his subverted claims, and in the cause of their rightful lord abandoned all consideration of self, their families and lands, and with their followers offered their lives to redeem his rights or perish in the attempt. No empty boast, as the conclusion testified. God forbid that we should have more such examples of Rajput devotion to their sense of fidelity to their lords !

¹ See statement of its revenues during the last emperor, who had preserved the empire of Delhi united.

² Abul Fazl uses this expression when moralizing on the fall of Shihab-ud-din, King of Ghazni and first established monarch of India, slain by Prithviraja, the Hindu sovereign of Delhi.

* This statement about Muhammad Ghori is wrong : he was not "slain by Prithviraja."

³ The Rajput, who possesses but an acre of land, has the proud feeling of common origin with his sovereign, and in styling him *bapji* (sire), he thinks of him as the common father or representative of the race. What a powerful incentive to action !

⁴ Aurangzeb.

it. Unfortunately we have only the relation of isolated encounters, which, though exhibiting a prodigality of blood and acts of high devotion, are deficient in those minor details which give unity and interest to the whole.

Let us take the Rajput character from the royal historians themselves, from Akbar, Jahangir, Aurangzeb. The most brilliant conquests of these monarchs were by their Rajput allies ; though the little regard the latter had for opinion alienated the sympathies of a race, who, when rightly managed, encountered at command the Afghan amidst the snows of the Caucasus, or made the furthest Cheronese tributary to the empire. Assam, where the British arms were recently engaged, and for the issue of which such anxiety was manifested in the metropolis of Britain, was conquered by a Rajput prince,¹ whose descendant is now an ally of the British Government.

But Englishmen in the east, as elsewhere, undervalue everything not national. They have been accustomed to conquest, not reverses : though it is only by studying the character of those around them, that the latter can be avoided and this superiority maintained. Superficial observers imagine, that from lengthened predatory spoliation the energy of the Rajput has fled : an idea which is at once erroneous and dangerous. The vices now manifest from oppression will disappear with the cause, and with reviving prosperity new feelings will be generated, and each national tie and custom be strengthened. The Rajput would glory in putting on his saffron robes² to fight for such a land, and for those who disinterestedly laboured to benefit it.

Let us, then, apply history to its proper use. We need not turn to ancient Rome for illustration of the dangers inseparable from wide dominion and extensive alliances. The twenty-two Satrapies of India, the greater part of which are now the appanage of Britain, exhibited, even a century ago, one of the most splendid monarchies history has made known, too extensive for the genius

¹ Raja Man of Jaipur, who took Arakan, Orissa, and Assam. Raja Jaswant Singh of Marwar retook Kabul for Aurangzeb, and was rewarded by poison. Raja Ram Singh Hara, of Kotah, made several important conquests ; and his grandson, Raja Ishwari Singh, and his five brothers, were left on one field of battle.

*Man Singh did not "take" Arakan and Assam, nor did Jaswant Singh "retake" Kabul.

² When a Rajput is determined to hold out to the last in fighting, he always puts on a robe dyed in saffron.

of any single individual effectually to control. Yet was it held together, till encroachment on their rights, and disregard to their habits and religious opinions, alienated the Rajputs, and excited the inhabitants of the south to rise against their Mughal oppressors. 'Then was the throne of Aurangzeb at the mercy of a Brahmin¹, and the grandson² of a cultivator in the province of Khandesh held the descendants of Timur pensioners on his bounty'.

APPENDIX

PAPERS REFERRED TO IN THE SKETCH OF A FEUDAL SYSTEM IN RAJASTHAN, BEING

LITERAL TRANSLATIONS *from* INSCRIPTIONS *and* ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS,
most of which are in the AUTHOR'S POSSESSION.

No. I.

Translation of a Letter from the expatriated Chiefs³ of Marwar to the Political Agent of the British Government, Western Rajput States.

After compliments.

We have sent to you a confidential person, who will relate what regards us. The Sarkar Company are sovereigns of Hindustan, and you know well all that regards our condition. Although there is nothing which respects either ourselves or our country hid from you, yet is there matter immediately concerning us which it is necessary to make known.

Sri Maharaja⁴ and ourselves are of one stock, all Rathors. He is our head, we his servants : but now anger has seized him,

¹ Peshwa.

² Sindhia.

³ The names omitted to prevent any of them falling a sacrifice to the blind fury of their prince. The brave chief of Nimaj has sold his life, but dearly. In vain do we look in the annals of Europe for such devotion and generous despair as marked his end, and that of his brave clan. He was a perfect gentleman in deportment, modest and mild, and head of a powerful clan.

⁴ Man Singh.

and we are dispossessed of our country. Of the estates, our patrimony and our dwelling, some have been made *khalisa*,¹ and those who endeavour to keep aloof, expect the same fate. Some under the most solemn pledge of security have been inveigled and suffered death, and others imprisoned. *Mutsuddis*,² officers of State, men of the soil and those foreign to it, have been seized, and the most unheard of deeds and cruelties inflicted, which we cannot even write. Such a spirit has possessed his mind as never was known to any former prince of Jodhpur. His forefathers have reigned for generations; our forefathers were their ministers and advisers, and whatever was performed was by the collective wisdom of the council of our chiefs. Before the face of his ancestors, our own ancestors have slain and been slain; and in performing services to the Kings,³ they made the State of Jodhpur what it is. Wherever Marwar was concerned, there our fathers were to be found, and with their lives preserved the land. Sometimes our head was a minor: even then, by the wisdom of our fathers and their services, the land was kept firm under our feet, and thus has it descended from generation to generation. Before his eyes (Raja Man's) we have performed good service: when at that perilous time the host of Jaipur⁴ surrounded Jodhpur, on the field we attacked it; our lives and fortunes were at stake, and God granted us success: the witness is God Almighty. Now, men of no consideration are in our prince's presence: hence this reverse. *When our services are acceptable, then is he our lord; when not, we are again his brothers and kindred, claimants and laying claim to the land.*

He desires to dispossess us; but can we let ourselves be dispossessed? The English are masters of all India. The chief of . . . sent his agent to Ajmer; he was told to go to Delhi. Accordingly Thakur . . . went there, but no path was pointed out. If the English chiefs will not hear us, who will? The English allow no one's lands to be usurped, and our birth-place is Marwar—from Marwar we must have bread. A hundred thou-

¹ Fiscal, that is, sequestrated.

² Clerks, and inferior officers of Government.

³ Alluding to the sovereigns of Delhi. In the magnificent feudal assemblage at this gorgeous court, where seventy-six princes stood in the Divan (*Dewan-i-Khas*) each by a pillar covered with plates of silver, the Marwar prince had the right hand of all. I have an original letter from the great-grandfather of Raja Man to the Rana, elate with this honour.

⁴ In 1806.

sand Rathors,—where are they to go to? From respect to the English alone have we been so long patient, and without acquainting your Government of our intentions, you might afterwards find fault; therefore we make it known, and we thereby acquit ourselves to you. What we brought with us from Marwar we have consumed, and even what we could get on credit; and now, when want must make us perish, we are ready and can do anything.¹

The English are our rulers, our masters. Sri Man Singh has seized our lands: by your Government interposing these troubles may be settled, but without its guarantee and intervention we can have no confidence whatever. Let us have a reply to our petition. We will wait it in patience; but if we get none, the fault will not be ours, having given everywhere notice. Hunger will compel man to find a remedy. For such a length of time we have been silent from respect to your Government alone: our own Sarkar is deaf to complaint. But to what extreme shall we wait? Let our hopes be attended to. Sambat 1878, Sawan sudi duj. (August 1821.)

True Translation :

(Signed) JAMES TOD.

No. II.

Remonstrance of the Sub-Vassals of Deogarh against their chief, Rawat Gokul Das.

1. He respects not the privileges or customs established of old.
2. To each Rajput's house a *charsa*² or hide of land was attached: this he has resumed.
3. Whoever bribes him is a true man: who does not, is a thief.
4. Ten or twelve villages established by his *pattayats*³ he has resumed, and left their families to starve.
5. From time immemorial sanctuary (*saran*) has been esteemed sacred: this he has abolished.
6. On emergencies he would pledge his oath to his subjects (*ryots*), and afterwards plunder them.

¹ The historian of the Middle Ages justly remarks, that "the most deadly hatred is that which men, exasperated by proscription and forfeitures, bear their country."

² Hide or skin, from the vessel used in irrigation being made of leather.

³ The vassals, or those holding fiefs (*patta*) of Deogarh.

7. In old times, it was customary when the presence of his chiefs and kindred was required, to invite them by letter : a fine is now the warrant of summons, thus lessening their dignity.

8. Such messengers, in former times, had a *taka*¹ for their ration (*bhatta*) ; now he imposes two rupees.

9. Formerly, when robberies occurred in the mountains within the limits of Deogarh, the loss was made good : now all complaint is useless, for his *Faujdar*² receives a fourth of all such plunder. The Mers³ range at liberty ; but before they never committed murder : now they slay as well as rob our kin ; nor is there any redress, and such plunder is even sold within the town of Deogarh.

10. Without crime, he resumes the land of his vassals for the sake of imposition of fines ; and after such are paid, he cuts down the green crops, with which he feeds his horses.

11. The cultivators⁴ on the lands of the vassals he seizes by force, extorts fines, or sells their cattle to pay them. Thus cultivation is ruined and the inhabitants leave the country.

12. From oppression the town magistrates⁵ of Deogarh have fled to Raipur. He lays in watch to seize and extort money from them.

13. When he summons his vassals for purposes of extortion and they escape his clutches, he seizes on their wives and families. Females, from a sense of honour, have on such occasions thrown themselves into wells.

14. He interferes to recover old debts, distraining the debtor of all he has in the world ; half he receives.

15. If any one have a good horse, by fair means or foul he contrives to get it.

16. *When Deogarh was established, at the same time were our allotments : as is his patrimony, so is our patrimony.*⁶

¹ A copper coin, equal to two-pence.

² Military commander ; a kind of inferior *maire du palais*, on every Rajput chieftain's estate, and who has the military command of the vassals. He is seldom of the same family, but generally of another tribe.

³ Mountaineers.

⁴ Of the Jat and other labouring tribes.

⁵ *Chauthias*, from *chohut*, 'civil jurisdiction.' In every town there is an unpaid magistracy, of which the head is the *Nagar Seth*, or chief citizen, and the four *Chauthias*, tantamount to the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, who hold their courts and decide in all civil cases.

⁶ Here are the precise sentiments embodied in the remonstrances of the great feudal chiefs of Marwar to their prince ; see Appendix No. 1.

Thousands have been expended in establishing and improving them, yet our rank, privileges, and rights, he equally disregards.

17. From these villages, founded by our forefathers, he at will takes four or five skins of land and bestows them on foreigners ; and thus the ancient proprietors are reduced to poverty and ruin.

18. From of old, all his Rajput kin had daily rations, or portions of grain : for four years these rights have been abolished.

19. From ancient times the *pattayats* formed his council : now he consults only foreigners. What has been the consequence ? The whole annual revenue derived from the mountains is lost.

20. From the ancient *Bhum*¹ of the Frerage² the mountaineers carry off the cattle, and instead of redeeming them, this *Faujdar* sets the plunderers up to the trick of demanding *rakhwali*.³

21. Money is justice, and there is none other : whoever has money may be heard. The bankers and merchants have gone abroad for protection, but he asks not where they are.

22. When cattle are driven off to the hills, and we do ourselves justice and recover them, we are fined, and told that the mountaineers have his pledge. Thus our dignity is lessened. Or if we seize one of these marauders, a party is sent to liberate him, for which the *Faujdar* receives a bribe. Then a feud ensues at the instigation of the liberated Mer, and the unsupported Rajput is obliged to abandon his patrimony.⁴ There is neither protection nor support. The chief is supine, and so regardless of honour, that he tells us to take money to the hills and redeem our property. Since this *Faujdar* had power, 'poison has been our fate.' Foreigners are all in all, and the home-bred are set aside. Deccanis and plunderers enjoy the lands of his brethren. Without fault, the chiefs are deprived of their lands, to bring which into order time and money have been lavished. Justice there is none.

Our rights and privileges in his family are the same as his in the family of the Presence.⁵ Since you⁶ entered Mewar, lands long lost have been recovered. What crimes have we committed, that at this day we should lose ours ?

We are in great trouble.⁷

¹ The old allodial allotments.

² *Bhayyad*.

³ The *salvamenta* of our feudal writers ; the *blackmail* of the north.

⁴ 'Watan.'

⁵ The Rana.

⁶ The Author.

⁷ A quotation from *Dict. de l'anc. Regime* omitted.

No. III

Maharaja Sri Gokul Das to the four ranks (*char mist*) of *Pattayats* of Deogarh, commanding. Peruse.

Without crime no vassal shall have his estate or *charsas* dis-seized. Should any individual commit an offence, it shall be judged by the *four ranks* (*char mist*), my brethren, and then punished. Without consulting them on all occasions I shall never inflict punishment.¹ To this I swear by Sri Nathji. No departure from this agreement shall ever occur. S. 1874 ; the 6th Paush.

No. IV

Grant from Maharana Ari Singh, Prince of Mewar, to the Sindhi Chief, Abdul Rahim Beg.

Ramji !² Ganeshji !² Eklingji !²

Sri Maharaja Dhiraj Maharana Ari Singh to Mirza Abdul Rahim Beg Adilbegot, commanding.

Now some of our chiefs having rebelled and set up the impostor Ratna Singh, brought the Deccani army and erected batteries against Udaipur, in which circumstances your services have been great and tended to the preservation of our sovereignty : therefore, in favour towards you, I have made this grant, which your children and children's children shall continue to enjoy. You will continue to serve faithfully ; and whoever of my race shall dispossess you or yours, on him be Eklingji and the sin of the slaughter of Chitor.

Particulars.

- 1st. In estates, 2,00,000 rupees.
- 2nd. In cash annually, 25,000.
- 3rd. Lands outside the Debari gate, 10,000.
- 4th. As a residence, the dwelling-house called Bharat Singh's.
- 5th. A hundred bighas of land outside the city for a garden.
- 6th. The town of Mithun in the valley, to supply wood and forage.
- 7th. To keep up the tomb of Ajmeri Beg, who fell in action, one hundred bighas of land.

¹ This reply to the remonstrance of his vassals is perfectly similar in point to the 43rd article of Magna Carta.

² Invocations to Ram, Ganesh (god of wisdom), and Eklinga, the patron divinity of the Sesodia Guhilots.

Privileges and Honours.

8th. A seat in Durbar and rank in all respects equal to the chieftain of Sadri.¹

9th. Your kettle-drums (Nagara) to beat to the exterior gate, but with one stick only.

10th. *Amar Balaona*,² and a dress of honour on the *Dasahra*³ festival.

11th. Drums to beat to Ahar. All other privileges and rank like the house of Salumbar.⁴ Like that house, yours shall be from generation to generation ; therefore according to the valuation of your grant you will serve.

12th. Your brothers or servants, whom you may dismiss, I shall not entertain or suffer my chiefs to entertain.

13th. The Chamars⁵ and Kirania⁶ you may use at all times when alone, but never in the Presence.

14th. Munawar Beg, Anwar Beg, Chaman Beg, are permitted seats in front of the throne ; *Amar Balaona*, and honorary dresses on *Dasahra*, and seats for two or three other relatives who may be found worthy the honour.

15th. Your agent (*Vakil*) shall remain at court with the privileges due to his rank.

By command :

SAH MOTI RAM BOLIA,

S. 1826 (A.D. 1770) Bhadon (August) sudi 11 Somwar (Monday).

No. V

Grant of the Patta of Bhainsrur to Rawat Lal Singh, one of the sixteen great vassals of Mewar.

Maharaja Jagat Singh to Rawat Lal Singh Kesarisinghogot,⁷ commanding.

¹ The first of the foreign vassals of the Rana's house.

² A horse furnished by the prince, always replaced when he dies, therefore called *Amar*, or immortal.

³ The grand military festival, when a muster is made of all the Rajput quotas.

⁴ The first of home-chieftains.

⁵ The tail of the wild ox, worn across the saddle-bow.

⁶ An umbrella or shade against the sun ; from *kirān*, 'a ray.'

⁷ Clan (*got*) of Kesari Singh, one of the great branches of the Chundawats.

Now to you the whole Pargana of Bhainsror¹ is granted as *Giras*, viz. :

Town of Bhainsror.....	3,000	1,500
Fifty-two others (names uninteresting), besides one in the valley of the capital.		
Total value.....	62,000	31,000 ²

With two hundred and forty-eight horse and two hundred and forty-eight foot, good horse and good Rajputs, you will perform service. Of this, forty-eight horse and forty-eight foot are excused for the protection of your fort ; therefore with two hundred foot and two hundred horse you will serve when and wherever ordered. The first grant was given in Pus, S. 1798, when the income inserted was over-rated. Understanding this, the Presence (*huzur*) ordered sixty thousand of annual value to be attached to Bhainsror.

NO. VI

Grant from Maharana Sangram Singh of Mewar to his Nephew, the Prince Madhu Singh, heir-apparent to the principality of Jaipur.

SRI RAMJAYATI

(*Victory to Rama.*)

SRI GANESII PRASAD,
(*By favour of Ganesh.*)

SRI EKLINGA PRASAD,
(*By favour of Eklinga*)³.

Maharaja Dhiraj Maharana Sri Sangram Singh, Adisatu, commanding. To my nephew, Kanwar Madhu Singhji, *giras* (a fief) has been granted, viz. :

The fief (*putta*) of Rampura ; therefore, with one thousand horse and two thousand foot, you will perform service during six months annually ; and when foreign service is required three thousand horse.

While the power of the Presence is maintained in these districts you will not be dispossessed.

¹ On the left bank of the Chambal.

² To explain these double *rekhs*, or estimates, one is the full value, the other the deteriorated rate.

³ Two monograms and foot-notes omitted.

By command :

PANCHOLI RAICHAND and MEHTA MUL DAS.

S. 1785 (A.D. 1729) ; Chait sudi 7th ; Mangalwar (*Tuesday*).

Addressed in the Rana's own hand.

To my nephew Madhu Singh.¹ My child, I have given you Rampura : while mine, you shall not be deprived of it. Done.

No. VII

Grant of Bhum Rakhwali (Salvamenta) from the village of Dongla to Maharaja Khushlhal Singh—S. 1806 (A.D. 1750), the first of Sawan (July).

1st. A field of one hundred and fifty-one bighas, of which thirty-six are irrigated.

2nd. One hundred and two bighas of waste and unirrigated, *viz.*,

Six bighas cultivated by Govinda the oilman.

Three, under Hira and Tara the oilmen.

Seventeen cultivated by the mason Hansa, and Lal the oilman.

Four bighas of waste and forest land (*parti, aryana*) which belonged to Govinda and Hira, &c. &c. : and so on, enumerating all the fields composing the above aggregate.

Dues and Privileges.

Pieces of money..... 12

Grain..... 24 maunds.

On the festivals of Rakhi, Dewali, and Holi, one copper coin from each house.

Serana.....at harvest

Shukri from the Brahmins.

Transit duties for protection of merchandize, *viz.*, a pice on every cart-load, and half a pice for each bullock.

Two platters on every marriage feast.

¹ *Bhanaij* is sister's son ; as *Bhatija* is brother's son. It will be seen in the Annals, that to support this prince to the succession of the Jaipur Gadi, both Mewar and Jaipur were ruined, and the power of the Deccanis established in both countries.

No. VIII

Grant of Bhum by the Inhabitants of Amli to Rawat Fateh Singh of Amet.—S. 1814 (A.D. 1758).

The Ranawats Sawant Singh and Subhag Singh had Amli in grant : but they were oppressive to the inhabitants, slew the *Patels* Jodha and Bhagi, and so ill-treated the Brahmins, that Kusal and Nathu sacrificed themselves on the pyre. The inhabitants demanded the protection of the Rana, and the *Pattayats* were changed ; and now the inhabitants grant in *raḡhuwālī* one hundred and twenty-five bighas as *bhum* to Fateh Singh.¹

No. IX

Grant of Bhum by the Inhabitants of the Town of Dongla to Maharaja Zorawar Singh, of Bhindar.

To Sri Maharaja Zorawar Singh, the *Patels*, traders, merchants, brahmins, and united inhabitants of Dongla, make agreement.

Formerly the "runners" in Dongla were numerous ; to preserve us from whom we granted *bhum* to the Maharaja. To wit :

One well, that of Hira the oilman.

One well, that of Dipa the oilman.

One well, that of Dewa the oilman.

In all, three wells, being forty-four bighas of irrigated (*piwāl*), and one hundred and ninety-one bighas of unirrigated (*mal*) land. Also a field for juar.

Customs or Dignities (Maryad) attached to the Bhum.

1st. A dish (*ḡansa*) on every marriage.

2nd. Six hundred rupees ready cash annually.

3rd. All *bhumias*, *girāsias*, the high roads, passes from raids and "runners," and all disturbances whatsoever, the Maharaja must settle.

When the Maharaja is pleased to let the inhabitants of Dongla reinhabit their dwellings, then only can they return to them.²

¹ This is a proof of the value attached to *bhum*, when granted by the inhabitants, as the first act of the new proprietor, though holding the whole town from the crown, was to obtain these few bighas as *bhum*. After having been sixty years in that family, Amli has been resumed by the crown : the *bhum* has remained with the chief.

² This shows how *bhum* was extorted in these periods of turbulence, and that this individual gift was as much to save them from the effects of the Maharaja's violence as to gain protection from that of others.

Written by the accountant Kacchia, on the full moon of Jeth, S. 1858, and signed by all the traders, brahmins, and towns-people.

No. X

Grant of Bhum by the Prince of Mewar to an inferior Vassal.

Maharana Bhim Singh to Baba Ram Singh, commanding.

Now a field of two hundred and twenty-five bighas in the city of Jahajpur, with the black orchard (*sham bagh*) and a farm-house (*noharu*) for cattle, has been granted you in *bhum*.

Your forefathers recovered for me Jahajpur and served with fidelity; on which account this *bhum* is renewed. Rest assured no molestation shall be offered, nor shall any *Puttayat* interfere with you.

Privileges.

One serana.¹

Two halmas.²

Offerings of cocoanuts on the Holi and Dasahra festivals.

From every hundred bullock-loads³ of merchandize, twelve annas.

From every hundred and twenty-five ass-loads, six annas.

From each horse sold within Jahajpur, two annas.

From each camel sold, one anna.

From each oil-mill, one pula.

From each iron mine (*madri*), a quarter rupee.

From each distillation of spirits, a quarter rupee.

From each goat slain, one pice.

On births and marriages⁴ five platters (*kansa*).

¹ A seer on each maund of produce.

² The labour of two ploughs (*hal*). *Halma* is the personal service of the husbandman with his plough for such time as is specified. *Halma* is precisely the detested *corvée* of the French regime.

* A quotation from *Dict. de l'anc. Régime* omitted.

³ A great variety of oppressive imposts were levied by the chiefs during these times of trouble, to the destruction of commerce and all facility of travelling. Everything was subject to tax, and a long train of vexatious dues exacted for "repairs of forts, boats at ferries, night-guards, guards of passes," and other appellations, all having much in common with the "*Droit de Peage*" in France.

* A quotation from *Dict. de l'anc. Régime* omitted.

⁴ The privileges of our Rajput chieftains on the marriages of their vassals and cultivating subjects are confined to the best dishes of the marriage feast or a pecuniary commutation. This is, however, though in a minor degree, one of the vexatious claims of feudality of the French system, known

The handful (*inch*) from every basket of greens.

With every other privilege, attached to *bhum*.

Irrigated land (<i>piwal</i>)	51 bighas.
Unirrigated do. (<i>mal</i>)	110 do.
Mountain do. (<i>magra</i>)	40 do.
Meadow do. (<i>bira</i>)	25 do.
<hr/>	
	226 bighas.
<hr/>	

Asar (June) S. 1853 (A.D. 1797).

No. XI

Charter of Privileges and Immunities granted to the town of Jhalrapatan, engraved on a Pillar in that City.

S. 1853 (A.D. 1797), corresponding with the Saka 1718, the sun being in the south, the season of cold, and the happy month of Kartika,¹ the enlightened half of the month, being Monday the full moon.

Maharaja Dhiraj Sri Ummed Singh Deo,² the *Faujdar*³ Raja Zalim Singh and Kunwar Madhu Singh, commanding. To all the inhabitants of Jhalrapatan, *Patels*,⁴ *Patwaris*,⁵ *Mahajans*,⁶ and to all the thirty-six castes, it is written.

At this period entertain entire confidence, build and dwell.

Within this abode all forced contributions and confiscations are for ever abolished. The taxes called *Bhalamanusi*,⁷ *Anni*,⁸ and *Rekha Barar*,⁹ and likewise all *Bhet-Begar*,¹⁰ shall cease.

To this intent is this stone erected, to hold good from year to year, now and evermore. There shall be no violence in this terri-

under the term *nocages*, where the seigneur or his deputy presided, and had the right to be placed in front of the bride, "et de chanter a la fin du repas, une chanson guillerette." But they even carried their insolence further, and "puosserent leur mepris pour les villains (the agricultural classes of the Rajput system) jusqu'a exiger que leurs chiens eussent leur couvert aupres de la mariee, et qu'on les laissat manger sur la table."—Art. '*Nocages*', *Dict. de l'anc. Regime*.

¹ December.

² The Raja of Kotah.

³ Commander of the forces and Regent of Kotah.

⁴ Officers of the land revenue.

⁵ Land accountants.

⁶ The mercantile class.

⁷ Literally, 'good behaviour.'

⁸ An agricultural tax.

⁹ Tax for registering.

¹⁰ This includes in one word the forced labour exacted from the working classes: the *corvée* of the French system.

tory. This is sworn by the cow to the Hindu and the hog to the Mussulman : in the presence of Captain Dilel Khan, Chaudhuri Sarup Chand, Patel Lalo, the Mahesri Patwari Balkishen, the architect Kalu Ram, and the stone-mason Balkishen.

*Parmo*¹ is for ever abolished. Whoever dwells and traffics within the town of Patan, one-half of the transit duties usually levied in Haravati are remitted ; and all *mapa* (meter's) duties are for ever abolished.

No. XII

Abolitions, Immunities, Prohibitions, &c. &c. Inscription in the Temple of Lachhmi Narayan at Akola.

In former times tobacco was sold in one market only. Rana Raj Singh commanded the monopoly to be abolished. S. 1645.

Rana Jagat Singh prohibited the seizure of the cots and quilts by the officers of his Government from the printers of Akola.

No. XIII

Privileges and Immunities granted to the Printers of Calico and Inhabitants of the Town of Great Akola in Mewar.

Maharana Bhim Singh, commanding, to the inhabitants of Great Akola.

Whereas the village has been abandoned from the assignments levied by the garrison of Mandalgarh, and it being demanded of its population how it could again be rendered prosperous, they unanimously replied : "Not to exact beyond the dues and contributions (*dand dor*) established of yore ; to erect the pillar promising never to exact above half the produce of the crops, or to molest the persons of those who thus paid their dues."

The Presence agreed, and this pillar has been erected. May Eklinga look to him who breaks this command. The hog to the Mussulman and the cow to the Hindu.

Whatever contributions (*dand*) *parmo*,² *puli*,³ heretofore levied shall be paid.

¹ Grain thrown on the inhabitants at an arbitrary rate ; often resorted to at Kotah, where the Regent is farmer-general.

² Grain, the property of the Government, thrown on the inhabitants for purchase at an arbitrary valuation.

³ The handful from each sheaf at harvest.

All crimes committed within the jurisdiction of Akola to be tried by its inhabitants, who will sit in justice on the offender and fine him according to his faults.

On *Amavas*¹ no work shall be done at the well² or at the oil-mill, nor printer put his dye-pot on the fire.³

Whoever breaks the foregoing, may the sin of the slaughter of Chitor be upon him.

This pillar was erected in the presence of Mehta Sardar Singh, Sanwal Das, the Chaudhuris Bhopat Ram and Daulat Ram, and the assembled *Panch* of Akola.

Written by the Chaudhuri Bhopji, and engraved by the stone-cutter Bhima.

S. 1856 (A.D. 1800).

No. XIV

*Prohibition against Guests carrying away Provisions from the Public Feast.*⁴

Sri Maharana Sangram Singh, to the inhabitants of Marmi.

On all feasts of rejoicing, as well as those on the ceremonies for the dead, none shall carry away with them the remains of the feast. Whoever thus transgresses shall pay a fine to the crown of one hundred and one rupees. S. 1769 (A.D. 1713), Chait Sudi 7th.

¹ A day sacred to the Hindu, being that which divides the month.

² Meaning, they shall not irrigate the fields.

³ This part of the edict is evidently the instigation of the Jains, to prevent the destruction of life, though only that of insects.

⁴ The cause of this sumptuary edict was a benevolent motive, and to prevent the expenses on these occasions falling too heavily on the poorer classes. It was customary for the women to carry away under their petticoats (*ghagra*) sufficient sweetmeats for several days' consumption. The great Jai Singh of Ambar had an ordinance restricting the number of guests to fifty-one on these occasions, and prohibited to all but the four wealthy classes the use of sugar-candy: the others were confined to the use of molasses and brown sugar. To the lower vassals and the cultivators these feasts were limited to the coarser fare; to jwar flour, greens and oil. A dyer who on the Holi feasted his friends with sweetmeats of fine sugar and scattered about balls made of brown sugar, was fined five thousand rupees for setting so pernicious an example. The *sadh* or marriage-present, from the bridegroom to the bride's father, was limited to fifty-one rupees. The great sums previously paid on this score were preventives of matrimony. Many other wholesome regulations of a much more important kind, especially those for the suppression of infanticide, were instituted by this prince.

No. XV

Maharana Sangram Singh to the merchants and bankers of Bakrol. The custom of furnishing quilts (*si-rak*)¹ of which you complain, is of ancient date. Now when the collectors of duties, their officers, or those of the land revenue stop at Bakrol, the merchants will furnish them with beds and quilts. All other servants will be supplied by the other inhabitants.

Should the dam of the lake be in any way injured, whoever does not aid in its repair shall, as a punishment, feed one hundred and one Brahmins. Asar 1715, or June A.D. 1659.

No. XVI

Warrant of the Chief of Bijolli to his Vassal, Gopal Das Saktawat.

Maharaja Mandhata to Saktawat Gopal Das, be it known.

At this time a daily fine of four rupees is in force against you, Eighty are now due ; Ganga Ram having petitioned in your favour, forty of this will be remitted. Give a written declaration to this effect--that with a specified quota you will take the field ; if not, you will stand the consequences.

Viz : One good horse and one matchlock, with appurtenances complete, to serve at home and abroad (*des pardes*), and to run the country² with the Kher.

When the levy (*kher*) takes the field, Gopal Das must attend

¹ 'Defence against the cold weather' (*si*). This in the ancient French *regime* came under the denomination of *Albergie* ou Hebergement, un droit royal.

* A French quotation omitted.

² The '*daurayats*' or runners, the term applied to the bands who swept the country with their forays in those periods of general confusion, are analogous to the armed bands of the middle ages, who in a similar manner desolated Europe under the term *routiers*, tantamount to our *rabars* (on the road), the *labars* of the Pindaris in India. The Rajput *daurayat* has as many epithets as the French *routiers*, who were called *escorcheurs*, *tard veneurs*, (of which class Gopal Das appears to have been), *mille-diabls*, *Guilleries*, &c.

From the Crusades to the sixteenth century, the nobles of Europe, of whom these bands were composed (like our Rajputs), abandoned themselves to this sort of life.

* A quotation from *Dict. l'ancien Regime* omitted.

We have this apology for the Rajput *routiers*, that the nobles of Europe had not ; they were driven to it by perpetual aggressions of invaders. I invariably found that the reformed *routier* was one of the best subjects : it secured him from indolence, the parent of all Rajput vices.

in person. Should he be from home, his retainers must attend, and they shall receive rations from the Presence.

Sawan sudi das (August 10th) S. 1782.

No. XVII

Maharaja Udikaran to the Saktawat Shambhu Singh. Be it known.

I had annexed Gura to the fisc, but now, from favour, restore it to you. Make it flourish, and serve me at home and abroad, with one horse, and one foot soldier.

When abroad you shall receive rations (*bhatta*) as follows :

Flour.....3 lbs.

Pulse4 ounces.

Butter (*ghee*).....2 pice weight.

Horses' feed... ..4 seers at 22 takas each seer,
of daily allowance.

If for defence of the fort you are required, you will attend with all your dependents, and bring your wife, family, and chattels ; for which, you will be exempted from two years of subsequent service.

Asar 14, S. 1834.

No. XVIII

Bhum in Mund-kati, or Compensation for Blood, to Jeth Singh Chundawat.

The Patel's son went to bring home his wife with Jeth's Rajputs as a guard. The party was attacked, the guard killed, and there having been no redress for the murder, twenty-six bighas have been granted in mund-kati¹ (compensation):

No. XIX

Rawat Megh Singh to his natural brother, Jamna Das, a patta (*fief*) has been granted, *viz.*

¹ *Mund*, 'the head', *kati*, 'cut'.

The village of Rajpura, value.....Rupees 401
 A garden of mogra flowers.....11

Rupees.....412

Serve at home and abroad with fidelity : contributions and aids pay according to custom, and as do the rest of the vassals.

Jeth 14th, S. 1874.

No. XX

Charter given by the Rana of Mewar, accepted and signed by all his Chiefs ; defining the duties of the contracting Parties.

A. D. 1818.

Siddh Sri Maharaja Dhiraj, Maharana Bhim Singh, to all the nobles my brothers and kin, Rajas, Patels, Jhalas Chauhans, Chundawats, Panwars, Sarangdeots, Saktawats, Rathors, Ranawts, &c. &c.

Now, since S. 1822 (A.D. 1776), during the reign of Sri Ari Singhji,¹ when the troubles commenced, laying ancient usages aside, undue usurpations of the land have been made : therefore on this day, Baisakh badi 14th, S. 1874 (A.D. 1818), the Maharana assembling all his chiefs, lays down the path of duty in new ordinances.

1st. All lands belonging to the crown, obtained since the troubles, and all lands seized by one chief, from another, shall be restored.

2nd. All *Rakhwali*,² *Bhum*, *Lagat*,³ established since the troubles, shall be renounced.

3rd. *Dhan*,⁴ *Biswa*,⁵ the right of the crown alone, shall be renounced.

4th. No chiefs shall commit thefts or violence within the boundaries of their estates. They shall entertain no Thags,⁶ foreign thieves or thieves of the country, as Moghias,⁶ Baoris,⁶ Thoris⁶ : but those who shall adopt peaceable habits may remain ; but should any return to their old pursuits, their heads shall instantly be taken off. All property stolen shall be made good by the proprietor of the estate within the limits of which it is plundered.

¹ The rebellion broke out during the reign of this prince.

² Salvamenta.

⁴ Transit duty.

⁶ Different descriptions of thieves.

³ Dues.

⁵ Ibid.

5th. Home or foreign merchants, traders, *Kafilas*,¹ *Banjaras*,² who enter the country, shall be protected. In no wise shall they be molested or injured, and whoever breaks this ordinance, his estate shall be confiscated.

6th. According to command, at home or abroad service must be performed. Four divisions (*chaukis*) shall be formed of the chiefs, and each division shall remain three months in attendance at court, when they shall be dismissed to their estates. Once a year, on the festival of the Dasahra,³ all the chiefs shall assemble with their quotas ten days previous thereto, and twenty days subsequent they shall be dismissed to their estates. On urgent occasions, and whenever their services are required, they shall repair to the Presence.

7th. Every *Pattawat* holding a separate *putta* from the Presence, shall perform separate service. They shall not unite or serve under the greater *Pattawats* : and the sub-vassals of all such chiefs shall remain with and serve their immediate *Pattawat*.⁴

8th. The Maharana shall maintain the dignities due to each chief according to his degree.

9th. The Ryots shall not be oppressed : there shall be no new exactions or arbitrary fines. This is ordained.

10th. What has been executed by Thakur Ajit Singh and sanctioned by the Rana, to this all shall agree.⁵

11th. Whosoever shall depart from the foregoing, the Maharana shall punish. In doing so the fault will not be the Rana's. Whoever fails, on him be the oath (*an*) of Eklinga and the Maharana.

[Here follow the signatures of all the chieftains of rank in Mewar, which it is needless to insert.]

¹ Caravans of merchandize, whether on camels, bullocks or in carts.

² Caravans of bullocks, chiefly for the transport of grain and salt.

³ On this festival the muster of all the feudal retainers is taken by the Rana in person, and honorary dresses and dignities are bestowed.

⁴ This article had become especially necessary, as the inferior chiefs, particularly those of the third class, had amalgamated themselves with the head of their clans, to whom they had become more accountable than to their prince.

⁵ This alludes to the treaty which this chief had formed, as the ambassador of the Rana, with the British Government.

II

MEWAR¹

To prevent the recurrence of this predatory system² it was deemed politic to unite all these settled States, alike interested with ourselves in its overthrow, in one grand confederation. Accordingly the Rajput States were invited to shelter under our protecting alliance; and with one exception (Jaipur) they eagerly embraced the invitation. The ambassadors of the various Governments followed each other in quick succession to Delhi, where the treaties were to be negotiated, and in a few weeks all Rajputana was united to Britain by compacts of one uniform character; insuring to them external protection with internal independence, as the price of acknowledged supremacy, and a portion of revenue to the protecting Government. By this comprehensive arrangement, we placed a most powerful barrier between our territories and the strong natural frontier of India; and so long as we shall respect their established usages, and by contributing to the prosperity of the people preserve our motives from distrust, it will be a barrier impenetrable to invasion.

Of all the princes who obtained succour at this momentous crisis in the political history of India, none stood more in need of it than the Rana of Udaipur. On January 16, 1818, the treaty was signed, and in February an envoy was nominated; who immediately proceeded to the Rana's court, to superintend and maintain the newly formed relations.³ The right wing of the grand army⁴ had already preceded him to compel the surrender of such territory as was unjustly held by the lawless partisans of Sindhia, and to reduce to obedience the refractory nobles, to whom anarchy

¹Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 547-587.

²The reference is to Maratha occupation and plunder.

³The author had the honour to be selected by the Marquess of Hastings to represent him at the Rana's Court, with the title of 'Political Agent to the Western Rajput States.' During the campaign of 1817-18 he was placed as the point of communication to the various divisions of the northern army; at the same time being intrusted with the negotiations with Holkar (previous to the rupture), and with those of Kotah and Bundi. He concluded the treaty with the latter State *en route* to Udaipur, where, as at the latter, there were only the benefits of moral and political existence to confer.

⁴Commanded by Major-General Sir R. Donkin, K.C.B.

was endeared from long familiarity. The strongholds in the plains, as Raipur, Rajnagar, &c. soon surrendered ; and the payment of the arrears of the garrison of Kumbhalmer put this important fortress in our possession.

In his passage from Jahajpur, which guards the range on the east to Kumbhalmer on the Aravali west, a space of 140 miles, the limits of Mewar, only two thinly-peopled towns were seen which acknowledged the Rana's authority. All was desolate ; even the traces of the footsteps of man were effaced. The babul (*mimosa Arabica*), and gigantic reed, which harboured the boar and the tiger, grew upon the highways ; and every rising ground displayed a mass of ruin. Bhilwara, the commercial *entrepot* of Rajputana, which ten years before contained six thousand families, showed not a vestige of existence. All was silent in her streets—no living thing was seen except a solitary dog, that fled in dismay from his lurking-place in the temple, scared at the unaccustomed sight of man.¹

An envoy was despatched by the Rana to congratulate the Agent, who joined him in the British camp at Nathdwara ; and while he returned to arrange the formalities of reception, the Agent obtained the cession of Kumbhalmer, which, with the acquisitions before mentioned, paved the way for a joyful reception. The prince, Javan Singh, with all the State insignia, and a numerous *cortege* advanced to receive the mission, and conduct it to the capital. A spot was fixed on in a grove of palmyras, about two miles from the city, where carpets were spread, and where the prince received the Agent and suite in a manner at once courteous and dignified.² Of him it might have been said, in the language applied by Jahangir to the son of Rana Amar—"His countenance carried the impression of his illustrious extraction."

We entered the city³ by the gate of the sun ; and through a vista of ruin the mission was inducted into its future residence,

¹ The author had passed through Bhilwara in May 1806 when it was comparatively flourishing. On this occasion (Feb. 1818) it was entirely deserted. It excited a smile, in the midst of regrets, to observe the practical wit of some of the soldiers, who had supplied the naked representative of *Adinath* with an apron—not of leaves, but scarlet cloth.

² The Agent had seen him when a boy, at a meeting already described ; but he could scarcely have hoped to find in one, to the formation of whose character the times had been so unfavourable, such a specimen as this descendant of Pratap.

³ A description of the city and valley will be more appropriate elsewhere.

once the abode of the fair Rampiyari.¹ Like all the mansions of Rajputana, it was a quadrangular pile, with an open paved area, the suites of apartments carried round the sides, with latticed or open corridors extending parallel to each suite. Another deputation with the *mehmani*, consisting of a hundred trays of sweetmeats, dried fruits, and a purse of one thousand rupees for distribution amongst the domestics, brought the Rana's welcome upon our arrival in his capital, and fixed the next day for our introduction at court.

At four in the afternoon, a deputation, consisting of the officiating prime minister, the representative of the Chundawats, with mace-bearers and a numerous escort, came to announce the Rana's readiness to receive the mission ; which, with all the "pomp and circumstance" peculiar to these countries, was marshalled in front of the Residency, thronged by crowds of well-dressed inhabitants, silently gazing at the unusual sight.² The grand Nakaras having announced the Rana in court, the mission proceeded through streets which everywhere presented marks of rapine, hailed by the most enthusiastic greetings. "Jai ! Jai ! Farangi ka Raj !" "*Victory, victory to the English Government !*" resounded from every tongue. The bards were not idle ; and the unpoetic name of the Agent was hitched into rhyme. Groups of musicians were posted here and there, who gave a passing specimen of the *tappas* of Mewar ; and not a few of the fair, with brazen ewers of water on their heads, welcomed us with the *suhelia*, or songs of joy. Into each of these vessels the purse-bearer dropped a piece of silver ; for neither the songs of the *suhelia*, the *tappas* of the minstrel, nor encomiastic stave of the bard, are to be received without some acknowledgment that you appreciate their merit and talents, however you may doubt the value they put upon your own. As we ascended the main streets leading to the Tripolia, or triple portal, which guards the sacred enclosure, dense masses of people obstructed our progress ; and even the walls of the temple of Jagannath were crowded. According to etiquette, we dismounted at the *Porte*, and proceeded on foot across the ample terrace ; on

^{*1} See Crooke, Vol. I, p. 508.

² The escort consisted of two companies of foot, each of one hundred men, with half a troop of cavalry. The gentlemen attached to the mission were Captain Waugh (who was secretary and commandant of the escort), with Lieutenant Carey as his subaltern. Dr. Duncan was the medical officer.

which were drawn up a few elephants and horse, exercising for the Rana's amusement.

The palace is a most imposing pile, of a regular form, built of granite and marble, rising at least a hundred feet from the ground, and flanked with octagonal towers, crowned with cupolas. Although built at various periods, uniformity of design has been very well preserved ; nor is there in the east a more striking or majestic structure. It stands upon the very crest of a ridge running parallel to, but considerably elevated above, the margin of the lake. The terrace, which is at the east and chief front of the palace, extends throughout its length, and is supported by a triple row of arches from the declivity of the ridge. The height of this arcaded wall is fully fifty feet ; and although all is hollow beneath, yet so admirably is it constructed, that an entire range of stables is built on the extreme verge of the terrace, on which the whole personal force of the Rana, elephants, horse, and foot, are often assembled. From this terrace the city and the valley lay before the spectator, whose vision is bounded only by the hills shutting out the plains ; while from the summit of the palace nothing obstructs its range over lake and mountain.

A band of Sindhis guarded the first entrance to the palace ; and being Saturday, the Saktawats were on duty in the great hall of assembly. Through lines of Rajputs we proceeded till we came to the marble staircase, the steps of which had taken the form of the segment of an ellipse, from the constant friction of the foot ; an image of Ganesha guarded the ascent to the interior of the palace, and the apartment, or landing, is called *Ganesha deori*, from the Rajput *Janus*. After proceeding through a suite of saloons, each filled with spectators, the herald's voice announced to "the lord of the world" that the English envoy was in his presence ; on which he arose, and advanced a few paces in front of the throne, the chieftains standing to receive the mission. Everything being ruled by precedent, the seat allotted for the envoy was immediately in front and touching the *royal cushion (gadi)* : being that assigned to the Peshwa in the height of Maratha prosperity, the arrangement, which was a subject of regular negotiation, could not be objected to. The apartment chosen for the initiatory visit was the *Surya mahal*, or "hall of the sun," so called from a medallion of the orb in basso-relievo which decorates the wall. Close thereto is placed the Rana's throne, above which, supported by slender silver columns, rises a velvet canopy.

The *Gadi*, or throne, in the East, is but a huge cushion, over which is thrown an embroidered velvet mantle. The chiefs of the higher grade, or "*the sixteen*," were seated, according to their rank, on the right and left of the Rana; next and below these were the princes Amar and Javan Singh: and at right angles (by which the court formed three sides of a square), the chiefs of the second rank. The civil officers of the State were near the Rana in front, and the seneschal, butler, keeper of the wardrobe, and other confidential officers and inferior chieftains, formed a group standing on the extreme edge of the carpet.

The Rana's congratulations were hearty and sincere: in a few powerful expressions he depicted the miseries he had experienced, the fallen condition of his State, and the gratitude he felt to the British Government which had interposed between him and destruction; and which for the first moment of his existence allowed him to sleep in peace. There was an intense earnestness in every word he uttered, which, delivered with great fluency of speech and dignity of manner, inspired deep respect and sympathy. The Agent said, that the Governor-General was no stranger to the history of his illustrious family, or his own immediate sufferings; and that it was his earnest desire to promote, by every means in his power, the Rana's personal dignity and prosperity of his dominions. After conversing a few minutes, the interview was closed with presents to the Agent and suite: to the former a caparisoned elephant and horse, jewelled aigrette, and pearl necklace, with shawls and brocades; and with the customary presentation of essence of rose and the pan leaf, the Rana and court rising, the envoy made his *salaam* and retired. In a short time the Rana, attended by his second son, ministers, and a select number of the chiefs, honoured the envoy with a visit. The latter advanced beyond his residence to meet the prince, who was received with presented arms by the guard, the officers saluting, and conducted to his throne, which had been previously arranged. Conversation was now unrestrained, and questions were demanded regarding everything which appeared unusual. After sitting half an hour, the Agent presented the Rana with an elephant and two horses, caparisoned with silver and gilt ornaments and velvet embroidered housings, with *twenty-one shields*¹ of shawls, brocades, muslins, and jewels; to prince Amar, unable from sick-

¹ The buckler is the tray in which gifts are presented by the Rajputs.

ness to attend his father a horse and *eleven shields*; and to his brother, the second prince, Javan Singh a horse and *nine shields*; to the ministers and chiefs according to rank: the whole entertainment costing about 20,000 rupees, or £2,000. Amidst these ceremonials, receiving and returning visits of the Rana, his chiefs, his ministers, and men of influence and information commercial and agricultural, some weeks passed in silent observation, and in the acquisition of materials for action.¹

For the better comprehension of the internal relations, past and present, of Mewar, a sketch is presented, showing the political divisions of the tribes and the fiscal domain, from which a better idea may be formed of Rajput feudal economy than from a chapter of dissertation. The princes of Mewar skilfully availed themselves of their natural advantages in the partition of the country. The mountain-barriers east and west were allotted to the chiefs to keep the mountaineers and foresters in subjection, whose leading passes were held by a *lord-marcher*, and the quotas of his quarter; and while strong forts guarded the exposed northern and southern entrances, the crown-land lay in the centre, the safest and the richest. The exterior, thus guarded by a cordon of feudal levies composed of the quotas of the greater fiefs; the

¹ If we dare compare the moral economy of an entire people to the physical economy of the individual, we should liken this period in the history of Mewar to intermittent pulsation of the heart—a pause in moral as in physical existence; a consciousness thereof, intently awaiting the propelling power to restore healthful action to a state of languid repose; or what the Rajput would better comprehend, his own condition when the opiate stimulant begins to dissipate, and mind and body are alike abandoned to helpless imbecility. Who has lived out of the circle of mere vegetation, and not experienced this temporary deprivation of moral vitality? for no other simile would suit the painful pause in the sympathies of the inhabitants of this once fertile region, where experience could point out but one page in their annals, one period in their history, when the clangour of the war trumpet was suspended, or the sword shut up in its scabbard. The portals of Janus at Rome were closed but twice in a period of seven hundred years; and in exactly the same time from the conquest by Shihabuddin to the great pacification, but twice can we record peace in Mewar—the reign of Numa has its type in Shah Jahan, while the more appropriate reign of Augustus belongs to Britain. Are we to wonder then that a chilling void now occupied (if the solecism is admissible) the place of interminable action? when the mind was released from the anxiety of daily, hourly, devising schemes of preservation, to one of perfect security—that enervating calm in which, to use their own homely phrase, *Sher aur bakri ekhi thali se piye*, ‘the wolf and the goat drank from the same vessel.’ But this unruffled torpidity had its limit: the Agrarian laws of Mewar were but mentioned, and the national pulse instantly rose.

minor and most numerous class of vassals, termed *gol*, literally "the mass," and consisting of ten thousand horse, each holding directly of the crown independent of the greater chiefs, formed its best security against both external aggression and internal commotions.

Such is a picture of the feudal economy of Mewar in the days of her renown ; but so much had it been defaced through time and accident, that with difficulty could the lineaments be traced with a view to their restoration ; her institutions a dead letter, the prince's authority despised, the nobles demoralized and rebellious, internal commerce abandoned, and the peasantry destroyed by the combined operation of war, pestilence, and exile. Expression might be racked for phrases which could adequately delineate the miseries all classes had endured. It is impossible to give more than a sketch of the state of the *das sahas Mewar*, 'the ten thousand townships' which once acknowledged her princes, and of which above three thousand still exist. All that remained to them was the valley of the capital ; and though Chitor and Mandalgarh were maintained by the fidelity of the Rana's servants, their precarious revenues scarcely sufficed to maintain their garrisons. The Rana was mainly indebted to Zalim Singh of Kotah for the means of subsistence ; for in the struggle for existence his chiefs thought only of themselves, of defending their own estates, or buying off their foes ; while those who had succumbed took to horse, scoured the country, and plundered without distinction. Inferior clanships declared themselves independent of their superiors, who in their turn usurped the crown domain, or by bribing the necessities of their prince, obtained his patent for lands, to which, as they yielded him nothing, he became indifferent. The crown-tenants purchased of these chiefs the protection (*rakhwali*) which the Rana could not grant, and made alienations of the *crown taxes*, besides private rights of the community, which were often extorted at the point of the lance. Feuds multiplied, and the name of each clan became the watchword of alarm or defiance to its neighbour : castles were assaulted, and their inmates, as at Sheogarh and Lawa, put to the sword ; the Mers and Bhils descended from their hills, or emerged from their forests, and planted ambuscades for the traveller or merchant, whom they robbed or carried to their retreats, where they languished in durance till ransomed. Marriage-processions were thus intercepted, and the honeymoon was passed on a cliff of the

Aravalli, or in the forests on the Mahi. The Rajput, whose moral energies were blunted, scrupled not to associate and to divide the spoil with these lawless tribes, of whom it might be said, as of the children of Ishmael, "Their hands were against every man, and every man's hand against them." Yet notwithstanding such entire disorganization of society, external commerce was not stagnant; and in the midst of this rapine, the produce of Europe and Kashmir would pass each other in transit through Mewar, loaded it is true by a multiplicity of exactions, but guarded by those who scorned all law but the *point of honour*, which they were paid for preserving.

The capital will serve as a specimen of the country. Udaipur, which formerly reckoned fifty thousand houses within the walls, had not now three thousand occupied, the rest were in ruin, the rafters being taken for fire-wood. The realisation of the spring harvest of 1818, from the entire fiscal land, was about £4,000! Grain sold for seven seers the rupee, though thrice the quantity was procurable within the distance of eighty miles. Insurance from the capital to Nathdwara (twenty-five miles) was eight per cent. The Kotharia chief, whose ancestors are immortalized for fidelity, had not a horse to conduct him to his prince's presence, though his estates were of fifty thousand rupees annual value. All were in ruins; and the Rana, the descendant of those patriot Rajputs who opposed Babur, Akbar, and Aurangzeb, in the days of Mughal splendour, had not fifty horse to attend him, and was indebted for all the comforts he possessed to the liberality of Kotah.

Such was the chaos from which order was to be evoked. But the elements of prosperity, though scattered, were not extinct; and recollections of the past deeply engraved in the national mind, became available to re-animate their moral and physical existence. To call these forth demanded only exertion of moral interference, and every other was rejected. The lawless freebooter, and even the savage Bhil, felt awed at the agency of a power never seen. To him moral opinion (compared with which the strength of armies is nought) was inexplicable, and he substituted in its stead another invisible power—that of magic: and the belief was current throughout the intricate region of the West, that a single individual could carry an army in his pocket, and that our power could animate slips of paper cut into the figures of armed men, from which no precaution could guard their retreats. Accordingly,

at the mere name of the British power, rapine ceased, and the inhabitants of the wilds of the West, the "forest lords," who had hitherto laughed at subjection, to the number of seven hundred villages, put each the sign of the dagger to a treaty, promising abstinence from plunder and a return to industrious life—a single individual of no rank the negotiator. Moreover, the treaty was religiously kept for twelve months; when the peace was broken, not by them, but against them.

To the Rajput, the moral spectacle of a Peshwa marched into exile with all the quietude of a pilgrimage, effected more than twenty thousand bayonets, and no other auxiliary was required than the judicious use of the impressions from this and other passing events, to relay the foundations of order and prosperity—by never doubting the issue, success was insured. The British force, therefore, after the reduction of the plans enumerated, was marched to cantonments; the rest was left for time and reason to accomplish.

Before proceeding further, it may be convenient to sketch the form of civil government in Mewar, and the characters of its most conspicuous members: the former we shall describe as it was when the machine was in regular action; it will be found simple, and perfectly suited to its object.

There are four grand officers of the Government:—

- 1st. The *Pradhan*, or prime minister;
- 2nd. *Bakhshi*, commander of the forces;
- 3rd. *Suratnama*¹, keeper of the records;
- 4th. *Sahai*, keeper of the signet.²

The first, the *Pradhan*, or civil premier, must be of the non-militant tribe. The whole of the territorial and financial arrangements are vested in him. He nominates the civil governors of districts, and the collectors of the revenue and custom; and has fourteen *thuas*, or departments, under him, which embrace all that relates to expenditure.

2d. The *Bakhshi* must also be of a non-militant tribe, and one different from the *Pradhan*. His duties are mixed civil and military. He takes the musters, and pays mercenaries, or rations, to the feudal tenants when on extra service, and he appoints a deputy

¹ "Properly *Suratnavis*, 'statement-writer'." (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 557.)

² Or rather, who makes the monogrammatic signet "*Sahi*" to all deeds, grants, &c.

to accompany all expeditions, or to head frontier-posts, with the title of *Faujdar*, or commander. The royal insignia, the standard, and keettle-drums accompany him, and the highest nobles assemble under the general control of this civil officer, never under one of their own body. From the *Bakhshi's* bureau all patents are issued, as also all letters of sequestration of feudal land.

The *Bakhshi* has four secretaries :—

- 1st. Draws out deeds ;
- 2nd. Accountant ;
- 3rd. Recorder of all patents or grants ;
- 4th. Keeps duplicates.

3rd. The *Suratnama* is the auditor and recorder of all the household expenditure and establishments, which are paid by his cheques. He has four assistants also, who make a daily report, and give a daily balance of accounts.

4th. The *Sahai*. He is secretary both for home and foreign correspondence. He draws out the royal grants or patents of estates, and superintends the deeds of grant on copper-plate to religious establishments. Since the privilege appertaining to Salumbar, of confirming all royal grants with his signet *the lance*, has fallen into desuetude, the *Sahai* executes this military autograph.¹

To all decrees, from the daily stipend to the *pattu*, or patent of an estate, each minister must append his seal, so that there is a complete system of check. Besides these, the higher officers of Government, there are thirty-six *karkhanas*, or inferior officers, appointed directly by the Rana, the most conspicuous of which are the justiciary,² the keepers of the register-office, of the mint, of the armoury, of the regalia, of the jewels, of the wardrobe, of the stables, of the kitchen, of the band, of the seneschalsy, and of the seraglio.

There was no want of aspirants to office, here hereditary ; but it was vain to look amongst the descendants of the virtuous Pancholi, or the severe Amarchand, and the prediction of the former, "Dust will cover the head of Mewar when virtue wanders in rags," was strictly fulfilled. There appeared no talent,

¹ The Salumbar chief had his deputy, who resided at court for this sole duty, for which he held a village. * See Crooke, Vol. I, p. 235.

² Niyao, Daftar, Taksala, Silah, Gadi, Gahna, Kaprabandar, Ghora, Rasora, Nakkar-khana, Jaleb, Rawala.

no influence, no honesty ; yet the deficiency was calculated to excite sorrow rather than surprise ; to stimulate exertion on their behalf, rather than damp the hope of improvement ; though all scope for action, save in the field of intrigue, was lost, and talent was dormant for want of exercise.

The Rana's character¹ was little calculated to supply his minister's deficiencies. Though perfectly versed in the past history of his country, its resources, and their management ; though able, wise, and amiable, his talents were nullified by numerous weak points. Vain shows, frivolous amusements, and an ill-regulated liberality alone occupied him ; and so long as he could gratify these propensities, he trusted complacently to the exertions of others for the restoration of order and his proper authority. He had little steadiness of purpose, and was particularly obnoxious to female influence. It is scarcely to be wondered that he coveted repose, and was little desirous to disturb the only moment his existence had presented of enjoying it, by inviting the turmoils of business. No man, however, was more capable of advising : his judgment was good, but he seldom followed its dictates ; in short, he was an adept in theory, and a novice in practice. The only man about the court at once of integrity and efficiency was Kishendas, who had long acted as ambassador, and to whose assiduity the sovereign and the country owed much ; but his services were soon cut off by death.

Such were the materials with which the work of reform commenced. The aim was to bring back matters to a correspondence with an era of their history, when the rights of the prince, the vassal, and the cultivator, were alike well defined—that of Amar Singh.

The first point to effect was the recognition of the prince's authority by his nobles ; the surest sign of which was their presence at the capital, where some had never been, and others only when it suited their convenience or their views. In a few weeks the Rana saw himself surrounded by a court such as had not been known for half a century. It created no small curiosity to learn by what secret power they were brought into each other's presence.

^{*1} Tod says elsewhere about Rana Bhim Singh (1778-1828) : "He was but eight years of age on his accession, and remained under his mother's tutelage long after his minority had expired. This subjection fixed his character ; naturally defective in energy, and impaired by long misfortune, he continued to be swayed by faction and intrigue." (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 511).

Even the lawless Hamira, who but a short while before had plundered the marriage dower of Hari queen coming from Kotah, and the chief of the Sangawat clan, who had sworn "he might bend his head to woman, but never to his sovereign," left their castles of Badesar and Deogarh, and "placing the royal rescript on their heads," hastened to his presence; and in a few weeks the whole feudal association of Mewar was embodied in the capital.

To recall the exiled population was a measure simultaneous with the assembling of the nobles; but this was a work requiring time; they had formed ties, and incurred obligations to the societies which had sheltered them, which could not at once be disengaged or annulled. But wherever a subject of Mewar existed, proclamations penetrated, and satisfactory assurances were obtained, and realized to an extent which belied in the strongest manner the assertion that patriotism is unknown to the natives of Hindustan. The most enthusiastic and cheering proofs were afforded, that neither oppression from without, nor tyranny within, could expel the feeling for the '*bapota*,' the land of their fathers. Even now, though time has chastened the impressions, we should fear to pen but a tithe of the proofs of devotion of the husbandman of Mewar to the *solum natale*: it would be deemed romance by those who never contemplated humanity in its reflux from misery and despair to the 'sweet influences' of hope; he alone who had witnessed the day of trouble, and beheld the progress of desolation—the standing corn grazed by Maratha horse—the rifled towns devoted to the flames—the cattle driven to the camp, and the chief men seized as hostages for money never to be realized—could appreciate their deliverance. To be permitted to see those evils banished, to behold the survivors of oppression congregated from the most distant provinces, many of them strangers to each other, and the helpless awaiting the *lucky day* to take possession of their ruined abodes, was a sight which memory will not part with. Thus on the 3rd of Sawan (July), a favourite day with the husbandman, three hundred of all conditions, with their waggons and implements of labour, and preceded by banners and music, marched into Kapasan;¹ and *Ganesh* was once again invoked as they reconsecrated their dwellings, and placed his portrait as the Janus of their portals. On the same day, and within eight months subsequent to the signature of the treaty, above three hundred towns

*¹About 35 miles north of Udaipur City.

and villages were *simultaneously* re-inhabited ; and the land, which for many years had been a stranger to the plough-share, was broken up. Well might the superstitious fancy that miracles were abroad ; for even to those who beheld the work in progression it had a magical result, to see the waste covered with habitations, and the verdant corn growing in the fields where lately they had roused the boar from his retreat ! It was a day of pride for Britain ! By such exertions of her power in these distant lands her sway is hallowed. By Britain alone can this fair picture be defaced ; the tranquillity and independence she has conferred, by her alone may be disturbed !

To these important preliminary measures, the assembly of the nobles and recall of the population, was added a third, without which the former would have been nugatory. There was no wealth, no capital, to aid their patriotism and industry. Foreign merchants and bankers had abandoned the devoted land ; and those who belonged to it partook of her poverty and her shame. Money was scarce, and want of faith and credit had increased the usury on loans to a ruinous extent. The Rana borrowed at thirty-six per cent. ; besides twenty-five to forty per cent. discount for his *barats*, or patents empowering collection on the land ; a system pursued for some time even after his restoration to authority. His profusion exceeded even the rapidity of renovation ; and the husbandman had scarcely broken up his long-waste fields, when a call was made by the harpies of the State for an advance on their produce, while he himself had been compelled to borrow at a like ruinous rate for seed and the means of support, to be paid by expectations. To have hoped for the revival of prosperity amidst such destitution, moral and pecuniary, would have been visionary. It was as necessary to improve the one, as to find the other : for poverty and virtue do not long associate, and certainly not in Mewar. Proclamations were therefore prepared by the Rana, inviting foreign merchants and bankers to establish connections in the chief towns throughout the country ; but as in the days of demoralization little faith was placed in the words of princes, similar ones were prepared by the Agent, guaranteeing the stipulations, and both were distributed to every commercial city in India. The result was as had been foreseen : branch banks were everywhere formed, and mercantile agents fixed in every town in the country, whose operations were only limited by the slow growth of moral improvement. The shackles which bound

external commerce were at once removed, and the multifarious posts for the collections of transit duties abolished : in lieu of which chain of stations, all levies on goods in transit were confined to the frontiers. The scale of duties was revised : and by the abolition of intermediate posts, they underwent a reduction of from thirty to fifty per cent. By this system, which could not for some time be comprehended, the transit and custom duties of Mewar made the most certain part of the revenue, and in a few years exceeded in amount what had ever been known.

The chief commercial mart, Bhilwara, which showed not a vestige of humanity, rapidly rose from ruin, and in a few months contained twelve hundred houses, half of which were occupied by foreign merchants. Bales of goods, the produce of the most distant lands, were piled up in the streets lately overgrown with grass, and a weekly fair was established for the home manufactures. A charter of privileges and immunities was issued, exempting them from all taxation for the first year, and graduating the scale for the future ; calculated with the same regard to improvement, by giving the mind the full range of enjoying the reward of its exertions. The right of electing their own chief magistrates and the assessors of justice, was above all things indispensable, so as to render them as independent as possible of the needy servants of the court. A guard was provided by the Government for their protection, and a competent authority nominated to see that the full extent of their privileges, and the utmost freedom of action, were religiously maintained. The entire success of this plan may at once be recorded to prevent repetition. In 1822, Bhilwara contained nearly three thousand dwellings, which were chiefly inhabited by merchants, bankers, or artisans. An entire new street had been constructed in the centre of the town, from the duties levied, and the shops and houses were rented at a moderate rate ; while many were given up to the proprietors of their sites, returning from exile, on their paying the price of construction. But as there is no happiness without alloy, so even this pleasing picture had its dark shades to chasten the too sanguine expectation of imparting happiness to all. Instead of a generous emulation, a jealous competition checked the prosperity of Bhilwara ; the base spirit of exclusive monopoly desired a distinction between the native and the stranger-merchant, for which they had a precedent in the latter paying an addition to the town-duty of *metage* (*mapa*). The unreasonableness of this was discussed, and

it was shown to be more consonant to justice that he who came from Jaisalmer, Surat, Benares, or Delhi, should pay less than the merchant whose domicile was on the spot. When at length the parties acquiesced in this opinion, and were intreated and promised to know none other distinction than that of "inhabitant of Bhilwara," sectarian differences, which there was less hope of reconciling, became the cause of disunion. All the Hindu merchants belong either to the Vishnu or Jain sects; consequently each had a representative head, and "*the five*" for the adjudication of their internal arrangements; and these, the wise men of both parties, formed the general council for the affairs of Bhilwara. But they carried their religious differences to the judgment seat, where each desired pre-eminence. Whether the point in dispute hinged on the interpretation of law, which with all these sects is of divine origin, or whether the mammon of unrighteousness was the lurking cause of their bickerings, they assuredly did much harm, for their appeals brought into play what of all things was least desired, the intrigues of the profligate dependents of the court. It will be seen hereafter,¹ in visits to Bhilwara, how these disputes were in some degree calmed. The leaders on both sides were distinctly given to understand they would be made to leave the place. Self-interest prevented this extremity; but from the withdrawing of that active interference (which the state of the alliance did not indeed warrant, but which humanity interposed for their benefit) together with the effect of appeals to the court, it is to be apprehended that Bhilwara may fail to become what it was intended to be, the chief commercial mart of Central India.²

Of the three measures simultaneously projected and pursued for the restoration of prosperity, the industrious portion has been described. The feudal interest remains, which was found the most difficult to arrange. The agricultural and commercial classes required only protection and stimulus, and we could repay the

¹ In the Personal Narrative.

² Although Bhilwara has not attained that high prosperity my enthusiasm anticipated, yet the philanthropic Heber records that in 1825 (three years after I had left the country) it exhibited "a greater appearance of trade, industry, and moderate but widely diffused wealth and comfort, than he had witnessed since he left Delhi." The record of the sentiments of the inhabitants towards me, as conveyed by the bishop, was gratifying, though their expression could excite no surprise in any one acquainted with the characters and sensibilities of these people.

benefits their industry conferred by the lowest scale of taxation, which, though in fact equally beneficial to the Government, was construed as a boon. But with the feudal lords there was no such equivalent to offer in return for the sacrifices many had to make for the re-establishment of society. Those who were well inclined, like Kotharia, had everything to gain, and nothing left to surrender; while those who, like Deogarh, Salumbar, or Bednore, had preserved their power by foreign aid, intrigue, or prowess, dreaded the high price they might be called upon to pay for the benefit of security which the alliance conferred. All dreaded the word 'restitution,' and the audit of half a century's political accounts; yet the adjustment of these was the cornerstone of the edifice, which anarchy and oppression had dismantled. Feuds were to be appeased, a difficult and hazardous task; and usurpations, both on the crown and each other, to be redeemed. "To bring the wolf and the goat to drink from the same vessel," was a task of less difficulty than to make the Chundawat and Saktawat labour in concert for the welfare of the prince and the country. In fine, a better idea cannot be afforded of what was deemed the hopelessness of success than the opinion of Zorawar Singh, the chief of the latter clan, who had much to relinquish: "Were *Parameswara* (the Almighty) to descend, he could not reform Mewar." We judged better of them than they did of each other.

It were superfluous to detail all the preparatory measures for the accomplishment of this grand object; the meetings and adjournments, which only served to keep alive discontent. On the 27th of April, the treaty with the British Government was read, and the consequent change in their relations explained. Meanwhile, a charter,¹ defining the respective rights of the crown and of the chiefs, with their duties to the community, was prepared, and a day named for a general assembly of the chieftains to sanction and ratify this engagement. The 1st of May was fixed: the chiefs assembled; the articles, ten in number, were read and warmly discussed; when with unmeaning expressions of duty, and objections to the least prominent, they obtained through their speaker, Gokul Das of Deogarh, permission to reassemble at his house to consider them, and broke up with the promise to attend next day. The delay, as apprehended, only generated opposition, and the 2nd and 3rd passed in intercom-

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties*, Vol. III, pp. 43-44.

munications of individual hope and fear. It was important to put an end to speculation. At noon, on the 4th of May, the grand hall was again filled, when the Rana, with his sons and ministers, took their seats. Once more the articles were read, objections raised and combated, and midnight had arrived without the object of the meeting being advanced, when an adjournment, proposed by Gokul Das, till the arrival of the Rana's plenipotentiary from Delhi, met with a firm denial; and the Rana gave him liberty to retire, if he refused his testimony of loyalty. The Begun chief, who had much to gain, at length set the example, followed by the chiefs of Amet and Deogarh, and in succession by all the sixteen nobles, who also signed as the proxies of their relatives, unable from sickness to attend. The most powerful of the second grade also signed for themselves and the absent of their clans, each, as he gave in his adhesion, retiring; and it was three in the morning of the 5th of May ere the ceremony was over. The chief of the Saktawats, determined to be conspicuous, was the last of his own class to sign. During this lengthened and painful discussion of fifteen hours' continuance, the Rana conducted himself with such judgment and firmness, as to give sanguine hopes of his taking the lead in the settlement of his affairs.

This preliminary adjusted, it was important that the stipulations of the treaty should be rigidly, if not rapidly effected. It will not be a matter of surprise, that some months passed away before the complicated arrangements arising out of this settlement were completed; but it may afford just grounds for gratulation, that they were finally accomplished without a shot being fired, or the exhibition of a single British soldier in the country, nor, indeed, within one hundred miles of Udaipur. "Opinion" was the sole and all-sufficient ally effecting this political reform. The Rajputs, in fact, did not require the demonstration of our physical strength; its influence had reached far beyond Mewar. When a few firelocks defeated hundreds of the foes of public tranquillity, they attributed it to "*the strength of the Company's Salt*,"¹ the

¹ "*Kampani Sahab ka namak ka zor se*" is a common phrase of our native soldiery; and "*Dohai! Kampani ka!*" is an invocation or appeal against injustice; but I never heard this watch-word so powerfully applied as when a *Sub.* with the Resident's escort in 1812. One of our men, a noble young Rajput about nineteen years of age, and six feet high, had been sent with an elephant to forage in the wilds of Narwar. A band of at least fifty predatory horsemen assailed him, and demanded the

moral agency of which was proclaimed the true basis of our power. "*Sachha Raj*" was the proud epithet applied by our new allies to the British Government in the East ; a title which distinguished the immortal Alfred, "the upright."

It will readily be imagined that a reform, which went to touch the entire feudal association, could not be accomplished without harassing and painful discussions, when the object was the renunciation of lands, to which in some cases the right of inheritance could be pleaded, in others, the cognizance of successful revenge, while to many prescriptive possession could be asserted. It was the more painful, because although the shades which marked the acquisition of such lands were varied, no distinction could be made in the mode of settlement, *viz.* unconditional surrender. In some cases, the Rana had to revoke his own grants, wrung either from his necessities or his weakness ; but in neither predicament could arguments be adduced to soften renunciation, or to meet the powerful and pathetic, and often angry appeals to justice or to prejudice. Counter-appeals to their loyalty, and the necessity for the re-establishment of their sovereign's just weight and influence in the social body, without which their own welfare could not be secured, were adduced ; but individual views and passions were too absorbing to bend to the general interest. Weeks thus passed in interchange of visits, in soothing pride, and in flattering vanity by the revival of past recollections, which gradually familiarized the subject to the minds of the chiefs, and brought them to compliance. Time, conciliation, and impartial justice, confirmed the victory thus obtained ; and when they were made to see that no interest was overlooked, that party views were unknown, and that the system included every class of society in its beneficial operation, cordiality followed concession. Some of these cessions were alienations

surrender of the elephant, which he met by pointing his musket and giving them defiance. Beset on all sides, he fired, was cut down, and left for dead, in which state he was found, and brought to camp upon a litter. One sabre-cut had opened the back entirely across, exposing the action of the viscera, and his arms and wrists were barbarously hacked: yet he was firm, collected, and even cheerful ; and to a kind reproach for his rashness, he said, "What would you have said, Captain Sahib, had I surrendered the Company's musket (*Kampani ka banduq*) without fighting ?" From their temperate habits, the wound in the back did well ; but the severed nerves of the wrists brought on a lock-jaw of which he died. The Company have thousands who would alike die for their *banduq*. It were wise to cherish such feelings.

from the crown of half a century's duration. Individual cases of hardship were unavoidable without incurring the imputation of favouritism, and the dreaded revival of ancient feuds, to abolish which was indispensable, but required much circumspection. Castles and lands in this predicament could therefore neither be retained by the possessor nor returned to the ancient proprietor without rekindling the torch of civil war. The sole alternative was for the crown to take the object of contention, and make compensation from its own domain. It would be alike tedious and uninteresting to enter into the details of these arrangements, where one chief had to relinquish the levy of transit duties in the most important outlet of the country, asserted to have been held during seven generations, as in the case of the chief of Deogarh. Of another (the Bhindar chief) who held *forty-three towns and villages*, in addition to his grant ; of Amet, of Badesar, of Dabla, of Lawa, and many others who held important fortresses of the crown independent of its will ; and other claims, embracing every right and privilege appertaining to feudal society ; suffice it, that in six months the whole arrangements were effected.

In the painful and protracted discussions attendant on these arrangements, powerful traits of national character were developed. The castle and domain of Arja half a century ago belonged to the crown, but had been usurped by the Purawats, from whom it was wrested by storm about fifteen years back by the Saktawats, and a patent sanctioning possession was obtained, on the payment of a fine of £1,000 to the Rana. Its surrender was now required from Fateh Singh, the second brother of Bhindar, the head of this clan ; but being regarded as the victorious completion of a feud, it was not easy to silence their prejudices and objections. The renunciation of the forty-three towns and villages by the chief of the clan caused not half the excitation, and every Saktawat seemed to forgo his individual losses in the common sentiment expressed by their head : "Arja is the price of blood, and with its cession our honour is surrendered." To preserve the point of honour, it was stipulated that it should not revert to the Purawats, but be incorporated with the fisc, which granted an equivalent ; when letters of surrender were signed by both brothers, whose conduct throughout was manly and confiding.

The Bednore and Amet chiefs, both of the superior grade of nobles, were the most formidable obstacles to the operation of the treaty of the 4th of May. The first of these, by name Jeth

Singh (*the victorious lion*), was of the Mertia clan, the bravest of the brave race of Rathor, whose ancestors had left their native abodes on the plains of Marwar, and accompanied the celebrated Mira Bai on her marriage with Rana Kumbha.¹ His descendants, amongst whom was Jaimal, of immortal memory, enjoyed honours in Mewar equal to their birth and high deserts. It was the more difficult to treat with men like these, whose conduct had been a contrast to the general license of the times, and who had reason to feel offended, when no distinction was observed between them and those who had disgraced the name of Rajput. Instead of the submission expected from the Rathor, so overwhelmed was he from the magnitude of the claims, which amounted to a virtual extinction of his power, that he begged leave to resign his estates and quit the country. In prosecution of this design, he took post in the chief hall of the palace, from which no entreaties could make him move; until the Rana, to escape his importunities, and even restraint, obtained his promise to abide by the decision of the Agent. The forms of the Rana's court, from time immemorial, prohibit all personal communication between the sovereign and his chiefs in matters of individual interest, by which indecorous altercation is avoided. But the ministers, whose office it was to obtain every information, did not make a rigid scrutiny into the title-deeds of the various estates, previous to advancing the claims of the crown. This brave man had enemies, and he was too proud to have recourse to the common arts either of adulation or bribery to aid his cause. It was a satisfaction to find that the two principal towns demanded of him were embodied in a grant of Sangram Singh's reign; and the absolute rights of the fisc, of which he had become possessed, were cut down to about fifteen thousand rupees of annual revenue. But there were other points on which he was even more tenacious than the surrender of these. Being the chief noble of the fine district of Bednore, which consisted of three hundred and sixty towns and villages, chiefly of feudal allotments (many of them of his own clan), he had taken advantage of the times to establish his influence over them, to assume the right of wardship of minors, and secure those services which were due to the prince, but which he wanted the power to enforce. The holders of these estates

^{*1} The tradition that Mira Bai was Rana Kumbha's wife is not correct.

were of the third class of vassals or *gol* (the mass), whose services it was important to reclaim, and who constituted in past times the most efficient force of the Ranas, and were the preponderating balance of their authority when mercenaries were unknown in these patriarchal States. Abundant means towards a just investigation had been previously procured; and after some discussion, in which all admissible claims were recognized, and argument was silenced by incontrovertible facts, this chieftain relinquished all that was demanded, and sent in, as from himself, his written renunciation to his sovereign. However convincing the data by which his proper rights and those of his prince were defined, it was to feeling and prejudice that we were mainly indebted for so satisfactory an adjustment. An appeal to the name of Jaimal, who fell defending Chitor against Akbar,¹ and the contrast of his ancestor's loyalty and devotion with his own contumacy, acted as a talisman, and wrung tears from his eyes and the deed from his hand. It will afford some idea of the difficulties encountered, as well as the invidiousness of the task of arbitrating such matters, to give his own comment verbatim: "I remained faithful when his own kin deserted him, and was one of four chiefs who alone of all Mewar fought for him in the rebellion; but the son of Jaimal is forgotten, while the '*plunderer*' is his boon companion, and though of inferior rank, receives an estate which elevates him above me"; alluding to the chief of Badesar, who plundered the queen's dower. But while the brave descendant of Jaimal returned to Bednore with the marks of his sovereign's favour, and the applause of those he esteemed, the '*runner*' went back to Badesar in disgrace, to which his prince's injudicious favour further contributed.

Hamira of Badesar was of the second class of nobles, a Chundawat by birth. He succeeded to his father Sardar Singh, the assassin of the prime minister even in the palace of his sovereign;² into whose presence he had the audacity to pursue the surviving brother, destined to avenge him.³ Hamira inherited all

*¹ See Crooke, Vol. I, p. 380.

*² See Crooke, Vol. I, p. 514 and note.

³ It will fill up the picture of the times to relate the revenge. When Jamshid, the infamous lieutenant of the infamous Amir Khan, established his headquarters at Udaipur, which he daily devastated, Sardar Singh, then in power, was seized and confined as a hostage for the payment of thirty thousand rupees demanded of the Rana. The surviving brothers of the murdered minister Somji "*purchased their foe*" with the sum

the turbulence and disaffection, with the estates, of his father ; and this most conspicuous of the many lawless chieftains of the times was known throughout Rajasthan as Hamira '*the runner*' (*daurayat*). Though not entitled to hold lands beyond thirty thousand annually, he had become possessed to the amount of eighty thousand, chiefly of the fisc or *khalisa*, and nearly all obtained by violence, though since confirmed by the prince's patent. With the chieftain of Lawa (precisely in the same predicament), who held the fortress of Kheroda and other valuable lands, Hamira resided entirely at the palace, and obtaining the Rana's ear by professions of obedience, kept possession, while chiefs in every respect his superiors had been compelled to surrender ; and when at length the Saktawat of Lawa was forbid the court until Kheroda and all his usurpations were yielded up, the son of Sardar displayed his usual turbulence, "curled his moustache" at the minister, and hinted at the fate of his predecessor. Although none dared to imitate him, his stubbornness was not without admirers, especially among his own clan ; and as it was too evident that fear or favour swayed the Rana, it was a case for the Agent's interference, the opportunity for which was soon afforded. When forced to give letters of surrender, the Rana's functionaries, who went to take possession, were insulted, refused admittance, and compelled to return. Not a moment could be lost in punishing this contempt of authority ; and as the Rana was holding a court when the report arrived, the Agent requested an audience. He found the Rana and his chiefs assembled in "the balcony of the sun," and amongst them the notorious Hamira. After the usual compliments, the Agent asked the minister if his master had been put in possession of Syana. It was evident from the general constraint, that all were acquainted with the result of the deputation ; but to remove responsibility from the minister, the Agent, addressing the Rana as if he were in ignorance of the insult, related the transaction, and observed that his Government would hold him culpable if

demanded, and anticipated his clansmen who were on the point of effecting his liberation. The same sun shone on the head of Sardar, which was placed as a signal of revenge over the gateway of Rampiyari's palace. I had the anecdotes from the minister Siyahai, one of the actors in these tragedies, and a relative of the brothers, who were all swept away by the dagger. A similar fate often seemed to him, though a brave man, inevitable during these resumptions ; which impression, added to the Rana's known inconstancy of favour, robbed him of half his energies.

he remained at Udaipur while his highness's commands were disregarded. Thus supported, the Rana resumed his dignity, and in forcible language signified to all present his anxious desire to do nothing which was harsh or ungracious ; but that, thus compelled, he would not recede from what became him as their sovereign. Calling for a *bira*, he looked sternly at Hamira, and commanded him to quit his presence instantly, and the capital in an hour ; and, but for the Agent's interposition, he would have been banished the country. Confiscation of his whole estate was commanded, until renunciation was completed. He departed that night ; and, contrary to expectation, not only were all the usurpations surrendered, but, what was scarcely contemplated by the Agent, the Rana's flag of sequestration was quietly admitted into the fortress of Badesar.¹

One more anecdote may suffice. The lands and fortress of Amli had been in the family of Amet since the year 27, only five years posterior to the date to which these arrangements extended ; their possession verged on half a century. The lords of Amet were of the Sixteen, and were chiefs of the clan Jagawat. The present representative enjoyed a fair character ; he could, with the chief of Bednore, claim the succession of the loyal ; for Pratap and Jaimal, their respective ancestors, were rivals and martyrs on that memorable day when the genius of Chitor abandoned the Sesodias. But the heir of Amet had not this alone to support his claims ; for his predecessor Pratap had lost his life in defending his country against the Marathas, and Amli had been his acquisition. Fateh Singh (such was his name) was put forward by the more artful of his immediate kin, the Chundawat interest ; but his disposition, blunt and impetuous, was little calculated to promote their views : he was an honest Rajput, who neither could nor cared to conceal his anger, and at a ceremonious visit paid him by the Agent, he had hardly sufficient control over himself to be courteous, and though he said nothing,

¹ Nearly twelve months after this, my public duty called me to Nimbhera *en route* to Kotah. The castle of Hamira was within an hour's ride, and at night he was reported as having arrived to visit me, when I appointed the next day to receive him. Early next morning, according to custom, I took my ride, with four of Skinner's Horse, and galloped past him, stretched with his followers on the ground not far from my camp, towards his forts. He came to me "after breakfast, called me his greatest friend, swore by his dagger he was my Rajput," and that he would be in future obedient and loyal ; but this, I fear, can never be.

his eyes, inflamed with opium and disdain, spoke his feelings. He maintained a dogged indifference, and was inaccessible to argument, till at length, following the example of Bednore, he was induced to abide by the Agent's mediation. He came attended by his vassals, who anxiously awaited the result, which an unpremeditated incident facilitated. After a long and fruitless expostulation, he had taken refuge in an obstinate silence; and seated in a chair opposite to the envoy, with his shield in front, placed perpendicularly on his knees, and his arms and head reclined thereon, he continued vacantly looking on the ground. To interrupt this uncourteous silence in his own house, the envoy took a picture, which with several others was at hand, and placing it before him remarked, "*That* chief did not gain his reputation for *swamidharma*¹ (loyalty) by conduct such as yours." His eyes suddenly recovered their animation and his countenance was lighted with a smile, as he rapidly uttered, "How did you come by this—why does this interest you?" A tear started in his eye as he added, "This is my "father!"—"Yes," said the Agent, "it is the loyal Pratap on the day he went forth to meet his death; but his name yet lives, and a stranger does homage to his fame."—"Take Amli, take Amli," he hurriedly repeated, with a suppressed tone of exultation and sorrow, "but forget not the extent of the sacrifice." To prolong the visit would have been painful to both, but as it might have been trusting too much to humanity to delay the resumption, the Agent availed himself of the moment to indite the *chhorchitthi*² of surrender for the lands.

With these instances, characteristic of individuals and the times, this sketch of the introductory measures for improving the condition of Mewar may be closed. To enter more largely in detail is foreign to the purpose of the work; nor is it requisite for the comprehension of the unity of the object, that a more minute dissection of the parts should be afforded. Before, however, we exhibit the general results of these arrangements, we shall revert to the condition of the more humble, but a most important part of the community, the peasantry of Mewar; and embody, in a few remarks, the fruits of observation or inquiry, as to their past and present state, their rights, the establishment of them, their infringement, and restitution. On this subject

¹ Literally, faith (*dharma*) to his lord (*swami*).

² Paper of relinquishment.

much has been necessarily introduced in the sketch of the feudal system, where landed tenures were discussed ; but it is one on which such a contrariety of opinion exists, that it may be desirable to show the exact state of landed tenures in a country, where Hindu manners should exist in greater purity than in any other part of the vast continent of India.

The ryot (*cultivator*) is the proprietor of the soil in Mewar. He compares his right therein to the *akshay duba*,¹ which no vicissitudes can destroy. He calls the land his *bapota*,² the most emphatic, the most ancient, the most cherished, and the most significant phrase his language commands for *patrimonial inheritance*. He has nature and Manu in support of his claim, and can quote the text, alike compulsory on prince and peasant, "*cultivated land is the property of him who cut away the wood, or who cleared and tilled it* :"³ an ordinance binding on the whole Hindu race, and which no international wars, or conquest, could overturn. In accordance with this principle is the ancient adage, not of Mewar only but all Rajputana, *Bhog ra dhanni Raj ho : bhum ra dhanni ma cho* : 'the Government is owner of the rent, but I am the master of the land.' With the toleration and benevolence of the race the conqueror is commanded "to respect the deities adored by the conquered, also their virtuous priests, and *to establish the laws of the conquered nation as declared in their books*."⁴ If it were deemed desirable to recede to the system of pure Hindu agrarian law, there is no deficiency of materials. The customary laws contained in the various reports of able men, superadded to the general ordinances of Manu, would form a code at once simple and efficient : for though innovation from foreign conquest has placed many principles in abeyance, and modified others, yet he has observed to little purpose who does not trace a uniformity of design, which at one time

¹ The *dub* grass flourishes in all seasons, and most in the intense heats : it is not only *amara* or 'immortal,' but *akshay*, 'not to be eradicated' : and its tenacity to the soil deserves the distinction.

² From *bap*, 'father,' and the termination *ot*, or *belonging to*, and by which clans are distinguished : as *Karansot*, 'descended of Karan : ' *Mansinghot*, 'descended of Man Singh.' It is curious enough that the mountain clans of Albania, and other Greeks, have the same distinguishing termination, and the Mainote of Greece and the Mairot of Rajputana alike signify *mountaineer*, or 'of the mountain,' *maina* in Albanian : *mairu* or *meru* in Sanskrit.

³ Text, ix, 44. On the 'Servile Classes,' Manu ; Haughton's edition.

⁴ On Government, text, vii, 201—3.

had ramified wherever the name of Hindu¹ prevailed : language has been modified, and terms have been corrupted or changed, but the primary pervading principle is yet perceptible ; and whether we examine the systems of Khandesh, the Carnatic, or Rajasthan, we shall discover the elements to be the same.

If we consider the system from the period described by Arrian, Curtius, and Diodorus, we shall see in the government of townships each commune an '*imperium in imperio*' : a little republic, maintaining its municipal legislation independent of the monarchy, on which it relies for general support, and to which it pays the *bhog*, or *tax in kind*, as the price of this protection ; for though the prescribed duties of kings are as well defined by Manu² as by any jurisconsult in Europe, nothing can be more lax than the mutual relations of the governed and governing in Hindu monarchies, which are resolved into unbounded liberity of action. To the artificial regulation of society, which leaves all who depend on manual exertion to an immutable degradation, must be ascribed these multitudinous Governments, unknown to the rest of mankind, which, in spite of such dislocation, maintain the bonds of mutual sympathies. Strictly speaking, every State presents the picture of so many hundred or thousand minute republics, without any connection with each other, giving allegiance (*an*) and rent (*bhog*) to a prince, who neither legislates for them, nor even forms a police for their internal protection. It is consequent on this want of paramount interference that, in matters of police, of justice, and of law, the communes act for themselves ; and from this want of paternal interference only have arisen those courts of equity, or arbitration, the *panchayats*.

But to return to the *freehold* ryot of Mewar, whose *bapota* is the *watan* and the *miras* of the peninsula,—words of foreign growth, introduced by the Mahomedan conquerors ; the first (Persian) is of more general use in Khandesh ; the other (Arabic) in the Carnatic. Thus the great Persian moralist Sadi exemplifies

¹ "Let the king receive his annual revenue through his collectors ; but let him observe the divine ordinances, and act as a father to his people." Text, vii, 80.—"To protect the people, and to honour the priests, are the highest duties of kings, and ensure them felicity." vii, 88.—"From the people he must learn the theory of agriculture, commerce, and practical arts." vii, 43.—To those who imagine that these ancient monarchies are simply despotic, instead of patriarchal, their divine legislator expressly declares, that "a king addicted to vices (which tend to misrule) may lose even his life from the public resentment." vii, 46.

its application : " If you desire to succeed to your father's inheritance (*miras*,) first obtain his wisdom."

While the term *bapota* thus implies the inheritance or patrimony, its holder, if a military vassal, is called '*Bhumia*,' a term equally powerful, meaning one actually identified with the soil (*bhum*), and for which the Mahomedan has no equivalent but in the possessive compound *watan-dar*, or *miras-dar*. The *Caniatchi*¹ of Malabar is the *Bhumia* of Rajasthan.

The emperors of Delhi, in the zenith of their power, bestowed the epithet 'zamindar' upon the Hindu tributary sovereigns ; not out of disrespect, but in the true application of their own term '*Bhumia Raj*,' expressive of their tenacity to the soil ; and this fact affords additional evidence of the proprietary right being in the cultivator (*ryot*), namely, that he alone can confer the freehold *land*, which gives the title of *Bhumia*, and of which both past history and present usage will furnish us with examples. When the tenure of land obtained from the cultivator is held more valid than the grant of the sovereign, it will be deemed a conclusive argument of the proprietary right being vested in the *ryot*. What should induce a chieftain, when inducted into a perpetual fief, to establish through the *ryot* a right *to a few acres in bhum*, but the knowledge that although the vicissitudes of fortune or of favour may deprive him of his aggregate signiorial rights, his claims, derived from the spontaneous favour of the commune, can never be set aside ; and when he ceases to be the lord, he becomes a member of the commonwealth, merging his title of *Thakur*, or Signior, into the more humble one of *Bhumia*, the allodial tenant of the Rajput feudal system, elsewhere discussed. Thus we have touched on the method by which he acquires this distinction, for protecting the community from violence ; and if left destitute by the negligence or inability of the Government, he is vested with the rights of the crown, in its share of the *bhog* or rent. But when their own land is in the predicament called *gulita*, or reversions from lapses to the commune, he is '*seised*' in all the rights of the former proprietor ; or, by internal arrangements, they can convey such right by cession of the commune.

The privilege attached to the *bhum*, and acquired from the community by the protection afforded to it, is the most powerful

¹ *Cani*, 'land,' and *atchi* 'heritage': Report, p. 289.—I should be inclined to imagine the *atchi*, like the *ot* and *awat*, Rajput terminations, implying clanship.

argument for the recognition of its original rights. The *Bhumia*, thus vested, may at pleasure drive his own plough, right to the soil. His *bhum* is exempt from the *jarib* (measuring rod) ; it is never assessed, and his only sign of allegiance is a quit-rent, in most cases triennial, and the tax of *khar-lakar*, a war imposition, now commuted for money. The State, however, indirectly receives the services of these allodial tenants, the yeomen of Rajasthan, who constitute, as in the districts of Kumbhalmer and Mandalgarh, the *lundwehr*, or local militia. In fact, since the days of universal repose set in, and the townships required no protection, an arrangement was made with the *Bhumias* of Mewar in which the crown, foregoing its claim of quit-rent, has obtained their services in the garrisons and frontier stations of police at a very slight pecuniary sacrifice.

Such are the rights and privileges derived from the ryot cultivator alone. The Rana may dispossess the chiefs of Bednore, or Salumbar, of their estates, the grant of the crown—he could not touch the rights emanating from the community ; and thus the descendants of a chieftain, who a few years before might have followed his sovereign at the head of one hundred cavaliers, would descend into the humble foot militia of a district. Thousands are in this predicament : the Kanawats, Lunawats, Kumbhawats, and other clans, who, like the Celt, forget not their claim of birth in the distinctions of fortune, but assert their propinquity as “brothers in the nineteenth or thirtieth degree to the prince” on the throne. So sacred was the tenure derived from the ryot, that even monarchs held lands in *bhum* from their subjects, for an instance of which we are indebted to the great poetic historian of the last Hindu king. Chand relates, that when his sovereign, the Chauhan, had subjugated the kingdom of Anhilwara¹ from the Solanki, he returned to the nephew of the conquered prince several districts and sea-ports, and *all the bhum held by the family*. In short, the Rajput vaunts his aristocratic distinction derived from the land ; and opposes the title of ‘*Bhumia Raj*,’ or Government of the soil, to the ‘*Bania Raj*,’ or commercial Government, which he affixes as an epithet of contempt to Jaipur : where “wealth accumulates and men decay.”

¹Nehrwala of D’Anville ; the Balhara sovereignty of the Arabian travellers of the eighth and ninth centuries. I visited the remains of this city on my last journey, and from original authorities shall give an account of this ancient emporium of commerce and literature.

In the great "register of patents" (*patta bahi*) of Mewar, we find a species of *bhum* held by the greater vassals on particular crown lands; whether this originated from inability of ceding entire townships to complete the estate to the rank of the incumbent, or whether it was merely in confirmation of the grant of the commune, could not be ascertained. The benefit from this *bhum* is only pecuniary, and the title is '*bhum rakhwali*,'¹ or *land* [in return for] '*preservation*.' Strange to say, the crown itself holds '*bhum rakhwali*' on its own fiscal demesnes consisting of small portions in each village, to the amount of ten thousand rupees in a district of thirty or forty townships. This species, however, is so incongruous that we can only state it does exist: we should vainly seek the cause for such apparent absurdity, for since society has been unhinged, the oracles are mute to much of antiquated custom.

We shall close these remarks with some illustrative traditions and yet existing customs, to substantiate the ryot's right in the soil of Mewar. After one of those convulsions described in the annals, the prince had gone to espouse the daughter of the Raja of Mandor, the (then) capital of Marwar. It is customary at the moment of "*hathlewa*," or the junction of hands, that any request preferred by the bridegroom to the father of the bride should meet compliance, a usage which has yielded many fatal results; and the Rana had been prompted on this occasion to demand a body of ten thousand Jat cultivators to repeople the deserted fisc of Mewar. An assent was given to the unprecedented demand, but when the inhabitants were thus despotically called on to migrate, they denied the power and refused. "Shall we," said they, "abandon the lands of our inheritance (*bapota*), the property of our children, to accompany a stranger into a foreign land, there to labour for him? Kill us you may, but never shall we relinquish our inalienable rights." The Mandor prince, who had trusted to this reply, deemed himself exonerated from his promise, and secured from the loss of so many subjects: but he was deceived. The Rana held out to them the enjoyment of the proprietary rights escheated to the crown in his country, with the lands left without occupants by the sword, and to all, increase of property. When equal and absolute power was thus conferred, they no longer hesitated to exchange the arid soil of Marwar for the garden of Raj-

¹ *Salvamenta* of the European system.

wara ; and the descendants of these Jats still occupy the flats watered by the Berach and Banas.

In those districts which afforded protection from innovation, the proprietary right of the ryot will be found in full force ; of this the populous and extensive district of Jahajpur, consisting of one hundred and six townships, affords a good specimen. There are but two pieces of land throughout the whole of this tract the property of the crown, and these were obtained by force during the occupancy of Zalim Singh of Kotah. The right thus unjustly acquired was, from the conscientiousness of the Rana's Civil Governor, on the point of being annulled by sale and reversion, when the court interfered to maintain its proprietary right to the tanks of Loharia and Itaunda, and the lands which they irrigate, now the *bhum* of the Rana.¹ This will serve as an illustration how *bhum* may be acquired, and the annals of Kotah will exhibit, unhappily for the ryots of that country, the almost total annihilation of their rights, by the same summary process which originally attached Loharia to the fisc.

The power of alienation being thus proved, it would be superfluous to insist further on the proprietary right of the cultivator of the soil.

Besides the ability to alienate as demonstrated, all the overt symbols which mark proprietary right in other countries are to be found in Mewar ; that of entire conveyance by sale, or temporary by mortgage ; and numerous instances could be adduced, especially of the latter. The fertile lands of Horla, along the banks of the Khari, are almost all mortgaged, and the registers of these transactions form two considerable volumes, in which great variety of deeds may be discovered : one extended for one hundred and one years ;² when redemption was to follow, without regard to

¹ The author has to acknowledge with regret, that he was the cause of the Mina proprietors not re-obtaining their *bapota* : this arose, partly from ignorance at the time, partly from the individual claimants being dead, and more than all, from the representation that the intended sale originated in a bribe to Sada Ram, the governor, which, however, was not the case.

² Claims to the *bapota* appear to be maintainable if not alienated longer than one hundred and one years ; and undisturbed possession (no matter how obtained) for the same period appears to confer this right. The *miras* of Khandesh appears to have been on the same footing. See Mr. Elphinstone's Report.

interest on the one hand, or the benefits from the land on the other, but merely by repayment of the sum borrowed. To maintain the interest during abeyance, it is generally stipulated that a certain portion of the harvest shall be reserved for the mortgagee—a fourth, a fifth, or ‘*gugri*’—a share so small as to be valued only as a mark of proprietary recognition.¹ The mortgagees were chiefly of the commercial classes of the large frontier towns; in many cases the proprietor continues to cultivate for another the lands his ancestor mortgaged four or five generations ago, nor does he deem his right at all impaired. A plan had been sketched to raise money to redeem these mortgages, from whose complex operation the revenue was sure to suffer. No length of time or absence can affect the claim to the *bapota*, and so sacred is the right of absentees, that land will lay sterile and unproductive from the penalty which Manu denounces on all who interfere with their neighbour’s rights: “for unless there be an especial agreement between the owner of the land and the seed, the fruits belong clearly to the land-owner”; even “if seed conveyed by water or by wind should germinate, the plant belongs to the land-owner, the mere sower takes not the fruit.”² Even crime and the extreme sentence of the law will not alter succession to property, either to the military or cultivating vassal; and the old Kentish adage, probably introduced by the Jutes from Scandinavia, who under Hengist established that kingdom of the heptarchy, *viz.*,

“The father to the bough,

And the son to the plough”

is practically understood by the Jats and Bhumias³ of Mewar, whose treason is not deemed hereditary, nor a chain of noble acts destroyed because a false link was thrown out. We speak of the military vassals—the cultivator cannot aspire to so dignified a crime as treason.

The officers of the townships are the same as have been so often described, and are already too familiar to those interested in the subject to require illustration. From the *Patel*, the Cromwell of each township, to the village gossip, the ascetic Sannyasi, each deems his office, and the land he holds in virtue thereof in perpe-

¹ The *sawmy begum* of the peninsula in *Fifth Report*, pp. 356-7; correctly *swami bhoga*, ‘lord’s rent’ in Sanskrit.

² Manu. ix, 52—54, on the Servile Classes.

³ Patel.

tuity, free of rent to the State, except a small triennial quit-rent,¹ and the liability, like every other branch of the State, to two war taxes.²

Opinions are various as to the origin and attributes of the *Patel*, the most important personage in village sway, whose office is by many deemed foreign to the pure Hindu system, and to which language even his title is deemed alien. But there is no doubt that both office and title are of ancient growth, and even etymological rule proves the *Patel* to be head (*pati*) of the community.³ The office of Patel of Mewar was originally elective; he was "*primus inter pares*," the constituted attorney or representative of the commune, and as the medium between the cultivator and the Government, enjoyed benefits from both. Besides his *bapota*, and the *serano*, or one-fortieth of all produce from the ryot, he had a remission of a third or fourth of the rent from such extra lands as he might cultivate in addition to his patrimony. Such was the *Patel*, the link connecting the peasant with the Government, ere predatory war subverted all order: but as rapine increased, so did his authority. He became the plenipotentiary of the community, the security for the contribution imposed, and often the hostage for its payment, remaining in the camp of the predatory hordes till they were paid off. He gladly undertook the liquidation of such contributions as these perpetual invaders imposed. To indemnify himself, a schedule was formed of the share of each ryot, and mortgage of land and sequestration of personal effects followed till his avarice was satisfied. Who dared complain against a *Patel*, the intimate of Pathan and Maratha commanders, his adopted patrons? He thus became the master of the fellow-citizens; and, as power corrupts all men, their tyrant instead of their mediator. It was a system necessarily

¹ Patel *barar*.

² The Ghar-ginti *barar*, and Khar-lakar or *wood and forage*, explained in the Feudal System.

³ In copper-plate grants dug from the ruins of the ancient Ujjain (presented to the Royal Asiatic Society), the prince's patents (*patta*) conferring gifts are addressed to the *Patta-silas* and ryots. I never heard an etymology of this word, but imagine it to be from *patta*, 'grant,' or '*patent*', and *silā*, which means a nail, or sharp instrument; metaphorically, that which binds or unites these patents; all, however, having *pati*, or chief, as the basis.—See Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. I, p. 237.

involving its own decay ; for a while glutted with plenty, but failing with the supply, and ending in desolation, exile, and death. Nothing was left to prey on but the despoiled carcass ; yet when peace returned, and in its train the exile ryot to reclaim the *bapota*, the vampire *Patel* was resuscitated, and evinced the same ardour for supremacy, and the same cupidity which had so materially aided to convert the fertile Mewar to a desert. The *Patel* accordingly proved one of the chief obstacles to returning prosperity ; and the attempt to reduce this corrupted middle-man to his original station in society was both difficult and hazardous, from the support they met in the corrupt officers at court, and the other influences "behind the curtain." A system of renting the crown-lands being deemed the most expedient to advance prosperity, it was incumbent to find a remedy for this evil. The mere name of some of these petty tyrants inspired such terror, as to check all desire of return to the country : but the origin of the institution of the office and its abuses being ascertained, it was imperative, though difficult, to restore the one and banish the other. The original elective right in many townships was therefore returned to the ryot, who nominated new *Patels*, his choice being confirmed by the Rana, in whose presence investiture was performed by binding a turban on the elected, for which he presented his *nazar*. Traces of the sale of these offices in past times were observable ; and it was deemed of primary importance to avoid all such channels for corruption, in order that the ryot's election should meet with no obstacle. That the plan was beneficial there could be no doubt : that the benefit would be permanent, depended, unfortunately, on circumstances which those most anxious had not the means to control : for it must be recollected, that although "personal aid and advice might be given when asked," all internal interference was by treaty strictly, and most justly, prohibited.

After a few remarks on the mode of levying the crown-rents we shall conclude the subject of village economy in Mewar, and proceed to close this too extended chapter with the results of four years of peace and the consequent improved prosperity.

There are two methods of levying the revenues of the crown on every description of corn—*kankut* and *batai* ; for on sugarcane, poppy, oil, hemp, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and garden stuffs, a money payment is fixed, varying from two to six rupees per

bigha. The *kankut* is a conjectural assessment of the standing crop, by the united judgment of the officers of Government, the *Patel*, the *Patwari*, or Registrar, and the owner of the field. The accuracy with which an accustomed eye will determine the quantity of grain on a given surface is surprising : but should the owner deem the estimate overrated, he can insist on *batai* or division of the corn after it is threshed ; the most ancient and only infallible mode by which the dues either of the Government or the husbandman can be ascertained. In the *batai* system, the share of the Government varies from one-third to two-fifths of the spring harvest, as wheat and barley ; and sometimes even half, which is the invariable proportion of the autumnal crops. In either case, *kankut* or *batai*, when the shares are appropriated, those of the crown may be commuted to a money payment at the average rate of the market. The *kut* is the most liable to corruption. The ryot bribes the Collector, who will underrate the crop ; and when he betrays his duty, the *shahnah*, or watchman, is not likely to be honest : and as the *makai*, or Indian corn, the grand autumnal crop of Mewar, is eaten green, the crown may be defrauded of half its dues. The system is one of uncertainty, from which eventually the ryot derives no advantage, though it fosters the cupidity of *Patels* and collectors ; but there was a *barar*, or tax, introduced to make up for this deficiency, which was in proportion to the quantity cultivated, and its amount at the mercy of the officers. Thus the ryot went to work with a mill-stone round his neck ; instead of the exhilarating reflection that every hour's additional labour was his own, he saw merely the advantage of these harpies, and contented himself with raising a scanty subsistence in a slovenly and indolent manner, by which he forfeited the ancient reputation of the Jat cultivator of Mewar.

Notwithstanding these and various other drawbacks to the prosperity of the country, in an impoverished court, avaricious and corrupt officers, discontented *Patels*, and bad seasons, yet the final report in May 1822 could not but be gratifying when contrasted with that of February 1818. In order to ascertain the progressive improvement, a census had been made at the end of 1821, of the three central fiscal districts¹ watered by the Berach

¹ Mui, Barak, and Kapasan.

and Banas. As a specimen of the whole, we may take the *tappa* or sub-division of Sahara. Of its twenty-seven villages six were inhabited in 1818, the number of families being three hundred and sixty-nine, three-fourths of whom belonged to the resumed town of Amli. In 1821 *nine hundred* and twenty-six families were reported, and every village of the twenty-seven was occupied, so that population had almost trebled. The number of ploughs was more than trebled, and cultivation quadrupled; and though this, from the causes described, was not above one-third of what real industry might have effected, the contrast was abundantly cheering. The same ratio of prosperity applied to the entire crown demesne of Mewar. By the recovery of Kumbhalmer, Raipur, Rajnagar, and Sadri-Kanera from the Marathas; of Jahajpur from Kotah; of the usurpations of the nobles; together with the resumption of all the estates of the females of his family, a task at once difficult and delicate¹; and by the subjugation of the mountain districts of Merwara, a thousand towns and villages were united to form the fiscal demesne of the Rana, composing twenty-four districts of various magnitudes, divided, as in ancient times, and with the primitive appellations, into portions tantamount to the tithings and hundreds of England, the division from time immemorial amongst the Hindus.² From these and the commercial duties³ a revenue was derived sufficient for the comforts, and even the dignities of the prince and his court, and promising an annual increase in the ratio of good government: but profusion scattered all that industry and ingenuity could collect; the artificial wants of the prince perpetuated the real necessities of the peasant, and this, it is to be feared, will continue till the present generation shall sleep with their forefathers.

¹ To effect this, indispensable alike for unity of Government and the establishment of a Police, the individual statements of their holders were taken for the revenues they had derived from them, and money payments three times the amount were adjudged to them. They were gainers by this arrangement, and were soon loaded with jewels and ornaments, but the numerous train of harpies who cheated them and abused the poor ryot, were eternally at work to defeat all such beneficial schemes; and the counteraction of the intrigues was painful and disgusting.

² Manu ordains the division into tens, hundreds and thousands.

³ Farmed for the ensuing three years from 1822, for seven lakhs of rupees.

*Abstract of the Fiscal Revenues of Mewar in the
years 1818-19-20-21-22.*

	Rs.	
Spring harvest of 1818 ..	40,000	
Ditto.....1819 ..	4,51,281	
Ditto.....1820 ..	6,59,100	
Ditto.....1821 ..	10,18,478	} The active superintendence of the British Agent being al- most entirely withdrawn.
Ditto.....1822 ..	9,36,640	

Abstract of Commercial Duties included in the above.

	Rs.	
In 1818.....	<i>Nominal</i>	
1819.....	96,683	
1820.....	1,65,108	
1821.....	2,20,000	} Farmed for three years from 1822, for 7,50,000 rupees which was assigned by the Rana for the liquidation of tribute fallen in arrear.
1822.....	2,17,000	

There are sources of wealth in Mewar yet untouched, and to which her princes owe much of their power. The tin mines of Jawara and Dariba alone, little more than half a century ago, yielded above three lakhs annually¹; besides rich copper mines in various parts. From such, beyond a doubt, much of the wealth of Mewar was extracted, but the miners are now dead, and the mines filled with water. An attempt was made to work them, but it was so unprofitable that the design was soon abandoned.

Nothing will better exemplify the progress of prosperity, than the comparative population of some of the chief towns before, and after four years of peace:

	No. of houses in 1818.	No. of houses in 1822.
Udaipur	3,500	10,000
Bhilwara	<i>not one</i>	2,700
Pur	200	1,200
Mandal	80	400
Gogunda	60	350

The feudal lands, which were then double the fiscal, did not exhibit the like improvement, the merchant and cultivator residing thereon not having the same certainty of reaping the fruits of their industry; still great amelioration took place, and few were so blind

¹ In S. 1816, Jawara yielded Rs. 222,000 and Dariba Rs. 80,000. The tin of these mines contains a portion of silver.

as not to see their account in it.¹ The earnestness with which many requested the Agent to back their expressed intentions with his guarantee to their communities of the same measure of justice and protection as the fiscal tenants enjoyed, was proof that they well understood the benefits of reciprocal confidence; but this could not be tendered without danger. Before the Agent left the country he greatly withdrew from active interference, it being his constant, as it was his last impressive lesson, that they should rely upon themselves if they desired to retain a shadow of independence. To give an idea of the improved police, insurance which has been described as amounting to eight per cent. in a space of twenty-five miles, became almost nominal, or one-fourth of a rupee per cent. from one frontier to the other. It would, however, have been quite Utopian to have expected that the lawless tribes would remain in that stupid subordination which the unexampled state of society imposed for a time (as described in the opening of these transactions), when they found that real restraints did not follow imaginary terrors. Had the wild tribes been under the sole influence of British power, nothing would have been so simple as effectually, not only to control, but to conciliate and improve them; for it is a mortifying truth, that the more remote from civilization, the more tractable and easy was the object to manage, more especially the Bhil.² But these children of nature were incorporated in the demesnes of the feudal chiefs, who when they found our system did not extend to perpetual control, returned to their old habits of oppression: this provoked retaliation, which to subdue requires more power than the Rana yet possesses, and, in the anomalous state of our alliances, will always be an embarrassing task to whosoever may exercise political control.

In conclusion, it is to be hoped that the years of oppression that have swept the land will be held in remembrance by the protecting power, and that neither petulance nor indolence will lessen the benevolence which restored life to Mewar, or mar the picture of comparative happiness it created.

¹ There are between two and three thousand towns, villages, and hamlets, besides the fiscal land of Mewar; but the tribute of the British Government is derived only from the fiscal; it would have been impossible to collect from the feudal lands, which are burthened with service, and form the army of the State.

² Sir John Malcom's wise and philanthropic measures for the reclamation of this race in Malwa will support my assertions.

The Sixteen Chief Nobles of Mewar, their titles, names, clans, tribes, estates, number of villages in each, and their value.

Title.	Names.	Clan.	Tribe.	Estate.	Number of villages.	Value A.D. 1760.	REMARKS.
Raj	Chandan Singh	Jhala	Jhala	Sadri	127	100,000	These estates are all diminished one-half in nominal amount; and their revenues still more. Would realise this if cultivated. This chief ceases to be one of the 16 since the Rana lost the province of Godwar. Would realise this if cultivated. Would realise more if cultivated. This includes usurpations—now seized by Sindhia. The estate would realise 70,000 if cultivated.
Rao	Pratap Singh	Chauhan	Chauhan	Bedla	80	100,000	
Rao	Mohkam Singh	Chauhan	Chauhan	Kotharia	65	80,000	
Rawat	Padam Singh	Chundawat	Sesodia	Salumbar	85	84,000	
Thakur	Zorawar Singh	Mertia	Rathor	Ghanerao	100	100,000	
Rao	Keshodas	—	Paramar	Bijolia	40	45,000	Would realise this if cultivated. Would realise more if cultivated. This includes usurpations—now seized by Sindhia. The estate would realise 70,000 if cultivated.
Rawat	Gokuldas	Sangawat	Sesodia	Deogarh	125	80,000	
Rawat	Maha Singh	Meghawar	Sesodia	Begun	150	200,000	
Raj	Kalyan Singh	Jhala	Jhala	Delwara	125	100,000	Would realise two-thirds if cultivated. Would realise two-thirds if cultivated. Would realise this if cultivated. Would realise half if cultivated. Would realise this if cultivated. Would realise this if cultivated.
Rawat	Salim Singh	Jagawat	Sesodia	Amet	60	60,000	
Raj	Chhattar Sal	Jhala	Jhala	Gogunda	50	50,000	
Rawat	Fateh Singh	Sarangdevot	Sesodia	Kanor	50	95,000	
Maharaja Thakur	Zorawar Singh	Saktawat	Sesodia	Bhindar	64	64,000	
Rawat	Jeth Singh	Mertia	Rathor	Bednore	80	80,000	These chiefs have lost all their influence and half their estates. These chiefs have taken rank on the depression of the above—they never appear at court on the same day.
Rawat	Salim Singh	Saktawat	Sesodia	Bansi	40	40,000	
Rao	Surajmal	Chauhan	Chauhan	Parsoli	40	60,000	
Rawat	Kesari Singh	Kishanawat	Sesodia	Bhainsror	60	60,000	
Rawat	Jawan Singh	Kishanawat	Sesodia	Kurabar	35	35,000	
Total number and estimated value of their estates sixty years ago, omitting Bhainsror and Kurabar, then enrolled in the second grade of chieftains.					1,181	1,310,000	

Note.—The inferior grades possessed estates to a still larger amount, conjointly yielding a revenue of thirty lakhs of rupees; and as each thousand rupees of estate furnished on emergency three horses completely equipped, the feudal interest could supply nine thousand horse besides foot, of which they make little account.

III

MARWAR¹

Alliance with the East India Company.

When, in 1817, we invited the Rajputs to disunite from the predatory powers, and to join us in establishing order throughout India, the young son² of Raja Man,³ or rather his ministers, sent envoys to Delhi. But ere the treaty was ratified, the dissipated youth was no more. On this event the Pokaran faction,⁴ dreading Raja Man's resumption of the government, made an application to Idar for a son to adopt as their sovereign. But splendid as was the offer, the Raja, who had but one son, rejected it, unless the demand were sustained by the unanimous suffrages of the nobles. Unanimity being unattainable, the faction had no alternative save the restoration of Raja Man ; but it was in vain they explained the new position of Marwar, the alliance with the English, which awaited his sanction, and the necessity that he, as the last prop of the royal family, should resume the reins of power. He listened to all with the most apathetic indifference. But although he saw in this new crisis of the political condition of his country, motives for effecting his escape from bondage, his mind was so tutored by bitter experience that he never for an instant betrayed its workings. When at length he allowed himself to comprehend the full nature of the changes which made even the faction desire his egress from solitude, so far from expressing any joy, he even disapproved of part of the treaty, and especially the article relating to the armed contingent of his vassals to be at the disposal of the protecting power, in which he wisely saw the germ of discord, from the certainty of interference it would lead to.

It was in December 1817 that the treaty was negotiated at Delhi by a Brahmin named Byas Bishen Ram, on the part of the

^{*1} Croke, Vol. II, pp. 1092-1121.

^{*2} On account of Man Singh's insanity his son Chhattar Singh was made Regent. See Croke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

^{*3} Man Singh, 1803-1843. For an account of his reign see Croke, Vol. II, pp. 1079-1101.

^{*4} See Croke, Vol. II, pp. 1066-1073, 1080-1090.

regent prince, and in December 1818, an officer of the British government¹ was deputed to report on its actual condition. Notwithstanding the total disorganization of the Government, from the combination of causes already described², the court had lost nothing of its splendour or regularity; the honour of all was concerned in preserving the dignity of the '*gadi*', though its incumbent was an object of distrust and even detestation. The ministry at this period was conducted by Akhai Chand (*Dewan*,) and Salim Singh of Pokaran, as the representative of the aristocracy, with the title of *Bhanjigar*. All the garrisons and offices of trust throughout the country were held by the creatures of a junto, of which these were the heads. There was, however, already the nucleus of an opposition in the brother of the murdered minister,³ named Fateh Raj, who was entrusted with the care of the city. The instructions of the agent were to offer the aid of the British Government towards the settlement of Raja Man's affairs; and at a private interview, three days after the agent's arrival, troops were offered to be placed at his disposal. But the wariness of his character will be seen in the use he made of this offer. He felt that the lever was at hand to crush faction to the dust; and with a Machiavellian caution, he determined that the existence of this engine should suffice; that its power should be felt, but never seen; that he should enjoy all the advantages this influence would give, without risking any of its dangers if called into action. Thus, while he rejected, though with thanks, the essential benefit tendered, qualifying his refusal with a sufficient reason—"reliance on himself to restore his State to order,"—he failed not to disseminate the impression amongst his chiefs, which was enough for his purpose, and which besides checked the dictation and interference that uniformly result from such unequal alliances.

Energetic counsels and rapid decision are unknown to Asiatic Governments, whose subjects are ever prone to suspicion whenever unusual activity is visible; and Raja Man had been schooled into circumspection from his infancy. He appeared anxious to bury the past in oblivion, by choosing men of both parties for the inferior duties of the ministry; and the blandness of his manners

¹ Mr. Wilder, Superintendent of the district of Ajmer.

² See Tod's account of Man Singh's reign.

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

and his conciliatory address lulled the most suspicious into security. After a short residence, the agent returned to Ajmer, having in vain tried to convince Raja Man that his affairs were irretrievable without the direct aid of the paramount power, which he persisted in repudiating, assigning as his reason that he felt convinced, from "the measures then in train," he should accomplish the task himself: of these measures conciliation appeared to be the basis.

At this period¹ an envoy was appointed, with powers direct from the Governor-General to Raja Man, but he was for some months prevented from proceeding to his court, from various causes.²

¹ In February 1819, the author had the political duties of Marwar added to those of the States of Udaipur, Kotah, Bundi, and Sirohi.

² One of these was an unpleasant altercation, which took place between the towns-people of the commercial mart of Pali and an English gentleman, sent unofficially to feel his way as to the extension of commercial enterprise, carrying specimens of the staple commodities of our trade. This interference with the very fountain-head of their trade alarmed the monopolists of Pali, who, dreading such competition, created or took advantage of an incident to rid themselves of the intruder. The commercial men of these regions almost all profess the Jain religion, whose first rule of faith is the preservation of life, in beast as in man. By them, therefore, the piece-goods, the broad-cloths and metals of the Christian trader, were only less abhorred than his flesh-pots, and the blood of the goats sworn to have been shed by his servants within the bounds of Pali, rose in judgment against their master, of whom a formal complaint was laid before Raja Man. It lost none of its acrimony in coming through the channel of his internuncio at Udaipur, the Brahmin, Bishen Ram. Mr. Rutherford rebutted the charge and an investigation took place at the capital on oath, upon which, as the merchants and the governor of Pali (a nephew of the minister) could not substantiate their charge, the latter was severely reprimanded for his incivility. But whether the story was true or false, it was quite enough for their purpose. The interdict between Mr. Rutherford and the inhabitants of Pali was more effectual than the sanitary cordon of any prince in Christendom. The feeling of resentment against him reached the agent of Government, who was obliged to support what appeared the cause of truth, even according to the deposition made before their own judgment-seat, and he was consequently deemed inimical to the prince and the faction which then guided his councils. Mr. Rutherford proceeded afterwards to Kotah, to exhibit the same wares; but he was there equally an object of jealousy, though from letters of recommendation from the agent, it was less strongly manifested. It furnished evidence that such interference would never succeed. It is well his mission did not appear to be sanctioned by the Government. What evil might not be effected by permitting unrestricted and incautious intercourse with such people, who can, and do obtain all they require of our produce without the presence of the producers, who, whether within or without the pale of

The agent, who reached Jodhpur early in the month of November, found matters in nearly the same state as on his predecessor's departure in February. The same faction kept the prince and all the officers of Government at their disposal. The Raja interfered but little with their measures, except to acquiesce in or confirm them. The mercenary bands of Sindhis or Pathans were in miserable plight and clamorous for their pay, not having been accounted with for three years ; and they were to be seen begging in the streets of the capital, or hawking bundles of forage on their heads to preserve them from starvation. On the approach of the agent of the British Government, the forms of accounts were gone through, and they gave in acquittances in full of all demands, on condition of receiving thirty per cent. of their arrears ; but this was only a form, and with his departure (in about three weeks), they despaired even of that.

The name of justice was unknown :—though in allusion to the religion of the men in power, it was common to hear it said, "You may commit murder and no one will notice it ; but woe to him who beats or maims a brute, for dogs are publicly fed while the soldier starves." In short, the sole object of the faction was to keep at a distance all interposition that might lead the prince to emancipate himself from their control. During the agent's stay of nearly three weeks, he had several private interviews with Raja Man. The knowledge he had of the history of his ancestry and his own situation, and of the causes which had produced it, failed not to beget a corresponding confidence ; and these interviews were passed in discussions on the ancient history of the country as well as on his own immediate affairs. The agent took leave with these words : "I know all the perils through which you have passed ; I am aware how you surmounted them. By your resolution, your external enemies are now gone : you have the British Government as a friend ; rely upon it with the same fortitude, and, in a very short time, all will be as you could desire."

Raja Man listened eagerly to these observations. His fine features, though trained to bear no testimony to the workings within, relaxed with delight as he rapidly replied, "In one twelvemonths, my affairs will be as friendship could wish." To

the Company's service, will not, I trust, be prematurely forced on Rajputana, or it will assuredly hasten the day of inevitable separation !

which the agent rejoined, "In half the time, Maharaja, if you are determined:" though the points to which he had to direct his mind were neither few nor slight, for they involved every branch of Government; as

1. Forming an efficient administration.
2. Consideration of the finances; the condition of the crown lands; the feudal confiscations, which, often unjust, had caused great discontent.
3. The re-organization and settlement of the foreign troops, on whose service the Raja chiefly depended.
4. An effective police on all the frontiers, to put down the wholesale pillage of the Mers in the south, the Larkhanis in the north, and the desert Sahariyas and Khosas in the west; reformation of the tariff, or scale of duties on commerce, which were so heavy as almost to amount to prohibition; and at the same time to provide for its security.

Scarcely had the agent left Jodhpur, before the faction, rejoiced at the removal of the only restraint on their narrow-minded views, proceeded in the career of disorder. Whether the object were to raise funds, or to gratify ancient animosities, the course pursued by the Dewan and his junto was the same. Ghanerao, the chief fief of Godwar, was put under sequestration, and only released by a fine of more than a year's revenue. All the minor chiefs of this rich tract suffered in the same manner, besides the indignity of having their lands placed under the control of a brother of the minister. Chandawal¹ was put under sequestration, and only released on a very heavy fine. At length the Dewan had the audacity to put his hand on Awa, the chief fief of Marwar; but the descendant of Champa replied, "My estate is not of to-day, nor thus to be relinquished." Gloom, mistrust, and resentment pervaded the whole feudal body. They saw a contemptible faction sporting with their honour and possessions, from an idea they industriously propagated, that an unseen but mighty power was at hand to support their acts, given out as those of the prince. If the Raja did dictate them, he took especial care it should not be seen; for in the absence of the British agent, he once more resumed his sequestered habits, and appeared to take no interest in the government further than to promote a coalition between Akhai Chand and Fateh Raj, who was

*¹ About 55 miles south-west of Jodhpur.

supported by a strong party of the chiefs, and the influence of the favourite queen. But Akhai Chand, who commanded, through his creatures, all the resources of the country, and its strongholds, even to the castle of Jodhpur, rejected these overtures, and feigning that there were plots against his personal safety, left the city; and the better to exclude his adversaries from the prince, resided entirely in the citadel.

Six months had thus fled. The fiat of Akhai Chand was supreme; he alone was visible; his orders alone were obeyed. Raja Man was only heard of as an automaton, moving as the Dewan pleased. But while the latter was thus basking in the full sunshine of prosperity, enriching himself and his dependents, execrated by the nobles and envied by his fellow-citizens, they heard of his fall! Then, the insanity of his master proved to be but a cloak to the intensity of his resentment. But a blind revenge would not have satisfied Raja Man. The victims of his deep dissimulation, now in manacles, were indulged with hopes of life, which, with the application of torture, made them reveal the plunder of prince and subject. A schedule of forty lakhs, or £400,000, was given in by the Dewan and his dependents, and their accounts being settled in this world, they were summarily dismissed to the other, with every mark of ignominy which could add to the horrors of death. Nagji, the *Kiladar*, and misleader of the late regent prince, with Mulji Dandal, one of the old allodial stock, had each a cup of poison, and their bodies were thrown over the 'Gate of Victory' (*Fateh Pol*). Jivaraj, a brother of the Dandal, with Biharidas Khichi, and the tailor, had their heads shaved, and their bodies were flung into the cascade beneath. Even the sacred character of "expounder of the Vedas," and that of "revealer of the secrets of heaven," yielded no protection; and Byas Sheodas, with Srikishen, *Jyotish*, the astrologer, were in the long list of proscriptions. Nagji, commandant of the citadel, and Mulji, had retired on the death of the regent-prince; and with the wealth they had accumulated, while administering to his follies, had erected palaces of strength. On the restoration of Raja Man, and the general amnesty which prevailed, they returned to their ancient offices in the castle, rose into favour, and forgot they had been traitors. Having obtained their persons, Man secured the ancient jewels of the crown, bestowed on these favourites during the ephemeral sway of his son. Their condemnation was then passed, and

they were hurled over the battlements of the rock which it was their duty to guard. With such consummate skill was the plot contrived, that the creatures of the minister, in the most remote districts, were imprisoned simultaneously with himself. Of the many subordinate agents thus confined, many were liberated on the disclosure of their wealth ; and by these sequestrations, Raja Man obtained abundant supplies. The enormous sum of a crore, or near one million sterling, was stated ; but if they yielded one-half (and this was not unlikely), they gave the means, which he was not slow to use, for the prosecution of what he termed a just punishment, though it better deserves the name of a savage revenge. Had he been satisfied with inflicting the last penalty of the law on the nefarious Akhai Chand, and some of the household officers whose fidelity ought ever to be firm, and with the sequestration of the estates of some two or three of the vassals whose power had become dangerous, or their treason too manifest to be overlooked, he would have commanded the services of the rest, and the admiration of all conversant with these events. But this first success added fuel to his revenge, and he sought out more noble victims to glut it. His circumspection and dissimulation were strengthened, not relaxed, by his success. Several of the chiefs, who were marked out for death, had received, only a few days before, the highest proof of favour in additional lands to their rent-roll, and accident alone prevented a group of the most conspicuous from falling into the snare which had inveigled Akhai Chand. Salim Singh of Pokaran, and his constant associate Surthan of Nimaj, with Anar Singh of Ahor, and the minors of their clans, whose duty daily carried them to the court, as the chief advisers of the prince, formed a part of the administration of the Dewan, and they naturally took alarm upon his confinement. To obviate this, a deputation was sent by the prince to tranquillize them by the assurance that, in the confinement of the minister, whose rapacity and misconduct deserved punishment, the Raja had attained all his ends. Thus, in order to encompass the destruction of the Pokaran chief, he would not have scrupled to involve all the rest. The prince, with his own mouth, desired the confidential servant of Anar Singh, who was his personal friend, to attend with the others. Their distrust saved him. The same night, the mercenary bands, to the number of eight thousand men, with guns, attacked Surthan Singh in his dwelling. With one hundred and eight of

his clan, he defended himself against great guns and small arms, as long as the house was tenable, and then sallied out sword in hand, and, with his brother and eighty of his kin, fell nobly in the midst of his foes. The remainder retreated with their arms to defend Nimaj and their infant chief. This gallant defence, in which many of the townspeople were slain, prevented a repetition of the attempt against the Pokaran chief, who remained on the defensive ; until, seeing an opportunity, he fled to his assistant or he would that day have renounced " the sheath of the dagger which held the fortunes of Marwar,"¹ and which now contained the accumulated revenge of four generations : of Deo Singh, of Sabhala, of Sawai, and his own. His death would have terminated this branch of Ajit's issue, adopted into the house of Pokaran,² in the history of which we have a tolerable picture of the precariousness of existence in Marwar.³

What better commentary can be made on Raja Man's character, than the few recorded words addressed to Fateh Raj, whom he sent for to the Presence, on the day succeeding these events ? " Now you may perceive the reasons why I did not sooner give you office." The individual, the brother of the late Induraj,⁴ was forthwith installed in the post of Dewan ; and with the sinews of war provided by the late sequestrations, the troops were satisfied, while by the impression so sedulously propagated and believed, that he had only to call on the British power for what aid he required, the whole feudal body was appalled : and the men, who would have hurled the tyrant from his throne, now only sought to avoid his insidious snares, more dangerous than open force.

Nimaj was besieged and nobly defended ; but at length the

*¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1071.

*² See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1066.

*³ In a letter addressed to the Government on these events, dated July 7, 1820, I observed. " The danger is, that success may tempt him to go beyond the line of necessity, either for the ends of justice or security. If he stops with the Pokaran chief, and one or two inferior, concerned in the coalition of 1806 and the usurpation of his son, with the condign punishment of a few of the civil officers, it will afford a high opinion of his character ; but if he involves Awa, and the other principal chiefs, in these proscriptions, he may provoke a strife which will yet overwhelm him. He has done enough for justice, and even for revenge, which has been carried too far as regards Surthan Singh, whose death (which I sincerely regret) was a prodigal sacrifice."

*⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

son of Surthan capitulated, on receiving the sign-manual of his prince promising pardon and restoration, guaranteed by the commander of the mercenary bands. To the eternal disgrace of the Raja, he broke this pledge, and the boy had scarcely appeared in the besieging camp, when the civil officer produced the Raja's mandate for his captivity and transmission to the presence. If it is painful to record this fact, it is pleasing to add, that even the mercenary commander spurned the infamous injunction. "No," said he ; "on the faith of my pledge (*buchan*) he surrendered ; and if the Raja breaks his word, I will maintain mine, and at least place him in security." He kept his promise, and conveyed him to the Aravalli mountains, whence he passed over to, and received protection in Mewar.

This and similar acts of treachery and cold-blooded tyranny completely estranged all the chiefs. Isolated as they were, they could make no resistance against the mercenary battalions, amounting to ten thousand men, exclusive of the quotas ; and they dared not league for defence, from the dreaded threat held over them, of calling in the British troops ; and in a few months the whole feudal association of Marwar abandoned their homes and their country, seeking shelter in the neighbouring States from the Raja's cruel and capricious tyranny. To his connection with the British Government alone he was indebted for his being able thus to put forth the resources of his policy, which otherwise he never could have developed either with safety or effect ; nor at any former period of the history of Marwar could the most daring of its princes have undertaken, with any prospect of success, what Raja Man accomplished under this alliance.

These brave men found asyla in the neighbouring States of Kotah, Mewar, Bikaner, and Jaipur. Even the faithful Anar Singh, whose fidelity no gratitude could ever repay, was obliged to seek refuge in exile. He had stood Man's chief shield against the proscription of Raja Bhim, when cooped up in Jalor, and sold his wife's ornaments, "even to her nose-ring," to procure him the means of subsistence and defence. It was Anar Singh who saved him when, in the attempt upon Pali, he was unhorsed and nearly made prisoner. He was among the four chiefs who remained by his fortunes when the rest deserted to the standard of the pretender ; and he was one of the same body, who rescued the trophies of their disgrace from the hands of their enemies when on the

road to Jaipur.¹ Last of all, he was mainly instrumental in the Raja's emancipation and in his resumption of the reins of Government. Well might the fury of his revenge deserve the term of madness! In A.D. 1821, the greater chieftains of Marwar, thus driven into exile, were endeavouring to obtain the mediation of the British authorities; but another year had elapsed without the slightest advance to accommodation. Their conduct has been exemplary, but their degrading position, dependent on the scanty resources of others, must of itself work a cure. Their manly remonstrance addressed to the British functionary is already before the reader.² He did not hesitate to tell them, that if in due time no meditation was held out, they must depend on themselves for redress!

Such was the political condition of Marwar until the year 1823. Had a demoniacal spirit of revenge not blinded Raja Man, he had a fine opportunity to lay the principles of order on a permanent basis, and to introduce those reforms necessary for his individual welfare as well as for that of the State. He had it in his power to modify the institutions, to curb without destroying the feudal chiefs, and to make the whole subservient to the altered condition of affairs. Instead of having the glory of fixing the constitution of his country, he has (reposing on external protection) broken up the entire feudal association, and rendered the paramount power an object of hatred instead of reverence.

It³ is impossible to quit the subject without a reflection on the anomalous condition of their alliance with the British Government which can sanction the existence of such a state of things as we have just described. It illustrates the assertions made in an early part of this work⁴, of the ill-defined principles which guide all our treaties with the Rajputs, and which, if not early remedied, will rapidly progress to a state of things full of misery to them, and of inevitable danger to ourselves. These "men of the soil," as they emphatically designate themselves, cling to it, and their ancient and well-defined privileges, with an unconquerable pertinacity; in their endeavours to preserve them, whole generations have been swept away, yet has their strength increased in the very ratio of oppression. Where are now the oppressors? the dynasties of

*¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1077-1089.

*² See *ante*, pp. 66-68.

*³ A few lines omitted.

*⁴ See Crooke, Vol. I, p. 146.

Ghazni, of Ghor, the Khiljis, the Lodis, the Pathans, the Timurs, and the demoralizing Maratha ? The native Rajput has flourished amidst these revolutions, and survived their fall ; and but for the vices of their internal sway, chiefly contracted from such association, would have risen to power upon the ruin of their tyrants. But internal dissension invited the spoiler ; and herds of avaricious Marathas and ferocious Pathans have reaped the harvest of their folly. Yet all these faults were to be redeemed in their alliances with a people whose peculiar boast was, that wisdom, justice, and clemency were the corner-stones of their power : seeking nothing from them beyond the means for their defence, and an adherence to the virtues of order. How far the protecting power has redeemed its pledge, in allowing years to pass away without some attempt to remedy the anarchy we have described, the reader is in a condition to judge. If it is said that we have tied up our hands by leaving them free agents in their internal administration, then let no offer to support be given to the head, for the oppression of the vassal and his rights, co-equal with those of the sovereign ; and if our mediation cannot be exerted, let us withdraw altogether the checks upon the operation of their own system of government, and leave them free agents in reality. A wiser, more humane, and liberal policy would be, to impose upon ourselves the task of understanding their political condition, and to use our just influence for the restoration of their internal prosperity, and with it the peace, present as well as prospective, of an important part of our empire. The policy which such views would suggest, is to support the opinion of the vast majority of the Rathors, and to seize the first opportunity to lend at least our sanction to an adoption, from the Idar branch, of Rathor blood, not only uncontaminated, but heirs presumptive to Jodha, and exclude the parricidal line which will continue to bring misery on the country. If, however, we apply only our own monarchical, nay despotic principles, to this feudal society, and interfere but to uphold a blind tyranny, which must drive these brave chiefs to despair, it will be well to reflect and consider, from the acts we have related, of what they are capable. Very different, indeed, would be the deeds of proscribed Rajputs from those of vagabond Pindaris, or desultory Marathas ; and what a field for aggression and retreat ! Rumour asserts that they have already done themselves justice ; and that, driven to desperation, and with no power to mediate, the dagger

has reached the heart of Raja Man ! If this be true, it is a retribution which might have been expected ; it was the only alternative left to the oppressed chiefs to do themselves justice. It is also said, that the 'pretended' son of Raja Bhim is now on the *gadi* of Jodha. This is deeply to be lamented. Raja Dhonkal will see only the party who espoused his pretensions, and the Pokaran chief and faction will hold that place in the councils of his sovereign, which of right belongs to the head of his clan, the Champawat chief of Awa, an exile in Mewar¹. Jealousy, feuds, and bloodshed will be the consequence, which would at once be averted by an adoption from Idar. Were a grand council of Rajputs to be convened, in order to adjust the question, nine-tenths would decide as proposed ; the danger of interference would be neutralized, and peace and tranquillity would be the boon bestowed upon thousands, and, what is of some consequence, future danger to ourselves would be avoided.

Economic Condition.

The extreme breadth of Marwar lies between two points in the parallel of the capital, *viz.* Girah, west, and Shamgarh, on the Aravalli range, east. This line measures two hundred and seventy British miles. The greatest length, from the Sirohi frontier to the northern boundary, is about two hundred and twenty miles.² From the remote angle, N.N.E., in the Didwana district, to the extremity of Sanchor, S.W., the diagonal measurement is three hundred and fifty miles. The limits of Marwar are, however, so very irregular, and present so many salient angles and abutments into other States, that without a trigonometrical process we cannot arrive at a correct estimate of its superficial extent : a nicety not, indeed, required.

The most marked feature that diversifies the face of Maru is the river Luni, which, rising on her eastern frontier at Pushkar, and pursuing a westerly course, nearly bisects the country, and forms the boundary between the fertile and sterile lands of Maru. But although the tracts south of this stream, between it and the Aravalli, are by far the richest part of Marwar, it would be erroneous to describe all the northern part as sterile. An ideal line,

¹ He was so when the author left India in 1823.

² The length was really about 320 miles ; the breadth did not exceed 170 miles.

passing through Nagor and Jodhpur, to Balotra, will mark the just distinction. South of this line will lie the districts of Didwana, Nagor, Merta, Jodhpur, Pali, Sojat, Godwar, Siwana, Jalor, Bhinmal, and Sanchor, most of which are fertile and populous ; and we may assign a population of eighty souls to the square mile. The space north of this line is of a very different character, but this requires a subdivision ; for while the north-east portion, which includes a portion of Nagor, the large towns of Phalodhi, Pokaran, &c., may be calculated at thirty, the remaining space to the south-west, as *Gugadeo-ka-thal* or 'desert of Guga,' Sheo, Barmer, Kotra, and Chhotan, can scarcely be allowed ten. In round numbers, the population of Marwar may be estimated at two millions of souls.

Classes of Inhabitants.—Of this amount, the following is the classification of the tribes. The Jats constitute five-eighths, the Rajputs two-eighths, while the remaining classes, sacerdotal,¹ commercial, and servile, make up the integral number. If this calculation be near the truth, the Rajputs, men, women, and children, will amount to five hundred thousand souls, which would admit of fifty thousand men capable of bearing arms, especially when we recollect that the Jats are the industrious class.

It is superfluous to expatiate on the peculiarities of the Rathor character. It stands deservedly high in the scale of the "thirty-six tribes," and although debased by one besetting sin (the use of opium), the Rathor is yet a noble animal, and requires only some exciting cause to show that the spirit, which set at defiance the resources of the empire in the zenith of its prosperity, is dormant only, not extinct. The reign of the present prince² has done more, however, than even the arms of Aurangzeb, to deteriorate the Rathors. Peace would recruit their thinned ranks, but the mistrust sown in every house by unheard of duplicity, has greatly demoralized the national character, which until lately stood higher than that of any of the circumjacent tribes. A popular prince, until within these very few years, could easily have collected a magnificent army, *ek hap ka bete*, 'the sons of one father,' round the '*gaddi* of Jodha': in fact, the *panchas hazar tarwar Rathoran*, meaning 'the fifty thousand Rathor swords,' is the proverbial

¹ The district of Sanchor is almost entirely Brahmin, forming a distinct tribe, called the Sanchora Brahmins.

² Man Singh (1803-1843).

phrase to denote the muster of Maru, of which they estimated five thousand cavalry. This was exclusive of the household and foreign troops supported on the fiscal lands. The Rathor cavalry was the best in India. There were several horse-fairs, especially those of Balotra and Pushkar, where the horses of Cutch and Kathiawar, the Jungle¹, and Multan, were brought in great numbers. Valuable horses were also bred on the western frontier, on the Luni, those of Rardara being in high estimation. But the events of the last twenty years appear to have dried up every source of supply. The breeding studs of Rardara, Cutch, and the Jungle are almost extinct, and supplies from the west of the Indus are intercepted by the Sikhs. The destruction of the predatory system, which created a constant demand, appears to have lessened the supply. So much for the general peace which the successes of Britain have produced.

In periods of civil commotion, or when the safety of the State was perilled, we hear of one clan (the Champawat) mustering four thousand horse. But if ever so many of "the sons of Champa" were congregated at one time, it is an extraordinary occurrence, and far beyond the demand which the State has upon their loyalty. To estimate what may be demanded of them, we have only to divide the rent-roll by five hundred rupees, the qualification for a cavalier in Maru, and to add, for each horse, two foot-soldiers. A schedule of the greater feudal estates shall be appended.

Soil, Agriculture, Products.—The following is the classification of the different heads of soil in Marwar :—*Bekul*, *Chikni*, *Pila*, and *Safed*. The first (whose etymology I know not) pervades the greater part of the country, being a light sand, having little or no earthy admixture, and only fit to produce *hajra* (millet), *mung*, *moth* (pulse), *til* (sesamum), melons and *gawar*.² *Chikni* (fat), a black earth, pervades the district of Didwana, Merta, Pali, and several of the feudal lands in Godvar. Wheat and grain are its products. The *pila* (yellow) is a sandy clay, chiefly about Khinwasar³ and the capital, also Jalor and Balotra, and portions of other districts. It is best adapted for barley, and that kind of wheat called *pattagehun* (the other is *kuthagehun*) ; also tobacco,

*¹ Lakhi Jangal.

*² Horse bean.

*³ In Nagor district.

onions, and other vegetables : the staple millets are seldom grown in this. The *safed* (white) is almost pure silex, and grows little or nothing, but after heavy falls of rain.

The districts south of the Luni, as Pali, Sojat, and Godwar, fertilized by the numerous petty streams flowing from the Aravalli, produce abundantly every species of grain with the exception of *bajra*, which thrives best in a sandy soil ; and in Nagor and Merta considerable quantities of the richer grains are raised by irrigation from wells. The extensive western divisions of Jalor, Sanchor, and Bhinmal, containing five hundred and ten towns and villages, which are *Khalisa*, or 'fiscal land,' possess an excellent soil, with the advantage of the rills from Abu, and the great southern barrier ; but the demoralized Government of Raja Man never obtains from them one-third of their intrinsic capability, while the encroachment of the Sahariyas, and other robbers from the Sind desert, encroach upon them often with impunity. Wheat, barley, rice, *joar* (millet), *mung* (pulse), *til* (sesamum), are the chief products of the richer lands ; while amidst the sandy tracts they are confined to *bajra*, *mung*, and *til*. With good government, Marwar possesses abundance of means to collect stores against the visitations which afflict these northern regions : but prejudice steps in to aid the ravages of famine, and although water is near the surface in all the southern districts, the number of wells bears no proportion to these in Mewar. The great district of Nagor, of five hundred and sixty towns and villages, the appanage of the heirs-apparent of Maru, in spite of physical difficulties, is, or has been made, an exception ; and the immense sheet of sandstone, on which a humid soil is embedded, has been pierced throughout by the energies of ancient days, and contains greater aids to agriculture than many more fertile tracts in the country.

Natural productions.—Marwar can boast of some valuable productions of her sterile plains, which make her an object of no little importance in the most distant and more favoured regions of India. The salt lakes of Pachbhadra, Didwana, and Sambhar, are mines of wealth, and their produce is exported over the greater part of Hindustan ; while to the marble quarries of Makrana (which gives its name to the mineral), on her eastern frontier, all the splendid edifices of the imperial cities owe their grandeur. The materials used in the palaces of Delhi, Agra, their mosques, and tombs, have been conveyed from Marwar. The quarries, un-

til of late years, yielded a considerable revenue ; but the age for palace-building in these regions is no more, and posterity will ask with surprise the sources of such luxury. There are also limestone quarries near Jodhpur and Nagor ; and the concrete called *kankar* is abundant in many of the districts, and chiefly used for mortar. Tin and lead are found at Sojat ; alum about Pali, and iron is obtained from Bhinmal and the districts adjoining Gujarat.

Manufactures.—The manufactures of Marwar are of no great importance in a commercial point of view. Abundance of coarse cotton cloths, and blankets, are manufactured from the cotton and wool produced in the country, but they are chiefly used there. Matchlocks, swords, and other warlike implements, are fabricated at the capital and at Pali ; and at the latter place they make boxes of iron, tinned, so as to resemble the tin boxes of Europe. Iron platters for culinary purposes are in such great demand as to keep the forges constantly going.

Commercial Marts.—None of these States are without traffic : each has her mart, or *entrepot* ; and while Mewar boasts of Bhilwara, Bikaner of Churu, and Amber of Malpura (the city of wealth), the Rathors claim Pali, which is not only the rival of the places just mentioned, but may make pretensions to the title of *emporium* of Rajputana. These pretensions we may the more readily admit, when we recollect that nine-tenths of the bankers and commercial men of India are natives of Marudesh, and these chiefly of the Jain faith. The laity of the *Khadatara* sect send forth thousands to all parts of India, and the Oswals, so termed from the town of Osian, near the Luni, estimate one hundred thousand families whose occupation is commerce. All these claim a Rajput descent, a fact entirely unknown to the European enquirer into the peculiarities of Hindu manners. The wealth acquired in foreign lands, from the Sutlej to the ocean, returns chiefly to their native soil ; but as neither primogeniture nor *majorats* are sanctioned by the Jain lawgivers, an equal distribution takes place amongst all the sons, though the youngest (as amongst the Getae of Asia, and the Jutes of Kent), receives often a double portion. This arises when the division takes place while the parent is living, being the portion set apart for his own support, which ultimately falls to the youngest with whom he probably resides. It would be erroneous to say this practice is extensive ; though sufficient

instances exist to suppose it once was a principle.¹ The bare enumeration of the tribes following commerce would fill a short chapter. A priest of the Jains (my own teacher), who had for a series of years devoted his attention to form a catalogue, which then amounted to nearly eighteen hundred classes, renounced the pursuit, on obtaining from a distant region, one hundred and fifty new names to add to his list.

Pali was the *entrepot* for the eastern and western regions, where the productions of India, Kashmir, and China, were interchanged for those of Europe, Africa, Persia, and Arabia. Caravans (*kitars*) from the ports of Cutch and Gujarat, imported elephants' teeth, copper, dates, gum-arabic, borax, coco-nuts, broad-cloths, silks, sandal wood, camphor, dyes, drugs, oxide and sulphuret of arsenic, spices, coffee &c. In exchange, they exported chintzes, dried fruits, *jira*, assafœtida from Multan, sugar, opium (Kotah and Malwa), silks and fine cloths, potash, shawls, dyed blankets, arms, and salt of home manufacture.

The route of the caravans was by Suigam², Sanchor, Bhinmal, Jalor to Pali, and the guardians of the merchandize were almost invariably Charans, a character held sacred by the Rajput. The most desperate outlaw seldom dared to commit any outrage on caravans under the safeguard of these men, the bards of the Rajputs. If not strong enough to defend their convoy with sword and shield, they would threaten the robbers with the *chandni*, or

¹ There is nothing which so much employs the assessors of justice, in those tribunals of arbitration, the *panchayats*, as the adjudication of questions of property. The highest compliment ever paid to the Author, was by the litigants of property amounting to half a million sterling, which had been going the rounds of various *panchayats* and appeals to native princes, alike unsatisfactory in their results. They agreed to admit as final the decision of a court of his nomination. It was not without hesitation I accepted the mediation propounded through the British Superintendent of Ajmer (Mr. Wilder); but knowing two men, whose integrity as well as powers of investigation were above all encomium I could not refuse. One of these had given a striking instance of independence in support of the award his penetration had led him to pronounce, and which award being set aside on appeal, through favouritism, he abjured every future call as an arbitrator. He was not a wealthy man, but such was the homage paid to his integrity and talents, that the greatest despot in India found it politic to re-assemble the court, have the case re-considered, and permit justice to take its course. In like manner, his demand was, that, before he agreed to devote his time to unravelling all the intricacies of the case, both litigants should sign a *muchalka* or 'bond,' to abide by the award. I have no recollection how it terminated.

*² In Palanpur State.

'self-immolation'; and proceed by degrees from a gash in the flesh to a death-wound, or if one victim was insufficient a whole body of women and children was sacrificed (as in the case of the Bamaniya Bhats), for whose blood the marauder is declared responsible hereafter.

Commerce has been almost extinguished within these last twenty years; and paradoxical as it may appear, there was tenfold more activity and enterprise in the midst of that predatory warfare, which rendered India one wide arena of conflict, than in these days of universal pacification. The torpedo touch of monopoly has had more effect on the *Kitars* than the spear of the desert Sahariya, or *barwatia* (outlaw) Rajput—against its benumbing qualities the Charan's dagger would fall innocuous; it sheds no blood, but it dries up its channels. If the products of the salt-lakes of Rajputana were preferred, even at Benares, to the sea-salt of Bengal, high impost duties excluded it from the market. If the opium of Malwa and Haravati competed in the China market with our Patna monopoly, again we intervened, not with high export duties, which we were competent to impose, but by laying our shackles upon it at the fountain-head. "*Aut Cæsar, aut nullus*," is our maxim in these regions; and in a country where our agents are established only to preserve political relations and the faith of treaties, the basis of which is non-interference in the internal arrangement of their affairs—albeit we have not a single foot of land in sovereignty, we set forth our *parwanas*, as peremptory as any Russian *ukase*, and command that no opium shall leave these countries for the accustomed outlets under pain of confiscation. Some, relying on their skill in eluding our vigilance, or tempted by the high price which these measures produce, or perhaps reckoning upon our justice, and upon impunity if discovered, tried new routes, until confiscation brought them to submission.

We then put an arbitrary value upon the drug, and forced the grower to come to us, and even take credit to ourselves for consulting his interests. Even admitting that such price was a remunerating one, founded upon an average of past years, still it is not the less arbitrary. No allowance is made for plentiful or bad seasons, when the drug, owing to a scarcity, will bear a double price. Our legislation is for "all seasons and their change." But this virtual infraction of the faith of treaties is not confined to

the grower or retailer ; it affects others in a variety of ways ; it injures our reputation and the welfare of those upon whom, for benevolent purposes, we have forced our protection. The transit duties levied on opium formed an item in the revenues of the princes of Rajputana ; but confiscation guards the passes of the Aravalli and Gujarat, and unless the smuggler wrap up his cargo in ample folds of deceit, the Rajput may go without his '*amal-pani*,' the infusion of this poison, dearer to him than life. It is in vain to urge that sufficient is allowed for home consumption. Who is to be the judge of this ? or who is so blind as not to see that any latitude of this kind would defeat the monopoly, which, impolitic in its origin, gave rise in its progress to fraud, gambling, and neglect of more important agricultural economy. But this policy must defeat itself : the excess of quantity produced will diminish the value of the original (Patna) monopoly, if its now deteriorated quality should fail to open the eyes of the quick-sighted Chinese, and exclude it from the market altogether.¹

Fairs.—There were two annual fairs in his country, Mundwa and Balotra ; the first chiefly for cattle. The merchandize of various countries was exposed and purchased by the merchants of the adjoining States. It commenced with the month of Magh, and lasted during six weeks. The other was also for cattle of all kinds, horses, oxen, camels, and the merchandize enumerated amongst the imports and exports of Pali. Persons from all parts of India frequented them ; but all these signs of prosperity are vanishing.

Administration.

Administration of justice.—The administration of justice is now very lax in these communities ; but at no time were the customary criminal laws of Rajputana sanguinary, except in respect to political crimes, which were very summarily dealt with when practicable. In these feudal associations, however, such crimes are esteemed individual offences, and the whole power of the Government is concentrated to punish them ; but when they are

¹ The Author learns that important modifications of this system have been made by the legislative authorities at home : of their extent he is ignorant, except that remuneration to chiefs for the loss of transit duties has not been omitted. This is as it should be !

committed against the community, justice is tempered with mercy, if not benumbed by apathy. In cases even of murder, it is satisfied with fine, corporal punishment, imprisonment, confiscation, or banishment. Inferior crimes, such as larcenies, were punished by fine and imprisonment, and when practicable, restitution ; or, in case of inability to pay, corporal punishment and confinement. But under the present lax system, when this impoverished Government has to feed criminals, it may be supposed that their prisons are not overstocked. Since Raja Bijai Singh's¹ death, the judgment-seat has been vacant. His memory is held in high esteem for the administration of justice, though he carried clemency to excess. He never confirmed a sentence of death ; and there is a saying of the criminals, yet extant, more demonstrative of his humanity than of good policy : " When at large we cannot even get *rabri* (porridge), but in prison we eat *laddu* (a sweet-meat)." Here, as at Jaipur, confined criminals are maintained by individual charity ; and it is a well-known fact, that at the latter place, but for the humanity of the mercantile classes, especially those of the Jain persuasion, they might starve. Perhaps it is the knowledge of this circumstance, which holds back the hand of the Government, or its agents, who may apply to their own uses the prison-fare. When once confined, the criminals are little thought of, and neglect answers all the ends of cruelty. They have, however, a source of consolation unknown to those who have passed " the bridge of sighs," or become inmates of the '*oubliettes*' of more civilized regions. That fortitude and resignation which religion alone can bestow on the one, is obtained through superstition by the other ; and prayers of the prison are poured forth for one of those visitations of Providence, which, in humbling the proud, prompts acts of mercy to others in order to ensure it to themselves. The celestial phenomena of eclipses, whether of the sun or moon, although predicted by the Pandits, who for ages have possessed the most approved theory for calculation, are yet looked upon with religious awe by the mass, and as " foreboding change to princes." Accordingly, when darkness dims the beams of Surya or Chandra, the face of the prisoner of Maru is lighted up with smiles ; his deliverance is at hand, and he may join the crowd to hoot and yell, and frighten the monster

¹ Bijai Singh, 1753-1793.

Rahu¹ from his hold of the "silver moon."² The birth of a son to the prince, and a new reign, are events likewise joyful to him.

The trial by *sagun*, literally 'oath of purgation,' or ordeal, still exists, and is occasionally had recourse to in Maru, as in other parts of Rajputana; and, if fallen into desuetude, it is not that these judgments of God (as they were styled in the days of European barbarism) are less relied on, but that society is so unhinged that even these appeals to chance find no subjects for practice, excepting by Zalim Singh; and he to the last carried on his antipathy to the *dakins* (witches) of Haravati who were always submitted to the process by 'water.' Trial by ordeal is of very ancient date in India: it was by 'fire' that Rama proved the purity of Sita, after her abduction by Ravana, and in the same manner as practised by one of our Saxon kings, by making her walk over a red-hot ploughshare. Besides the two most common tests, by fire and water, there is a third, that of washing the hands in boiling oil. It should be stated, that, in all cases, not only the selection but the appeal to any of these ordeals is the voluntary act of the litigants, and chiefly after the Panchayats or courts of arbitration, have failed. Where justice is denied, or bribery shuts the door, the sufferer will dare his adversary to the *sagun*, or submission to the judgment of God; and the solemnity of the appeal carries such weight, that it brings redress of itself, though cases do occur where the challenge is accepted, and the Author has conversed with individuals who have witnessed the operation of each of the ordeals.

Panchayats.—The Panchayats arbitrate in civil cases. From these courts of equity, there is an appeal to the Raja; but as unanimity is required in the judges, and a fee or fine must be paid by the appellant, ere his case can come before the prince, litigation is checked. The constitution of this court is simple. The plaintiff lays his case before the Hakim of the district, or the Patel of the village where he resides. The plaintiff and defendant have the right of naming the villages (two, each), from whence the members of the Panchayat are to be drawn. Information is accordingly sent to the Patels of the villages specified, who, with their respective

¹ The Rajputs and Hindus in general hold precisely the same idea, of the cause of eclipses, as the Getac. of Scandinavia.

² *Chandrama*. The moon is represented by silver, which is called after her (or him) *chandi*.

Patwaris (Registers), meet at the *Atai* or 'village-court.' Witnesses are summoned and examined on oath, the most common of which is the *gaddi-ki-an*, 'allegiance to the throne', resembling the ancient adjuration of the Scythians as recorded by Herodotus. This oath is, however, more restricted to Rajputs; the other classes have various forms based upon their religious notions. When the proceedings are finished, and judgment is given, the Hakim puts his seal thereto, and carries it into effect, or prepares it for appeal. It is affirmed that, in the good times of Rajputana, these simple tribunals answered every purpose.

Fiscal Revenues.—The fiscal revenues of Marwar are derived from various sources; the principal are—

- 1st. The *Khalisa* or 'crown lands';
- 2nd. The salt lakes;
- 3rd. Transit and impost duties;
- 4th. Miscellaneous taxes, termed *Hasil*.

The entire amount of personal revenue of the princes of Marwar does not at present exceed ten lakhs of rupees (£100,000 sterling), though in the reign of Bijai Singh, half a century ago, they yielded full sixteen lakhs, one-half of which arose from the salt lakes alone. The aggregate revenue of the feudal lands is estimated as high as fifty lakhs, or £500,000. It may be doubted whether at present they yield half this sum. The feudal contingents are estimated at five thousand horse, besides foot, the qualification being one cavalier and two foot-soldiers for every thousand rupees of income. This low estimate is to keep up the nominal value of estates, notwithstanding their great deterioration; for a 'knight's fee' of Marwar was formerly estimated at five hundred rupees.

The sum of ten lakhs, mentioned as the gross income of the prince, is what is actually realized by the treasury, for there are many public servants provided for out of the crown-lands, whose estates are not included.

The revenues are collected from the ryots in kind. A corn-rent, the only one recognized in ancient India, and termed *Butai*, or 'division,' is apportioned equally between the prince and the husbandman: a deviation from the more lenient practice of former times, which gave one-fourth, or one-sixth to the sovereign. Besides this, the cultivator has to pay the expense of guarding the crops, and also those who attend the process of division. An

assessment of two rupees is made on every ten maunds,¹ which more than covers the salaries paid to the *Shahnas* (watchmen), and *Kanwaris*,² and leaves a surplus divided by the Patel and village register (*Patwari*). A cart-load of *karbi* (the stalks of *joar* and *bajra*) is exacted from every cultivator as fodder for the prince's cattle; but this is commuted for a rupee, except in seasons of scarcity, when it is stored up. The other officers, as the Patwaris and Patels, are paid out of the respective shares of the farmer and the crown, *viz.* one-fourth of a seer each, from every maund of produce or an eightieth part of the gross amount. The cultivators of the *Pattawats* or feudal chiefs, are much better off than those of the *Khalisa*: from them only two-fifths are exacted; and in lieu of all other taxes and charges, a land-tax of twelve rupees is levied on every hundred bighas of land cultivated. The cultivators repay this mild assessment by attachment to the chiefs.

Anga is a poll-tax (from *anga*, 'body') of one rupee, levied on adults of either sex throughout Marwar.

Ghasmali is a graduated tax on cattle, or, as the term imports, the right of pasture. A sheep or goat is estimated at one anna (one-sixteenth of a rupee); a buffalo eight annas, or half a rupee; and each camel, three rupees.

Kewari is a tax on doors (*kewar*), and is considered peculiarly oppressive. It was first imposed by Bijai Singh, when, towards the latter end of his reign, his chiefs rebelled, and retired in a body to Pali to concert schemes for deposing him.³ Thither he fruitlessly followed in order to pacify them, and on his return found the gates (*kewar*) of his capital shut in his face, and Bhim Singh⁴ placed upon the *gaddi*. To supply the pecuniary exigencies consequent upon this embarrassing situation, he appealed to his subjects, and proposed a 'benevolence,' in aid of his necessities, of three rupees for each house, giving it a denomination from the cause whence it originated. Whether employed as a punishment of those who aided his antagonist, or as a convenient expedient of finance, he converted this temporary contribution into a permanent tax, which continued until the necessities of the confederacy against the present prince, Raja Man, and the usurpation

¹ The maund is about seventy-five lbs. weight.

² *Kan*, 'corn.'

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1076-1077.

⁴ Bhim Singh, 1793-1803.

of the fiscal lands by the Pathans, made him raise it to ten rupees on each house. It is, however, not equally levied ; the number of houses in each township being calculated, it is laid on according to the means of the occupants, and the poor man may pay two rupees, while the wealthy pays twenty. The feudal lands are not exempted, except in cases of special favour.

In estimating the amount of the *sair*, or imposts of Marwar, it must be borne in mind that the schedule appended represents what they have been, and perhaps might again be, rather than what they now are. These duties are subject to fluctuation in all countries, but how much more in those exposed to so many visitations from predatory foes, civil strife, and famine ! There is no reason to doubt that, in the "good old times" of Maru, the amount, as taken from old records, may have been realized :

Jodhpur	..	Rs.	76,000
Nagor	..	"	75,000
Didwana	..	"	10,000
Parbatsar	..	"	44,000
Merta	..	"	11,000
Kolia	..	"	5,000
Jalor	..	"	25,000
Pali	..	"	75,000
Jasol and Balotra fairs	..	"	41,000
Bhinmal	..	"	21,000
Sanchor	..	"	6,000
Phalodhi	..	"	41,000
TOTAL			4,30,000

The *Danis*, or collectors of the customs, have monthly salaries at the large towns, while the numerous petty agents are paid by a percentage on the sums collected. The *sair*, or imposts, include all those on grain, whether of foreign importation, or the home-grown, in transit from one district to another.

The revenue arising from the produce of the salt lakes has deteriorated with the land and commercial revenues ; and, though affected by political causes, is yet the most certain branch of income. The following schedule exhibits what has been derived from this lucrative source of wealth :

Pachbhadra	Rs.	2,00,000
Phalodhi	"	1,00,000
Didwana	"	1,15,000
Sambhar	"	2,00,000
Nawa	"	1,00,000
TOTAL		7,15,000

This productive branch of industry still employs thousands of hands, and hundreds of thousands of oxen, and is almost entirely in the hands of that singular race of beings called *Banjaras*, some of whose *tandas*, or caravans, amount to 40,000 head of oxen. The salt is exported to every region of Hindustan, from the Indus to the Ganges, and is universally known and sold under the title of *Sambhar Lun*, or 'salt of Sambhar', notwithstanding the quality of the different lakes varies, that of Pachbhadra, beyond the Luni, being most esteemed.¹ It is produced by natural evaporation, expedited by dividing the surface into pans by means of mats of the *Sarkanda* grass, which lessens the superficial agitation. It is then gathered and heaped up into immense masses, on whose summit they burn a variety of alkaline plants, such as the *sajji*, by which it becomes impervious to the weather.

We may recapitulate what the old archives state of the aggregate fiscal revenues in past times, amounting to nearly thirty lakhs of rupees. It would be hazardous to say to what extent the amount was over-rated :

1st.	<i>Khalisa</i> , or fiscal land, from 1,484 towns and villages.	Rs.	15,00,000
2nd.	<i>Sair</i> or imposts	"	4,30,000
3rd.	Salt lakes	"	7,15,000
4th.	<i>Hasil</i> , or miscellaneous taxes ; fluctuating and uncertain ; not less than	"	3,00,000
	TOTAL	"	29,45,000
	Feudal and ministerial estates	"	50,00,000
	GRAND TOTAL	"	79,45,000

¹The average selling price at Jodhpur is two rupees the maund four at Sambhar and Didwana, and five at Pachbhadra, Phalodhi, and

Thus the united fiscal and feudal revenues of Marwar are said to have amounted almost to eighty lakhs of rupees (£800,000). If they ever did reach this sum, which may be doubted, we do not err in affirming that they would now be over-rated at half that amount. Large fortunes are said to centre in the families of the ex-ministers, especially the Singhi family, reported to be immensely rich. Their wealth is deposited in foreign capitals. But much bullion is lost to the currency of these countries by the habits of secreting money. A very large treasure was discovered in Nagor by Bijai Singh, when demolishing some old buildings.

Military Forces.—It only remains to state the military resources of the Rathors, which fluctuate with their revenues. The Rajas maintain a foreign mercenary force upon their fiscal revenues to overawe their own turbulent vassalage. They are chiefly Rohilla and Afghan infantry, armed with muskets and matchlocks; and having cannon and sufficient discipline to act in a body, they are formidable to the Rajput cavaliers. Some years ago, Raja Man had a corps of three thousand five hundred foot, and fifteen hundred horse, with twenty-five guns, commanded by Hindal Khan, a native of Panipat. He has been attached to the family ever since the reign of Bijai Singh, and is (or was) familiarly addressed *kaka*, or 'uncle,' by the prince. There was also a brigade of those monastic militants, the *Bishanswamis*, under their leader, Kaimdas, consisting of seven hundred foot, three hundred horse, and an establishment of rockets (*bhan*), a very ancient instrument of Indian warfare, and mentioned long before gunpowder was used in Europe. At one period, the Raja maintained a foreign force amounting to, or at least mustered as, eleven thousand men, of which number two thousand five hundred were cavalry, with fifty-five guns, and a rocket establishment. Besides a monthly pay, lands to a considerable amount were granted to the commanders of the different legions. By these overgrown establishments, to maintain a superiority over the feudal lords which has been undermined by the causes related, the demoralization and ruin of this country have been accelerated. The existence of such a species of force, opposed in moral and religious sentiment to the retainers of the State, has only tended to

Nawa. Why the price at the capital is fifty per cent. lower than elsewhere, I know not, even if this statement is correct.

widen the breach between them and their head, and to destroy every feeling of confidence.

In Mewar there are sixteen great chiefs ; in Amber twelve ; in Marwar eight. The following table exhibits their names, clans, residences, and rated revenue. The contingent required by their princes may be estimated by the qualification of a cavalier, *viz.* one for every five hundred rupees of rent.

These are the principal chieftains of Marwar, holding lands on the tenure of service. There are many who owe allegiance and service on emergencies, the allodial vassals of Marwar, not enumerated in this list ; such as Barmer, Kotra, Jasol, Phulsund, Birganw, Bankaria, Kalindri, Barunda, who could muster a strong numerical force if their good-will were conciliated, and the prince could enforce his requisition. The specified census of the estates may not be exactly correct. The foregoing is from an old record, which is in all probability the best they have ; for so rapid are the changes in these countries, amidst the anarchy and rebellion we have been describing, that the civil officers would deem it time thrown away, to form, as in past times, an exact *pattabahi*, or 'register' of feoffs. The ancient qualification was one horseman and two foot soldiers, "when required," for each five hundred rupees in the rental ; but as the estates have been curtailed and diminished in value, in order to keep up their nominal amount one thousand is now the qualification.

Names of Chiefs.	Clans.	Places of Abode.	Revenue.	Remarks.
FIRST CLASS.				
1. Kesari Singh.....	Champawat.....	Awa	100,000	Premier noble of Marwar. Of this sum, half is the original grant: the rest is by usurpation of the inferior branches of his clan.
2. Bakhtawar Singh	Kumpawat.....	Asop	50,000	
3. Salim Singh.....	Champawat	Pokaran	100,000	The Pokaran chief is by far the most powerful in Marwar.
4. Surthan Singh.....	Udawat.....	Nimaj.....	50,000	The fief of Nimaj is now under sequestration, since the last incumbent was put to death by the Raja.
5.	Mertia	Rian	25,000	The Mertia is deemed the bravest of all the Rathor clans.
6. Ajit Singh.....	Mertia	Ghanerao	50,000	This fief formed one of the sixteen great fiefs of Mewar. The town, which is large, has been dismantled, and several villages sequestrated.
7.	Karamsot.....	Khinwasar	40,000	
8.	Bhatti.....	Khejarla.....	25,000	The only foreign chief in the first grade of the nobles of Marwar.

Names of Chiefs.	Clans.	Places of Abode.	Revenue.	Remarks.
SECOND CLASS.				
1. Sheonath Singh.....	Udawat.....	Kuchaman.....	50,000	A chief of considerable power.
2. Surthan Singh.....	Jodha.....	Khari-ka-dewa.....	25,000	
3. Prithi Singh.....	Udawat.....	Chandawal.....	25,000	
4. Tej Singh.....	Do.....	Khada.....	25,000	
5. Anar Singh.....	Bhatti.....	Ahor.....	11,000	In exile.
6. Jeth Singh.....	Kumpawat.....	Bagori.....	40,000	
7. Padam Singh.....	Do.....	Gajsinghpura.....	25,000	
8.	Mertia.....	Mehtri.....	40,000	
9. Kartan Singh.....	Udawat.....	Marot.....	15,000	
10. Zalim Singh.....	Kumpawat.....	Rohat.....	15,000	
11. Sawai Singh.....	Jodha.....	Chaupar.....	15,000	
12.	Budsu.....	20,000	
13. Sheodan Singh.....	Champawat.....	Kaota (great).....	40,000	
14. Zalim Singh.....	Do.....	Harsola.....	10,000	
15. Sawal Singh.....	Do.....	Degod.....	10,000	
16. Hukum Singh.....	Do.....	Kaota (little).....	11,000	

IV

JAIPUR¹

Reign of Pratap Singh

Throughout the twenty-five years' rule of Pratap,² he and his country underwent many vicissitudes. He was a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgment ; but neither gallantry nor prudence could successfully apply the resources of his petty State against its numerous predatory foes and its internal dissensions. The defection of Macheri was a serious blow to Jaipur, and the necessary subsidies soon lightened the hoards accumulated by his predecessors. Two payments to the Marathas took away eighty lakhs of rupees (£800,000) ; yet such was the mass of treasure notwithstanding the enormous sums lavished by Madho Singh for the support of his claims, besides those of the regency, that Pratap expended in charity alone, on the victory of Tonga, A.D. 1789, the sum of twenty-four lakhs, or a quarter of a million sterling.

In A.D. 1791, after the subsequent defeats at Patan, and the disruption of the alliance with the Rathors, Tukaji invaded Jaipur, and extorted an annual tribute, which was afterwards transferred to Amir Khan, and continues a permanent incumbrance on the resources of Jaipur. From this period to A.D. 1803, the year of Pratap's death, his country was alternately desolated by Sindhia's armies, under De Boigne or Perron, and the other hordes of robbers, who frequently contested with each other the possession of the spoils.

Reign of Jagat Singh

Jagat Singh succeeded in A.D. 1803, and ruled for fifteen years, with the disgraceful distinction of being the most dissolute prince of his race or of his age. The events with which his reign is crowded would fill volumes were they worthy of being recorded. Foreign invasions, cities besieged, capitulations and war-contributions, occasional acts of heroism, when the invader forgot the point

*¹ Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1363-1378, 1428-1439.

*² Pratap Singh, 1778-1803.

of honour, court intrigues, diversified, not unfrequently, by an appeal to the sword or dagger, even in the precincts of the court. Sometimes the daily journals (*akhbars*) disseminated the scandal of the *rawala* (female apartments), the follies of the libertine prince with his concubine *Ras-kafur*, or even less worthy objects, who excluded from the nuptial couch his lawful mates of the noble blood of Jodha, or Jaisal, the Rathors and Bhattis of the desert. We shall not disgrace these annals with the history of a life which discloses not one redeeming virtue amidst a cluster of effeminate vices, including the rankest, in the opinion of a Rajput—cowardice. The black transaction respecting the princess of Udaipur¹ covered him with disgrace, and inflicted a greater loss, in his estimation, even than that of character—a million sterling. The treasures of the Jai Mandir were rapidly dissipated, to the grief of those faithful hereditary guardians, the Minas of Kalikoh, some of whom committed suicide rather than see these sacred deposits squandered on their prince's unworthy pursuits. The lofty walls which surrounded the beautiful city of Jai Singh were insulted by every marauder; commerce was interrupted and agriculture rapidly declined, partly from insecurity, but still more from the perpetual exactions of his minions. One day a tailor² ruled the councils, the next a Bania, who might be succeeded by a Brahmin, and each had in turn the honour of elevation to the *donjon keep* of Nahargarh, the castle where criminals are confined, overlooking the city. The feudal chiefs held both his authority and his person in utter contempt, and the pranks he played with the 'Essence of Camphor' (*ras-kafur*³), at one time led to serious thoughts of deposing him; which project, when near maturity, was defeated by transferring "this queen of half of Amber," to the prison of Nahargarh. In the height of his passion for this Islamite concubine, he formally installed her as queen of half his dominions and actually conveyed to her in gift a moiety of the personality of the crown, even to the invaluable library of the illustrious Jai Singh, which was despoiled, and its treasures

*¹ The Krishnakumari episode: See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 535-541.

² Rorji *Khawas* was a tailor by birth, and, I believe, had in early life exercised the trade. He was, however, amongst the *Musahabs*, or privy councillors of Jagat Singh, and (I think) one of the ambassadors sent to treat with Lord Lake.

³ *Ras-kafur*, I am aware, means 'corrosive sublimate,' but it may also be interpreted 'essence of camphor.'

distributed amongst her base relations. The Raja even struck coin in her name, and not only rode with her on the same elephant, but demanded from his chieftains those forms of reverence towards her, which were paid only to his legitimate queens. This their pride could not brook, and though the Dewan, or prime minister, Misr Sheonarain, albeit a Brahmin, called her "daughter," the brave Chand Singh of Duni indignantly refused to take part in any ceremony at which she was present. 'This contumacy was punished by a mulct of £20,000, nearly four years' revenue of the fief of Duni !

Manu allows that sovereigns may be desposed, and the aristocracy of Amber had ample justification for such an act. But unfortunately the design became known, and some judicious friend, as a salvo for the Raja's dignity, propagated a report injurious to the fair fame of his Aspasia, which he affected to believe ; a mandate issued for the sequestration of her property, and her incarceration in the castle allotted to criminals. There she was lost sight of, and Jagat continued to dishonour the *gaddi* of Jai Singh until his death, on a day held especially sacred by the Rajput, the 21st of December 1818, the winter solstice ; when, to use their own metaphorical language, "the door of heaven is reopened."

Raja Jagat Singh left no issue, legitimate or illegitimate, and no provision had been made for a successor during his life. But as the laws of Rajputana, political or religious, admit of no *interregnum*, and the funeral pyre must be lit by an adopted child if there be no natural issue, it was necessary at once to inaugurate a successor ; and the choice fell on Mohan Singh, son of the ex-prince of Narwar. As this selection, in opposition to the established rules of succession, would, but for a posthumous birth, have led to a civil war, it may be proper to touch briefly upon the subject of heirs presumptive in Rajputana, more especially those of Jaipur : the want of exact knowledge respecting this point, in those to whom its political relations with us were at that time entrusted, might have had the most injurious effects on the British character. To set this in its proper light, we shall explain the principles of the alliance which rendered Jaipur a tributary of Britain.

Alliance with the East India Company

Jaipur was the last of the principalities of Rajputana to accept

the protection tendered by the Government of British India. To the latest moment, she delayed her sanction to a system which was to banish for ever the enemies of order. Our overtures and expostulations were rejected, until the predatory powers of India had been, one after another, laid prostrate at our feet. The Pindaris were annihilated ; the Peshwa was exiled from Poona to the Ganges ; the Bhonsla was humbled ; Sindhia palsied by his fears ; and Holkar, who had extensive lands assigned him, besides a regular tribute from Jaipur, had received a death-blow to his power in the field of Mehidpur.

Procrastination is the favourite expedient of all Asiatics ; and the Rajput, though a fatalist, often, by protracting the irresistible *honhar* (destiny), works out his deliverance. Amir Khan, the lieutenant of Holkar, who held the lands and tribute of Jaipur in *jaedad*, or assignment for his troops, was the sole enemy of social order left to operate on the fears of Jaipur, and to urge her to take refuge in our alliance ; and even he was upon the point of becoming one of the illustrious allies, who were to enjoy the "perpetual friendship" of Great Britain. The Khan was at that very moment battering Madhorajpura, a town almost within the sound of cannon-shot of Jaipur, and we were compelled to make an indirect use of this incident to hasten the decision of the Kachhwaha prince. The motives of his backwardness will appear from the following details.

Various considerations combined to check the ardour with which we naturally expected our offer of protection would be embraced. The Jaipur court retained a lively, but no grateful remembrance, of the solemn obligations we contracted with her in 1803, and the facility with which we extricated ourselves from them when expediency demanded, whilst we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating the treaty upon our ally. To use the words of one who has been mixed up with all the political transactions of that eventful period, with reference to the letter delivered by the envoy at the Jaipur court from our viceroy in the East, notifying the dissolution of the alliance : "The justice of these grounds was warmly disputed by the court, which under a lively sense of that imminent danger to which it had become exposed from this measure, almost forgot for a moment the temper and respect which it owed to the English nation." But the native envoy from Jaipur, attending the camp of the gallant Lake, took

a still higher tone, and with a manly indignation observed, that "this was the first time, since the English Government was established in India, that it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience : " a reproach the more bitter and unpalatable from its truth.¹

The enlarged and prophetic views of Marquess of Wellesley, which suggested the policy of uniting all these regular Governments in a league against the predatory powers, were counteracted by the timid, temporising policy of Lord Cornwallis, who could discover nothing but weakness in this extension of our influence. What misery would not these States have been spared, had those engagements, executed through the noble Lake (a name never mentioned in India, by European or native, without reverence), been maintained ; for the fifteen years which intervened between the two periods produced more mischief to Rajwara than the preceding half century, and half a century more will not repair it !

A circumstance that tended to increase this distrust was our tearing Wazir Ali from his sanctuary at Jaipur, which has cast an indelible stain upon the Kachhwaha name. We have elsewhere² explained the privileges of *saran*, or 'sanctuary,' which, when claimed by the unfortunate or criminal, is sacred in the eye of the Rajput. This trust we forced the Jaipur State to violate, though she was then independent of us. It was no excuse for the act that the fugitive was a foul assassin : we had no right to demand his surrender.³

There were other objections to the proffered treaty of no small weight. The Jaipur court justly deemed one-fifth (*eight lakhs*)

¹ *Vide* Malcolm's *Political History of India*.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 613.

³ A better commentary on the opinions held by the natives upon this subject could not be given than the speech of Holkar's envoy to the agent of the Governor-General of India, then with Lord Lake : "Holkar's vakil demanded, with no slight degree of pertinacity, the cession of the Jaipur and Bundi tributes ; and one of them, speaking of the former, stated, that he no doubt would continue to enjoy the friendship of the English, as he had disgraced himself to please that nation, by giving up Wazir Ali (who had sought his protection) to their vengeance. The vakil was severely rebuked by the agent (Colonel, now Sir John Malcolm) for this insolent reflection on the conduct of an ally of the British Government, who had delivered up a murderer whom it would have been infamy to shelter ;" though the author of the *Political History of India* might have added—but whom it was still greater infamy, according to *their code*, to surrender. See Malcolm's *Political History of India*, p. 432.

of the gross revenues of the crown, a high rate of insurance for protection ; but when we further stipulated for a prospective increase of nearly *one-third* of all surplus revenue beyond *forty lakhs*, they saw, instead of the generous Briton, a sordid trafficker of mercenary protection, whose rapacity transcended that of the Maratha.

Independent of these State objections, there were abundance of private and individual motives arrayed in hostility to the British offer. For example : the ministers dreaded the *surveillance* of a resident agent, as obnoxious to their authority and influence ; and the chieftains, whom rank and ancient usage kept at court as the counsellor of their prince, saw in prospect the surrender of crown-lands, which fraud, favour, or force had obtained for them. Such were the principal causes which impeded the alliance between Amber and the Government-general of British India ; but it would have marred the uniformity of Lord Hastings' plan to have left a gap in the general protective system by the omission of Jaipur. The events rapidly happening around them—the presence of Amir Khan—the expulsion of the orange flag of the Maratha, and the substitution of the British banner on the battlements of Ajmer—at length produced a tardy and ungracious assent, and, on the 2nd of April 1818, a treaty of ten articles was concluded which made the Kachhwaha princes the friends and tributaries in perpetuity of Great Britain.

Question of Succession

On the 21st of December of the same year, Jagat Singh died, and the choice of a successor speedily evinced to the ministers the impracticability of their exercising, as in days of yore, that “absolute power over their country and dependants,” guaranteed to them by the treaty. Our office of arbitrating the differences between the Raja and his vassals, on the subject of the usurpations from the crown-lands, was easy, and left no unpleasant feeling ; but when we intermeddled with the intrigues respecting the succession, our ignorance of established rights and usage rendered the interference offensive, and made the Jaipur chiefs repent the alliance which temporary policy had induced their prince to accept.

It may be of use in future negotiations, to explain the usages which govern the different States of Rajputana in respect to succession. The law of primogeniture prevails in all Rajput sove-

reignities ; the rare instances in which it has been set aside, are only exceptions to the rule. The inconclusive dicta of Manu, on this as on many other points, are never appealed to by the Rajputs of modern days. Custom and precedent fix the right of succession, whether to the *gaddi* of the State, or to a fief, in the eldest son, who is styled *Rajkumar*, *Pat-kumar* or simply *Kumarji*, 'the prince'; while his brothers have their proper names affixed, as *Kumar Jawan Singh*, 'Prince Jawan.' Seniority is, in fact, a distinction pervading all ranks of life, whether in royal families or those of chieftains ; all have their *Pat-kumar* and *Pat-rani*, or 'head child,' and 'head queen.' The privileges of the *Pat-rani* are very considerable. In minorities, she is the guardian, by custom as well as nature, of her child ; and in Mewar (the oldest sovereignty in India), she is publicly enthroned with the Rana. Seniority in marriage bestows the title of *Pat-rani*, but as soon as an heir is given to the State, the queen mother assumes this title, or that of *Maji*, simply 'the mother.'¹ In the duties of guardian, she is assisted by the chiefs of certain families, who with certain officers of the household enjoy this as an established hereditary distinction.

On the demise of a prince without lawful issue of his body, or that of near kindred, brothers or cousins, there are certain families in every principality (*raj*) of Rajwara, in whom is vested the right of presumptive heirship to the *gaddi*. In order to restrict the circle of claimants, laws have been established in every State limiting this right to the issue of a certain family in each principality. Thus, in Mewar, the elder of the Ranawat clans, styled *Babas*, or 'the infants,' possesses the latent right of heir presumptive. In Marwar, the independent house of Idar, of the family of Jodha ; in Bundi, the house of Dugari ; in Kotah, the Apjis of Pulaitha ; in Bikaner, the family of Mahajan ; and in Jaipur, the branch Rajawat (according to seniority), of the stock of Raja Man. Even in this stock there is a distinction between those prior, and those posterior, to Raja Madho Singh ; the former are styled simply *Rajawat*, or occasionally conjoined, *Munsinghot* ; the other *Madhani*. The Rajawats constitute a numerous *frerage*, of which the Jhalai house takes the lead ; and in which, provided there are

¹ In Mewar simply *Maii* ; at Jaipur, where they have long used the language and manners of Delhi, they affix the Persian word *Sahaba*, or 'lady-mother.'

no mental or physical disabilities, the right of furnishing heirs to the *gaddi* of Jaipur is a long-established, incontrovertible, and inalienable privilege.

We have been thus minute, because, notwithstanding the expressed wish of the Government not to prejudge the question, the first exercise of its authority as lord-paramount was to justify a proceeding by which these established usages were infringed, in spite of the eighth Article of the treaty: "The Maharaja and his successors shall remain absolute rulers of their country and dependants according to long established usage," &c. "*C'est le premier pas qui conte*," and this first step, being a wrong one, has involved an interference never contemplated, and fully justifying that wariness on the part of Jaipur, which made her hesitate to link her destiny with ours.

Both the sixth and seventh Articles contain the seeds of disunion, whenever it might suit the chicanery or bad faith of the protected, or the avarice of the protector. The former has already been called into operation, and the 'absolute rulers' of Jaipur have been compelled to unfold to the resident agent the whole of their financial and territorial arrangements, to prove that the revenues did not exceed the sum of forty *lakhs*, as, of the sum in excess (besides the stipulated tributary *fifth*), our share was to be *three-sixteenths*.¹

While, therefore, we deem ourselves justified in interfering in the two chief branches of government, the succession and finances, how is it possible to avoid being implicated in the acts of the

¹ Mewar was subjected to the same *premium* on her reviving prosperity. The author unsuccessfully endeavoured to have a limit fixed to the demand; but he has heard with joy that some important modifications have since been made in the tributary engagements both with Mewar and Amber: they cannot be made too light. Discontent in Rajputana will not be appeased by a few lakhs of extra expenditure. I gave my opinions fearlessly when I had every thing at stake; I will not suppress them now, when I have nothing either to hope or to fear but for the perpetuity of the British power in these regions, and the revival of the happiness and independence of those who have sought our protection. He will prove the greatest enemy to his country, who, in ignorance of the true position of the Rajputs, may aim at further trenching upon their independence. Read the thirty years' war between Aurangzeb and the Rathors! where is the dynasty of their tyrant? Look at the map: a desert at their back, the Aravalli in front; no enemies to harass or disturb them! How different would a Rajput foe prove from a contemptible Maratha, or the mercenary array of traitorous Nawabs, whom we have always found easy conquests! Cherish the native army: conciliate the Rajputs; then, laugh at foes!

government-functionaries, and involved in the party views and intrigues of a court, stigmatized even by the rest of Rajwara with the epithet of *jhutha durbar*, the 'lying court'? While there is a resident agent at Jaipur, whatever his resolves, he will find it next to impossible to keep aloof from the vortex of intrigue. The purest intentions, the highest talents, will scarcely avail to counteract this systematic vice, and with one party at least, but eventually with all, the reputation of his Government will be compromised.

This brings us back to the topic which suggested these remarks, the installation of a youth upon the *gaddi* of Jaipur¹.

The youth, named Mohan Singh, who was installed on the *gaddi* of Jaipur, on the morning succeeding Jagat Singh's decease, was the son of Monohar Singh, the ex-Raja of Narwar, who was chased from his throne and country by Sindhia. We have stated that the Jaipur family sprung from that of Narwar eight centuries ago; but the parent State being left without direct lineage, they applied to Amber and adopted a son of Prithwiraj I., from whom the boy now brought forward was fourteen generations in descent. This course of proceeding was in direct contravention of usage, which had fixed, as already stated, the heirs-presumptive, on failure of lineal issue, to the *gaddi* of Amber, in the descendants of Raja Man, and the branch *Madhani*, generally styled *Rajawat*, of whom the first claimant was the chief of Jhalai, and supposing his incompetency, Kama, and a dozen other houses of the 'infantas' of Jaipur.

The causes of departure from the recognized rule, in this respect, were the following. At the death of Jagat Singh, the reins of power were, and had been for some time, in the hands of the chief eunuch of the *rawala* (seraglio), whose name was Mohan Nazir², a man of considerable vigour of understanding, and not without the reputation of good intention in his administration of affairs, although the system of chicanery and force, by which he attempted to carry his object, savoured more of self-interest than of loyalty. The youth was but nine years of age and a long minority, with the exclusive possession of power, suggested the true motives of the Nazir. His principal coadjutor, amongst the great vassals

¹Two sentences omitted.

²*Nazir* is the official name, a Mahomedan one, denoting his capacity, as emasculated guardian of the seraglio. Jaipur and Bundi are the only two of the Rajput principalities who, adopting the Moslem custom, have contaminated the palaces of their queens with the presence of these creatures.

of the State, was Megh Singh of Diggi, a chief who had contrived by fraud and force to double his hereditary fief by usurpations from the crown-lands, to retain which he supported the views of the Nazir with all the influence of his clan (the Khangarot), the most powerful of the twelve great families of Amber.¹ The personal servants of the crown, such as the *Purohits*, *Dhabhais* (domestic chaplains and foster-brothers), and all the subordinate officers of the household, considered the Nazir's cause as their own : a minority and his favour guaranteed their places, which might be risked by the election of a prince who could judge for himself, and had friends to provide for.

There² was no previous consultation or concert amongst the military vassals, or the queens ; on the contrary, acting entirely on his own responsibility, the Nazir, on the morning succeeding the death of his master, placed young Mohan in "the car of the sun," to lead the funeral procession, and light the pyre of his adopted sire. Scarcely were the ablutions and necessary purifications from this rite concluded, when he received the congratulations of all present as lord of the Kachhwahas, under the revived name of Man Singh the Second. The transactions which followed, as related in the diary, until the final *denouement*, distinctly show, that having committed himself, the Nazir was anxious to obtain through the resident agents of the chieftains at court, their acquiescence in the measure under their signs-manual. It will be seen that the communications were received and replied to in that cautious yet courteous manner, which pledged the writer to nothing, and gained him time for the formation of a deliberate opinion : the decision was thus suspended ; all eyes were directed to the paramount power ; and the Nazir, whose first desire was to propitiate this, entreated the British functionary at Delhi to send his confidential Munshi to Jaipur without delay. This agent reached Jaipur from Delhi six days after the death of Jagat. He was the bearer of instructions, "requiring a full account of the reasons for placing the son of the Narwar Raja on the masnad ; of his family,

¹ The Khangarot clan enumerates twenty-two fiefs, whose united rent-rolls amount to 4,02,806 rupees annually, and their united quotas for the service of the State, six hundred and forty-three horse. Megh Singh, by his turbulence and intelligence, though only the sixth or seventh in the scale of rank of this body, had taken the lead, and become the organ of his clan at court.

² A few lines omitted.

lineage, right of succession, and by whose counsels the measure was adopted." On the 11th of January this requisition was reiterated; and it was further asked, whether the measure had the assent of the queens and chiefs, and a declaration to this effect, under their signatures, was required to be forwarded. Nothing could be more explicit, or more judicious than the tenor of these instructions.

The replies of the Nazir and confidential Munshi were such, that on the 7th of February the receipt of letters of congratulation from the British Agent, accompanied by one from the supreme authority, was formally announced, which letters being read in full court, "the *naubat* (kettledrum) again sounded, and young Man Singh was conducted to the Pratap Mahal, and seated on the *masnad*." On this formal recognition by the British Government, the agents of the chieftains at their sovereign's court, in reply to the Nazir's demand, "to know the opinions of the chiefs," answered, that "if he called them, they were ready to obey"; but at the same time they rested their adhesion on that of the chief queen, sister of the Raja of Jodhpur, who breathed nothing but open defiance of the Nazir and his *junta*. Early in March, public discontent became more manifest: and the Rajawat chief of Jhalai determined to appeal to arms in support of his rights as heir presumptive, and was soon joined by the chiefs of Sarwar and Isarda, junior but powerful branches of the same stock.

Another party seemed inclined, on this emergency, to revive the rights of that posthumous son of Prithi Singh, whom we have already described as living in exile at Gwalior, on the bounty of Sindhia¹; and nothing but the unfavourable report of his intellect and debased habits prevented the elder branch of the sons of Madho Singh recovering their lost honours.

While the paramount authority was thus deluded, and the chieftains were wavering amidst so many conflicting opinions, the queen continued resolute, and the Rajawats were arming—and the Nazir, in this dilemma, determined as a last resource, to make Raja Man of Jodhpur the umpire, hoping by this appeal to his vanity, to obtain his influence over his sister to an acquiescence in the irremediable step, which had been taken "in obedience (as he pretended) to the will of the deceased prince." Raja Man's reply is important: "that there could be no occasion for his or

¹ See Crooke, Vol. III. p. 1362.

his sister's signature to the required declaration on the right of succession to the masnad of Jaipur, which depended upon, and was vested in, the elders of the twelve tribes of Kachhwahas ; that if *they* approved and signed the declaration, the queen his sister, and afterwards himself, would sign it, if requisite."

The Nazir and his faction, though aided by the interposition of the Munshi, were now in despair, and in these desperate circumstances, he attempted to get up a marriage between the puppet he had enthroned and the grand-daughter of the Rana of Mewar. It was well contrived, and not ill-received by the Rana ; but there was an influence at his court which at once extinguished the plot, though supported at Delhi by the Rana's most influential agent. It was proposed that, at the same time, the Rana should consummate his nuptials with the Jaipur Raja's sister, the preliminaries of which had been settled a dozen years back. Money in abundance was offered, and the Rana's passion for pageantry and profusion would have prevented any objection to his proceeding to the Jaipur capital. To receive the chief of the universal Hindu race with due honour, the whole nobility of Amber would have left their estates, which would have been construed into, and accepted as, a voluntary acquiescence in the rights of the Nazir's choice, which the marriage would have completely cemented. Foiled in this promising design, the knot, which the precipitate and persevering conduct of the Nazir had rendered too indissoluble even for his skill to undo, was cut by the annunciation of the advanced pregnancy of the Bhattiani queen.

This timely interposition of *Mata Janami* (the Juno Lucina of Rajwara) might well be regarded as miraculous ; and though the sequel of this event was conducted with such publicity as almost to choke the voice of slander, it still found utterance.¹ It was deemed a sort of prodigy, that an event, which would have caused a jubilee throughout Dhundhar, should have been kept secret until three months after the Raja's death.² The mysteries of the *raualas* of Rajput princes find their way to the public out

¹ The publicity, on this occasion, is precisely of the same character as marked the accouchement of the Duchess de Berri. who, it is said, not only had the usual witnesses to silence the voice of doubt, but absolutely insisted on the *Marechaux* as well as the *Marechales* of France being in the room at the moment of parturition.

² Raja Jagat Singh died December 21, 1818, and the announcement of the Bhattiani being in "the eighth month of her pregnancy", was on March 24, 1819.

of doors ; and in Udaipur, more especially, are the common topics of conversation. The variety of character within its walls, the like variety of communicants without, the conflicting interests, the diversified objects of contention of these little worlds, render it utterly impossible that any secret can long be maintained, far less one of such magnitude as the pregnancy of the queen of a prince without issue. That this event should be revealed to the Nazir, the superintendent of the queen's palace, with all the formality of a new discovery, *three months* after Jagat Singh's death, must excite surprise ; since to have been the bearer of such joyful intelligence to his master, to whom he was much attached, must have riveted his influence.

At three o'clock on the 1st of April, a council of sixteen queens, the widows of the late prince, and the wives of all the great vassals of the State, "assembled to ascertain the fact of pregnancy", whilst all the great barons awaited in the antechambers of the Zanana Deori the important response of this council of matrons. When it announced that the Bhattiani queen was pregnant beyond a doubt, they consulted until seven, when they sent in a written declaration, avowing their unanimous belief of the fact ; and that "should a son be born, they would acknowledge him as their lord, and to none else pledge allegiance". A transcript of this was given to the Nazir, who was recommended to forward an attested copy to the British Agent at Delhi. From these deliberations, from which there was no appeal, the Nazir was excluded by express desire of the Rathor queen. He made an ineffectual effort to obtain from the chiefs a declaration, that the adoption of the Narwar youth was in conformity to the desire of the deceased prince, their master ; but this attempt to obtain indemnity for his illegal acts was defeated immediately on the ground of its untruth.

By this lawful and energetic exertion of the powers directly vested in the queen-mother and the great council of the chiefs, the tongue of faction was rendered mute ; but had it been otherwise, another queen was pronounced to be in the same joyful condition.¹ On the morning of the 25th of April, four months and four days after Jagat Singh's death, a son was ushered into the world with the usual demonstrations of joy, and received as the Autocrat of the Kachhwahas ; while the infant interloper was

¹ No notice, that I am aware of, was ever taken of this second announcement.

removed from the *gaddi*, and thrust back to his original obscurity. Thus terminated an affair which involved all Rajwara in discussion, and at one time threatened a very serious result. That it was disposed of in this manner was fortunate for all parties, and not least for the protecting power.

Economic Conditions and Administration

Boundaries and Extent—The boundaries of Amber and its dependencies are best seen by an inspection of the map. Its greatest breadth lies between Sambhar, touching the Marwar frontier on the west, and the town of Suraut, on the Jat frontier, east. This line is one hundred and twenty British miles, whilst its greatest breadth from north to south, including Shaikhavati¹, is one hundred and eighty. Its form is very irregular. We may, however, estimate the surface of the parent State, Dhundhar or Jaipur, at nine thousand five hundred square miles, and Shaikhavati at five thousand four hundred; in all, fourteen thousand nine hundred square miles.²

Population—It is difficult to determine with exactitude the amount of the population of this region; but from the best information, one hundred and fifty souls to the square mile would not be too great a proportion in Amber, and eighty in Shaikhavati; giving an average of one hundred and twenty-four to the united area, which consequently contains 185,670; and when we consider the very great number of large towns in this region, it may not be above, but rather below, the truth. Dhundhar, the parent country, is calculated to contain four thousand townships, exclusive of *purvas*, or hamlets, and Shaikhavati about half that number, of which Lachman Singh of Sikar and Khandela, and Abhai Singh of Khetri, have each about five hundred, or the half of the lands of the federation.

Classification of Inhabitants.—Of this population, it is still more difficult to classify its varied parts, although it may be asserted with confidence that the Rajputs bear but a small ratio to the rest, whilst they may equal in number any individual class, except the aboriginal *Minas*, who, strange to say, are still the most numerous. The following are the principal tribes, and the order in which they

^{*1} For an account of the Shaikhawat Federation see Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1378-1427.

^{*2} The actual area was about 15,579 square miles.

follow may be considered as indicative of their relative numbers. 1. Minas; 2. Rajputs; 3. Brahmins; 4. Banias; 5. Jats; 6. Dhakar, or Kirar (qu. *Kirata*?); 7. Gujars.

Minas.—The Minas are subdivided into no less than thirty-two distinct clans or classes, but it would extend too much the annals of this State to distinguish them. The immunities and privileges preserved to the Minas best attest the truth of the original induction of the exiled prince of Narwar to the sovereignty of Amber; and it is a curious fact, showing that such establishment must have been owing to adoption, not conquest, that this event was commemorated on every installation by a Mina of Kalikoh marking with his blood the *tika* of sovereignty on the forehead of the prince. The blood was obtained by incision of the great toe, and though, like many other antiquated usages, this has fallen into desuetude here (as has the same mode of inauguration of the Ranas by the Oghna Bhils), yet both in the one case and in the other, there cannot be more convincing evidence that these now outcasts were originally the masters. The Minas still enjoy the most confidential posts about the persons of the princes of Amber, having charge of the archives and treasure in Jaigarh; they guard his person at night, and have that most delicate of all trusts, the charge of the *raavala*, or seraglio. In the earlier stages of Kachhwaha power, these their primitive subjects had the whole insignia of State, as well as the person of the prince, committed to their trust; but presuming upon this privilege too far, when they insisted that, in leaving their bounds, he should leave these emblems, the *nakaras* and standards, with them, their pretensions were cancelled in their blood. The Minas, Jats and Kirars, are the principal cultivators, many of them holding large estates.

Jats.—The Jats nearly equal the Minas in numbers, as well as in extent of possessions, and are, as usual, the most industrious of all husbandmen.

Brahmins.—Of Brahmins, following secular as well as sacred employments, there are more in Amber than in any other State in Rajwara; from which we are not to conclude that her princes were more religious than their neighbours, but on the contrary, that they were greater sinners.

Rajputs.—It is calculated that, even now, on an emergency, if a national war roused the patriotism of the Kachhwaha feudality, they could bring into the field thirty thousand of their kin and

clan, or, to repeat their own emphatic phrase, "the sons of one father," which includes the Narukas and the chiefs of the Shaikhawat federation. Although the Kachhwahas, under their popular princes, as Pajun, Raja Man, and the Mirza Raja, have performed exploits as brilliant as any other tribes, yet they do not now enjoy the same reputation for courage as either the Rathors or Haras. This may be in part accounted for by the demoralization consequent upon their proximity to the Mughal court, and their participation in all its enervating vices; but still more from the degradations they have suffered from the Marathas, and to which their western brethren have been less exposed. Every feeling, patriotic or domestic, became corrupted wherever their pernicious influence prevailed.

Soil, husbandry, products.—Dhundhar contains every variety of soil, and the *kharif* and *rabi*, or autumnal and spring crops, are of nearly equal importance. Of the former *bajra* predominates over *joar*, and in the latter barley over wheat. The other grains, pulses, and vegetables, reared all over Hindustan, are here produced in abundance, and require not to be specified. The sugar-cane used to be cultivated to a very great extent, but partly from extrinsic causes, and still more from its holding out such an allurement to the renters, the husbandman has been compelled to curtail this lucrative branch of agriculture; for although land fit for *ikh* (cane) is let at four to six rupees per bigha, sixty have been exacted before it was allowed to be reaped. Cotton of excellent quality is produced in considerable quantities in various districts, as are indigo and other dyes common to India. Neither do the implements of husbandry or their application differ from those which have been described in this and various other works sufficiently well known.

Farming system.—It is the practice in this State to farm its lands to the highest bidder; and the mode of farming is most pernicious to the interests of the State, and the cultivating classes, both of whom it must eventually impoverish. The farmers-general are the wealthy bankers and merchants, who make their offers for entire districts; these they underlet in *tappas*, or subdivisions, the holders of which again subdivide them into single villages, or even shares of a village. With the profits of all these persons, the expenses attending collections, quartering of *barkandazes*, or armed police, are the poor *Bhumias* and Ryots saddled. Could

they only know the point where exaction must stop, they would still have a stimulus to activity ; but when the crops are nearly got in, and all just demands satisfied, they suddenly hear that a new renter has been installed in the district, having ousted the holder by some ten or twenty thousand rupees, and at the precise moment when the last toils of the husbandman were near completion. The renter has no remedy ; he may go and " throw his turban at the door of the palace, and exclaim *dohai, Raja Saheb!*" till he is weary, or marched off to the Kotwal's *chabutra*, and perhaps fined for making a disturbance. Knowing, however, that there is little benefit to be derived from such a course, they generally submit, go through the whole accounts, make over the amount of collections, and with the host of vultures in their train, who, never unprepared for such changes, have been making the most of their ephemeral power by battenning on the hard earnings of the peasantry, retire for this fresh band of harpies to pursue a like course. Nay, it is far from uncommon for three different renters to come upon the same district in one season, or even the crop of one season, for five or ten thousand rupees, annulling the existing engagement, no matter how far advanced. Such was the condition of this State ; and when to these evils were super-added the exactions called *dand*, or *barar*, forced contributions to pay those armies of robbers who swept the lands, language cannot exaggerate the extent of misery. The love of country must be powerful indeed which can enchain man to a land so misgoverned, so unprotected.

Revenues—It is always a task of difficulty to obtain any correct account of the revenues of these States, which are ever fluctuating. We have now before us several schedules, both of past and present reigns, all said to be copies from the archives, in which the name of every district, together with its rent, town and transit duties, and other sources of income, are stated ; but the details would afford little satisfaction, and doubtless the resident authorities have access to the fountain head. The revenues of Dhundhar, of every description, fiscal, feudal, and tributary, or impost, are stated, in round numbers, at one crore of rupees, or about a million of pounds sterling, which, estimating the difference of the price of labour, may be deemed equivalent to four times that sum in England. Since this estimate was made, there have been great alienations of territory, and no less

than sixteen rich districts have been wrested from Amber by the Marathas, or her own rebel son, the Naruka chief of Macheri.

The following is the schedule of alienations :—

1. Kama ¹	}	Taken by General Perron, for his master Sindhia ; since rented to the Jats, and retained by them.
2. Khorl.....		
3. Paharl.....		
4. Kanti.....	}	Seized by the Macheri Rao.
5. Ukrod.....		
6. Pandapan.....		
7. Ghazi-ka-thana.....		
8. Rampura (karda).....		
9. Ganwnri.....		
10. Reni.....		
11. Parbeni.....		
12. Mozpur Harsana.....	}	Taken by De Boigne and given to Murtaza Khan, Baraich, confirmed in them by Lord Lake.
13. Kanod or Kanound ²		
14. Narnol.....		
15. Kotputli.....	}	Taken in the war of 1803-4, from the Marathas, and given by Lord Lake to Abhai Singh of Khetri.
16. Tonk.....		
17. Rampura.....		
	}	Granted to Holkar by Raja Madho Singh ; confirmed in sovereignty to Amir Khan by Lord Hastings.

It must, however, be borne in mind, that almost all these alienated districts had but for a comparatively short period formed an integral portion of Dhundhar ; and that the major part were portions of the imperial domains, held in *jaedad* or 'assignment,' by the princes of this country, in their capacity of lieutenants of the emperor. In Raja Prithi Singh's reign, about half a century ago, the rent-roll of Amber and her tributaries was seventy-seven lakhs ; and in a very minute schedule formed in S. 1858 (A.D. 1802), the last year of the reign of Raja Pratap

* ¹ Crooke suggests, "This may possibly be Kamban in Bharatpur State". (Vol. III, p. 1432).

² Kanod was the fief of Amir Singh, Khangarot, one of the twelve great lords of Amber.

Singh, they were estimated at seventy-nine lakhs: an ample revenue, if well administered, for every object. We shall present the chief items which form the budget of ways and means of Amber.

Schedule of the revenues of Amber for S. 1858 (A.D. 1802-3), the year of Raja Jaqat Singh's accession.

KHALISA OR FISCAL LAND

	Rupees	
Managed by the Raja, or rented	20,55,000	
Deori taluka, expenses of the queen's household ..	5,00,000	
Shagirdpesha, servants of the household	3,00,000	
Ministers, and civil officers	2,00,000	
Jagirs for the Silahposh, or men-at-arms	1,50,000	
Jagirs to army, viz. ten battalions of infantry with cavalry	7,14,000	
Total Fiscal land ..	39,19,000	
Feudal lands (of Jaipur Proper)	17,00,000	
Udak, or charity lands, chiefly to Brahmins ..	16,00,000	
Dan and Mapa, or transit and impost duties of the country	1,90,000	
Kachahri, of the capital, includes town-duties, fines, contributions, &c. &c.	2,15,000	
Mint	60,000	
Hundi-bara, insurance, and dues on bills of exchange	60,000	
Faujdari, or commandant of Amber (annual fine) ..	12,000	
Faujdari, or commandant of city of Jaipur	8,000	
Bid'at, petty fines from the Kachahri, or hall of justice	16,000	
Sabzi-mandi, vegetable market	3,000	
Total lakhs ..	77,83,000	
Tribute {	Shaikhavati	3,50,000
	Rajawat and other feudatories of Jaipur ¹ ..	30,000
	Kothris of Haravati ²	20,000
Total Tribute ..	4,00,000	
Grand Total ..	81,83,000	

¹ Barwara, Khirni, Sawar, Isarda, &c. &c.

² Antardah, Balwan, and Indargarh.

If this statement is correct, and we add thereto the Shaikhawat, Rajawat, and Hara tributes, the revenues fiscal, feudal, commercial, and tributary, of Amber, when Jagat Singh came to the throne, would exceed eighty lakhs of rupees, half of which is *khalisa* or appertaining to the Raja—nearly twice the personal revenue of any other prince in Rajwara. This sum (forty lakhs) was the estimated amount liable to tribute, when the treaty was formed with the British Government, and of which the Raja has to pay eight lakhs annually, and *five-sixteenths* of all revenue surplus to this amount. The observant reader will not fail to be struck with the vast inequality between the estates of the defenders of the country, and these drones the Brahmins,—a point on which we have elsewhere treated¹: nor can anything more powerfully mark the utter prostration of intellect of the Kachhwaha princes, than their thus maintaining an indolent and baneful hierarchy, to fatten on the revenues which would support four thousand Kachhwaha cavaliers. With a proper application of her revenues, and princes like Raja Man to lead a brave vassalage, they would have foiled all the efforts of the Marathas: but their own follies and vices have been their ruin.

Foreign army—At the period (A.D. 1803) this schedule was formed of the revenues of Amber, she maintained a foreign army of thirteen thousand men, consisting of ten battalions of infantry with guns, a legion of four thousand *Nagas*, a corps of *aligols* for police duties, and one of cavalry, seven hundred strong. With these, the regular contingent of feudal levies, amounting to about four thousand efficient horse, formed a force adequate to repel any insult; but when the *kher*, or *levee en masse*, was called out, twenty thousand men, horse and foot, were ready to back the always embodied force.

A detailed schedule of the feudal levies of Amber may diversify the dry details of these annals, obviate repetition, and present a perfect picture of a society of clanships. In this list we shall give precedence to the *kothriband*, the holders of the twelve great fiefs (*bara-kothri*) of Amber².

* ¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 590-591.

* ² See Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1336.

*Schedule of the names and appanges of the twelve sons of
Raja Prithiraj, whose descendants form the bara-kothri, or
twelve great fiefs of Amber.*

Sons of Prithiraj.	Names of Families.	Names of Fiefs.	Present Chiefs.	Revenues.	Personal Quotas.
1. Chattarbhuja	Chattarbhuja	{ Pinar and Bhagru }	Bagh Singh	18,000	28
2. Kalyan	Kalyanot	Lotwara	Ganga Singh	25,000	47
3. Nathu	Nathawat	Chaumun	Kishan Singh	1,15,000	205
4. Balbhadar	Balbhadarot	Achrol	Kaim Singh	28,850	57
5. Jagmal his son					
6. Khangar	Khangarot	Thodri	Prithi Singh	25,000	40
7. Sultan	Sultanot	Chandsar		—	—
8. Pachain	Pachainot	Sambra	Sali Singh	17,700	32
9. Kaim	Gugawat	Dhuni	Rao Chand Singh	70,000	88
10. Kumbha	Kumbhani	Banskoh	Padam Singh	21,535	31
11. Surai	Kumbhawar	Mahar	Rawat Sarup Singh	27,538	45
	Sheosaran- pota	Nindar	Rawat Hari Singh	10,000	19
12. Banoir	Banbirpota	Ralkoh	Sarup Singh	19,000	35

It will be remarked that the estates of these, the chief vassals of Amber, are, with the exception of two, far inferior in value to those of the *sixteen* great chiefs of Mewar, or the *eight* of Marwar; and a detailed list of all the inferior feudatories of each *kothri*, or clan, would show that many of them have estates greater than those of their leaders: for instance, Kishan Singh of Chaumun has upwards of a *lakh*, while Beri Sal of Samod, the head of the clan (Nathawat), has only forty thousand: again, the chief of Balaheri holds an estate of thirty-five thousand, while that of the head of his clan is but twenty-five thousand. The representative of the Sheoharanpotas has an estate of only ten thousand, while the junior branch of Gura has thirty-six thousand. Again, the chief of the Khangarots has but twenty-five thousand, while no less than three junior branches hold lands to double that amount; and the inferior of the Balbhadarots holds upwards of a lakh, while his superior of Achrol has not a third of this rental. The favour of the prince, the turbulence or talents of individuals, have caused these inequalities; but, however disproportioned the gifts of fortune, the attribute of honour always remains with the lineal descendant and representative of the original fief.

We shall further illustrate this subject of the feudalities of Amber by inserting a general list of all the clans, with the number of subdivisions, the resources of each, and the quotas they ought to furnish. At no remote period this was held to be correct, and will serve to give a good idea of the Kachhwaha aristocracy. It was my intention to have given a detailed account of the subdivisions of each fief, their names, and those of their holders, but on reflexion, though they cost some diligence to obtain, they would have little interest for the general reader.

Schedule of the Kachhwaha clans ; the number of fiefs or estates in each ; their aggregate value, and quotas of horse for each estate¹.

Names of Clans.		Number of Fiefs in each Clanship or Clan.	Aggregate Revenue.	Aggregate Quotas.
12	Chhattarbhujoṭ ..	6	53,800	92
	Kalyanot ..	19	2,45,196	422
	Nathawot ..	10	2,20,800	371
	Balbhadarot ..	2	1,30,850	157
	Khanganot ..	22	4,02,806	643
	Sultanot ..	—	—	—
	Pachainot ..	3	24,700	45
	Gugawat ..	13	1,67,900	273
	Kumbhani ..	2	23,787	35
	Kumbhawāt ..	6	40,738	68
	Sheobaranpota ..	3	49,500	73
	Banbirpota ..	3	26,575	48
4	Rajawat ..	16	1,98,137	392
	Naruka ..	6	91,069	92
	Bankawat ..	4	34,600	53
	Puranmallot ..	1	10,000	19
10	Bhatti ..	4	1,04,039	205
	Chaulhan ..	4	30,500	61
	Bargujar ..	6	32,000	58
	Chandarawat ..	1	14,000	21
	Sarkarwar ..	2	4,500	8
	Gujars ..	3	15,300	30
	Rangras ..	6	2,91,105	549
	Khatri ..	4	1,20,000	281
	Brahmins ..	12	3,12,000	606
	Musalman ..	9	1,41,000	274

¹ The first *twelve* are the Bara-kothris, or twelve great fiefs of Amber.

The next *four* are of the Kachhwaha stock, but not reckoned amongst the *Kothribands*.

The last *ten* are foreign chieftains, of various tribes and classes.

No doubt great changes have taken place since this list was formed, especially amongst the mercenary Pattayats, or Jagirdars. The quotas are also irregular, though the qualification of a cavalier in this State is reckoned at five hundred rupees of income.

BIKANER¹*Reign of Surat Singh (1788—1828)*

The coalition against Jodhpur² was ruinous to Surat,³ who supported the cause of the pretender,⁴ on which the usurper⁵ expended twenty-four lakhs of rupees, nearly five years' revenue of this desert region. On this occasion, he led all his troops in person against Jodhpur, and united in the siege, which they were however compelled to abandon with dishonour, and retrograde to their several abodes. In consequence of this, the usurper fell sick, and was at the last extremity; nay, the ceremonies for the dead were actually commenced; but he recovered, to the grief and misery of his subjects. To supply an exhausted treasury, his extortions know no bounds; and having cherished the idea that he might compound his past sins by rites and gifts to the priests, he is surrounded by a group of avaricious Brahmins, who are maintained in luxury at the expense of his subjects. His cruelty keeps pace with his avarice and his fears. The chief of Bhukarka he put to death, notwithstanding his numerous services. Nahar Singh of Sidmukh, Gyan Singh and Guman Singh of Gandeli, amongst the chief feudatories of the State, shared the same fate. Churu was invested a third time, and with its chief, fell into the tyrant's hands.

With this system of terror, his increasing superstition, and diminished attention to public duties, the country is annually deteriorating in population and wealth; and as if they had not misery enough within, they have not had a single good season for years.⁶ Owing to the disobedience of the northern chiefs,

*¹ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1142-1143, 1145-1161.

*² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1080-1088.

*³ Surat Singh, 1788-1828.

*⁴ Dhonkal Singh. See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1080-1088.

*⁵ Surat Singh. See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1138-1139.

*⁶ This account was drawn up in 1814.

and the continual incursions of the Rahats, or 'Bhatti robbers', who sweep the land of cattle, and often cut and carry off entire crops, the peasant Jat, the ancient lord of the soil, is often left to the alternative of starvation or emigration. Many have consequently sought shelter in the British frontier territories, in Hansi and Hariana, where they are kindly received. Since the English have occupied Sirsa and the lands belonging to the Bhatti Bahadur Khan, the misfortunes of the cultivators of the northern parts of Bikaner have been doubled by the inroads of a band left without resource. In some parts, the Jats combine to protect themselves against these inroads: every hamlet has its post of defence, a tower of earth, on which is perched a watchman and a kettledrum, to beat the alarm, which is taken up from village to village, and when an enemy is discovered, all are in arms to defend their property. The unfortunate Jat is obliged to plough his fields under the load of shield and *sang*, or heavy iron lance: so that, at no distant period, the whole of this region must become as desolate as the tracts once possessed by the Johyas.¹

Geography—Population

This region is but little known to Europeans, by whom it has hitherto been supposed to be a perfect desert, unworthy of examination. Its present condition bears little comparison with what tradition reports it to have been in ancient times; and its deterioration, within three centuries since the Rajputs supplanted the Jats, almost warrants our belief of the assertion, that these deserts were once fertile and populous; nay, that they are still capable (notwithstanding the reported continual increase of the sand) to maintain an abundant population, there is little room to doubt. The princes of Bikaner used to take the field at the head of ten thousand of their kindred retainers; and although they held extraordinary grants from the empire² for the maintenance

¹ While putting this to the press, rumour says that the chiefs of Bikaner are in open rebellion against the Raja, who has applied, but without success, to the British Government for support. This, if true, is as it should be.

* A rebellion took place in 1815.

* ² The Mughal Empire.

of these contingents, their ability to do so from their proper resources was undoubted. To other causes than positive sterility must be attributed the wretched condition of this State. Exposed to the continual attacks of organized bands of robbers from without, subjected internally to the never-ending demands of a rapacious Government, for which they have not a shadow of advantage in return, it would be strange if aught but progressive decay and wretchedness were the consequence. In three centuries more than one-half of the villages, which either voluntarily or by force submitted to the rule of the founder, Bika, are now without memorial of their existence, and the rest are gradually approximating to the same condition. Commercial caravans, which passed through this State and enriched its treasury with the transit duties, have almost ceased to frequent it from the increasing insecurity of its territory. Besides the personal loss to the prince, the country suffers from the deterioration of the commercial towns of Churu, Rajgarh, and Rani, which as *entrepôts*, supplied the country with the productions of Sind and the provinces to the westward, or those of Gangetic India. Nor is this confined to Bikaner; the same cause affects Jaisalmer, and the more eastern principalities, whose misgovernment, equally with Bikaner, fosters the spirit of rapine; the Maldots of Jaisalmer and the Larkhanis of Jaipur are as notorious as the Bidawats of Bikaner¹; and to these may be added the Sahariyas, Khosas, and Rajars, in the more western desert, who, in their habits and principles, are as demoralized as the Bedouins of Arabia².

An estimate of the population of this arid region, without presenting some data, would be very unsatisfactory. The tract to the north-west of Jethpur is now perfectly desolate, and nearly so from that point to Bhatner; to the north-east, the population is but scanty, which observation also applies to the parts from the meridian of Bikaner to the Jaisalmer frontier; while internally, from these points, it is more uniform, and equals the northern parts of Marwar. From a census of the twelve principal towns, with an estimate, furnished by well-informed inhabitants, of the remainder, we may obtain a tolerably accurate approximation on this point:

*¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1143-1145.

*² One paragraph omitted.

<i>Chief Towns.</i>				<i>No. of Houses.</i>	
Bikaner	12,000
Nohar	2,500
Bahaduran	2,500
Reni	1,500
Rajgarh	3,000
Churu	3,000
Mahajan	800
Jethpur	1,000
Bidesar	500
Ratangarh	1,000
Deshmukh	1,000
Senthal	50
					<hr/> 28,850 <hr/>
100 villages, each having	200	houses	20,000
100 Ditto	150 ditto	15,000
200 Ditto	100 ditto	20,000
800 hamlets	30 each	24,000
					<hr/>
Total number of houses				..	107,850 <hr/>

Allowing five souls to each house, we have a total of 539,250 souls, giving an average of twenty-five to the sq. mile, which I cannot think exaggerated, and making the desert regions depending on Bikaner equal, in the density of population, the highlands of Scotland.

Of this population, full three-fourths are the aboriginal Jats; the rest are their conquerors, descendants of Bika, including the Saraswat Brahmins, Charans, Bards, and a few of the debased classes, whose numbers, conjointly, are not one-tenth of the Rajputs.

Jats—The Jats are the most wealthy as well as the most numerous portion of the community. Many of the old Bhumia landlords, representatives of their ancient communal heads, are men of substance; but their riches are of no use to them, and to avoid the rapacity of their Government, they cover themselves with the cloak of poverty, which is thrown aside only on nuptial festivities. On these occasions they disinter their hoards, which are lavish-

ed with unbounded extravagance. They even block up the highways to collect visitors, whose numbers form the measure of the liberality and munificence of the donor of the fete.

Sarsut (properly *Saraswat*) Brahmins are found in considerable numbers throughout this tract. They aver that they were masters of the country prior to the Jat colonists. They are a peaceable, industrious race, and without a single prejudice 'of the order'; they eat meat, smoke tobacco, cultivate the soil, and trade even in the sacred kine, notwithstanding their descent from Sringi Rishi, son of Brahma.

Charans—The Charans are the sacred order of these regions; the warlike tribes esteem the heroic lays of the bard more than the homily of the Brahmin. The Charans are throughout revered by the Rathors, and hold lands, literally, on the tenure of 'an old song.'

Malis, Nais, gardeners and barbers, are important members of every Rajput family, and to be found in all the villages, of which they are invariably the cooks.

Chuhras, Thoris, are actually castes of robbers: the former, from the Lakhi Jungle; the latter, from Mewar. Most of the chieftains have a few in their pay, entertained for the most desperate services. The Bahaduran chief has expelled all his Rajputs, and retains only Chuhras and Thoris. The Chuhras are highly esteemed for fidelity, and the barriers and portals throughout this tract are in their custody. They enjoy a very singular perquisite, which would go far to prove their being the aborigines of the country; namely, a fee of four copper coins on every dead subject, when the funeral ceremonies are over.

Rajputs—The Rathors of Bikaner are unchanged in their martial qualifications, bearing as high a reputation as any other class in India; and whilst their brethren of Marwar, Amber, and Mewar, have been for years groaning under the rapacious visitations of Marathas and Pathans¹, their distance and the difficulties of the country have saved them from such afflictions: though, in truth, they have had enough to endure at home, in the tyranny of their own lord. The Rathors of the desert have fewer prejudices than their more eastern brethren; they will eat food, without enquiring by whom it was dressed, and will drink either wine or water, without asking to whom the cup belonged. They

¹The Pindaris.

would make the best soldiers in the world if they would submit to discipline, as they are brave, hardy, easily satisfied, and very patient; though, on the other hand, they have imbibed some qualities, since their migration to these regions, which could only be eradicated in the rising generation: especially the inordinate use of opium, and smoking intoxicating herbs, in both of which accomplishments 'the sons of Bika' are said to bear the palm from the rest of the *chhattis rajkula*, the thirty-six royal tribes of India. The *piyala*, or 'cup,' is a favourite with every Rajput who can afford it, and is, as well as opium, a panacea for *ennui*, arising from the absence of all mental stimulants, in which they are more deficient, from the nature of the country, than most of their warlike countrymen.

Face of the country—The whole of this principality, with the exception of a few isolated spots, or *oases*, scattered here and there, consists more or less of sand. From the eastern to the western boundary, in the line of greatest breadth, it is one continuous plain of sand, though the *tibas*, or sand-hills, commence in the centre of the country, the principal chain running in the direction of Jaisalmer, and shooting forth subordinate branches in every direction; or it might be more correct to designate this main ridge, originating in the tracts bordering the eastern valley of the Indus, as terminating its elevations about the heart of Bikaner. On the north-east quarter, from Rajgarh to Nohar and Rawatsar, the soil is good, being black earth, slightly mixed with sand, and having water near enough to the surface for irrigation; it produces wheat, gram, and even rice, in considerable quantities. The same soil exists from Bhatner to the banks of the Gara. The whole of the Mohila tract is a fertile *oasis*, the *tibas* just terminating their extreme offsets on its northern limit: being flooded in the periodical rains, wheat is abundantly produced.

But exclusive of such spots which are "few and far between," we cannot describe the desert as a waste where "no salutary plant takes root, no verdure quickens"; for though the poverty of the soil refuses to aid the germination of the more luxuriant grains, Providence has provided a countervailing good, in giving to those it can rear a richness and superiority unknown to more favoured regions. The *bajra* of the desert is far superior to any grown in the rich loam of Malwa, and its inhabitant retains an

instinctive partiality, even when admitted to revel in the luxurious repasts of Mewar or Amber, for the *batis*, or 'bajra cakes,' of his native sand-hills, and not more from association than from their intrinsic excellence. In a plentiful season, they save enough for two years' consumption. The grain requires not much water, though it is of the last importance that this little should be timely.

Besides bajra, we may mention *moth* and *til* ; the former a useful pulse both for men and cattle; the other the oil-plant, used both for culinary purposes and burning. Wheat, gram and barley, are produced in the favoured spots described, but in these are enumerated the staple products of Bikaner.

Cotton is grown in the tracts favourable for wheat. The plant is said to be septennial, even decennial, in these regions. As soon as the cotton is gathered, the shoots are all cut off, and the root alone left. Each succeeding year, the plant increases in strength, and at length attains a size unknown where it is more abundantly cultivated.

Nature has bountifully supplied many spontaneous vegetable products for the use of man, and excellent pasture for cattle. *Guar*, *Kachri*, *Kakri*, all of the cucurbitaceous family, and water-melons of a gigantic size, are produced in great plenty. The latter is most valuable; for being cut in slices and dried in the sun, it is stored up for future use when vegetables are scarce, or in times of famine, on which they always calculate. It is also an article of commerce and much admired even where vegetables are more abundant. The copious mucilage of the dried melon is extremely nourishing; and deeming it valuable as an antiscorbutic in sea-voyages, the Author sent some of it to Calcutta many years ago for experiment. Our Indian ships would find no difficulty in obtaining a plentiful supply of this article, as it can be cultivated to any extent, and thus be made to confer a double benefit, on our seamen and the inhabitants of those desert regions. The superior magnitude of the water-melons of the desert over those of interior India gives rise to much exaggeration, and it has been gravely asserted by travellers in the sand *tibas*, where they are most abundant, that the mucilage of one is sufficient to allay the thirst both of a horse and his rider.

In these arid regions where they depend entirely on the heavens for water, and where they calculate on a famine every

seventh year, nothing that can administer to the wants of man is lost. The seeds of the wild grasses, as the *bharut*, *baru*, *harara*, *sawan*, are collected, and, mixed with *bajra*-flour, enter much into the food of the poorer classes. They also store up great quantities of the wild *ber*, *khair*, and *karel* berries; and the long pods of the *khejra*, astringent and bitter as they are, are formed into a flour. Nothing is lost in these regions which can be converted into food.

Trees they have none indigenous (mangoes and tamarind are planted about the capital), but abundant shrubs, as the *babul*, and ever-green *pilu*, the *jhal*, and others yielding berries. The Bidawats, indeed, apply the term 'tree' to the *rohira*, which sometimes attains the height of twenty feet, and is transported to all parts for house-building; as likewise is the *nima*, so well-known throughout India. The *phog* is the most useful of all these, as with its twigs they frame a wicker-work to line their wells, and prevent the sand from falling in.

The *ak*, a species of euphorbia, known in Hindustan as the *madar*, grows to an immense height and strength in the desert; from its fibres they make the ropes in general use throughout these regions, and they are reckoned superior, both in substance and durability, to those formed of *munj* (hemp), which is however cultivated in the lands of the Bidawats.

Their agricultural implements are simple and suited to the soil. The plough is one of single yoke, either for the camel or ox: that with double yoke being seldom required or chiefly by the *malis* (gardeners), when the soil is of some consistence. The drill is invariably used, and the grains are dropped singly into the ground, at some distance from each other, and each sends forth a dozen to twenty stalks. A bundle of bushes forms their harrow. The grain is trodden out by oxen; and the *moth* (pulse) which is even more productive than the *bajra*, by camels.

Water—This indispensable element is at an immense distance from the surface throughout the Indian desert, which, in this respect as well as many others, differs very materially from that portion of the great African Desert in the same latitudes¹.

At Deshnokh near the capital, the wells are more than two hundred cubits, or three hundred feet, in depth; and it is rare that water fit for man is found at a less distance from the surface

¹ Some sentences omitted.

than sixty, in the tracts decidedly termed *thal*, or 'desert': though some of the flats, or *oases*, such as that of Mohila, are exceptions and abundance of brackish water, fit for cattle, is found throughout at half this depth, or about thirty feet. All the wells are lined with basket-work made of *phog* twigs, and the water is generally drawn up by hand-lines.¹

Sar, or 'salt lakes.'—There are a few salt lakes, which throughout the whole of the Indian desert, are termed *sar*, though none are of the same consequence as those of Marwar. The largest is at the town of Sar, so named after the lake, which is about six miles in circumference. There is another at Chhappar about two miles in length and although each of them frequently contains a depth of four feet of water, this entirely evaporates in the hot winds, leaving a thick sheet of saline incrustation. The salt of both is deemed of inferior quality to that of the more southerly lakes.

Physiography of the country.—There is little to vary the physiography of this region, and small occasion to boast either of its physical or moral beauties; yet, strange to say, I have met with many whose love of country was stronger than their perceptions of abstract veracity, who would dwell on its perfections, and prefer a mess of *rabri*, or porridge made of *bajra*, to the greater delicacies of more civilized regions. To such, the *tibas*, or 'sand-ridges,' might be more important than the Himalaya, and their diminutive and scanty brushwood might eclipse the gigantic foliage of this huge barrier. Verdure itself may be abhorrent to eyes accustomed to behold only arid sands; and a region without *tufans* or 'whirlwinds'; or armies of locusts rustling like a tempest, and casting long shadows on the lands, might be deemed by the prejudiced, deficient in the true sublime. Occasionally the sand-stone formation rises above the surface, resembling a few low isolated hills; and those who dwell on the boundaries of Nagor, if they have a love of more decided elevations than their native sand-hills afford, may indulge in a distant view of the terminations of the Aravalli.

¹ Water is sold, in all the large towns, by the *malis* or 'gardeners' who have the monopoly of this article. Most families have large cisterns or reservoirs, called *tankas*, which are filled in the rainy season. They are of masonry, with a small trap door at the top, made to exclude the external air, and having a lock and key affixed. Some large *tankas* are established for the community, and I understand this water keeps sweet for eight or twelve months' consumption.

Economic Conditions

Mineral productions—The mineral productions of this country are scanty. They have excellent quarries of freestone in several parts, especially at Hasera, thirteen coss to the north-east of the capital, which yield a small revenue estimated at two thousand rupees annually. There are also copper mines at Biramsar and Bidesar; but the former does not repay the expense of working, and the latter, having been worked for thirty years, is nearly exhausted.

An unctuous clay is excavated from a pit, near Kolait, in large quantities, and exported as an article of commerce, besides adding fifteen hundred rupees annually to the treasury. It is used chiefly to free the skin and hair from impurities, and the Cutchi ladies are said to eat it to improve their complexions.

Animal productions—The kine of the desert are highly esteemed; as are the camels, especially those used for expedition and the saddle, which bear a high price,¹ and are considered superior to any in India. They are beautifully formed, and the head possesses much blood and symmetry. Sheep are reared in great abundance, and find no want of food in the excellent grasses and shrubs which abound. The *phog*, *jawas*, and other prickly shrubs, which are here indigenous, form the dainties of the camel in other regions. The Nilgai or elk, and deer of every kind are plentiful; and the fox of the desert is a beautiful little animal. Jackals and hyænas are not scarce, and even lions are by no means unknown in Bikaner.

Commerce and Manufactures—Rajgarh was the great commercial mart of this country, and the point of *rendezvous* for caravans from all parts. The produce of the Punjab and Kashmir came formerly direct by Hansi-Hisar,—that of the eastern countries by Delhi, Rewari, Dadri, etc. consisting of silks, fine cloths, indigo, sugar, iron, tobacco, etc.; from Haravati and Malwa came opium, which supplied all the Rajput States; from Sind, *via* Jaisalmer, and by caravans from Multan and Shikarpur, dates, wheat, rice, *loongis* (silk vestments for women), fruits etc.; from Pali, the imports from maritime countries, as spices, tin, drugs, coco-nuts, elephants' teeth, etc. Much of this was for

¹One thousand rupees have been given for one; one hundred is the average value.

internal consumption, but the greater part a mere transit trade which yielded considerable revenue.

Woollens—The wool of the sheep pastured in the desert is, however, the staple commodity both of manufacture and trade in this region. It is worked into every article of dress, both male and female, and worn by all, rich and poor. It is produced from the loom, of every texture and quality, from the coarse *loi* or 'blanket,' at three rupees per pair (six shillings), to thirty rupees. The quality of these last is very fine, of an intermediate texture between the shawl and camlet, and without any nap: it is always bordered with a stripe of chocolate brown or red. Of this quality are the *dopattas* or 'scarfs' for the ladies. Turbans are also manufactured of it, and though frequently from forty to sixty-one feet in length, such is the fineness of the web, that they are not bulky on the head.

From the milk of the sheep and goats as well as kine, *ghee* or 'clarified butter' is made, and forms an important article of trade.

Manufactures in iron—The Bikaneris work well in iron, and have shops at the capital and all the large towns for the manufacture of sword-blades, match-locks, daggers, iron lances, etc. The sword-handles, which are often inlaid with variegated steel or burnished, are in high request, and exported to various parts of India. They have also expert artists in ivory, though the articles are chiefly such as are worn by females, as *churis*, or 'bracelets.'

Coarse cotton cloths, for internal consumption, are made in considerable quantities.

Fairs—Annual fairs were held, in the months of Kartik and Phalgun, at the towns of Kolait and Gajner, and frequented by the merchants of the adjacent countries. They were celebrated for cattle, chiefly the produce of the desert, camels, kine, and horses from Multan and the Lakhi Jungle, a breed now almost extinct. These fairs have lost all their celebrity: in fact, commerce in these regions is extinct.

Administration

Government revenues—The personal revenues of the Raja were derived from a variety of sources: from the *Khalisa*, or 'crown-lands' imposts, taxes on agriculture, and that compendi-

ous item which makes up the deficiencies in all oriental budgets, *dand*, or 'contribution'. But with all these "appliances and means to boot," the civil list of this desert King seldom exceeded five lakhs of rupees, or about £50,000 per annum. The lands of the feudality are more extensive proportionally in this region than in any other in Rajputana, arising out of the original settlement, when the Bidawats and Kandhalots, whose joint acquisitions exceeded those of Bika, would not admit him to hold lands in their territory, and made but a slight pecuniary acknowledgment of his supremacy. The districts in which the crown-lands lie are Rajgarh, Reni, Nohar, Gharib, Ratangarh, Rania, and more recently Churu.

The following are the items of the revenue:—1st. *Khalisa*, or fiscal revenue; 2nd. *Dhuan*; 3rd. *Anga*; 4th. Town and transit duties; 5th. *Paseti*, or 'plough-tax'; 6th. *Malba*.

1st. The *fisc*. Formerly this branch of revenue yielded two lakhs of rupees; but with progressive superstition and prodigality, the Raja has alienated almost two-thirds of the villages from which the revenue was drawn. These amounted to two hundred; now they do not exceed eighty, and their revenue is not more than one lakh of rupees. Surat Singh is guided only by caprice; his rewards are uniform, no matter what the service or the object, whether a Brahmin or a camel-driver. The *Khalisa* is the only source which he considers he has merely a life-interest in. To supply the deficiencies, he has direct recourse to the pockets of his subjects.

2nd. *Dhuan* may be rendered hearth-tax, though literally it is a smoke (*dhuan*) tax. All must eat; food must be dressed; and as they have neither chimneys nor glass windows on which to lay the tax, Surat Singh's chancellor of the exchequer makes the smoke pay a transit duty ere it gets vent from the various orifices of the edifice. It only amounts to one rupee on each house or family, but would form an important item if not evaded by the powerful chiefs: still it yields a lakh of rupees. The town of Mahajan, which was settled on Ratan Singh, son of Raja Nunkaran, on the resignation of his right of primogeniture and succession, enjoys exemption from this tax. It is less liable to fluctuation than other taxes, for if a village becomes half-deserted, those who remain are saddled with the whole. *Dhuan* is only known to the two western States, Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

3rd. *Anga*. This is not a capitation but a *body* tax (from *anga*, the body), and was established by Raja Anup Singh.¹ It might almost be termed a property-tax, since it embraced quadrupeds as well as bipeds of every sex and age, and was graduated according to age and sex in the human species, and according to utility in the brute. Each male adult was assessed one *anga*, fixed at four annas (about six pence), and cows, oxen, buffaloes were placed upon a level with the lord of the creation. Ten goats or sheep were estimated as one *anga*; but a camel was equivalent to four *angas*, or one rupee, which Raja Gaj Singh² doubled. This tax which is by far the most certain in a country, perhaps still more pastoral than agricultural, is most providently watched, and though it has undergone many changes since it was originally imposed, it yet yields annually two lakhs of rupees.

4th. *Sair*, or 'imposts.' This branch is subject to much fluctuation, and has diminished greatly since the reign of Surat Singh. The duties levied in the capital alone formerly exceeded what is collected throughout the whole of his dominions; being once estimated at above two lakhs, and now under one. Of this amount, half is collected at Rajgarh, the chief commercial mart of Bikaner. The dread of the *Rahats*, who have cut off the communications with the Punjab, and the want of principle within, deter merchants from visiting this State, and the caravans from Multan, Bahawalpur, and Shikarpur, which passed through Bikaner to the eastern States, have nearly abandoned the route. The only duties of which he is certain are those on grain, of four rupees on every hundred maunds sold or exported, and which, according to the average sale price of these regions, may be about two per cent.

5th. *Paschi* is a tax of five rupees on every plough used in agriculture. It was introduced by Raja Rai Singh³, in commutation of the corn-tax, or levy in kind, which had long been established at one-fourth of the gross produce. The Jats were glad to compound, and get rid of the agents of corruption, by the substitution of the plough-tax. It formerly yielded two lakhs of rupees, but with decreasing agriculture has fallen, like every

*¹ Anup Singh, 1669-1698 A.D.

*² Gaj Singh, 1745-1788 A.D.

*³ Raj Singh, 1571-1611 A.D.

other source, to a little more than one-half, but still yields a lakh and a quarter.

6th. *Malba* is the name of the original tax which the Jat communities imposed upon themselves, when they submitted to the sway in perpetuity of Bika and his successors. It is the land-tax¹ of two rupees on each hundred bighas of land cultivated in Bikaner. It is now unproductive, not realizing fifty thousand rupees, and it is said that a composition has been effected, by which it has been, or will be, relinquished: if so, Surat Singh gives up the sole legitimate source of revenue he possesses.

Recapitulation.

1st.	Khalisa, or fisc ²	1,00,000
2nd.	Dhuan	1,00,000
3rd.	Anga	2,00,000
4th.	Sair, imposts ³	75,000
5th.	Paseti, plough-tax	1,25,000
6th.	Malba, land-tax	50,000
TOTAL				6,50,000

Besides this, the fullest amount arising to the prince from annual taxation, there are other items which occasionally replenish the treasury of Surat Singh.

¹ *Mal* is the term for land which has no irrigation but from the heavens.

² Nohar district, 84 villages, Revenue	Rs.	1,00,000
Reni district, 24 villages, Revenue	..	10,000
Rania district, 44 villages, Revenue	..	20,000
Jaloli district, 1 village, Revenue	..	5,000

Total original Fiscal Lands	..	1,35,000
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Since Rajgarh, Churu, and other places recovered.

³ Impost Duties in old times, *viz.*

Town of Nunkaran	..	Rs.	2,000
Rajgarh	10,000
Shaikhsar	5,000
Capital—Bikaner	75,000
From Churu and other towns	45,000
			1,37,000

Datoi is a triennial tax of five rupees levied on each plough. It was instituted by Raja Zorawar Singh¹. The whole country is liable to it, with the exception of fifty villages in Asaichwati, and seventy of the Beniwalis, conditionally exempted, to guard the borders. It is now frequently evaded by the feudal chieftains, and seldom yields a lakh of rupees.

In addition to these specific expedients, there are many arbitrary methods of increasing the "ways and means" to satisfy the necessities or avarice of the present ruler², and a train of dependent harpies, who prey upon the cultivating peasantry, or industrious trader. By such shifts, Surat Singh has been known to double his fixed revenue.

Dand, *Khushhali*—The terms *Dand*, and *Khushhali*, though etymologically the antipodes of each other,—the first meaning a 'compulsory contribution,' the other a 'benevolence, or voluntary'³,—have a similar interpretation in these regions, and make the subjects of those parts devoutly pray that their prince's house may be one rather of mourning than rejoicing, and that defeat rather than victory may be attendant on his arms.

It⁴ is from the chieftain, the merchant, and the banker, that the chief sums are realized; though indirectly the poor peasant contributes his share. There are fourteen collectors of *dand*⁵, one to every *chira* or division, and these are furnished with arbitrary schedules according to the circumstances, actual or supposed, of each individual. So unlimited are these exactions, that the chief of Gandeli for two years offered the collector of his quarter ten thousand rupees if he would guarantee him against any further demand during even twelve months; and being refused, he turned the collector out, shut the gates of his castle, and boldly bid his master defiance.

One of his expedients to levy a *khushhali*, or 'benevolence,' is worth relating: it was on the termination of his expedition against Bhatner, which added this celebrated desert and castle to his territory, and in which he was attended by the entire feudal

*¹ Zorawar Singh. 1735-1745 A.D.

*² Surat Singh.

*³ *Khush* means 'happiness, pleasure, volition :—*ap ki khushi*, 'at your pleasure.'

*⁴ Some sentences omitted.

*⁵ This was written in 1813.

army of Bikaner. On his return, "flushed with conquest," he demanded from each house throughout his dominions the sum of ten rupees to cover the expenses of the war. If the tyrant-ridden subjects of Surat Singh thus *rejoice* in his successes, how must they feel for his defeats! To them both are alike ominous, when every artifice is welcomed, every villainy practised, to impoverish them. Oppression is at its height, and must work out its *own* cure.

Army

Feudal levies—The disposable force of all these feudal principalities must depend on the personal character of the Raja. If Surat Singh were popular, and the national emergencies demanded the assemblage of the *kher*, or *levee en masse*, of the 'sons of Bika,' he might bring ten thousand Rajputs into the field, of whom twelve hundred might be good horse, besides the foreign troops and park; but under present circumstances, and the rapid deterioration of every branch of society, it may be doubted whether one-half could be collected under his standard.

The household troops consist of a battalion of foreign infantry, of five hundred men with five guns, and three squadrons of horse, about two hundred and fifty in number; all under foreign leaders. This is independent of the garrison of the capital, whose commandant is a Rajput of the Parihar tribe, who has twenty-five villages assigned for the payment of his troops.

Foreign Troops.

			Foot	Horse	Guns
Sultan Khan	---	200	—
Anokha Singh, Sikh	—	250	—
Budh Singh Dewara	—	200	—
Durjan Singh's Battalion	700	4	4
Ganga Singh's Battalion	1,000	25	6
			—	—	—
TOTAL FOREIGNERS	1,700	679	10
Park	---	—	21
			—	—	—
			1,700	679	31
			—	—	—

Schedule exhibiting the Fiefs of Bikaner.

Names of Chieftains.	Clans.	Places of Abode.	Revenue.	Retainers :		REMARKS.
				Foot.	Horse.	
Beri Sal ..	Bika ..	Mahajan ..	40,000	5,000	100	One hundred and forty villages attached for this fief, settled on the heir of Raja Nunkaran, who consequently forfeited the <i>gadi</i> . The first of the chiefs of Bikaner.
Abhai Singh ..	Benirot ..	Blukarka ..	25,000	5,000	200	
Anup Singh ..	Bika ..	Jasana ..	5,000	400	40	
Prem Singh ..	Do. ..	Bai ..	5,000	400	25	
Chain Singh ..	Benirot ..	Sawa ..	20,000	2,000	300	
Himmat Singh ..	Rawat ..	Rawatsar ..	20,000	2,000	300	
Sheo Singh ..	Benirot ..	Churu ..	25,000	2,000	200	
Ummed Singh ..	Benirot ..	Bidesar ..	50,000	10,000	2,000	One hundred and forty <i>kothris</i> (families, lit. <i>chambers</i>) of this class.
Jeth Singh ..	Bidawat ..	Sondwa ..				
Bahadur Singh ..	Benirot ..	Mainsar ..				
Suraj Mal ..	Narnot ..	Tendesar ..	40,000	4,000	500	
Guman Singh ..	Narnot ..	Kachor ..				
Atai Singh ..	Narnot ..	Nimbaj ..	5,000	500	125	
Sher Singh ..	Narnot ..	Sidmukh ..				
Devi Singh ..	Narnot ..	Karipura ..	20,000	5,000	400	
Ummed Singh ..	Narnot ..	Ajipura ..				
Surthan Singh ..	Narnot ..	Beasar ..				
Karnidhan ..	Narnot ..	Beasar ..				
Carried forward			255,000	36,300	4,190	

Names of Chieftains.	Clans.	Places of Abode.	Revenue.	Retainers :		REMARKS.
				Foot.	Horse.	
		Brought forward		36,300	4,190	
Surthan Singh	Kachhwaha	Nainawas	255,000	150	30	These two fiefs are held by foreign nobles of the house of Amber, and the ancient Pramara (<i>udg.</i> Pawar). The fief of Pugal was wrested from the Bhattis of Jaisalmer.
Padam Singh	Panwar	Jethisar	4,000	200	100	
Kishen Singh	Bika	Hayadesar	5,000	200	50	
Rao Singh	Bhatti	Pugal ¹	6,000	1,500	40	
Sultan Singh	Do.	Rajasar	1,500	200	50	
Laktir Singh	Do.	Raner	2,000	400	75	
Karnai Singh	Do.	Satsar	1,100	200	9	
Bhum Singh	Do.	Chakara	1,500	60	4	
Four Chieftains, ² viz.						
1. Bhoni Singh	Bhatti	Bichnok	1,500	60	6	
2. Zalim Singh	Do.	Gariala	1,100	40	4	
3. Sardar Singh	Do.	Suriara	800	30	2	
4. Khet Singh	Do.	Randisar	600	32	2	
Chand Singh	Karamsot	Nokha	11,000	1,500	500	Twenty-seven villages dependent on this family from Jodhpur, and settled here eleven years. Twenty-seven villages.
Satidan	Rupawat	Badila	5,000	200	25	
Bhum Singh	Bhatti	Janglu	2,500	400	9	
Ketsi	Do.	Jaminsar	15,000	500	150	
Ishwari Singh	Mandla	Sarunda	11,000	2,000	150	
Padam Singh	Bhatti	Kudsu	1,500	60	4	
Kalyan Singh	Do.	Nainwa	1,000	40	2	
		TOTAL	332,100	44,072	5,402	

If ever the whole feudal array of Bikaner amounted to this, it would assuredly be found difficult now, were the *han* proclaimed, to assemble one-fourth of this number.

¹ Pugal Patta.

² These chiefs are called Sardars of Khari Patta, one of the original conquests of the founder, Bika.

VII

JAISALMER¹

*Reign of Mulraj (1761—1820)*²

It was in the Samvat (era) of Vikrama, 1818, that Rawal Mulraj was inaugurated on the throne of Jaisal³; and it was in the year of our Lord 1818, that a treaty of "perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interests" was concluded between the Honourable East India Company and Maharawal Mulraj, the Raja of Jaisalmer, his heirs and successors, the latter agreeing "to act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and with submission to its supremacy." This was almost the last act of Rawal Mulraj, who had always been a mere puppet in the hands of Mehta Salim Singh or his father. He died A.D. 1820, when his grandson, Gaj Singh, was proclaimed.

Reign of Gaj Singh (1820—1846)

Rawal Gaj Singh was fitted, from his years, his past seclusion, and the examples which had occurred before his eyes, to be the submissive pageant Salim Singh⁴ required. Isolated, in every sense, from intercourse with the rest of mankind, by the policy of the minister, he had no community of sympathy with them, and no claim upon their aid. Surrounded by the creatures of Salim Singh, who, even to their daily dole, ascribe everything to this man's favour, each word, each gesture, is watched and reported. The prince himself, his wives and family, are alike dependents on the minister's bounty, often capriciously exercised. If he requires a horse, he must solicit it; or if desirous of bestowing some recompense, he requests to be furnished with the means, and deems himself fortunate if he obtain a moiety of his suit.

British Alliance

It will be observed from the date of this treaty (Dec. 1818),

^{*1} Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1235-1241, 1244—1256.

^{*2} For the detailed history of this reign see Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1228-1235.

^{*3} Founder of Jaisalmer. See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1203-1207.

^{*4} Minister and virtual ruler of the State.

that Jaisalmer was the last of the States of India received under the protection of the British Government.¹ Its distance made it an object of little solicitude to us; and the minister, it is said, had many long and serious consultations with his oracles before he united his destiny with ours. He doubted the security of his power if the Rawal should become subordinate to the British Government; and he was only influenced by the greater risk of being the sole State in Rajwara without the pale of its protection, which would have left him to the mercy of those enemies whom his merciless policy had created around him. The third and most important article of the treaty tranquillized his apprehensions as to external foes; with these apprehensions all fear as to the consequences arising from ministerial tyranny towards the princely exiles was banished, and this alliance, instead of checking his rapacity and oppression, incited them. But it is necessary, in the first place, to bestow a few remarks on the policy of the alliance as regards the British Government.

Its inequality requires no demonstration: the objects to be attained by it to the respective parties having no approximation to parity. The advantages to Jaisalmer were immediate: and to use the phraseology of the treaty, were not only of "great magnitude," but were vitally important. From the instant the treaties were exchanged, her existence as a permanent State, which was not worth half a century's purchase, was secured. Her power had been gradually declining, and reign after reign was narrowing her possessions to the vicinity of the capital. One state, Bahawalpur, had been formed from her northern territory; while those of Sind, Bikaner and Jodhpur, had been greatly aggrandized at her expense; and all were inclined, as occasion arose, to encroach upon her feebleness. The faithless character of the minister, Salim Singh, afforded abundant pretexts for quarrel, and the anarchy of her neighbours proved her only safeguard during the later years of her independent existence. Now, the British Government having pledged itself to exert its power for the protection of the principality, in the event of any "serious invasion," her fears either of Sindhis, Daudputras, or of Rathors, are at rest. The full extent of this pledge may not have been

¹ Actually Sirohi was the last State to accept the suzerainty of the Company.

contemplated when it was given; like all former alliances, it is the base of another step in advance. Instead of restricting the vast circle of our political connections, it at once carried us out of India, placing us in actual contact and possible collision with the rulers of Sind and the people beyond the Indus. Marwar and Bikaner being already admitted to our alliance, the power of settling their feuds with the Bhattis is comparatively simple; but with Daudputra we have no political connections, and with Sind, only those of "perpetual friendship, and mutual intercourse": but no stipulation ensuring respect to our remonstrances in case of the aggression of their subjects on our Bhatti ally.¹

What, therefore, are the advantages we can hold out to ourselves for the volunteer of our amity and protection to this oasis of the desert? To have disregarded the appeal of Jaisalmer for protection, to have made her the sole exception in all Rajputana from our amicable relations, would have been to consign her to her numerous enemies, and to let loose the spirit of rapine and revenge, which it was the main object of all these treaties to suppress: the Bhattis would have become a nation of robbers, the Bedouins of the Indian desert. Jaisalmer was the first link in a chain of free States, which formerly united the commerce of the Ganges with that of the Indus, but which interminable feuds had completely severed; the possibility of reunion depending upon a long continuance of tranquillity and confidence. This object alone would have warranted our alliance with Jaisalmer. But if we look to futurity, to the possible invasion of India, which can be best effected through the maritime provinces of Persia, the valley of the Indus will be the base of the invader's operations. The possession of Jaisalmer would then be of vital importance, by giving us the command of Upper Sind, and enabling us to act against the enemy simultaneously with our armies east of the Delta, the most practicable point of advance into India. Whilst² an impassable desert is between us, and we have the power, by means of our allies, of assailing an enemy at several points, though we are liable to attack but from one, an invader could not maintain himself a single season. On this ground, the maintenance of friendship with this remote nook of Rajput civilization is defensible, and we have the additional

*1 Some sentences omitted.

*2 Some sentences omitted.

incitement of rescuing the most industrious and wealthy commercial communities in India from the fangs of a harpy: to whom, and the enormities of his government, we return.

Misgovernment of Salim Singh

No language can adequately represent the abuse of power with which the treaty has armed the rapacious minister of Jaisalmer, and it is one of the many instances of the inefficacy of our system of alliances to secure prosperity, or even tranquillity to these long-afflicted regions; which, although rescued from external assailants, are still the prey of discord and passion within. It will not be difficult, at the proper time and place, to make this appear. The Mehta felt the advantages which the treaty gave him, in respect to neighbouring States; but he also felt that he had steeped himself too deeply in the blood of his master's family, and in that of his noblest chieftains, to hope that any repentance, real or affected, could restore to him the confidence of those he had so outraged. With commercial men, with the industrious husbandman or pastoral communities, he had so long forfeited all claim to credit, that his oath was not valued at a single grain of the sand of their own desert dominion.

The bardic annalist of Rajputana, when compelled to record the acts of a tyrant, first announces his moral death; then comes the metempsychosis,—the animating his frame with the spirit of a demon. In this manner is delineated the famed Visaldeo, the Chauhan King of Ajmer. Whether the Bhatti minister will obtain such a posthumous apology for his misdeeds, a future historian will learn; but assuredly he is never mentioned, either in poetry or prose, but as a vampire, draining the life-blood of a whole people. For a short time after the treaty was formed, he appeared to fall in with the march of universal reformation; but whether it was that his crimes had outlawed him from the sympathies of all around, or that he could feel no enjoyment but in his habitual crimes, he soon gave ampler indulgence to his rapacious spirit. The cause of his temporary forbearance was attributed to his anxiety to have an article added to the treaty, guaranteeing the office of prime minister in his family, perhaps with a view to legalize his plunder; but seeing no hope of fixing an hereditary race of vampires on the land, his outrages became past all endurance, and compelled the British Agent, at length, to report, to his Government (on the 17th December, 1821), that he

considered the alliance disgraceful to our reputation, by countenancing the idea that such acts can be tolerated under its protection. Representations to the minister were a nullity; he protested against their fidelity; asserted in specious language his love of justice and mercy; and recommenced his system of confiscations, and punishments, with redoubled severity.

All Rajawara felt an interest in these proceedings, as the bankers of Jaisalmer, supported by the capital of that singular class, the Paliwals, are spread all over India. But this rich community, amounting to five thousand families, are nearly all in voluntary exile, and the bankers fear to return to their native land with the fruits of their industry, which they would renounce for ever, but that he retains their families as hostages. Agriculture is almost unknown, and commerce, internal or external, has ceased through want of security. The sole revenue arises from confiscation. It is asserted that the minister has amassed no less than *two crores*, which wealth is distributed in the various cities of Hindustan, and has been obtained by pillage and the destruction of the most opulent families of his country during the last twenty years. He has also, it is said, possessed himself of all the crown-jewels and property of value, which he has sent out of the country. Applications were continually being made to the British Agent for passports (*paravanas*), by commercial men, to withdraw their families from the country. But all have some ties which would be hazarded by their withdrawing, even if such a step were otherwise free from danger; for while the minister afforded passports, in obedience to the wish of the agent, he might cut them off in the desert. This makes many bear the ills they have.

Geography and Population

The country still dependent on the Rawal extends between $70^{\circ} 30'$ and $72^{\circ} 30'$ E. long., and between the parallels of $26^{\circ} 20'$ and $27^{\circ} 50'$ N. lat., though a small strip protrudes, in the N. E. angle, as high as $28^{\circ} 30'$. This irregular surface may be roughly estimated to contain fifteen thousand square miles. The number of towns, villages, and hamlets, scattered over this wide space, does not exceed two hundred and fifty: some estimate it at three hundred, and others depress it to two hundred: the mean cannot be wide of the truth. To enable the reader to arrive at a conclusion as to the population of this region, we subjoin a calculation, from data furnished by the best-informed natives, which was

Towns.	Fiscal and Feudal.	Number of Houses.	Number of Inhabitants	Remarks.
Jaisalmer.....	Capital.....	7,000	35,000	
Bikampur.....	Pattayat	500	2,000	The chief has the title of Rao, and twenty-four villages dependent, not included in this estimate.
Sirara	Do	300	1,200	
Nachna.....	Do	400	1,600	
Katori.....	Fiscal.....	300	1,200	Kelan Bhatti: the Kelan tribe extends to Pugal.
Kaba.....	Do	300	1,200	
Kuldaro	Do	200	800	
Satta	Pattayat.....	300	1,200	Rawalot: first noble of Jaisalmer.
Jinjiniali	Do	300	1,200	
Devi-Kot.....	Fiscal.....	200	800	
Bhap.....	Do	200	800	Maldot: has eighteen villages attached, not included in this.
Balana	Pattayat.....	150	600	
Satiasa	Do	100	400	
Baru.....	Do	200	800	All of the Rawalot clan.
Chaun.....	Do	200	800	
Loharki.....	Do	150	600	
Noantala.....	Do	150	600	
Lahti.....	Do	300	1,200	
Dangari.....	Do	150	600	
Bijorai.....	Fiscal.....	200	800	
Mandai.....	Do	200	800	
Ramgarh.....	Do	200	800	
Birsalpur.....	Pattayat.....	200	800	
Girajsar.....	Do	150	600	

Two hundred and twenty-five villages and hamlets, from four to fifty houses each; say, each average twenty, at four inhabitants to each

56,400
18,000

Total..... 74,400

made in the year 1815; but we must add, that from the tyranny of the minister, the population of the capital (which is nearly half of the country), has been greatly diminished.

According to this census, we have a population not superior to one of the secondary cities of Great Britain, scattered over fifteen thousand square miles; nearly one-half, too, belonging to the capital, which being omitted, the result would give from two to three souls only for each square mile.

Face of the country.—The greater part of Jaisalmer is *thal*, or *rui*, both terms meaning 'a desert waste.' From Lohwar, on the Jodhpur frontier, to Khara, the remote angle touching Sind, the country may be described as a continuous tract of arid sand, frequently rising into lofty *tibas* (sand-hills), in some parts covered with low jungle. This line, which nearly bisects Jaisalmer, is also the line of demarcation of positive sterility and comparative cultivation. To the north, is one uniform and naked waste; to the south, are ridges of rock termed *magra*, *rui*, and light soil.

The ridge of hills is a most important feature in the geology of this desert region. It is to be traced from Cutch Bhuj, strongly or faintly marked, according to the nature of the country. Sometimes it assumes, as at Chhotan, the character of a mountain; then dwindles into an insignificant ridge scarcely discernible, and often serves as a bulwark for the drifting sands, which cover and render it difficult to trace it at all. As it reaches the Jaisalmer country it is more developed; and at the capital, erected on a peak about two hundred and fifty feet high, its presence is more distinct, and its character defined. The capital of the Bhattis appears as the nucleus of a series of ridges, which diverge from it in all directions for the space of fifteen miles. One branch terminates at Ramgarh, thirty-five miles north-west of Jaisalmer; another branch extends easterly to Pokaran (in Jodhpur), and thence, in a north-east direction, to Phalodi; from whence, at intervals, it is traceable to Gariala, nearly fifty miles due north. It is a yellow-coloured sand-stone, in which ochre is abundantly found, with which the people daub their houses.

These barren ridges, and the lofty undulating *tibas* of sand, are the only objects which diversify the almost uniform sterility of these regions. No trees interpose their verdant foliage to relieve the eye, or shelter the exhausted frame of the traveller.

It is nearly a boundless waste, varied only by a few stunted shrubs of the acacia or *mimosa* family, some succulent plants, or prickly grapes, as the *bharut* or burr, which clings to his garment and increases his miseries. Yet compared with the more northern portion, where "a sea of sand without a sign of vegetation"¹ forms the prospect, the vicinity of the capital is a paradise.

There is not a running stream throughout Jaisalmer; but there are many temporary lakes or salt-marshes, termed *sar*; formed by the collection of waters from the sand-hills, which are easily dammed in to prevent escape. They are ephemeral, seldom lasting but a few months; though after a very severe monsoon they have been known to remain throughout the year. One of these, called the Kanod Sar, extends from Kanod to Mohan-garh, covering a space of eighteen miles, and in which some water remains throughout the year. When it overflows, a small stream issues from the Sar, and pursues an easterly direction for thirty miles before it is absorbed: its existence depends on the parent lake. The salt which it produces is the property of the crown, and adds something to the revenue.

Economic Conditions

Soil, husbandry, and products.—Notwithstanding the apparent poverty of this desert soil, nature has not denied it the powers of production; it is even favourable to some grains, especially the *bajra*, which prefers a light sand. In a favourable season, they grow sufficient for the consumption of two and even three years, and then they import only wheat from Sind. When those parts favourable for *bajra* have been saturated with two or three heavy showers, they commence sowing, and the crops spring up rapidly. The great danger is that of too much rain when the crops are advanced, for, having little tenacity, they are often washed away. The *bajra* of the sand-hills is deemed far superior to that of Hindustan, and prejudice gives it a preference even to wheat, which does not bear a higher price,

¹ So Mr. Elphinstone describes the tract about Pugal, one of the earliest possessions of the Bhattis, and one of the *Naukoti-Maru-ki*, or "nine castles of the desert," around whose sand-hills as brave a colony was reared and maintained as ever carried lance. Rao Raning was lord of Pugal, whose son originated that episode given on p. 733, Crooke, Vol. I. Even these sand-hills, which in November appeared to Mr. Elphinstone without a sign of vegetation, could be made to yield good crops of *bajra*.

in times of scarcity. *Bajra*, in plentiful seasons, sells at one and a half maund for a rupee: but this does not often occur, as they calculate five bad seasons for a good one. *Joar* is also grown, but only in the low flats. Cotton is produced in the same soil as the *bajra*. It is not generally known that this plant requires but a moderate supply of water; it is deteriorated in the plains of India from over-irrigation: at least such is the idea of the desert-farmer, who perhaps does not make sufficient allowance for the cooler substratum of his sand-hills, compared with the black loam of Malwa. A variety of pulses grows on the sheltered sides of the *tibas*, as *mung*, *moth*, etc.; also the oil-plant (*til*) and abundance of the *gawar*, a diminutive melon, not larger than a hen's egg, which is sent hundreds of miles, as a rarity. Around the capital, and between the ridges where soil is deposited or formed, and where they dam up the waters, are grown considerable quantities of wheat of very good quality, turmeric, and garden-stuffs. Barley and *gram* are, in good seasons, reared in small quantities, but rice is entirely an article of import from the valley of Sind.

Implements of husbandry.—Where the soil is light, it will be concluded that the implements are simple. They have two kinds of plough, for one or two oxen, or for the camel, which animal is most in requisition. They tread out the grain with oxen, as in all parts of India, and not unfrequently they yoke the cattle to their *hakerries*, or carts, and pass the whole over the grain.

Manufactures.—There is little scope for the ingenuity of the mechanic in this tract. They make coarse cotton cloths, but the raw material is almost all exported. Their grand article of manufacture is from the wool of the sheep pastured in the desert, which is fabricated into *lois*, or blankets, scarfs, petticoats, turbans, of every quality. Cups and platters are made from a mineral called *abrak*, a calcareous substance, of a dark chocolate ground, with light brown vermiculated stripes; female ornaments of elephants' teeth, and arms of an inferior quality. These comprehend the artificial productions of this desert capital.

Commerce.—Whatever celebrity Jaisalmer possesses, as a commercial mart, arises from its position as a place of transit between the eastern countries, the valley of the Indus, and those beyond that stream, the *Kúars* (the term for a caravan of camels).

to and from Hyderabad, Rori-Bakhar, Shikarpur and Uchh, from the Gangetic provinces, and the Punjab, passing through it. The indigo of the Doab, the opium of Kotah and Malwa, the famed sugar-candy of Bikaner, iron implements from Jaipur, are exported to Shikarpur and lower Sind whence elephants' teeth (from Africa), dates, coco-nuts, drugs, and chandan, are imported, with pistachois and dried fruits from Bahawalpur.

Administration

Revenues and taxes.—The personal revenue of the princes of Jaisalmer¹ is, or rather was, estimated at upwards of four lakhs of rupees, of which more than one lakh was from the land. The transit duties were formerly the most certain and most prolific branch of the fiscal income; but the bad faith of the minister, the predatory habits of the Bhatti chiefs proceeding mainly from thence, and the general decrease of commerce, have conspired nearly to annihilate this source of income, said at one time to reach three lakhs of rupees. These imposts are termed *dan*, and the collector *dani*, who was stationed at convenient points of all the principal routes which diverge from the capital.

Land-tax.—From one-fifth to one-seventh of the gross produce of the land is set aside as the tax of the crown, never exceeding the first nor falling short of the last². It is paid in kind, which is purchased on the spot by the Paliwal Brahmins, or Banias, and the value remitted to the treasury.

Dhuan.—The third and now the most certain branch of revenue is the *dhuan*, literally 'smoke,' and which we may render 'chimney or hearth-tax', though they have neither the one nor the other in these regions. It is also termed *thali*, which is the brass or silver platter out of which they eat, and is tantamount to a table-allowance. It never realizes above twenty thousand rupees annually, which, however, would be abundant for the simple fare of Jaisalmer. No house is exempt from the payment of this tax.

¹ I have no correct data for estimating the revenues of the chieftains. They are generally almost double the land-revenue of the princes in the other States of Rajwara; perhaps about two lakhs, which ought to bring into the field seven hundred horse.

² These notes on the sources of revenue in Jaisalmer were communicated to me so far back as 1811, and I laid them before the Bengal Government in 1814-15.

Dand.—There is an arbitrary tax levied throughout these regions, universally known and detested under the name of *dand*, the make-weight of all their budgets of ways and means. It was first imposed in Jaisalmer in S. 1830 (A.D. 1774), under the less odious appellation of “additional *dhuan* or *thali*,” and the amount was only two thousand seven hundred rupees, to be levied from the monied interest of the capital. The Mahesris agreed to pay their share, but the Oswals (the two chief mercantile classes) holding out, were forcibly sent up to the castle, and suffered the ignominious punishment of the bastinado. They paid the demand, but immediately on their release entered into a compact on oath, never again to look on the Rawal’s (Mulraj’s) face, which was religiously kept during their mutual lives. When he passed through the streets of his capital, the Oswals abandoned their shops and banking-houses, retiring to the interior of their habitations in order to avoid the sight of him. This was strenuously persevered in for many years, and had such an effect upon the prince, that he visited the principal persons of this class, and “spreading his scarf” (*pala pasarna*),¹ entreated forgiveness, giving a writing on oath never again to impose *dand*, if they would make the *dhuan* a permanent tax. The Oswals accepted the repentance of their prince, and agreed to his terms. In S. 1841 and 1852, his necessities compelling him to raise money, he obtained by loan, in the first period, twenty-seven thousand, and in the latter, forty thousand rupees, which he faithfully repaid. When the father of the present minister came into power, he endeavoured to get back the bond of his sovereign abrogating the obnoxious *dand*, and offered, as a bait, to renounce the *dhuan*. The Oswals placed more value on the virtue of this instrument than it merited, for in spite of the bond, he in S. 1857 levied sixty thousand, and in 1863 eighty thousand rupees. A visit of the Rawal to the Ganges was seized upon as a fit opportunity by his subjects to get this oppression redressed, and fresh oaths were made by the prince, and broken by the minister, who has bequeathed his rapacious spirit to his son.

Since the accession of Gaj Singh, only two years ago,² Salim Singh has extorted fourteen lakhs (£140,000). Bardhman, a

¹ *Pala pasarna*, or ‘spreading the cloth or scarf,’ is the figurative language of entreaty, arising from the act of spreading the garment, preparatory to bowing the head thereon in token of perfect submission.

² This was written in 1821-2.

merchant of great wealth and respectability, and whose ancestors are known and respected throughout Rajwara as *Sahukars*, has been at various times stripped of all his riches by the minister and his father, who, to use the phraseology of the sufferers, "will never be satisfied while a rupee remains in Jaisalmer."

Establishments, Expenditure.—We subjoin a rough estimate of the household establishment, &c. of this desert King.

Bar ¹	20,000
Rozgar Sardar ²	40,000
Sihbandis or Mercenaries ³	75,000
Household horse, 10 elephants, 200 camels, and chariots.....	36,000
500 Bargir horse.....	60,000
Rani's or queen's establishment.....	15,000
The wardrobe.....	5,000
Gifts.....	5,000
The kitchen.....	5,000
Guests, in hospitality.....	5,000
Feasts, entertainments.....	5,000
Annual purchase of horses, camels, oxen, &c....	20,000
<hr/>	
TOTAL.....	Rs. 2,91,000

The ministers and officers of Government receive assignments on the transit-duties, and some have lands. The whole of this State-expenditure was more than covered, in some years, by the transit-duties alone; which have, it is asserted, amounted to the almost incredible sum of three lakhs, or £30,000.

¹ The *Bar* includes the whole household or personal attendants, the guards, and slaves. They receive rations of food, and make up the rest of their subsistence by labour in the town. The *Bar* consists of about 1,000 people, and is estimated to cost 20,000 rupees annually.

² Rozgar-Sardar is an allowance termed *kansa*, or 'dinner,' to the feudal chieftains who attend the Presence. Formerly they had an order upon the Danis, or collectors of the transit duties; but being vexatious, Pansa Sah, minister to Rawal Chaitra, commuted it for a daily allowance, varying, with the rank of the person, from half a silver rupee to seven rupees each, daily. This disbursement is calculated at 40,000 rupees annually.

³ Sihbandis are mercenary soldiers in the fort, of whom 1,000 are estimated to cost 75,000 rupees annually.

Population

Tribes.—We shall conclude our account of Jaisalmer with a few remarks on the tribes peculiar to it.

Of its Rajput population, the Bhattis, we have already given an outline in the general essay on the tribes.¹ Those which occupy the present limits of Jaisalmer retain their Hindu notions, though with some degree of laxity from their intercourse with the Mahomedans on the northern and western frontiers; while those which long occupied the north-east tracts, towards Phulra and the Gara, on becoming proselytes to Islam ceased to have either interest in or connection with the parent State. The Bhatti has not, at present, the same martial reputation as the Rathor, Chauhan, or Sisodia, but he is deemed at least to equal if not surpass the Kachhwaha, or any of its kindred branches, Naruka or Shaikhawat. There are occasional instances of Bhatti intrepidity as daring as may be found amongst any other tribe; witness the feud between the chiefs of Pugal and Mandor. But this changes not the national characteristic as conventionally established: though were we to go back to the days of chivalry and Prithwiraj, we should select Achalesa Bhatti, one of the bravest of his champions, for the portrait of his race. The Bhatti Rajput, as to physical power, is not perhaps so athletic as the Rathor, or so tall as the Kachhwaha, but generally fairer than either, and possessing those Jewish features which Mr. Elphinstone remarked as characteristic of the Bikaner Rajputs. The Bhatti intermarries with all the families of Rajwara, though seldom with the Ranas of Mewar. The late Jagat Singh of Jaipur had five wives of this stock, and his posthumous son, real or reputed, has a Bhattiani for his mother.

The² poorer Rajputnis are very masculine, and assist in all the details of husbandry.

The Bhatti is to the full as addicted as any of his brethren to the immoderate use of opium. To the *amalpani*, or 'infusion,' succeeds the pipe, and they continue inhaling mechanically the smoke long after they are insensible to all that is passing around them; nay, it is said, you may scratch or pinch them while in this condition without exciting sensation. The *hukka* is the

*¹ See Crooke, Vol. I, p. 102.

*² Some sentences omitted.

dessert to the *amalpani*; the panacea for all the ills which can overtake a Rajput, and with which he can at any time enjoy a paradise of his own creation. To ask a Bhatti for a whiff of his pipe would be deemed a direct insult.

Paliwals—Next to the lordly Rajputs, equalling them in numbers and far surpassing them in wealth, are the Paliwals. They are Brahmins, and denominated *Paliwal* from having been temporal proprietors of Pali, and all its lands, long before the Rathors colonized Marwar. Tradition is silent as to the manner in which they became possessed of this domain; but it is connected with the history of the *Pali*, or pastoral tribes, who from the town of Pali to Palitana, in Saurashtra, have left traces of their existence; and I am much mistaken if it will not one day be demonstrated, that all the ramifications of the races figuratively denominated *Agnikula*, were Pali in origin: more especially the Chauhans, whose princes and chiefs for ages retained the distinctive affix of *pal*.

These Brahmins, the Paliwals, as appears by the *Annals* of Marwar, held the domain of Pali when Sihaji, at the end of the twelfth century,¹ invaded that land from Kanauj, and by an act of treachery first established his power. It is evident, however, that he did not extirpate them, for the cause of their migration to the desert of Jaisalmer is attributed to a period of a Mahomedan invasion of Marwar, when a general war-contribution (*dand*) being imposed on the inhabitants, the Paliwals pleaded *caste*, and refused. This exasperated the Raja; for as their habits were almost exclusively mercantile their stake was greater than that of the rest of the community, and he threw their principal men into prison. In order to avenge this, they had recourse to a grand *chandni*, or 'act of suicide'; but instead of gaining their object, he issued a manifesto of banishment to every Paliwal in his dominions. The greater part took refuge in Jaisalmer, though many settled in Bikaner, Dhat, and the valley of Sind. At one time, their number in Jaisalmer was calculated to equal that of the Rajputs. Almost all the internal trade of the country passes through their hands, and it is chiefly with their capital that its merchants trade in foreign parts. They are the *Metayers* of the desert, advancing money to the cultivators,

* ¹ Really in the 13th Century. See Bithu inscription. *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XL.

taking the security of the crop; and they buy up all the wool and *ghee* (clarified butter), which they transport to foreign parts. They also rear and keep flocks. The minister, Salim Singh, has contrived to diminish their wealth, and consequently to lose the main support of the country's prosperity. They are also subject to the visits of the Maldots, Tejmallots, and other plunderers; but they find it difficult to leave the country owing to the restrictive *cordon* of the Mehta. The Paliwals never marry out of their own tribe; and, directly contrary to the laws of Manu, the bridegroom gives a sum of money to the father of the bride. It will be deemed a curious incident in the history of superstition, that a tribe, Brahmin by name, at least, should worship the bridle of a horse. When to this is added the fact, that the most ancient coins discovered in these regions bear the Pali character and the effigies of the horse, it aids to prove the Scythic character of the early colonists of these regions, who, although nomadic (*Pali*), were equestrian. There is little doubt that the Paliwal Brahmins are the remains of the priests of the Pali race, who, in their pastoral and commercial pursuits, have lost their spiritual power.

Pokharna Brahmins—Another singular tribe, also Brahminical, is the Pokharna, of whom it is calculated there are fifteen hundred to two thousand families in Jaisalmer. They are also numerous in Marwar and Bikaner, and are scattered over the desert and valley of the Indus. They follow agricultural and pastoral pursuits chiefly, having little or no concern in trade. The tradition of their origin is singular: it is said that they were *Beldars*, and excavated the sacred lake of Pushkar, for which act they obtained the favour of the deity and the grade of Brahmins, with the title of *Pokharna*. Their chief object of emblematic worship, the *kudala*, a kind of pick-axe used in digging, seems to favour this tradition.

Jats—The Jats here, as elsewhere, form a great part of the agricultural population; there are also various other tribes.

VII

BUNDI¹

Relations with the East India Company.

The period of Srijji's² death was an important era in the history of the Haras. It was at this time that a British army, under the unfortunate Monson, for the first time appeared in these regions, avowedly for the purpose of putting down Holkar, the great foe of the Rajputs, but especially of Bundi. Whether the aged chief was yet alive and counselled this policy, which has since been gratefully repaid by Britain, we are not aware; but whatever has been done for Bundi has fallen short of the chivalrous deserts of its prince. It was not on the advance of our army, when its ensigns were waving in anticipation of success, but on its humiliating flight, that a safe passage was not only cheerfully granted, but aided to the utmost of the Raja's means, and with an almost culpable disregard of his own welfare and interests. It was, indeed, visited with retribution, which we little knew, or, in the pusillanimous policy of that day, little heeded. Suffice it to say, that, in 1817, when we called upon the Rajputs to arm and coalesce with us in the putting down of rapine, Bundi was one of the foremost to join the alliance. Well she might be; for the Maratha flag waved in unison with her own within the walls of the capital, while the revenues collected scarcely afforded the means of personal protection to its prince. Much of this was owing to our abandonment of the Rao in 1804.

Throughout the contest of 1817 Bundi had no will but ours; its prince and dependents were in arms ready to execute our behest; and when victory crowned our efforts in every quarter, on the subsequent pacification, the Rao Raja Bishan Singh³ was not forgotten. The districts held by Holkar, some of which had been alienated for half a century, and which had become ours by right of conquest, were restored to Bundi without a qualification; while, at the same time, we negotiated the surrender to him of the districts held by Sindhia, on his paying, through us, an

*¹ Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1516-1520.

*² Maharao Ummad Singh. 1743-1804. See Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1499-1516.

*³ Ruler of Bundi, 1770-1821.

annual sum calculated on the average of the last ten years' depreciated revenue. The intense gratitude felt by the Raja was expressed in a few forcible words: "I am not a man of protestation; but my head is yours whenever you require it." This was not an unmeaning phrase of compliment; he would have sacrificed his life, and that of every Hara who "ate his salt", had we made experiment of his fidelity. Still, immense as were the benefits showered upon Bundi, and with which her prince was deeply penetrated, there was a drawback. The old Machiavelli of Kotah¹ had been before him in signing himself '*fidwi Sarkar Angrez*' (the slave of the English Government), and had contrived to get Indargarh, Balwan, Antardah, and Khatoli, the chief feudatories of Bundi, under his protection.

The frank and brave Rao Raja could not help deeply regretting an arrangement, which, as he emphatically said, was "clipping his wings". The disposition is a bad one, and both justice and political expediency enjoin a revision of it, and the bringing about a compromise which would restore the integrity of the most interesting and deserving little State in India.² Well has it repaid the anxious care we manifested for its interests; for while every principality has, by some means or other, caused uneasiness or trouble to the protecting power, Bundi has silently advanced to comparative prosperity, happy in her independence, and interfering with no one. The Rao Raja survived the restoration of his independence only four short years, when he was carried off by that scourge, the cholera morbus.....He interdicted his wives from following him to the pyre.....

Administration.

He³ was somewhat despotic in his own little empire, knowing

^{*1} Zalim Singh.

² The Author had the distinguished happiness of concluding the treaty with Bundi in February 1818. His previous knowledge of her deserts was not disadvantageous to her interests, and he assumed the responsibility of concluding it upon the general principles which were to regulate our future policy as determined in the commencement of the war; and setting aside the views which trenched upon these in our subsequent negotiations. These general principles laid it down as a *sine qua non* that the Marathas should not have a foot of land in Rajputana west of the Chambal; and he closed the door to recantation by sealing the reunion in perpetuity to Bundi, of Patan and all land so situated.

^{*3} Bishan Singh.

that fear is a necessary incentive to respect in the governed, more especially amongst the civil servants of his Government; and, if the Court Journal of Bundi may be credited, his audiences with his chancellor of the exchequer, who was his premier, must have been amusing to those in the ante-chamber. The Raja had a reserved fund, to which the minister was required to add a hundred rupees daily; and whatever plea he might advance for the neglect of other duties, on this point none would be listened to, or the appeal to Iudrajit was threatened. "The conqueror of Indra" was no superior divinity but a shoe of superhuman size suspended from a peg, where a more classic prince would have exhibited his rod of empire. But he reserved this for his barons, and the shoe, thus misnamed, was the humiliating corrective for an offending minister.

At Bundi, as at all these patriarchal principalities, the chief agents of power are few. They are four in number, namely: 1. The *Diwan*, or *Musahib*; 2. The *Faujdar*, or *Kiladar*; 3. The *Bakhshi*; 4. The *Risala*, or Comptroller of Accounts.

This little State became so connected with the imperial court, that, like Jaipur, the princes adopted several of its customs. The *Pradhan*, or Premier, was entitled *Diwan* and *Musahib*; and he had the entire management of the territory and finances. The *Faujdar* or *Kiladar* is the governor of the castle, the *Maire de Palais*, who at Bundi is never a Rajput, but some *Dhabhai* or foster-brother, identified with the family, who likewise heads the feudal quotas or mercenaries, and has lands assigned for their support. The *Bakhshi* controls generally all accounts; the *Risala* those of the household expenditure.

The late prince's management of his revenue was extraordinary. Instead of the surplus being lodged in the treasury, it centred in a mercantile concern conducted by the prime minister, in the profits of which the Raja shared. But while he exhibited but 15 per cent. gain in the balance sheet, it was stated at thirty. From this profit the troops and dependents of the court were paid, chiefly in goods and grain, and at such a rate as he chose to fix.¹ Their necessities, and their prince being joint partner in the firm, made complaint useless; but the system entailed upon the premier universal execration.

¹ The truck system, called *parna*, is well known in Rajputana.

VIII

KOTAH¹

*Revenue System of Zalim Singh.*²

Patel System—Having been immersed in the troubled sea of political intrigue, the Protector had no better knowledge of the system of revenue and landed economy than other *Rangra*³ chieftains; and he followed the immemorial usage termed *lattha* and *batai*,⁴ or rent in kind by weight or measure, in proportion to the value of the soil or of the product. The Regent soon found the disadvantages of this system which afforded opportunity for oppression on the part of the collectors, and fraud on that of the tenant, both detrimental to the Government, and serving only to enrich that vulture, the *Patel*. When this rapacious, yet indispensable medium between the peasant and ruler leagued with the collectors—and there was no control to exaction beyond the conscience of this constituted attorney of each township, either for the assessment or collection—and when the Regent cared not for the means so that the supplies were abundant, nothing but ruin could ensue to the ryot.

Having made himself master of the complicated details of the *batai*, and sifted every act of chicanery by the most inquisitorial process, he convoked all the Patels of the country, and took their depositions as to the extent of each *pateli*, their modes of collection, their credit, character, and individual means; and being thus enabled to form a rough computation of the size and revenues of each, he recommenced his tour, made a *chakbandi*, or measurement of the lands of each township, and classified them, according to soil and fertility, as *piwal* or irrigated; *gorma*, or good soil, but dependent on the heavens; and *normi*, including pasturage and mountain-tracts. He then, having formed an average from the accounts of many years, instituted a fixed

^{*1} Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1550-1569, 1577-1582, 1588-1589.

^{*2} Zalim Singh (1740-1824) was virtual dictator of Kotah for about half a century. See Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1535-1619.

^{*3} "Rangra is an epithet applied to the Rajputs, implying turbulent".

^{*4} *Lattha*, a 'measuring pole'. *Batai*, 'division of crop between landlord and tenant'.

money-rent, and declared that the *batai* system, or that of payment in kind was at an end. But even in this he showed severity; for he reduced the *jarib*, or standard measure, by a third, and added a fourth to his averages. Doubtless he argued that the profit which the Patels looked forward to would admit of this increase, and determined that his vigilance should be more than a match for their ingenuity.

Having thus adjusted the rents of the fisc, the dues of the Patel were fixed at one and a half annas per bigha on all the lands constituting a *pateli*; and as his personal lands were on a favoured footing and paid a much smaller rate than the ryot's, he was led to understand that any exaction beyond what was authorised would subject him to confiscation. Thus the dues on collection would realize to the Patel from five to fifteen thousand rupees annually. The anxiety of these men to be reinstated in their trusts was evinced by the immense offers they made, of ten, twenty, and even fifty thousand rupees. At one stroke he put ten lakhs, or £100,000 sterling into his exhausted treasury, by the amount of *nazaranas*, or fines of relief on their re-induction into office. The ryot hoped for better days; for notwithstanding the assessment was heavy, he saw the limit of exaction, and that the door was closed to all subordinate oppression. Besides the spur of hope, he had that of fear, to quicken his exertion; for with the promulgation of the edict substituting money-rent for *batai*, the ryot was given to understand that 'no account of the seasons' would alter or lessen the established dues of the State, and that uncultivated lands would be made over by the Patel to those who would cultivate them; or if none would take them, they would be incorporated with the *khas* or personal farms of the Regent. In all cases, the Patels were declared responsible for deficiencies of revenue.

Hitherto this body of men had an incentive, if not a licence, to plunder, being subject to an annual or triennial tax termed *patel-barar*. This was annulled; and it was added, that if they fulfilled their contract with the State without oppressing the subject, they should be protected and honoured. Thus these Patels, the elected representatives of the village and the shields of the ryot, became the direct officers of the crown. It was the Regent's interest to conciliate a body of men, on whose exertions the prosperity of the State mainly depended; and they gladly and unanimously entered into his views. Golden bracelets and turbans, the signs

of inauguration, were given, with a "grant of office," to each Patel, and they departed to their several trusts.

Out¹ of this numerous body of Patels, Zalim selected four of the most intelligent and experienced, of whom he formed a council attached to the Presence. At first their duties were confined to matters of revenue; soon those of police were superadded, and at length no matter of internal regulation was transacted without their advice. In all cases of doubtful decision, they were the court of appeal from provincial panchayats, and even from those of the cities and the capital itself. Thus they performed the three-fold duties of a board of revenue, of justice, and of police, and perhaps throughout the world, there never was a police like that of Zalim Singh: there was not one Fouche, but four; and a net of *espionage* was spread over the country, out of whose meshes nothing could escape.

Such was the Patel system of Kotah. A system so rigid had its alloy of evil; the veil of secrecy, so essential to commercial pursuits, was rudely drawn aside; every transaction was exposed to the Regent, and no man felt safe from the inquisitorial visits of the spies of this council. A lucky speculation was immediately reported, and the Regent hastened to share in the success of the speculator. Alarm and disgust were the consequence; the spirit of trade was damped; none were assured of the just returns of their industry; but there was no security elsewhere, and at Kotah only the protector dared to injure them.

The council of Venice was not more arbitrary than the Patel board of Kotah; even the ministers saw the sword suspended over their heads, while they were hated as much as feared by all but the individual who recognized their utility.

It would be imagined that with a council so vigilant the Regent would feel perfectly secure. Not so: he had spies over them. In short, to use the phrase of one of his ministers,—a man of acute perception and powerful understanding, when talking of the vigour of his mental vision,—when his physical organs had failed, *pani pina, aur mut tolna*, which we will not translate.

The Patel, now the virtual master of the peasantry, was aware that fine and confusion would follow the discovery of direct oppression of the ryots; but there were many indirect modes by which he could attain his object, and he took the most

*¹One paragraph omitted.

secure, the medium of their necessities. Hitherto, the impoverished husbandman had his wants supplied by the *Bohra*, the sanctioned usurer of each village; now, the privileged Patel usurped his functions, and bound him by a double chain to his purposes. But we must explain the functions of the *Bohra*, in order to show the extent of subordination in which the ryot was placed.

The *Bohra* of Rajputana is the *Metayer* of the ancient system of France. He furnishes the cultivator with whatever he requires for his pursuits, whether cattle, implements, or seed; and supports him and his family throughout the season until the crop is ready for the sickle, when a settlement of accounts takes place. This is done in two ways; either by a cash payment, with stipulated interest according to the risk previously agreed upon; or, more commonly, by a specified share of the crop, in which the *Bohra* takes the risk of bad seasons with the husbandman. The utility of such a person under an oppressive Government, where the ryot can store up nothing for the future, may readily be conceived; he is, in fact, indispensable. Mutual honesty is required; for extortion on the part of the *Bohra* would lose him his clients, and dishonesty on that of the peasant would deprive him of his only resource against the sequestration of his patrimony. Accordingly, this monied middleman enjoyed great consideration, being regarded as the patron of the husbandman. Every peasant had his particular *Bohra*, and not unfrequently from the adjacent village in preference to his own.

Such was the state of things when the old system of *lattha batai* was commuted for *bighoti*, a specific money-rent apportioned to the area of the land. The Patel, now tied down to the simple duties of collection, could touch nothing but his dues, unless he leagued with or overturned the *Bohra*: and in either case there was risk from the lynx-eyed scrutiny of the Regent. They, accordingly, adopted the middle course of alarming his cupidity, which the following expedient effected. When the crop was ripe, the peasant would demand permission to cut it. "Pay your rent first," was the reply. The *Bohra* was applied to: but his fears had been awakened by a caution not to lend money to one on whom the Government had claims. There was no alternative but to mortgage to the harpy Patel a portion of the produce of his fields. This was the precise point at which he aimed; he took the crop at his own valuation, and gave his receipt that the

dues of Government were satisfied; demanding a certificate to the effect "that having no funds forthcoming when the rent was required, and being unable to raise it, the mortgager voluntarily assigned, at a fair valuation, a share of the produce." In this manner did the Patels hoard immense quantities of grain, and as Kotah became the granary of Rajputana, they accumulated great wealth, while the peasant, never able to reckon on the fruits of his industry, was depressed and impoverished. The Regent could not long be kept in ignorance of these extortions; but the treasury overflowed, and he did not sufficiently heed the miseries occasioned by a system which added fresh lands by sequestration to the home farms, now the object of his especial solicitude.

Matters proceeded thus until the year 1867 (A.D. 1811), when, like a clap of thunder, mandates of arrest were issued, and every Patel in Kotah was placed in fetters, and his property under the seal of the State: the ill-gotten wealth, as usual, flowing into the exchequer of the Protector. Few escaped heavy fines; one only was enabled altogether to evade the vigilance of the police, and he had wisely remitted his wealth, to the amount of seven lakhs, or £70,000, to a foreign country; and from this individual case, a judgment may be formed of the prey these cornorants were compelled to disgorge.

It is to be inferred that the Regent must have well weighed the present good against the evil he incurred, in destroying in one moment the credit and efficacy of such an engine of power as the *pateli* system he had established. The Council of Four maintained their post, notwithstanding the humiliated condition of their compeers; though their influence could not fail to be weakened by the discredit attached to the body. The system Zalim had so artfully introduced being thus entirely disorganized, he was introduced to push still further the resources of his energetic mind, by the extension of his personal farms. In describing the formation and management of these, we shall better portray the character of the Regent than by the most laboured summary; the acts will paint the man.

There¹ are four modes of levying the land-tax, three of which are common throughout Rajwara; the fourth is more peculiar to Haravati and Mewar. The first and most ancient is that of *batai*, or 'payment in kind,' practised before metallic currency

¹Two paragraphs omitted.

was invented. The system of *batai* extends, however, only to corn; for sugar-cane, cotton, hemp, poppy, al, kusumbha, ginger, turmeric, and other dyes and drugs, and all garden stuffs, pay a rent in money. This rent was arbitrary and variable, according to the necessities or justice of the ruler. In both countries five to ten rupees per bigha are demanded for sugar-cane; three to five for cotton, poppy, hemp, and oil-plant; and two to four for the rest. But when heaven was bounteous, avarice and oppression rose in their demands, and seventy rupees per bigha were exacted for the sugar-cane, thus paralyzing the industry of the cultivator, and rendering abortive the beneficence of the Almighty.

Batai, or 'division in kind,' varies with the seasons and their products:

1st. The *unalu*, or 'summer harvest,' when wheat, barley, and a variety of pulses, as gram, moth, moong, til, are raised. The share of the State in these varies with the fertility of the soil, from one-fourth, one-third, and two-fifths, to one-half—the extreme fractions being the maximum and minimum; those of one-third and two-fifths are the most universally admitted as the share of the crown. But besides this, there are dues to the artificers and mechanics, whose labour to the village is compensated by a share of the harvest from each cultivator; which allowances reduce the portion of the latter to one-half of the gross produce of his industry, which if he realize, he is contented and thrives.

The second harvest is the *siyalu*, or 'autumnal,' and consists of *makkai* or *bhutta* (Indian corn), or joar, bajra, the two chief kinds of maize, and *til* or sesamum, with other small seeds, such as *kangni*, with many of the pulses. Of all these, one-half is exacted by the State.

Such is the system of *batai*; let us describe that of *kut*.¹ *Kut* is the conjectural estimate of the quantity of the standing crop on a measured surface, by the officers of the Government in conjunction with the proprietors, when the share of the State is converted into cash at the average rate of the day, and the peasant is debited the amount. So exactly can those habitually

¹ It would be more correct to say that *batai*, or 'payment in kind,' is divided into two branches, *viz.*, *kut* and *lattha*; the first being a portion of the standing crop by conjectural estimate; the other by actual measure after reaping and thrashing.

exercised in this method estimate the quantity of grain produced on a given surface, that they seldom err beyond one-twentieth part of the crop. Should, however, the cultivator deem his crop over-estimated, he has the power to cut and weigh it; and this is termed *lattha*.

The third is a tax in money, according to admeasurement of the field, assessed previously to cultivation.

The fourth is a mixed tax, of both money and produce.

None of these modes is free from objection. That of *kut*, or conjectural estimate of the standing crop, is, however, liable to much greater abuse than *lattha*, or measurement of the grain. In the first case, it is well known that by a bribe to the officer, he will *kut* a field at ten maunds, which may realize twice the quantity; for the chief guarantees to honesty are fear of detection, and instinctive morality; feeble safeguards, even in more civilized States than Rajwara. If he be so closely watched that he must make a fair *kut*, or estimate, he will still find means to extort money from the ryot, one of which is, by procrastinating the estimate when the ear is ripe, and when every day's delay is a certain loss. In short, a celebrated superintendent of a district, of great credit both for zeal and honesty, confessed, "we are like tailors; we can cheat you to your face, and you cannot perceive it." The ryot prefers the *kut*; the process is soon over, and he has done with the Government; but in *lattha*, the means are varied to perplex and cheat it; beginning with the reaping, when, with a liberal hand, they leave something for the gleaner; then, a "tithe for the *khurpi*, or sickle"; then, the thrashing; and though they muzzle the ox who treads out the corn, they do not their own mouths, or those of their family. Again, if not convertible into coin, they are debited and allowed to store it up, and "the rats are sure to get into the pits." In both cases, the *shahnahs*, or village-watchmen, are appointed to watch the crops, as soon as the ear begins to fill; yet all is insufficient to check the system of pillage; for the ryot and his family begin to feed upon the heads of Indian corn and maize the moment they afford the least nourishment. The *shahnah*, receiving his emoluments from the husbandman as well as from the crown, inclines more to his fellow-citizen; and it is asserted that *one-fourth of the crop*, and even a *third*, is frequently made away with before the share of the Government can be fixed.

Yet the system of *lattha* was pursued by the Regent before he commenced that of *pateli*, which has no slight analogy to the permanent system of Bengal,¹ and was attended with similar results,—distress, confiscation, and sale, to the utter exclusion of the hereditary principle, the very corner-stone of Hindu society.

Farming System—Let us proceed with the most prominent feature of the Regent's internal administration—his farming monopoly—to which he is mainly indebted for the reputation he enjoys throughout Rajputana. The superficial observer, who can with difficulty find a path through the corn-fields which cover the face of Haravati, will dwell with rapture upon the effects of a system in which he discovers nothing but energy and efficiency: he cannot trace the remote causes of this deceptive prosperity, which originated in moral and political injustice. It was because his own tyranny had produced unploughed fields and deserted villages, starving husbandmen and a diminishing population; it was with the distrained implements and cattle of his subjects, and in order to prevent the injurious effects of so much waste land upon the revenue, that Zalim commenced a system which has made him *farmer-general* of Haravati; and he has carried it to an astonishing extent. There is not a nook or a patch in Haravati, where grain can be produced, which his ploughs do not visit. Forests have disappeared; even the barren rocks have been covered with exotic soil, and the mountain's side, inaccessible to the plough, is turned up with a spud, and compelled to yield a crop.

In S. 1840 (A.D. 1784), Zalim possessed only two or three hundred ploughs, which in a few years increased to eight hundred. At the commencement of what they term the new era (*naya samvat*) in the history of landed property of Kotah, the introduction of the *pateli* system, the number was doubled; and at the present time² no less than *four thousand ploughs*, of double yoke, employing *sixteen thousand oxen*, are used in the farming system of this extraordinary man; to which may be added one thousand more ploughs and four thousand oxen employed on the estates of the prince, and the different members of his family.

¹ The Patel of Haravati like the zamindar of Bengal, was answerable for the revenues; the one, however, was hereditary only during pleasure; the other perpetually so. The extent of their authorities was equal.

² This was drawn up in 1820-21.

This is the secret of the Raj Rana's power and reputation; and to the wealth extracted from her soil, Kotah owes her preservation from the ruin which befell the States around her during the convulsions of the last half century, when one after another sank into decay. But although sagacity marks the plan, and unexampled energy superintends its details, we must, on examining the foundations of the system either morally or politically, pronounce its effects a mere paroxysm of prosperity, arising from stimulating causes which present no guarantee of permanence. Despotism has wrought this magic effect: there is not one, from the noble to the peasant, who has not felt, and who does not still feel, its presence. When the arm of the octogenarian Protector shall be withdrawn, and the authority transferred to his son, who possesses none of the father's energies, then will the impolicy of the system become apparent. It was from the sequestered estates of the valiant Hara chieftain, and that grinding oppression which thinned Haravati of its agricultural population, and left the lands waste, that the Regent found scope for his genius. The fields, which had descended from father to son through the lapse of ages, the unalienable right of the peasant, were seized, in spite of law, custom, or tradition, on every defalcation; and it is even affirmed that he sought pretexts to obtain such lands as from their contiguity or fertility he coveted, and that hundreds were thus deprived of their inheritance. In vain we look for the peaceful hamlets which once studded Haravati: we discern instead the *ori*, or farm-house of the Regent, which would be beautiful were it not erected on the prosperity of the subject; but when we enquire the ratio which the cultivators bear to the cultivation, and the means of enjoyment this artificial system has left them, and find that the once independent proprietor, who claimed a sacred right of inheritance,¹ now ploughs like

¹ Throughout the Bundi territory, where no regent has innovated on the established laws of inheritance, by far the greater part of the land is the absolute property of the cultivating *ryot*, who can sell or mortgage it. There is a curious tradition that this right was obtained by one of the ancient princes making a general sale of the crown land, reserving only the tax. In Bundi, if a *ryot* becomes unable, from pecuniary wants or otherwise, to cultivate his lands, he lets them; and custom has established *four annas per bigha* of irrigated land, and *two annas* for *gorma*, that dependent on the heavens, or a share of the produce in a similar proportion, as his right. If in exile, from whatever cause, he can assign this share to trustees; and, the more strongly to mark his inalienable right in such

as if the fields formerly his own, all our perceptions of moral justice are shocked.

The love of country and the passion for possessing land are strong throughout Rajputana: while there is a hope of existence, the cultivator clings to the '*bapota*,' and in Haravati this *amor patriæ* is so invincible, that, to use their homely phrase, "he would rather fill his *pēt* in slavery there, than live in luxury abroad." But where could they fly to escape oppression? All around was desolation; armies perambulated the country, with rapid strides, in each other's train, "one to another still succeeding." To this evil Kotah was comparatively a stranger; the Protector was the only plunderer within his domains. Indeed, the inhabitants of the surrounding States, from the year 1865, when rapine was at its height, flocked into Kotah, and filled up the chasm which oppression had produced in the population. But with the banishment of predatory war, and the return of industry to its own field of exertion, this panacea for the wounds which the ruler has inflicted will disappear; and although the vast resources of the Regent's mind may check the appearance of decay, while his faculties survive to superintend this vast and complicated system, it must ultimately, from the want of a principle of permanence, fall into rapid disorganization. We proceed to the details of the system, which will afford fresh proofs of the talent, industry, and vigilance of this singular character.

The soil of Kotah is a rich tenacious mould, resembling the best parts of lower Malwa. The single plough is unequal to breaking it up, and the Regent has introduced the plough of double yoke from the Konkan. His cattle are of the first quality, and equally fit for the park or the plough. He purchases at all the adjacent fairs, chiefly in his own dominions, and at the annual *melā* (fair) of his favourite city *Jhalra-Patan*. He has tried those of Marwar and of the desert, famed for a superior race of cattle; but he found that the transition from their sandy regions to the deep loam of Haravati soon disabled them.

Each plough or team is equal to the culture of one hundred *bighas*; consequently 4,000 ploughs will cultivate 400,000 during each harvest, and for both 800,000, nearly 300,000 English acres.

a case; the trustees reserve on his own account *two seers on every maund of produce*, which is emphatically termed '*hakḥ bapota ka bhūm*', the "dues of the patrimonial soil."

The soil is deemed poor which does not yield seven to ten maunds of wheat per bigha, and five to seven of millet and Indian corn. But to take a very low estimate, and allowing for bad seasons, we may assume four maunds per bigha, as the average produce, (though double would not be deemed an exaggerated average): this will give 3,200,000 maunds of both products, wheat and millet, and the proportion of the former to the latter is as three to two. Let us estimate the value of this. In seasons of abundance, twelve rupees per *mauni*,¹ in equal quantities of both grains, is the average; at this time (July 1820), notwithstanding the preceeding season has been a failure throughout Rajwara, (though there was a prospect of an excellent one), and grain a dead weight, eighteen rupees per *mauni* is the current price, and may be quoted as the average standard of Haravati: above is approximating to dearth, and below to the reverse. But if we take the average of the year of actual plenty, or *twelve* rupees² per *mauni* of equal quantities of wheat and joar, or one rupee per maund, the result is thirty-two lakhs of rupees annual income.

Let us endeavour to calculate how much of this becomes net produce towards the expenses of the Government, and it will be seen that the charges are about one-third gross amount.

Expenses.

Establishments— <i>viz.</i> , feeding cattle and servants, tear and wear of gear, and clearing the fields— one-eighth of the gross amount ³ , or.....	{	4,00,000
Seed.....		
Replacing 4,000 oxen annually, at 20s.....		6,00,000
Extras.....		80,000
		20,000
		<hr/> 11,00,000

¹ Grain Measure of Rajputana.—

75 pounds = 1 seer.

43 seers = 1 maund.

12 maunds = 1 *mauni*.

100 maunds = 1 *manasa*.

² It does descend as low as eight rupees per *mauni* for wheat and barley, and four for the millets, in seasons of excessive abundance.

³ It is not uncommon in Rajwara, when the means of individuals prevent them from cultivating their own lands, to hire out the whole with men and implements; for the use of which *one-eighth* of the produce is the established consideration. We have applied this in the rough estimate of the expenses of the Regent's farming system.

We do not presume to give this, or even the gross amount, as more than an approximation to the truth; but the Regent himself has mentioned that in one year the casualties in oxen amounted to five thousand! We have allowed one-fourth, for an ox will work well seven years, if taken care of. Thus, on the lowest scale, supposing the necessities of the Government required the grain to be sold in the year it was raised, twenty lakhs will be the net profit of the Regent's farms. But he has abundant resources without being forced into the market before the favourable moment; until when, the produce is hoarded up in subterranean granaries. Every thing in these regions is simple, yet efficient: we will describe the grain-pits.

These pits or trenches are fixed on elevated dry spots; their size being according to the nature of the soil. All the preparation they undergo is the incineration of certain vegetable substances, and lining the sides and bottom with wheat or barley stubble. The grain is then deposited in the pit, covered over with straw, and a terrace of earth, about eighteen inches in height, and projecting in front beyond the orifice of the pit, is raised over it. This is secured with a coating of clay and cow-dung, which resists even the monsoon, and is renewed as the torrents injure it. Thus the grain may remain for years without injury, while the heat which is extricated checks germination, and deters rats and white ants. Thus the Regent has seldom less than fifty lakhs of maunds in various parts of the country, and it is on emergencies, or in bad seasons, that these stores see the light; when, instead of twelve rupees, the *mauni* runs as high as forty, or the famine price of sixty. Then these pits are mines of gold; the Regent having frequently sold in one year sixty lakhs of maunds. In S. 1860 (or A.D. 1804), during the Maratha war, when Holkar was in the Bharatpur State, and predatory armies were moving in every direction, and when famine and war conjoined to desolate the country, Kotah fed the whole population of Rajwara, and supplied all these roving hordes. In that season, grain being fifty-five rupees per *mauni*, he sold to the enormous amount of *one crore of rupees, or a million sterling!*

Reputable merchants of the Mahajan tribe refrain from speculating in grain, from the most liberal feelings, esteeming it *dharm nahin hai*, 'a want of charity.' The humane Jain merchant says, "to hoard up grain, for the purpose of taking advantage of human misery, may bring riches, but never profit."

According to the only accessible documents, the whole crown-revenue of Kotah from the tax in kind, amounted, under bad management, to twenty-five lakhs of rupees. This is all the Regent admits he collects from (to use his own phrase) his handful (*pachiwara*) of soil: of course he does not include his own farming system, but only the amount raised from the cultivator. He confesses that two-thirds of the superficial area of Kotah were waste; but that this is now reversed, there being two-thirds cultivated, and only one-third waste, and this comprises mountain, forest, common, &c.

In S. 1865 (A.D. 1809), as if industry were not already sufficiently shackled, the Regent established a new tax on all corn exported from his dominions. It was termed *lattha*, and amounted to a rupee and a half per *mauni*. This tax—not less unjust in origin than vexatious in operation—worse than even the infamous *gabelle*, or the *droit d'aubaine* of France—was another fruit of monopoly. It was at first confined to the grower, though of course it fell indirectly on the consumer; but the *Jagatya*,¹ or chief collector of the customs, a man after the Regent's own heart, was so pleased with its efficiency on the very first trial, that he advised his master to push it farther, and it was accordingly levied as well on the farmer as the purchaser. An item of ten lakhs was at once added to the budget; and as if this were insufficient to stop all competition between the Regent-farmer-general and his subjects, three, four, nay even five *latthas*, have been levied from the same grain before it was retailed for consumption. Kotah exhibited the picture of a people, if not absolutely starving, yet living in penury in the midst of plenty. Neither the lands of his chiefs nor those of his ministers were exempt from the operation of this tax, and all were at the mercy of the *Jagatya*, from whose arbitrary will there was no appeal. It had reached the very height of oppression about the period of the alliance with the British Government. This collector had become a part of his system; and if the Regent required a few lakhs of ready money, *Jo hukm*, 'your commands,' was the reply. A list was made out of 'arrears of *lattha*,' and friend and foe, minister, banker, trader, and farmer, had a circular. Remonstrance was not only vain but dangerous:

¹ A Marathi word derived from Arabic *Zakat* (religious alms).—Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1564.

even his ancient friend, the Pandit Balal, had twenty-five thousand rupees to pay in one of these schedules; the *homme d'affaires* of one of his confidential chiefs, five thousand; his own foreign minister a share, and many bankers of the town, four thousand, five thousand, and ten thousand each. The term *lattha* was an abuse of language for a forced contribution: in fact the obnoxious and well-known *dand* of Rajwara. It alienated the minds of all men, and nearly occasioned the Regent's ruin; for scarcely was their individual sympathy expressed, when the Hara princes conspired to emancipate themselves from his interminable and galling protection.

When the English Government came in contact with Rajwara, it was a primary principle of the universal protective alliance to proclaim that it was for the benefit of the governed as well as the governors, since it availed little to destroy the wolves without, if they were consigned to the lion within. But there are and must be absurd inconsistencies, even in the policy of western legislators, where one set of principles is applied to all. Zalim soon discovered that the fashion of the day was to *parwarish*, 'foster the ryot.' The odious character of the tax was diminished, and an edict limited its operation to the farmer, the seller, and the purchaser; and so anxious was he to conceal this weapon of oppression, that the very name of *lattha* was abolished, and *sarwai hasil*, or 'extraordinaries,' substituted. This item is said still to amount to five lakhs of rupees.

Thus did the skill and rigid system of the Regent exact from his *pachiwara* of soil, full fifty lakhs of rupees. We must also recollect that nearly five more are to be added on account of the household lands of the members of his own and the prince's family, which is almost sufficient to cover their expenses.

What will the European practical farmer, of enlarged means and experience, think of the man who arranged this complicated system, and who, during forty years, has superintended its details? What opinion will he form of his vigour of mind, who, at the age of fourscore years, although blind and palsied, still superintends and maintains this system? What will he think of the tenacity of memory, which bears graven thereon, as on a tablet, an account of all these vast depositories of grain, with their varied contents, many of them the store of years past; and the power to check the slightest errors of the intendant of this vast accumulation; while, at the same time, he regulates the

succession of crops throughout this extensive range? Such is the minute topographical knowledge which the Regent possesses of his country, that every field in every farm is familiar to him: and woe to the superintendent *havalدار* if he discovers a fallow nook that ought to bear a crop.

Yet vast as this system is, overwhelming as it would seem to most minds, it formed but a part of the political engine conducted and kept in action by his single powers. The details of his administration, internal as well as external, demanded unremitted vigilance. The formation, the maintenance and discipline of an army of twenty thousand men, his fortresses, arsenals, and their complicated minutiae, were amply sufficient for one mind. The daily account from his police, consisting of several hundred emissaries, besides the equally numerous reports from the head of each district, would have distracted an ordinary head, "for the winds could not enter and leave Haravati without being reported." But when, in addition to all this, it is known that the Regent was a practical merchant, a speculator in exchanges, that he encouraged the mechanical arts, fostered foreign industry, pursued even horticulture, and, to use his own words, "considered no trouble thrown away which made the rupee return sixteen and a half annas", with whom can he be compared? Literature, philosophy, and *excerptae* from the grand historical epics, were the amusements of his hours of relaxation; but here we anticipate, for we have not yet finished the review of his economical character. His monopolies, especially that of grain, not only influenced his own market, but affected all the adjacent countries; and when speculation in opium ran to such a demoralizing excess in consequence of the British Government monopolizing the entire produce of the poppy cultivated throughout Malwa, he took advantage of the *mania*, and by his sales or purchases raised or depressed the market at pleasure. His gardens, scattered throughout the country, still supply the markets of the towns and capital with vegetables, and his forests furnish them with fuel.

So rigid was his system of taxation, that nothing escaped it. There was a heavy tax on widows who remarried. Even the *gourd* of the mendicant paid a tithe, and the ascetic in his cell had a domiciliary visit to ascertain the gains of mendicancy, in order that a portion should go to the exigencies of the State. The *tumba barar*, or 'gourd-tax', was abolished after forming

for a twelve-month part of the fiscal code of Haravati, and then not through any scruples of the Regent, but to satisfy his friends. Akin to this, and even of a lower grade, was the *jharu-barar*, or 'broom tax,' which continued for ten years; but the many lampoons it provoked from the satirical *Bhat* operated on the more sensitive feelings of his son, Madho Singh, who obtained its repeal.

Though¹ rigid in his observance of the ceremonies of religion, and sharing in the prevailing superstitions of his country, he never allows the accidental circumstance of birth or caste to affect his policy. Offences against the State admit of no indemnity, be the offender a Brahmin or a bard; and if these classes engage in trade, they experience no exemption from imposts.

Such is an outline of the territorial arrangements of the Regent Zalim Singh. When power was assigned to him, he found the State limited to Kelwara on the east; he has extended it to the verge of the Plateau, and the fortress which guards its ascent, at first rented from the Marathas, is now by treaty his own. He took possession of the reins of power with an empty treasury and *thirty-two lakhs* of accumulating debt. He found the means of defence a few dilapidated fortresses, and a brave but unmanageable feudal army. He has, at an immense cost, put the fortresses into the most complete state of defence, and covered their ramparts with many hundred pieces of cannon; and he has raised and maintains, in lieu of about four thousand Hara cavaliers, an army,—regular we may term it,—of twenty thousand men, distributed into battalions, a park of one hundred pieces of cannon, with about one thousand good horse, besides the feudal contingents.

But is this prosperity? Is this the greatness which the Raja Guman² intended should be entailed upon his successors, his chiefs, and his subjects? Was it to entertain twenty thousand mercenary soldiers from the sequestered fields of the illustrious Hara, the indigenous proprietor? Is this government, is it good government according to the ideas of more civilized nations, to

*¹ Two paragraphs omitted.

*² Maharao of Kotah, 1766-1771. At the time of his death he placed his successor, Ummed Singh (1771-1819), then ten years of age, 'in the lap' of Zalim Singh.

extend taxation to its limit, in order to maintain this cumbrous machinery? We may admit that, for a time, such a system may have been requisite, not only for the maintenance of his delegated power, but to preserve the State from predatory spoliation; and now, could we see the noble restored to his forfeited estates, and the ryot to his hereditary rood of land, we should say that Zalim Singh had been an instrument in the hand of Providence for the preservation of the rights of the Haras. But, as it is, whilst the corn which waves upon the fertile surface of Kotah presents not the symbol of prosperity, neither is his well-paid and well-disciplined army a sure means of defence: moral propriety has been violated; rights are in abeyance, and until they be restored, even the apparent consistency of the social fabric is obtained by means which endanger its security.

British Alliance

When, in A.D. 1817, the Marquess of Hastings proclaimed war against the Pindaris, who were the very lees of the predatory hordes, which the discomfiture of the greater powers had thrown off, neutrality was not to be endured; and it was announced that all those who were not for us in this grand enterprise, which involved the welfare of all, should be considered against us. The Rajput States, alike interested with ourselves in the establishment of settled government, were invited to an alliance offensive and defensive with us, which was to free them for ever from the thralldom of the predatory armies; in return for which, we demanded homage to our power, and a portion of their revenues as the price of protection. The eagle-eye of Zalim saw at once the virtue of compliance, and the grace attendant on its being quickly yielded. Accordingly, his envoy was the first to connect Kotah in the bonds of alliance, which soon united all Rajwara to Britain. Meanwhile, all India was in arms; two hundred thousand men were embodied, and moving on various points to destroy the germ of rapine for ever. As the first scene of action was expected to be in the countries bordering upon Haravati, the presence of an agent with Zalim Singh appeared indispensable. His instructions were to make available the resources of Kotah to the armies moving round him, and to lessen the field of the enemy's manœuvres, by shutting him out of that country. So efficient were these resources,

that in five days after the Agent reached the Regent's camp,¹ every pass was a post; and a corps of fifteen hundred men, infantry and cavalry, with four guns, was marched to co-operate with General Sir John Malcolm, who had just crossed the Narmada with a weak division of the army of the Deccan, and was marching northward surrounded by numerous foes and doubtful friends. Throughout that brilliant and eventful period in the history of British India, when every province from the Ganges to the ocean was agitated by warlike demonstrations, the camp of the Regent was the pivot of operations and the focus of intelligence. The part he acted was decided, manly, and consistent; and if there were moments of vacillation, it was inspired by our own conduct, which created doubts in his mind as to the wisdom of his course. He had seen and felt that the grand principle of politics, expediency, guided all courts and councils, whether Mughal, Maratha, or British: the disavowal of the alliances formed by Lord Lake, under Marquess Wellesley's administration, proved this to demonstration, and he was too familiar with the history of our power to give more credit than mere politeness required to our boasted renunciation of the rights of anticipated conquest. A smile would play over the features of the orbless politician when the envoy disclaimed all idea of its being a war of aggrandisement. To all such protestations he would say, "Maharaja, I cannot doubt you believe what you say; but remember what old Zalim tells you; the day is not distant when only one emblem of power (*ekhi sikka*) will be recognized throughout India." This was in A.D. 1817-18; and the ten years of life since granted to him must have well illustrated the truth of this remark; for although no absolute conquest or incorporation of Rajput territory has taken place, our system of control, and the establishment of our monopoly within these limits (not then dreamed of by ourselves), has already verified in part his prediction. It were indeed idle to suppose that any protestations could have vanquished the arguments present to a mind which had pondered on every page of the history of our power; which had witnessed its development,

¹ The author of these annals, then Assistant Resident at Sindhia's court, was deputed by Lord Hastings to the Raj Rana Zalim Singh. He left the residency at Gwalior on the 12th November 1817, and reached the Regent's camp at Rauta, about twenty-five miles S. S. E. of Kotah, on the 23rd.

from the battle of Plassy under Clive, to Lake's exploits at the altars of Alexander. He had seen throughout, that the fundamental rule which guides the Rajput prince, "obtain land," was one both practically and theoretically understood by viceroys from the west, who appeared to act upon the four grand political principles of the Rajput, *sham, dan, bhed, dand*; or, persuasion, gifts, stratagem, force; by which, according to their great law-giver, kingdoms are obtained and maintained, and all mundane affairs conducted. When, therefore, in order to attain our ends, we expatiated upon the disinterestedness of our views, his co-operation was granted less from a belief in our professions, than upon a dispassionate consideration of the benefits which such alliance would confer upon Kotah, and of its utility in maintaining his family in the position it had so long held in that State. He must have balanced the difficulties he had mastered to maintain that power, against the enemies, internal and external, which had threatened it, and he justly feared both would speedily be sacrificed to the incapacity of his successors. To provide a stay to their feebleness was the motive which induced him to throw himself heart and hand into the alliance we sought; and of signal benefit did he prove to the cause he espoused. But if we read aright the workings of a mind, which never betrayed its purpose either to friend or foe, we should find that there was a moment wherein, though he did not swerve from the path he had chalked out, or show any equivocation in respect to the pledge he had given, the same spirit which had guided him to the eminence he had acquired, suggested what he might have done at a conjuncture when all India, save Rajputana, was in arms to overthrow the legions of Britain. All had reason to dread her colossal power, and hatred and revenge actuated our numerous allies to emancipate themselves from a yoke, which, whether they were bound by friendship or by fear, was alike galling. If there was one master-mind that could have combined and wielded their resources for our overthrow, it was that of Zalim Singh alone. Whether the aspirations of his ambition, far too vast for its little field of action, soared to this height, or were checked by the trammels of nearly eighty winters, we can only conjecture. Once, and once only, the dubious oracle came forth. It was in the very crisis of operations, when three English divisions were gradually closing upon the grand Pindari horde, under Karim Khan, in the very heart of his dominions, and his

troops, his stores, were all placed at our disposal, he heard that one of these divisions had insulted his town of Bara: then, the ideas which appeared to occupy him burst forth in the ejaculation, "that if twenty years could be taken from his life, Delhi and Deccan should be one;" and appeared to point to the hidden thoughts of a man, whose tongue never spoke but in parables.

There is also no doubt that his most confidential friends and ministers, who were Marathas, were adverse to his leaguings with the English, and for a moment he felt a repugnance to breaking the bond which had so long united him with their policy. He could not but enumerate amongst the arguments for its maintenance, his ability to preserve that independence which fifty years had strengthened, and he saw that, with the power to which he was about to be allied, he had no course but unlimited obedience; in short, that his part must now be subordinate. He preferred it, however, for the security it afforded; and as in the course of nature he must soon resign his trust, there was more hope of his power descending to his posterity than if left to discord and faction. But when hostilities advanced against the freebooters, and the more settled Governments of the Peshwa, Bhonsla, Holkar, and Sindhia, determined to shake off our yoke, we could urge to him irresistible arguments for a perfect identity of interests. The envoy had only to hint that the right of conquest would leave the districts he rented from Holkar at our disposal; and that as we wanted no territory in Central India for ourselves, we should not forget our friends at the conclusion of hostilities. If ever there were doubts, they were dissipated by this suggestion; and on the grand horde being broken up, it was discovered that the families of its leaders were concealed in his territory. Through his indirect aid we were enabled to secure them, and at once annihilated the strength of the marauders. For all these important services, the sovereignty of the four districts he rented from Holkar was guaranteed to the Regent. The circumstances attending the conveyance of this gift afforded an estimate of Zalim's determination never to relinquish his authority; for, when the *sanad* was tendered in his own name, he declined it, desiring the insertion of that of "his master, the Maharao." At the time, it appeared an act of disinterested magnanimity, but subsequent acts allowed us to form a more correct appreciation of his motives. The campaign concluded, and the noble commander and his

enlightened coadjutor¹ left the seat of war impressed with the conviction of the great services, and the highest respect for the talents, of the veteran politician, while the envoy, who had acted with him during the campaign, was declared the medium of his future political relations.

In March, A.D. 1818, profound repose reigned from the Sutlej to the ocean, of which Rajput history presented no example. The magic Runes, by which the north-man could "hush the stormy wave," could not be more efficacious than the rod of our power in tranquillising this wide space, which for ages had been the seat of conflict. The *satya yuga*, the golden age of the Hindu, alone afforded a parallel to the calm which had succeeded the eras of tumultuous effervescence.

Thus matters proceeded till November 1819, when the death of the Maharao Ummed Singh engendered new feelings in the claimants to the succession, and placed the Regent in a position from which not even his genius might have extricated him, unaided by the power whose alliance he had so timely obtained.² And here it becomes requisite to advert to the terms of this alliance. The treaty was concluded at Delhi, on the 26th of December 1817, by the envoys of the Regent, in the name of his lawful sovereign, the Maharao Ummed Singh, ratified by the contracting parties, and the deeds were interchanged at the Regent's court early in January. To this treaty his sovereign's seal and his own were appended; but no guarantee of the Regent's power was demanded pending the negotiation, nor is he mentioned except in the preamble, and then only as the ministerial agent of the Maharao Ummed Singh, in whose behalf alone the treaty was virtually executed. This excited the surprise of the British representative,³ who, in his official despatch detailing the progress and conclusion of the negotiations, intimated that he not only expected such stipulation, but was prepared for admitting it. There was no inadvertence in this omission; the Regent saw no occasion for any guarantee, for the plenary exercise of the powers of sovereign during more than half a century had consti-

¹ I allude to Mr. Adam, who divided with the noble Marquess the entire merits of that ever memorable period.

² For the story of disputed succession see Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1583-1612.

³ C. T. Metcalfe, Esq., then Resident at Delhi, now Sir C. T. Metcalfe, Bart., member of Council in Bengal.

tuted him, *de facto*, prince of Kotah. Moreover, we may suppose, had he felt a desire for such stipulation, that a feeling of pride might have stifled its expression, which by making the choice of ministers dependent on a foreign power would have virtually annulled the independent sovereignty of Kotah. Whatever was the reason of the omission, at a season when his recognition might have had the same formal sanction of all the parties as the other Articles of the treaty, it furnished the future opponents of the Regent's power with a strong argument against its maintenance in perpetuity on the death of the Maharao Ummed Singh.

It has been already said, that the treaty was concluded at Delhi in December 1817, and interchanged in January 1818. In March of the same year, two supplemental Articles were agreed to at Delhi, and transmitted direct to the Regent, guaranteeing the administration of affairs to his sons and successors for ever.

There is not a shadow of doubt that the supplemental Articles of the treaty of Kotah, which pledged our faith to two parties in a manner which rendered its maintenance towards both an impossibility, produced consequences that shook the confidence of the people of Rajwara in our political rectitude. They established two pageants instead of one, whose co-existence would have been miraculous; still, as a measure ought not to be judged entirely by its results, we shall endeavour to assign the true motive and character of the act.

If these Articles were not dictated by good policy; if they cannot be defended on the plea of expediency; if the omission in the original treaty of December could not be supplied in March, without questioning the want of foresight of the framer; he might justify them on the ground that they were a concession to feelings of gratitude for important services, rendered at a moment when the fate of our power in India was involved to an extent unprecedented since its origin. To effect a treaty with the Nestor of Rajwara was to ensure alliance with the rest of the States, which object was the very essence of Lord Hastings' policy. Thus, on general views, as well as for particular reasons (for the resources of Kotah were absolutely indispensable), the co-operation of the Regent was a measure vitally important. Still it may be urged that as the Regent himself, from whatever motive, had allowed the time to go by when necessity might have compelled us to incorporate such an Article in the original treaty, was there no

other mode of reimbursing these services besides a guarantee which was an apple of discord? The war was at an end; and we might with justice have urged that 'the State of Kotah,' with which we had treated, had, in the destruction of all the powers of anarchy and sharing in its spoils, fully reaped the reward of her services. Such an argument would doubtless have been diplomatically just; but we were still revelling in the excitement of unparalleled success, to which Zalim had been no mean contributor, and the future evil was overlooked in the feverish joy of the hour. But if cold expediency may not deem this a sufficient justification, we may find other reasons. When the author of the policy of 1817 had maturely adjusted his plans for the union of all the settled Governments in a league against the predatory system, it became necessary to adopt a broad principle with respect to those with whom we had to treat. At such a moment he could not institute a patient investigation into the moral discipline of each State, or demand of those who wielded the power by what tenure they held their authority. It became, therefore, a matter of necessity to recognize those who were the rulers *de facto*, a principle which was publicly promulgated and universally acted upon. Whether we should have been justified in March, when all our wishes had been consummated, in declining a proposal which we would most gladly have submitted to in December, is a question which we shall leave diplomatists to settle.¹

¹The overture for these supplementary Articles, in all probability, originated not with the Regent, but with the son. Had the author (who was then the medium of the political relations with Kotah) been consulted regarding their tendency, he was as well aware *then* as *now*, what he ought to have advised. Whether his feelings, alike excited by the grand work in which he bore no mean part, would have also clouded his judgment, it were useless to discuss. It is sufficient, in all the spirit of candour, to suggest such reasons as may have led to a measure, the consequences of which have been so deeply lamented.

IX

ALLIANCES WITH THE BRITISH¹

With our present system of alliances, so pregnant with evil from their origin, this fatal consequence² (far from desired by the legislative authorities at home) must inevitably ensue. If the wit of man had been taxed to devise a series of treaties with a view to an ultimate rupture, these would be entitled to applause as specimens of diplomacy.

There is a perpetual variation between the spirit and the letter of every treaty; and while the internal independence of each State is the groundwork, it is frittered away and nullified by successive stipulations, and these positive and negative qualities continue mutually repelling each other, until it is apparent that independence cannot exist under such conditions. Where discipline is lax, as with these feudal associations, and where each subordinate vassal is master of his own retainers, the article of military contingents alone would prove a source of contention. By leading to interference with each individual chieftain, it would render such aid worse than useless. But this is a minor consideration to the tributary pecuniary stipulation which, unsettled and undetermined, leaves a door open to a system of espionage into their revenue accounts—a system not only disgusting, but contrary to treaty, which leaves 'internal administration' sacred. These openings to dispute, and the general laxity of their Governments coming in contact with our regular system, present dangerous handles for ambition.

Our anomalous and inconsistent interference in some cases, and our non-interference in others, operate alike to augment the dislocation induced by long predatory oppression in the various orders of society, instead of restoring that harmony and continuity which had previously existed. The great danger, nay, the inevitable consequence of perseverance in this line of conduct, will be their reduction to the same degradation with our other allies, and their ultimate incorporation with our already too extended dominion.

^{*1} Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 146-152.

^{*2} "The dread of their amalgamation with our empire."

It may be contended, that the scope and tenor of these alliances were not altogether unfitted for the period when they were formed, and our circumscribed knowledge; but was it too late, when this knowledge was extended, to purify them from the dross which deteriorated the two grand principles of mutual benefit, on which all were grounded, viz. 'perfect internal independence' to them, and 'acknowledged supremacy' to the protecting power? It will be said, that even these corner-stones of the grand political fabric are far from possessing those durable qualities which the contracting parties define, but that, on the contrary, they are the Ormuzd and Ahrimanes, the good and evil principles of contention. But when we have superadded pecuniary engagements of indefinite extent, increasing in the ratio of their prosperity, and armed quotas or contingents of their troops, whose loose habits and discipline would ensure constant complaint, we may certainly take credit for having established a system which must compel that direct interference, which the broad principle of each treaty professes to check.

The inevitable consequence is the perpetuation of that denationalising principle, so well understood by the Marathas, '*divide et impera*'. We are few; to use an Oriental metaphor, our agents must 'use the eyes and ears of others'. That mutual dependence, which would again have arisen, our interference will completely nullify. Princes will find they can oppress their chiefs, chiefs will find channels by which their sovereign's commands may be rendered nugatory, and irresponsible ministers must have our support to raise these undefined tributary supplies; and unanimity, confidence, and all the sentiments of gratitude which they owe, and acknowledge to be our due, will gradually fade with the national degradation. That our alliances have this tendency cannot be disputed. By their very nature they transfer the respect of every class of subjects from their immediate sovereign to the paramount authority and its subordinate agents. Who will dare to urge that a Government, which cannot support its internal rule without restriction, can be national? that without power unshackled and unrestrained by exterior council or espionage, it can maintain self-respect, the corner-stone of every virtue with States as with individuals? This first of feelings these treaties utterly annihilate. Can we suppose such denationalised allies are to be depended upon in emergencies? or, if allowed to retain a spark of their ancient moral

inheritance, that it will not be kindled into a flame against us when opportunity offers, instead of lighting up the powerful feeling of gratitude which yet exists towards us in these warlike communities?

Like us they were the natural foes of that predatory system which so long disturbed our power, and our preservation and theirs were alike consulted in its destruction. When we sought their alliance, we spoke in the captivating accents of philanthropy; we courted them to disunite from this Ahrimanes of political convulsion. The benevolent motives of this great mover of these alliances we dare not call in question, and his policy coincided with the soundest wisdom. But the treaties might have been revised, and the obnoxious parts which led to discord abrogated, at the expense of a few paltry lakhs of tribute and a portion of sovereign homage. It is not yet too late. True policy would enfranchise them altogether from our alliance; but till then let them not feel their shackles in the galling restraint on each internal operation. Remove that millstone to national prosperity, the poignant feeling that every increased bushel of corn raised in their long-deserted fields must send its tithe to the British granaries. Let the national mind recover its wonted elasticity, and they will again attain their former celebrity. We have the power to advance this greatness, and make it and its result our own; or, by a system unworthy of Britain, to retard and even quench it altogether.¹

When so many nations are called upon, in a period of great calamity and danger, to make over to a foreigner, their opposite in every thing, their superior in most, the control of their forces in time of war, the adjudication of their disputes in time of peace, and a share in the fruits of their renovating prosperity, what

¹ If Lord Hastings' philanthropy, which rejoiced in snatching these ancient States from the degradation of predatory warfare, expected that in four short years order should rise out of the chaos of a century, and "was prepared to visit with displeasure all symptoms of internal neglect, arising from supineness, indifference, or concealed ill-will"; if he signified that "Government would take upon itself the task of restoring order", and that "all changes" on this score "would be demanded and rigidly exacted": in fine, that "such arrangements would be made as would deprive them of the power of longer abusing the spirit of liberal forbearance, the motives of which they were incapable of understanding or appreciating"; what have they to hope from those without his sympathies?

must be the result; when each Rajput may hang up his lance in the hall, convert his sword to a ploughshare, and make a basket of his buckler? What but the prostration of every virtue? It commences with the basis of the Rajput's—the martial virtues; extinguish these and they will soon cease to respect themselves. Sloth, low cunning and meanness will follow. What nation ever maintained its character that devolved on the stranger the power of protection? To be great, to be independent, its martial spirit must be cherished; happy if within the bounds of moderation. Led away by enthusiasm, the author experienced the danger of interference, when observing but one side of the picture—the brilliant lights which shone on their long days of darkness, not calculating the shade which would follow the sudden glare.

On our cessation from every species of interference alone depends their independence or their amalgamation—a crisis fraught with danger to our overgrown rule.

PART II

STUDIES SUPPLEMENTARY TO TOD

I

RAJPUT FEUDALISM

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

In the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to give a satisfactory account of the political, military and social organisation of the Rajputs during the period of Muslim rule in India. The available bardic chronicles have not yet been thoroughly studied. So far as we know, they are concerned primarily with dramatic military exploits, and it is hardly possible to extract from them any clear idea about medieval Rajput polity. "The quasi-historical poems and the commemorative songs of the *charanas* rather magnify, as they are expected to do, the achievements of the princes, and the people have left few spokesmen".¹ For obvious reasons the Persian chronicles are not of much assistance in this matter. Inscriptions are rare and practically useless for our purpose.

Tod's chapters on *Sketch of a Feudal System in Rajasthan* contain a brief description of Rajput political organisation in his days, with special reference to the conditions prevailing in Mewar. He was an enthusiastic and acute observer. He has left for us many valuable facts which bring to light some interesting aspects of Rajput polity, although in some cases the value of his observations is vitiated by his obvious anxiety to discover elements of European Feudalism in the Rajput States. It must be noted, again, that Tod's account relates to the conditions prevailing towards the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. We cannot be sure whether his observations should be regarded as applicable to the political organisation of the Rajputs in the pre-Mughal age or even in the seventeenth century.

POSITION OF THE RAJPUT STATES IN THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

The political and military system on which the Rajput States had been reared during the medieval period were in a

¹ S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity", *The Guardian*, August 22, 1931.

melting pot at the time when they came into contact with expanding British Imperialism. Tod does not fail to notice the disintegrating effects of Mughal rule and Maratha plunder.¹ He says: "Maratha cunning, engrafted on Mahomedan intolerance, had greatly obscured these institutions".

Tod gives us a brief account of the relationship between the Rajput States and the Mughal Empire. A more complete picture may be found in Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari*. From the point of view of revenue administration these tributary States were included within the *Subahs* of the Empire. Of the *Subah* of Ajmer only two *sarkars* (Ajmer and Nagor) were directly administered; the rest consisted of the Rajput principalities. Each of them, it seems, contributed to the Imperial treasury a fixed round sum, for the revenue figures are generally given in even thousands. It was for the head of the State concerned to realise the revenue from the ryots and to raise the local militia; the Imperial Government had no direct concern with these matters. The Imperial Governor of Ajmer realised the tribute from the Rajput Princes within his jurisdiction,² closely watched their activities and stationed *Faujders* and *Qiladars* in important forts like Ranthambhor. But he had no authority to interfere in the internal affairs of the States. The Princes had full internal powers and dealt directly with the Imperial Government. The Emperor had, in theory, full control over succession. From every new Prince he exacted homage and offerings before his formal installation on his ancestral *gadi*. Every Rajput State was treated, for official purposes, as a *jagir* which the Emperor conferred on his nominee. The chief obligations of the Princes were the regular payment of the tribute and the regular provision of contingents for the Imperial army. The chief restriction on their powers was the obligation to use the Mughal coins in their territories.³ No Rajput Prince was allowed to mint coins in his own name till the middle of the eighteenth century, and even then the Emperor's name had to be inscribed on the Rajput coins in recognition of his suzerainty.⁴

¹ See *ante*, pp. 1-5, 7, 22-24.

² Sirohi, Jalor, Dungarpur and Banswara were included within the *Subah* of Ajmer for revenue purposes, but politically they were attached to the *Subah* of Ahmedabad.

³ P. Saran, *Provincial Government of the Mughals*, pp. 126-133.

⁴ W. W. Webb, *Currencies of the Hindu States of Rajputana*.

RESULTS OF MUGHAL SUPREMACY

Tod does not clearly notice the revolutionary results of two centuries of Mughal supremacy in Rajputana. He says: "Throughout Rajasthan the character and welfare of the States depend on that of the sovereign: he is the main spring of the system...."¹ To what extent this was due to Mughal influence, he does not say. It has been suggested by a modern writer that the autocracy of the Mughal Emperors exercised an indirect influence on the political organisation of the Rajput States: "The autocracy at the imperial capital supplied the incentive to the prince to play the autocrat in his more limited sphere of action".² It was the influence of the Mughal court, we are told, which transformed the leader of the clan into "the irresponsible bureaucrat of the eighteenth century". This view is not without substance. The position of the Rajput Princes loyal to the Mughal Empire was so secure that they could defy their nobles and set aside traditional restraints on their own power. As they could count on Imperial assistance for the suppression of internal rebellions they could easily assume autocratic powers. Referring to Udai Singh of Marwar (1581-1595) Tod says:

"On the union of the imperial house with that of Jodhpur, by the marriage of Jodh Bai to Akbar,³ the emperor not only restored all the possessions he had wrested from Marwar, with the exception of Ajmer, but several rich districts in Malwa, whose revenues doubled the resources of his own fiscal domain. With the aid of his imperial brother-in-law, he greatly diminished the power of the feudal aristocracy, and clipped the wings of almost all the greater vassals, while he made numerous sequestrations of the lands of the ancient allodality and lesser vassals; so that it is stated, that, either by new settlement or confiscation, he added fourteen hundred villages to the fisc."⁴

Referring to Sawai Jai Singh of Amber, Tod says:

"During those troubles (*i.e.*, "troubles which ensued on the demise of Aurangzeb"), Jai Singh's power as the king's lieutenant in Agra, which embraced his hereditary domains, gave him ample opportunity to enlarge and consolidate his territory."⁵

¹ See *ante*, p. 21.

² S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity", *The Guardian*, August 22, 1931.

³ Jodh Bai was married to Jahangir.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 965.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1351.

These two extracts give us some idea about the way in which the Rajput principalities protected by the Mughal Emperors were transformed into something like autocratically governed States. In Mewar, however, the course of events was different; there the Crown became weaker and the nobility stronger.

Mewar's contact with the Mughal Empire affected the position of her rulers in three directions. It was during the Mughal period that Mewar lost her old pre-eminence among the Rajput States. Amber and Jodhpur rose to prominence under the Mughals, for their Princes rendered conspicuous services to the Empire for about two centuries.¹ But the Princes of Mewar kept themselves aloof from the splendour of Delhi and Agra even after the treaty with Jahangir, and thereby lost the advantage which fell to successful generals and courtiers like Mirza Raja Jai Singh of Amber. "The Maharana of Udaipur, in spite of his pre-eminent descent, was a negligible factor of the Hindu population of the Mughal world, as he hid himself among his mountain fastnesses, and never appeared in the Mughal court or camp".² Thus in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we find the Princes of Amber and Jodhpur playing the leading role in the Imperial Court, and the Rana of Mewar was steadily pushed into the background.

This loss of prestige could not but affect the Rana's power and influence in his own State. There were other factors also which contributed to his weakness. In pre-Mughal times it was the custom to change the estates (called 'fiefs' by Tod) of the nobles after a few years, so that none of them might acquire strong local influence. They attended the Rana's court and tried to satisfy him by loyal service, for it was to him—and to him alone—that they looked for preferment. During the long struggle against the Mughal Empire this system was changed in a way favourable to the nobles. The Ranas were on numerous occasions driven from the plains and compelled to take refuge in the hills. During these periods of confusion they could not transfer the nobles from one 'fief' to another, for most of the 'fiefs' were

¹ "The Court of Jaipur, by its assiduity and the services which it rendered to that of Delhi by contributing to its strength, had the precedence and the right of mediation above all the other Indian Courts before the Mughal Emperor...."—J. Pillet's *Memoir on Jaipur*, 1794. (*Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, p. 2).

² Sir J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 324.

virtually under the control of the Mughal garrisons scattered over the country. On the conclusion of permanent peace with the Mughal Government in 1615 most of the nobles found themselves in possession of fixed estates, from which the Ranas could no longer dislodge or transfer them. Moreover, the loyalty and self-sacrifice of the nobles in the long war against the Mughals induced the Ranas to load them with honours and to increase their possessions. Thus in the seventeenth century the position of the nobility became stronger than ever before. Secondly, the increase of material possessions was accompanied by a simultaneous promotion in rank and honour. Captain Brookes wrote in 1859, "In the Durbar, they (*i.e.*, the nobles) take rank above the heir-apparent, a custom unprecedented in India, and granted in consequence of the heir-apparent having attended the Emperor's Court.¹ When a chief enters the presence, the entire court, including the prince, rises to receive him, and the whole ceremonial is so intricate, that it has been a puzzle to every European officer who has had any connection with Meywar".²

It would be a mistake to think, however, that the Rana of Mewar was a puppet. Contrasting the reigns of Raj Singh (1652-80) and Jai Singh (1680-98) Tod says:

"The reigns of Raj Singh and Jai Singh illustrate the obvious truth, that on the personal character of the chief of a feudal government everything depends. The former, infusing by his talent and energy patriotic sentiments into all his subordinates, vanquished in a series of conflicts the vast military resources of the empire, led by the emperor, his sons, and chosen generals; while his successor, heir to this moral strength, and with every collateral aid, lowered her to a stage of contempt from which no talent could subsequently raise her".³

Apart from the personal ability of the ruling Prince there was another factor which proved to be an effective restriction on the powers of the nobles in Mewar. It was their poverty. They

¹ When Rana Amar Singh concluded peace with Jahangir, it was stipulated that the Rana would be represented in the Imperial Court by his eldest son. It was a special favour granted by the Emperor to the Rana, for all other Rajput Princes were required to attend the Mughal Court in person. Still Mewar considered this obligation so humiliating that the heir-apparent was degraded in his own capital.

² *History of Meywar*, pp. 55-56.

³ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 460.

had to provide food, clothing and opium for all their needy relations, even those most remotely connected with them.¹ The size of an estate was no criterion of its owner's affluence, for the owner of a larger estate might be encumbered with more than the average proportion of dependants. In the eighteenth century the weakness of the Ranas and the confusion created by the inroads of the Marathas enabled many nobles to encroach upon the crown estates and thereby to increase their own income. It is said that the Chief of Lawah had plundered the covering of the Rana's sole elephant.²

EFFECTS OF MARATHA INVASIONS

When the Mughal Empire broke down the Rajputs became the victims of long-continued Maratha aggression. Tod makes no secret of his views on the "predatory" incursions of the Marathas. A large share of the miseries suffered by the Rajputs during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was undoubtedly due to their unscrupulous greed. They were constantly in want of money, and to them the desert of Rajputana appeared to be as good a pagoda tree as the fertile Doab and the smiling plains of Bengal.

The Mughal Emperors in a sense deserved the tribute which they exacted from Rajputana, for they enforced internal as well as external peace, and afforded the Rajput Princes sufficient scope for the display of their military ardour and administrative skill. As generals and provincial governors several Rajput Princes played a distinguished part in the history of the Mughal Empire. But the Marathas rendered no service in exchange for the large sums they realised by force from the impoverished Rajput States. Instead of suppressing internal dissensions in those States they utilised them for their own aggrandisement. When Imperial generals like Mirza Najaf Khan and adventurers like Amir Khan devastated Rajputana, the Maratha overlords of the Rajputs did not come to their rescue. No Rajput Prince was allowed to fight under the Maratha banner as a respected and valued vassal; the Maratha Empire gained nothing from the loyal service of the Rajputs, although the part played by them in the extension and consolidation of the Mughal

¹ See *ante*, p. 43.

² Brookes, *History of Meywar*, p. 19.

Empire was even then a living memory. Had the Marathas utilised the Rajputs as the Mughals had done, the history of India in the eighteenth century would in all probability have flowed through different channels.

In criticising Maratha policy towards the Rajput States two important points should be remembered. In the first place, frequent invasions and consequent devastations of territory were rendered necessary by the persistent refusal of the Rajput Princes to honour their agreements with the Marathas. They were determined not to pay money unless they were forced to do so. The Marathas knew this and applied force whenever their demands were refused. Both the parties thus moved in a vicious circle; Rajputana lay prostrate under the heel of her oppressors. Secondly, the depredations caused by the Maratha forces grew in extent and horror with the increase of the non-Maratha element in the armies led by Sindhia and Holkar. Malcolm remarks about Mahadji Sindhia: "The countries under his own observation were well managed, as were all those where the inhabitants were peaceable and obedient; but in his efforts to reduce the chiefs of Hindustan, the princes of Rajputana, and the petty Rajas of Central India, to the state of subjects, he let loose all the irregular violence of his army; and the proceedings of some of those he employed to complete the subjugation of the Rajputs were marked by a spirit of rapacity and oppression that has, perhaps, never been surpassed even in the annals of the Marathas."¹ The horrors committed by the Pindaris are generally reflected upon the whole course of Maratha relations with Rajputana, but this is hardly fair to the Maratha people.

DEGENERATION OF THE RAJPUTS

While we must blame the Marathas for bringing to dust the descendants of those Rajput heroes who had fought for centuries in defence of their liberty and their faith, we must note with regret that the Rajputs of the eighteenth century were largely responsible for their own sufferings. The old clan feeling prevented unity even in the face of overwhelming disaster. Long submission to the Mughals had weakened the feeling of patriotism; that intense love of liberty, which had been the key to Rajput

¹ *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 129.

history for centuries, was no longer an active force in Rajput life. The simple, straightforward Rajput warrior had learned all the arts of the Mughal courtier, and tried to rival the Maratha in political intrigue and barren diplomacy. The Mughal *harem* had cast its baneful influence on the private life of the Rajput Princes and nobles: we find a descendant of Mirza Raja Jai Singh dressing himself like a courtesan and dancing in his *zenana* with bells tied to his ankles. Such men could not stand against the new-born imperial zeal of the Marathas, led by capable and ambitious leaders like Peshwa Baji Rao I, Malhar Rao Holkar and Mahadji Sindhia. The Rajput was not yet a stranger to that reckless personal courage which had made him a fitting hero of medieval romance; but personal courage counted little in long-drawn contests with large Maratha armies. The Europeanised infantry of the Marathas shattered the impregnable walls of medieval Rajput forts¹ and crushed the proud Rajput cavalry. But the Rajputs remained blind to the lessons of the age: they recklessly sent their cavalry to destruction in pitched battles with de Boigne's brigades. The nobles lost their accustomed place of honour in the council of their Princes, who gave their confidence to barbers, tailors, elephant-drivers and water-carriers. Assassination became a recognised political weapon. Society became so corrupt that even the Royal *zenana* was occasionally polluted by immorality. Rajputana was on the verge of collapse from within while the Marathas were knocking at the gates from without. In his exaggerated admiration for the Rajputs² Tod overlooked the grave defects of their character and political organisation and portrayed them as helpless victims of unscrupulous aggression.

PARTIAL DISSOLUTION OF THE CLAN SYSTEM

Every Rajput State was, generally speaking, one particular clan politically organised into one unit under the pressure of historical circumstances and economic conditions which were not remembered in later days. "In every State", says a modern

¹ Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 126-127.

² Referring to Mewar Tod says: "I look upon Mewar as the land of adoption, and, linked with all the associations of my early hopes and their actual realisation, I feel inclined to exclaim with reference to her unmanageable children, 'Mewar, with all thy faults, I love thee still'." (*Personal Narrative*).

writer, "the ruling class belongs to one particular clan.....The humblest members of the clan considered themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the same father enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler himself.¹ The latter was thus nothing but a *primus inter pares*.....The State in fact did not belong to the ruler—it belonged to the clan as a whole".²

This identification of the clan with the State was not an active force in the Rajput polity of the eighteenth century. Ambitious Princes anxious to imitate the Mughal pattern of autocracy naturally tried to undermine the authority of the clan as represented by the nobles. One of the measures adopted by them to serve this purpose was to introduce within their respective States some nobles who were "foreign in country and blood". Tod says, "Chiefs of Rathor, Chauhan, Paramara, Solanki and Bhatti tribes were intermingled".³ The epithet of *kala patta*, or "black grant," was applied to all grants of land to "foreign" nobles.⁴ Naturally the position of these nobles was less secure than that of the nobles of the indigenous clan, and the Prince could place more reliance on outsiders having no root in the soil and absolutely dependent on his favour.

Of the eighteen chief nobles of Mewar mentioned by Tod⁵ as many as nine were "foreign in country and blood". From the important estate of Ghanerao, says Tod, "the Rana could command four thousand Rathors holding lands on the tenure of service." It was held by a Rathor noble of the Mertia clan. Bijolia, one of the principal "fiefs" in Mewar, was held by a Paramara. The Chief of Rupnagar, a conspicuous member of the second grade of the Rana's nobility, was a Solanki. A Bhatti held the important estate of Khejurla in Mewar.⁶

The composition of the indigenous nobility in Mewar was very complex. Writing in 1859 a British political officer having first hand acquaintance with conditions in Mewar observed, "None of the principal chiefs of Mewar are the descendants of those who received estates in the country on its conquest by Bappa Rawul. Of the existing chiefs, some are of tribes differing

¹ See *ante*, pp. 66-68.

² S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity," *The Guardian*, August 22, 1931.

³ See *ante*, p. 35.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 37.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 121.

⁶ See Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

from the Oodeypoor family, while the greater number are collateral descendants of comparatively recent Ranas, the oldest and most important being separated from the reigning princes by eighteen generations, or about 480 years. The latter regard themselves as a brotherhood, of which the Rana is the head. They possess peculiar privileges, and are called *Home* chieftains, in contradistinction to chiefs who have emigrated from other countries, and acquired estates and titles in Meywar, and who are called *Foreign* chieftains".¹

The most important of all the nobles of Mewar, indigenous as well as foreign, was the Rawat of Salumbar, the head of the Chundawat clan, and the direct descendant of Chunda, the eldest son of Rana Lakha, who surrendered his right to the throne to his younger brother Mokal in the fifteenth century. In renouncing his right to the throne Chunda retained for his descendants the right to advise the Rana on all important matters of State and the principal place in the council of the Prince. This somewhat extraordinary relationship between the ruler and one of the nobles was not peculiar to Mewar. "In each Rajput family and even in each Bheel Pal,"² especially in case of incompetency in the head, there is a 'Baujgurrea' who is consulted in all important transactions, and without whose advice nothing is undertaken".³ This custom prevailed also in Central India. Malcolm says, "When a noble is raised by his (*i.e.*, ruler's) favour to power, but without distinct office, he is termed a counsellor⁴ or mediator; such person being generally deemed a channel of intercourse between the prince and his subjects".⁵ It seems, however, that while in Mewar the office was strictly hereditary, in other States and estates it was not always so.

The peculiar position of the Rawat of Salumbar raised difficult problems in Mewar. The extent of his powers and privileges was undefined, and the Rana naturally tried to free himself from this thralldom. For generations the Ranas and the Rawats were on bad terms; in spite of this the Chief of Salumbar could not be deprived of his customary privileges. At the time

¹ Brookes, *History of Meywar*, p. 54.

² A Bhill 'Pal' meant a village inhabited by the Bhils within the estate of a Rajput Chief.

³ Brookes, *History of Meywar*, pp. 54-55.

⁴ Malcolm says, "The Hindu name of this officer is *Bhanigurréc*".

⁵ *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. 1, p. 549.

when the treaty with the Company was being negotiated the Rana's agent, who was a relative of the Rawat of Salumbar, wanted to introduce a clause guaranteeing the position of the 'Baujurrea' to the Rawat of Salumbar, but Metcalfe merely gave an assurance that "the good conduct of the minister would ensure His Lordship's (i.e., the Governor-General's) approbation". Thus the age-old custom failed to survive the alliance with the Company, and a very unpleasant and inconvenient restriction on the Rana's power was abolished by Metcalfe's shrewd interference.

Next in importance to the Chundawat nobles were the Saktawats, the descendants of Rana Pratap's brother Sakta Singh. These two powerful families were hostile to each other, and the Ranas supported the Saktawats in order to balance the power of the Chundawats. During the long reign of Rana Bhim Singh (1777-1828) the bitter feud between these two powerful families created anarchy and confusion in Mewar and was largely responsible for the depredations of the Marathas in that unhappy State.

In general, the Prince was never absolutely free to dispose of any substantial portion of the patrimony of the clan in favour of "foreign" nobles. Tod says, "Though in all these estates there is a mixture of foreign Rajputs, yet the blood of the chief predominates".¹ The clan system was too strong to be completely broken.

This statement applies with particular force to Marwar. Of the 24 first and second class nobles mentioned by Tod,² only two were "foreigners". Tod says, "The aristocracy in Marwar has always possessed more power than in any of the sister principalities around. The cause may be traced to their first settlement in the desert; and it has been kept in action by the peculiarities of their condition, especially in that protracted struggle for the rights of the minor Ajit, against the despotism of the empire. There was another cause,.....which arose out of the laws of adoption".³

Our information about the early history of the Rathors, from the time of Siha to the accession of Chunda in or about

¹ See *ante*, p. 37.

² See *ante*, pp. 149-150.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1066.

1381 A.D., is extremely meagre; but a critical study of the annals brings out some important features. The Rathors were multiplying in number and wandering in pursuit of land. Conflicts naturally followed, not only with the Muslims who had occupied important posts like Nagor, but also with Rajput clans like the Parihars of Mandor, the Bhattis of Jaisalmer and the Chauhans of Jalor, as well as aboriginal tribes like the Bhils. The struggles arising out of the pursuit of land were not always conducted by the head of the clan, *i.e.*, the ruler of the new-born Rathor State; it seems that the Rathor chiefs, especially the enterprising members of the collateral branches of the ruling family, fought in many cases for themselves, and looked upon as their own any estate which they might conquer by their own prowess. In such cases the allegiance to the ruler was purely nominal. Thus the central authority in the Rathor State was weak from its very birth.¹

To that weakness another factor contributed. Up to the fourteenth century the principle of primogeniture did not regulate succession to the headship of the Rathor State. The most successful member of the ruling family secured the headship of the State, and in those days of strife and turmoil nobody cared for mere right of birth. Even in the seventeenth century Jaswant Singh, the second son of Gaj Singh, succeeded his father in supersession of the claim of his elder brother Amar Singh. This violation of primogeniture was due to the desire expressed by Gaj Singh on his death bed, which was confirmed by Emperor Shah Jahan; but the significant fact is that it was not opposed by the nobles who were probably satisfied with the succession of *any* member of the ruling family.

In the sixteenth century Maldev made an attempt to strengthen the central authority at the expense of the nobles. At his accession the authority of the ruler of Jodhpur was practically limited to the districts of Jodhpur and Sojhat. Collateral branches of the ruling family controlled the districts of Bikaner, Phalodi, Merta and Mallani, over which the paramountcy of the head of the State was hardly recognised. Maldev temporarily succeeded in imposing his authority on his over-mighty subjects, but the suspicion evoked by his policy

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 962-963.

in the minds of the nobles was largely responsible for his failure in the struggle against Sher Shah.

It was really difficult to determine the exact relationship between the head of the Rathor State and his nobles. The ruler might claim their full allegiance and effective authority over their estates, for he was the head of the State and of the clan as well. The nobles might resent the interference of the ruler in the affairs of their estates, which they or their ancestors had conquered with little or no assistance from the central authority. Such a constitutional problem arose in every Rajput State, and nowhere was a working solution discovered. The moderation of the rulers and the principle of *swami-dharma* or loyalty to the lord, which was an active force in Rajput life, averted dangerous crises.

The establishment of Mughal suzerainty, as we have pointed out above, strengthened the Prince and reduced the nobility to a difficult position. A new situation, however, arose after the death of Jaswant Singh. The Rathors had to wage a long war against Aurangzib for their very existence. They fought in the name of their minor Prince, Ajit Singh, who could not give them effective leadership. Just as the Maratha war of independence after Sambhaji's defeat and death stimulated feudal tendencies and increased the power of ambitious military chieftains, so also the long war of the Rathors against the Mughal Empire removed all restrictions imposed by tradition and custom upon the nobles and eclipsed the central authority which was practically non-existent for a quarter of a century. After Aurangzib's death Ajit Singh was restored to power and for some years occupied a prominent place at the Mughal court; but his repeated rebellions, and the progressive decline of imperial authority, made it impossible for him to crush the Rathor nobles with Mughal support. In the second half of the eighteenth century Marwar was torn by civil war and devastated by the Marathas, and the rulers could not consolidate their power. So the nobles of Marwar remained more powerful than their brethren in the neighbouring States, and the Rathor Princes could not make themselves "irresponsible bureaucrats".

Of the 26 principal nobles of Jaipur mentioned by Tod¹ no less than 10 were "foreigners".

¹ See *ante*, p. 173.

POSITION OF THE NOBLES

Next to the Prince in rank and power was the chief holding his estate directly from the Crown. The origin of these "fiefs" may be traced to various factors. Some of them consisted of lands occupied by collateral branches of the ruling family with or without the assistance of the Prince. For instance, we may refer to the estates of Bika, a younger member of the Rathor ruling family, and of the chiefs of the Shekhawat federation. Some of the "fiefs", again, arose out of circumstances similar to those which led to the growth of 'marches' or 'marks' in medieval Europe. With regard to Mewar Tod observes, "The local disposition of the estates was admirably contrived. Bounded on three sides, the south, east, and west, by marauding barbarous tribes of Bhils, Mers, and Minas, the circumference of this circle was sub-divided into estates for the chiefs, while the *khahisa*, or fiscal land, the best and richest, was in the heart of the country, and consequently well protected".¹ Thus some of the chiefs were originally wardens of the marches, defending the heart of the kingdom (*i.e.*, the Crown demesne) against the frontier tribes. The holders of these two classes of "fiefs" were in all cases Rajputs, and in most cases they belonged to the Prince's own clan. A different class of "fiefs" may be called "official fiefs". Tod says, "Titles are granted, and even fiefs of office, to ministers and civil servants not Rajputs; they are, however, but official, and never confer hereditary right. These official fiefs may have arisen, here and in Europe, from the same cause: the want of a circulating medium to pay the offices. The Mantris of Mewar prefer estates to pecuniary stipend, which give more consequence in every point of view....In Mewar the prince's architect, painter, physician, bard, genealogist, heralds, and all the generation of the foster-brothers, hold lands."² Finally, the weakness of the Prince occasionally led to the creation of new "fiefs", just as in Lancastrian England the "over-mighty" nobles unscrupulously seized the lands of the Crown. Tod says, "Many estates were obtained, during periods of external commotion, by threats, combination, or the avarice of the prince—his short-sighted policy, or that of his ministers."³

¹ See *ante*, p. 13.

² See *ante*, pp. 12-13.

³ See *ante*, p. 38.

The Chiefs were divided into different grades according to their income and status in the Prince's court. In Mewar there were four grades.¹ Tod says, "The honours and privileges, and the gradations of rank, amongst the vassals of the Rana's house, exhibit a highly artificial and refined state of society. Each of the superior rank is entitled to a banner, kettle-drums preceded by heralds and silver maces, with peculiar gifts and personal honours, in commemoration of some exploit of their ancestors."² Some of the powerful and wealthy chiefs lived in a semi-royal style. Tod says, "The court and the household economy of a great chieftain is a miniature representation of the sovereign's. . . . He must have his *shish-mahal*, his *bari-mahal*, and his *mandir*, like his prince".³

One of the most important duties of the chiefs was to attend the Prince's court. Tod says, "For state and show, a portion of the greater vassals reside at the capital for some months, when they have permission to retire to their estates, and are relieved by another portion. On the grand military festival the whole attend for a given time; and when the prince took the field, the whole assembled. . . ."⁴

"On all grand occasions", says Tod, "where the general peace or tranquillity of the Government is threatened, the chiefs form the council of the sovereign".⁵ To be excluded from the council of the Prince was to be in utter disgrace.⁶ But they had no concern with the promulgation of laws.⁷ In Feudal Europe the vassals of the Crown were not excluded from this important privilege. This is an important point of difference between European Feudalism and the system of government prevalent in Rajputana, but Tod has not appreciated its significance.

So far as the distribution of justice in, and the internal economy of, the estates were concerned, the chiefs practically enjoyed uncontrolled authority. The Prince's *chabutras*, or "terraces of justice", could not ordinarily be established "within the bounds of a chief."⁸ Tod says, "Now each chief claims the

¹ See *ante*, pp. 14-15.

² See *ante*, p. 10.

³ See *ante*, p. 42.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 20.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 19.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 66-68.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 18.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 19.

right of administering justice in his own domain, that is, in civil matters; but in criminal cases they ought not, without the special sanction of the crown....the self-constituted tribunals, the *panchayats*, sit in judgment in all cases where property is involved."

"SUB-INFEUDATION"

Sub-infeudation, in the proper sense of the term, was unknown in Rajputana¹, but in large estates the Chiefs generally allotted villages for the maintenance of their sons and brothers. Tod says, "In all the large estates, the chief must provide for his sons or brothers, according to his means and the number of immediate descendants". This system weakened the nobility and was sometimes "ruinous to the protection and general welfare of the country." It was also occasionally detrimental to the interests of the State. "It is pursued", says Tod, "in some parts till there is actually nothing left sufficiently large to share, or to furnish subsistence for one individual: consequently a great deprivation of services to the State ensues". This system was, however, prevalent more in "the isolated tributary Thakurats or lordships scattered over the country"² than in "the large principalities". In Mewar the Chiefs were careful not to let this practice become too common; "they send the extra numbers to seek their fortunes abroad".

"SUB-VASSALS"

The nature and strength of the Rajput political organisation were determined by two important factors: the reciprocal duties of Prince and Chiefs and the relations between chiefs and their "sub-vassals". Tod's observations on these points³ are illustrated by two important documents⁴ quoted by him. These documents embody the views of the Chiefs of Mewar and the "sub-vassals" of Deogarh, "one of the largest fiefs in Rajasthan." In their complaint to the British Government against Raja Man Singh of Marwar the Chiefs of that State declared, "Sri Maharaja and ourselves are of one stock, all Rathors. He is our head, we

¹ See *ante*, pp. 42-45.

² "The Jarejas of Cutch, the tribes in Kathiawar and the small independencies of Gujarat."

³ See *ante*, pp. 26-27.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 66-70.

his servants. . . . *When our services are acceptable, then is he our lord; when not, we are again his brothers and kindred, claimants and laying claim to the land.*" There could be no clearer definition of the reciprocal duties of Prince and Chiefs, no more authentic interpretation of the idea that the State was the joint property of the clan. The same idea is forcefully expressed in the remonstrance of the "sub-vassals" of Deogarh against their Chief: *"When Deogarh was established, at the same time were our allotments: as his patrimony, so is our patrimony. . . . Our rights and privileges in his family are the same as his in the family of the Presence (i.e., the Rana)."*

If the "sub-vassals" had their rights they had their duties too. They were bound to follow the standard of the lord (i.e., the Chief) even against their sovereign. Tod says, "If the question were put to a Rajput to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or his sovereign, the reply would. . . imply that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards." Numerous instances could be given of whole clans devoting themselves to the Chief against their sovereign¹. Those "sub-vassals" who wished to stand well with their chiefs would be very slow in receiving any honours or favours from the Prince.² No "sub-vassal" could perform any service to the Prince except through his own immediate superior. No Rajput Prince was wise or strong enough to impose an oath of Salisbury on subjects whose service was available to the State only under these dangerous restrictions.

The looseness of the link between the Prince and the "sub-vassals" was an obvious source of weakness, not only to the political structure of the Rajput State, but also to its military organisation. Originally there was no standing army in any Rajput State; the Prince had to depend on such forces as the chiefs could collect in any emergency. Naturally the loyalty of the chiefs, and the readiness of the "sub-vassals" to render service, were decisive factors. The system completely broke down in the eighteenth century under the pressure of the political and military chaos of that age of transition. Mewar had to create the nucleus of a standing army by enlisting some mercenaries

¹ See the account of the death of the Chief of Nimaj in *Annals of Marwar* and the description of the Sheogarh Feud in Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

² See the story of the Deogarh Chief and his "sub-vassal": *ante*, p. 27.

from Sind. The principal motive was probably to deal with internal troubles caused by "over-mighty subjects".¹ Tod has left for us an English version of a grant from Rana Ari Singh to a Sindhi Chief named Abdul Rahim Beg (dated 1770).² It is significant to note that this chief of Muslim mercenaries was granted rank and privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Rawat of Salumbar, "the first of home-chieftains."

"FEUDAL INCIDENTS"

Tod has made an elaborate attempt to compare the general obligations of Rajput "vassals" with the "feudal incidents" of medieval Europe.³

The practice of realising *relief*—"a sum of money due from every one of full age taking a fief by descent"—was widely prevalent in the Rajput States, although during the troubled period preceding the establishment of British suzerainty "some of the chiefs obtained renunciation of the fine of relief, which was tantamount to making a grant in perpetuity, and annulling the most overt sign of paramount sovereignty". In Mewar custom required "the *bona fide* surrender of the fief and renewal thereof."

Alienation required "the sanction of the lord paramount" only in cases of "donations for pious uses". In this respect, therefore, "Feudalism" in Rajputana was not similar to Feudalism in Europe. Although Tod refers to "the remonstrance of the Deogarh vassals" he does not clearly realise that the clan system and the European custom of alienation were irreconcilable. The "vassals" of Rajputana derived their right to land, not from the Prince's favour, but from their membership of the clan: the State was the property of the clan, and every member of the clan was entitled to his patrimony. Naturally the Prince, who was virtually little more than the biggest co-sharer, could not exercise any rigid control over alienation.

Escheats and forfeitures were well known in Rajputana. Hereditary "fiefs" reverted to the Crown on failure of heirs, as they could not be bequeathed by will. "Forfeitures for crimes . . . are partial or entire, according to the delinquency."

¹ See the story of Bhindir in Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

² See *ante*, pp. 71-72.

³ See *ante*, pp. 27-36.

Aids, implying "free gifts" or "benevolences", were realised by the Rajput Princes from their Chiefs and by the latter from the "sub-vassals". "On the marriage of the daughter of the prince, a benevolence or contribution was always levied". Special taxes, like the *barar* (war-tax) in Mewar, were imposed "in periods of emergency or danger."

Wardship, says Tod, "does exist, to foster the infant vassal during minority; but often terminating, as in the system of Europe, in the nefarious act of defrauding a helpless infant, to the pecuniary benefit of some court favourite." The guardianship of infant Chiefs was generally vested in their mothers, occasionally in the head of the clan concerned. Sometimes the Prince himself undertook this responsibility.

The control exercised by the feudal Kings of Europe on the *marriage* of their vassals was never claimed by the Princes of Rajputana.

"Thus," concludes Tod, "setting aside marriage (which even in Europe was only partial and local) and alienation, four of the six chief incidents marking the feudal system are in force in Rajasthan, *viz.*, relief, escheats, aids, and wardships."

CONCLUSION

The political and military systems on which the Rajput States had been reared during the medieval period were in a melting pot at the time when they came into contact with expanding British Imperialism. Was Tod correct in describing these systems as feudal? Our answer to this important question may be best expressed in the words of the *Rajputana Gazetteer*¹:

"In fact, the system upon which the land is distributed among the branch families and other great hereditary landholders, is the basis of the political constitution of a Rajput State and forms its characteristic distinction. And this system is not, speaking accurately, feudal, though it has grown in certain States into something very like feudalism. The tenure of the great clansmen involves military service and payment of financial aids, but its source is to be found in the original clan-occupation of the lands, and in the principles of kinship and a purity of descent from the original occupants or conquerors".

¹ First edition (1879), Vol. I, pp. 59-60.

II

CONDITION OF RAJPUTANA

ADMINISTRATION: MINISTERS

In the Rajput States a distinction was drawn between the civil and military counsellors of the Prince. The Premier was usually a Rajput, a court favourite who owed his exalted office to his "talents, character, or intrigue." In different States he had different titles—*bhanjgarh* in Mewar, *pradhan* in Marwar, *musahib* in Jaipur, *kiladar* or *dewan* in Kotah. He was "the military minister, with the political government of the fiefs." He was the "dispenser of the favours of the sovereign." He had "unbounded authority over the military classes" and "unlimited power over the inferior officers of the State". He had "a powerful body of retainers always at his command." The Premiership was sometimes hereditary. In Mewar it was hereditary in the Salumbar family. In Marwar it was hereditary in the house of Awa.¹ In Kotah Zalim Singh was the all-powerful Premier. Similar was the position of Salim Singh in Jaisalmer.²

The Premier did not interfere with civil administration which, in Mewar, was in charge of the "civil premier", called *pradhan*. He belonged to a "non-militant" (i.e., non-Rajput) tribe. "The whole of the territorial and financial arrangements are vested in him." He was assisted by the *bakhshi*, who took the musters, paid the soldiers and issued patents as well as letters of sequestration of feudal land. In his case the general rule of separating civil functions from military duties was not observed. Two other "grand officers" were the *suratnama* ("the auditor and recorder of all the household expenditure and establishments") and the *sahai* ("secretary both for home and foreign correspondence").³ In Bundi there were four ministers: the *dewan* or *musahib* (who had "the entire management of the territory and finances"), the *faujdar* (who was the governor of the castle and headed the "feudal quotas" or the mercenaries), the

¹ See *ante*, pp. 54-59, 248-249.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1230-1233, 1240-1241.

³ See *ante*, pp. 92-93.

bakhshi (controller of accounts) and the *risala* (controller of the household expenditure). The *faujdar* was never a Rajput.¹

The tendency to exclude the Rajputs from high administrative posts seems to have been universal in the Rajput world. Malcolm's remarks on the Rajput States of Central India may be quoted in this connection:

"The Rajput chiefs employ their own tribe in the army, but seldom, if ever, in civil stations. . . . When a noble is raised by his favour to power, but without distinct office, he is termed a counsellor or mediator; such person being generally deemed a channel of intercourse between the prince and his subjects. The reason for not employing Rajputs in the civil offices of these petty governments is, in the first place, their unfitness from want of education; and in the second, their insubordinate and ambitious spirit. These stations (but particularly that of Kamdar, or minister) are generally filled by Brahmins, Banias (merchants), or persons of the Kaith, or writer tribe."²

LEGISLATION³

The Prince was naturally the head of all departments of the State. In normal times the Rana of Mewar "promulgated all the legislative enactments in which the general rights and wants of the community were involved." In this he was assisted by "his civil council, the four ministers of the crown and their deputies"; the martial vassals or chiefs had no concern with law-making.

There was little scope for legislation in States dominated by age-old customs. Customs varied in each State, and not infrequently in the different parts of a single State. In some cases tradition had handed down to later generations the circumstances explaining the origin of particular customs; but, generally speaking, such information was not available. Tod was particularly interested in the inscriptions which lay scattered all over Rajputana. He also found important records in the archives of the Princes. Moreover, there were many books of grants to the chiefs and "vassals", and also the grand rent-roll of the country. "From all these", says Tod, "a sufficiency of customary rules could easily be found to form the written law of fiefs in Rajasthan".

¹ See *ante*, p. 209.

² *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 549-550. . . .

³ See *ante*, pp. 5-8, 18.

He makes some illustrative references to sumptuary laws, commercial regulations, etc.

It seems that the legislation of the Rajput Princes dealt with civil affairs alone ; criminal cases were presumably governed solely by customs. Whether Muslim law and Mughal custom exercised any influence on the Rajputs in this matter, is uncertain.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Tod does not give us a consistent account of the judicial system in the Rajput States. It may be presumed that the Prince was not only the formal fountain of justice but also the actual judge of the more important cases.

In Mewar "the resident ruler of the district" was also a judicial functionary. There was, again, "a special officer of the Government in each frontier thana, or garrison post", who, in addition to other duties, administered justice with the aid of the *chabutra*. This peculiar court consisted of *chauthias*, or "assessors of justice", elected by their fellow-citizens. It represented a democratic element in the administration of justice. It was clearly distinguished from the general *panchayat*, which was "formed from the respectable population at large".

In every big city in Rajasthan there was a hereditary *Nagar Seth*, or "chief magistrate", who administered justice with the aid of the local *chauthia*.

The regular administration of justice was often impeded by the privileges and obstinacy of the chiefs. Tod says, "The *chabutras*, or terraces of justice, were always established in the *Khalisa*, or crown demesne. It was deemed a humiliating intrusion if they sat within the bounds of a chief". Rajputana produced no Henry II who could expand royal justice at the cost of these baronial courts. The system of *rozina* was a crude method for the enforcement of justice on a chief or his dependent.¹

In Marwar, as in Jaipur, confined criminals were maintained by individual charity, for the grants made by the State for their maintenance were usually misappropriated by the agents of the Government. Tod says, "When once confined, the criminals are little thought of, and neglect answers all the ends of cruelty". Prisoners were released on special occasions like a solar or lunar

¹ See *ante*, pp. 18-19.

eclipse, the birth of a son to the Prince, the beginning of a new reign, etc.

In Marwar the *Panchayats* arbitrated in civil cases. In theory there was an appeal to the Prince, but the conditions attached to appeals checked litigation. If the *Panchayat* failed trial by ordeal (*sagun*) was sometimes resorted to. In such cases not only the selection but also the appeal to any of the three customary tests (by fire, by water, and by washing the hands in boiling oil) was the voluntary act of the litigants.

The criminal laws of Rajputana were not sanguinary, except in respect to political crimes. In cases of ordinary murder justice was usually satisfied with fine, corporal punishment, imprisonment, confiscation, or banishment. "Inferior crimes, such as larcenies, were punished by fine and imprisonment, and when practicable, restitution ; or, in the case of inability to pay, corporal punishment and confinement". The nature of punishment often depended on the temperament of the judge. Raja Bijay Singh (1753-1793) of Marwar never confirmed a sentence of death. Stories relating to his clemency were current in Rajputana in Tod's days.¹

LAND REVENUE

The financial resources of the Rajput States were limited. "The land-tax in the *Khalisa* demesne is the chief source of supply", says Tod.² According to his estimate, it was doubtful whether the *khalisa* lands in Mewar amounted to one-fourth of those distributed in grant to the Chiefs.³ And land was not distributed to the Chiefs alone : the temples, the priests, the Brahmins, the bards and the genealogists received a substantial share. Tod says, "There is scarcely a State in Rajputana in which one-fifth of the soil is not assigned for the support of the temples, their ministers, the secular Brahmins, bards, and genealogists. But the evil was not always so extensive ; the abuse is of modern growth".⁴

The following account of the present revenue system of Mewar may give us some idea about the system prevalent in Tod's days :

¹ See *ante*, pp. 140-143.

² See *ante*, p. 16.

³ See Tod's "Abstract of Fiscal Revenues of Mewar"—*ante*, p. 119.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 589.

"In the *khalsa* area there is no distinction between rent and revenue, and no trace of *zamindar* middleman. . . . The system is *ryotwari*, that is to say, the actual cultivator pays revenue (*bhog* or *hasil*), usually in cash but sometimes in kind, direct to the *Darbar*. The rest of territory is held on either the *jagir*, *bhum* or *muafi* tenure. The majority of the Rajput *jagirdars* pay to the *Darbar* a fixed annual quit rent, called *chhutund*, because it was supposed to be one-sixth of the annual income of their estates, and usually take from one-fourth to one-half. The *bhumias*¹ generally cultivate their own lands, and they pay a small sum yearly to the *Darbar*; it is called *bhum barar*, and was formerly one-sixth of their assets, but now bears no relation whatever to the rental value of their holdings. The *muafidars* ordinarily pay nothing to the State and collect rent in kind from those to whom they lease their fields, but in some cases, when they do not themselves cultivate, the *Darbar* exacts a share of the produce".²

In Marwar "the entire amount of personal revenue" of the Prince did not exceed in the early years of Man Singh's reign (1803-1843) ten *lakhs* of rupees, though in the reign of Bijay Singh (1753-1793) the income of the State amounted to 16 *lakhs*, one-half of which came from the salt lakes alone. The aggregate revenue of the "feudal lands" was approximately 50 *lakhs*, but in Tod's days these lands hardly produced half this sum.³

In Bikaner the lands of the Chiefs were proportionately more extensive than those in any other State. This abnormal distribution was the result, says Tod, of "the original settlement, when the Bidawats and Kandhalots, whose joint acquisitions exceeded those of Bika, would not admit him to hold lands in their territory,⁴ and made but a slight pecuniary acknowledgement of his supremacy". In Tod's days the revenue of the *khalsa* lands did not exceed one *lakh* of rupees.⁵

In Jaisalmer the Prince derived more than one *lakh* from the land. "From one-fifth to one-seventh of the gross produce of the land," says Tod, "is set aside as the tax of the crown, never exceeding the first, nor falling short of the last."⁶

¹ See *ante*, pp. 38-41.

² Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. IIA, p. 49.

³ See *ante*, p. 143.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1127-1132.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 185.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 201.

In the year 1802-3 "the revenues fiscal, feudal, commercial, and tributary, of Amber" were estimated to exceed eighty *lakhs* of rupees, half of which came from the *khalsa* lands.¹

TAXES

In addition to the land tax in the *khalsa* and the income drawn from the Chiefs, the Princes derived considerable revenues from other sources. In Mewar there were many taxes²: the transit duties on commerce and trade, duties realised from larger towns and commercial marts, duties on mines³ and marble quarries, war tax,⁴ house tax, plough tax, marriage tax, *nazarana* on confirmation of estates, fines,⁵ *Khar-Lakar*,⁶ duties on the sale of spirits, opium, tobacco etc., quit-rent of the *Bhumia* chiefs. The privilege of coining was a royal monopoly⁷, and the mint was a considerable source of income. It will be noticed that almost all the sources of revenue, except the commercial taxes, were inelastic. Commerce could not prosper during the troubled period through which Rajputana passed as a result of the Maratha incursions. Hence during that period the Rajput Princes were reduced to acute financial stringency and compelled to introduce novel and vexatious taxes, some of which are noted below.

In Marwar there were the following taxes: *anga* (poll tax), *ghasmali* (cattle tax), *kewari* (door tax), *sair* (imposts, including those on grain, "whether of foreign importation, or the home-grown, in transit from one district to another"), *hasil* (miscellaneous taxes). The salt lakes of Marwar yielded more than seven *lakhs* per year.⁸

¹ See *ante*, pp. 168-170.

² See *ante*, pp. 15-17, 33.

³ What Tod calls the "tin mines of Jawara" (*ante*, p. 16) are probably the lead and zinc mines at the village of Jawar, 16 miles south of Udaipur, which were discovered towards the end of the 14th century. They were worked till the great famine of 1812-13, and are said to have yielded up to 1766 a net annual revenue of about two *lakhs*. (Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. IIA, p. 53). The revenue derived from the Jawar mines enabled the Ranas to maintain their independence against the Mughals till the re-conquest of the plains. (Brookes, *History of Meywar*, p. 3).

⁴ It was a kind of substitute for the regular mode of levying the rents on the produce of the soil and was generally realised from those mountain regions where the produce was disproportionate to the cultivated surface.

⁵ Fines on renewal of estates and also in composition of offences.

⁶ "Wood and forage for the supply of the prince's army."

⁷ In Mewar the Chief of Salumbar had a copper currency of his own.

⁸ See *ante*, pp. 143-146.

In Bikaner there were the following taxes: *dhuan* (hearth-tax), *anga*¹, *sair* (impost), *paseti* (tax on ploughs), *malba* (special land-tax paid by the Jats), *dato*i ("a triennial tax of five rupees levied on each plough"). There were, in addition, many "arbitrary methods" of increasing the income of the oppressive ruler, Surat Singh, and "a train of dependent harpies, who prey upon the cultivating peasantry, or industrious trader". *Dand* (compulsory contribution) and *khushhali* (benevolence) were almost normal items of taxation².

In Jaisalmer the transit duties³, which were "formerly the most certain and most prolific branch of the fiscal income", had dwindled on account of maladministration and "the general decrease of commerce". *Dhuan* and *dand* were realised, as in Bikaner.⁴

In Kotah Zalim Singh's system of taxation was so rigid that "nothing escaped it". *Lattha* was a new tax on all corn exported from the State. Tod says that it was "worse than even the infamous *gabelle*". There was a 'broom-tax'. Widows who remarried had to pay a heavy tax. "Even the gourd of the mendicant paid a tithe⁵, and the ascetic in his cell had a domiciliary visit to ascertain the gains of mendicity, in order that a portion should go to the exigencies of the State".⁶

CONDITION OF THE PEASANTRY

In Mewar the cultivator was the proprietor of the soil which he called his *bapota*, "the most emphatic, the most ancient, the most cherished, and the most significant phrase his language commands for patrimonial inheritance". He had the right of alienation, "of entire conveyance by sale, or temporary by mortgage". The *Patel*, who was originally the elected representative of the commune, became, during the disturbed years of Maratha incursions, "the master of his fellow-citizens". His encroachments on the traditional rights of the cultivators could not be

¹ In Marwar *anga* was a tax of one rupee levied on adults of either sex. In Bikaner "it embraced quadrupeds as well as bipeds of every sex and age, and was graduated according to age and sex in the human species, and according to utility in the brute".

² See *ante*, pp. 185-189.

³ *Dan*.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 201-202.

⁵ *Tumba barar*.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 222-225.

effectively restrained even by Tod, for "all interference was by treaty strictly, and most justly, prohibited".

In Mewar there were two methods of levying the revenues on corn: *Kankut* ("a conjectural assessment of the standing crop, by the united judgement of the officers of Government, the Patel, the Patwari, or registrar, and the owner of the field") and *batai* ("division of the corn after it is threshed"). It was for the cultivator to choose the method. In the *batai* system the share of the Government varied from one-third to one-half. A money payment was fixed for sugar-cane, poppy, oil, hemp, tobacco, cotton, indigo and garden stuffs.¹

In Marwar the revenues were collected from the *ryots* in kind. The cultivator had to surrender 50 per cent. of the produce; besides, he had to pay the expenses of guarding the crops and also those of the royal officers who divided the produce. The *ryots* of the "feudal chiefs" were much better off than those of the *khalsa*, for they had to pay only two-fifths of the produce, and in lieu of all other taxes and charges they had to pay a land-tax of Rs. 12 on every hundred *bighas* of cultivated land. "The cultivators", said Tod, "repay this mild assessment by attachment to the Chiefs".²

In Jaipur the lands were farmed to the highest bidder. The misery caused by this "pernicious" system to the cultivating classes did not escape Tod's notice.³

Tod describes in detail the revenue system of Zalim Singh of Kotah.⁴ The first important measure was the three-fold classification of land according to soil and fertility (*piwal* or irrigated; *gorma*, good soil, but dependent on the heavens; *mormi*, including pasturage and mountain-tracts). The time-honoured *batai* system was abolished and a fixed money-rent was prescribed on the basis of an average calculated from the accounts of many years. This new system was preceded by a *chakbandi* or measurement of the lands of each township. The assessment was heavy; to add to the cultivator's burden, it was declared that 'no account of the season' would alter or lessen the dues of the State, and that uncultivated lands would be confiscated. At the same time the Patel's legitimate dues were fixed and a rigid system of

¹ See *ante*, pp. 108-117.

² See *ante*, pp. 143-144.

³ See *ante*, pp. 166-167.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 210-226.

control was established. On the whole, therefore, the ryot "hoped for better days"; "he saw the limit of exaction, and that the door was closed to all subordinate oppression".

In 1811 Zalim Singh abolished the Patel system and became the farmer-general. In 1784 he possessed only 200 or 300 ploughs; in 1820-21 he had no less than 4,000 ploughs. Tod says, "The fields, which had descended from father to son through the lapse of ages, the unalienable right of the peasant, were seized, in spite of law, custom, or tradition, on every defalcation; and it is even affirmed that he sought pretexts to obtain such lands as from their contiguity or fertility he coveted, and that hundreds were thus deprived of their inheritance". Although this system ruined many peasants, it increased the area under cultivation. Tod says, "There is not a nook or a patch in Haravati where grain can be produced which his ploughs do not visit. Forests have disappeared; even the barren rocks have been covered with exotic soil, and the mountain's side, inaccessible to the plough, is turned up with a spud, and compelled to yield a crop". Tod recognises that "to the wealth extracted from her soil, Kotah owes her preservation from the ruin which befell the States around her during the convulsions of the last half century when one after another sank into decay". But she purchased her immunity from "decay" by reducing her peasants to the condition of Helots.

ARMY

The unsettled conditions of the eighteenth century made it necessary for every Rajput State to create a standing army. Mewar had a force composed of Sindhi adventurers.¹ "In Marwar", says Tod, "the feudal compact was too strong to tolerate it (*i.e.*, a standing army), till Pathan predatory hands, prowling amidst the ruins of Mogul despotism, were called in to partake in each family broil; the consequence was the weakening of all, and opening the door to a power stronger than any to be the arbiter of their fate". The "turbulent vassalage" of Marwar could not be overawed without the assistance of "a foreign mercenary force". The "Rohilla and Afghan infantry" employed by the Princes of Marwar, "having cannon and sufficient discipline to act in a body", were "formidable to the Rajput

¹ See *ante*, pp. 71, 87, 255-256.

cavaliers". Raja Man Singh had a corps of 3,500 foot and 1,500 horse, with 25 guns, commanded by Hindal Khan, who was familiarly addressed as "uncle". In addition to the Muslim mercenaries there was in Marwar a brigade of "monastic militants" or fighting *Sannyasis*. The commanders of the mercenaries were not satisfied with monthly pay alone; "lands to a considerable amount" were granted to them. At one period the Raja of Jodhpur maintained a mercenary force consisting of 11,000 men. Apart from the financial strain imposed by "these overgrown establishments" on the Prince's "fiscal revenues", the employment of Muslim mercenaries offended the Rajputs and widened the breach between the ruler and the ruled. The "feudal contingents" were estimated at 5,000 horse, besides foot.¹

Jaipur adopted the custom of employing mercenaries to a greater extent. In 1803 the foreign army of Jaipur was 13,000 strong, consisting of ten battalions of infantry with guns, a legion of 4,000 Nagas, a corps of *Aligols* for police duties and 700 cavalry. In addition there was "the regular contingent of feudal levies, amounting to about 4,000 efficient horse". In spite of its numerical strength the standing army of Jaipur was "an ill paid band, neither respected at home nor feared abroad."²

In Bikaner "the household troops" consisted of a battalion of "foreign infantry" and three squadrons of horse, "all under foreign leaders." There was a separate garrison at the capital under a Rajput commander.³

In Jaisalmer Rs. 75,000 were spent annually on *Sihbandis* or mercenaries.⁴

Zalim Singh of Kotah also maintained "foreign troops" under "foreign leaders". Dalil Khan and Mihrab Khan were his military advisers. The former built fortifications, while the latter kept the infantry "in a state of admirable discipline and efficiency". Zalim Singh kept their pay in arrears presumably to ensure their loyalty.

Tod was aware of the historical importance of this vital change in the military system of the Rajputs. He says :

¹ See *ante*, pp. 147-148, 126.

² Irregular infantry. See Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 164.

³ See *ante*, p. 170.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 189.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 203.

"We do not mean that the Rajput princes never employed any other than their own feudal clans ; they had foreign Rajputs in their pay, but still on the same tenure, holding lands for service ; but never till this period had they soldiers entertained on monthly stipend. These hired bands were entirely composed of infantry, having a slight knowledge of European tactics, the superiority of which, even over their high-minded cavaliers, they had so severely experienced in their encounters with the Mahrattas. The same causes had operated on the courts of Udaipur and Jaipur to induce them to adopt the like expedient ; to which, more than to the universal demoralization which followed the breaking up of the empire, may be attributed the rapid decay of feudal principles throughout Rajputana. These guards were composed either of Purbia Rajputs, Sindhis, Arabs, or Rohillas. They received their orders direct from the prince, through the civil officers of the State, by whom they were entrusted with the execution of all duties of importance or dispatch. Thus they soon formed a complete barrier between the prince and his vassals, and consequently became objects of jealousy and of strife. In like manner did all the other States make approaches towards a standing army ; and though the motive in all cases was the same, to curb, or even to extinguish, the strength of the feudal chiefs, it has failed throughout, except in the solitary instance of Kotah, where twenty well-disciplined battalions, and a hundred pieces of artillery, are maintained chiefly from the feudal sequestrations".¹

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Like other provinces of India, Rajputana was inhabited by a people primarily agricultural in their occupation. The following figures show the proportion of the population dependent on pasture and agriculture in certain States in 1901 : Mewar—56½ per cent. ; Dungarpur—nearly 59 per cent. ; Banswara—nearly 68 per cent. ; Partabgarh—more than 52 per cent. ; Jaisalmer—45 per cent. ; Sirohi—nearly 38 per cent. ; Bikaner—nearly 72 per cent. ; Marwar—62½ per cent.² In Sirohi the country is rocky and hilly ; naturally the cultivated area was too small to provide livelihood even to 50 per cent. of the population. In Jaisalmer the desert

¹ Crooke, Vol. II. pp. 1067-1068.

² The figures for 1901 have been quoted because they approximate more closely than later figures to the conditions of Rajputana in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the period described in Tod's book.

prevented the extension of cultivation. Throughout Rajputana water supply is scarce and rainfall is scanty and uncertain. Moreover, a substantial portion of the country is covered with hills and forests. Such a country yields crop sparingly and only to the hardy tiller. Naturally there were frequent famines in Rajputana. Mewar was visited by a famine in 1764; Marwar suffered the same fate in 1794 and 1804. A large part of Rajputana suffered terribly in the great famine of 1812-13. Not more than three *seers* of grain were available for a rupee, and water was scarce.

Rajputana is not rich in mineral resources. Mewar was comparatively fortunate in her mineral and metallic products, and to the latter have been attributed the resources which enabled the Ranas to struggle for so long against the superior power of the Mughals. There were lead and zinc mines at Jawar.¹ The lead mines at Potlan and Dariha had been closed for a long time. Mining of copper was formerly practised in Mewar on a large scale. "Throughout the range of hills on the east and north-east runs an endless vein of hematite of iron . . . but the mines are not worked to any great extent". The only precious stones were garnets which occurred in the Aravalli schists at several places in the Bhilwara district. In Dungarpur the only useful metals consisted of iron and copper ores, extensively worked in the past. In Jaisalmer and Marwar the only important mineral was salt. Marble and sandstone were available in Marwar and Jaipur.

The manufactures of Rajputana were not of great commercial importance in Tod's days. In Marwar coarse cotton cloths and blankets were manufactured for local use from local cotton and wool. Matchlocks, swords and other warlike implements were made at Jodhpur and at Pali, and at the latter place were also made excellent boxes of iron, resembling the tin boxes of Europe. Iron platters for culinary purposes were in great demand.² In Bikaner the wool of the sheep pastured in the desert was the staple commodity both of manufacture and trade. It was worked into every article of dress, and worn by all, male and female, rich and poor. Bikaner was also famous for blacksmiths who manufactured excellent sword-blades, matchlocks, daggers, iron lances, etc. There were also expert artists in ivory, who specialised in the construction of bracelets for women. Coarse cotton cloths were

¹ See *ante*, pp. 16, 263.

² See *ante*, pp. 136-137.

made in considerable quantities for internal consumption.¹ There was little scope for the ingenuity of the mechanic in the desert of Jaisalmer. Coarse cotton cloths were made for local use, and good blankets, scarfs, petticoats, turbans etc. were manufactured from the wool of the sheep pastured in the desert. There were ivory-workers and blacksmiths too. Cups and platters were made from a mineral called *abur*, "a calcareous substance, of a dark chocolate ground, with light brown vermiculated stripes."² Jaipur produced excellent cotton as well as indigo and other dyes common to India.

Rajputana enjoyed considerable commercial importance before the disintegration of the Mughal Empire ushered in the age of political turmoil and 'predatory warfare.' The establishment of British suzerainty restored the confidence of the mercantile classes and to some extent revived the commercial prosperity of the Rajput States. When Tod arrived in Mewar as Political Agent in 1818, he found that the foreign merchants and bankers had abandoned the country ; money was scarce, and the rate of interest was abnormally high. He invited foreign merchants to establish connection with Mewar once again. Proclamations guaranteed by the Political Agent were distributed in every commercial city in Northern India. Many merchants returned, and found, to their surprise and satisfaction, that the duties on goods in transit were levied only at frontier stations instead of, as before, at a large number of intermediate posts. Trade flourished, revenues increased, and Bhilwara, the chief commercial mart in the State, rapidly rose from ruin.³

During the Mughal period Marwar enjoyed considerable trade, for this State formed the connecting link between the sea-coast and Northern India. The chief mart was Pali⁴ which, says Tod, might make pretensions to the title of emporium of Rajputana. "From remote times", observes Tod, "Pali has been the connecting link between the sea-coast and Northern India. Commercial houses established at Muskat-Mandavi, Surat, and Navanagar transmit the products of Persia, Arabia, Africa, and Europe, receiving those of India and Tibet. To enumerate all the articles, it would be necessary to name the various products of each : from the coast,

¹ See *ante*, pp. 183-184.

² See *ante*, pp. 200-201.

³ See *ante*, pp. 97-98.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 811-813.

elephants' teeth, rhinoceros' hides, copper, tin, pewter, dates dried and moist, of which there is an immense consumption in these regions; gum-arabic, borax, cocoanuts, broad-cloths, stripped silks, called *patang*; various dyes, particularly the *Kermes* or crimson; drugs, especially the oxides of arsenic and quick-silver; spices, sandal-wood, camphor, tea, *momiai* or mummy, which is much sought after in medicine, and green glass (*Kunch*). From Bahawalpur, soda (*saji*), the dyes called *al* and *majith*, matchlocks, dried fruits, assafoetida, Multan chintzes, and wood for household furniture. From Kotah and Malwa, opium and chintzes. From Jaipur, various cloths and sugars. From Bhuj, swords and horses. The exports of home production are the two staple articles of salt and woollens; to which we may add coarse cotton cloths, and paper made in the town of Pali".

Another important commercial centre in Marwar was the village of Ramdeora, 6 miles to the north of Pokaran. Here merchants from Karachi, Tatta, Multan, Shikarpur and Cutch exchanged the produce of various countries. The famine of 1812-13, the anarchy of Man Singh's reign (1803-43) and the interminable feuds between the Rathors and the Bhattis of Jaisalmer ruined the commercial prosperity of this village¹. In spite of the unfavourable political situation the sturdy sons of Marwar knew how to earn money. Even in those days nine-tenths of the bankers and commercial men of India were Marwaris, and most of them were Jains.

The route of the caravans passing through Marwar was by Sanchor, Bhinmal, Jalor to Pali. Bhinmal and Sanchor were inhabited by very wealthy merchants; but, says Tod, "insecurity both within and without has much injured these cities."² The caravans were guarded by the bards or *charans*, whose character was held sacred by the Rajputs. Tod says, "The most desperate outlaw seldom dared to commit any outrage on caravans under the safeguard of these men. If not strong enough to defend their convoy with sword and shield, they would threaten the robbers with the *chandi*, or self-immolation; and proceed by degrees from a gash in the flesh to a deathwound, or if one victim was insufficient, a whole body of women and children was sacrificed . . . for whose blood the marauder was declared responsible hereafter."³

¹ See Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1272.

² See Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1269.

³ See *ante*, p. 138.

Rajgarh and Churu were the two important commercial marts of Bikaner. The former was the point of rendezvous for caravans from all parts. Tod says, "The produce of the Punjab and Kashmir came formerly direct by Hansi-Hisar,—that of the eastern countries by Delhi, Rewari, Dadri, &c. consisting of silks, fine cloths, indigo, sugar, iron, tobacco, &c. ; from Haravati and Malwa came opium¹, which supplied all the Rajput States ; from Sind *via* Jaisalmer, and by caravans from Multan and Shikarpur, dates, wheat, rice, *lungis* (silk vestments for women), fruits, &c. ; from Pali, the imports from maritime countries, as spices, tin, drugs, cocoanuts, elephants' teeth, &c. Much of this was for internal consumption, but the greater part a mere transit trade which yielded considerable revenue."²

The town of Jaisalmer was a commercial mart of some importance, from its position on the direct route between the valley of the Indus on the west and the Punjab and the Gangetic valley to the north and east. Many caravans passed through this oasis in the desert. Tod says, "The indigo of the Doab, the opium of Kotah and Malwa, the famed sugar-candy of Bikaner, iron implements from Jaipur, are exported to Shikarpur and lower Sind, whence elephants' teeth (from Africa), dates, cocoanuts, drugs and *Chundus* are imported, with pistachios and dried fruits from Bahawalpur."³

Malpura was the principal commercial mart in Jaipur. Jhalrapatan, the famous town of Zalim Singh, Regent of Kotah, was 'the grand commercial mart of Upper Malwa'. Salt drawn from the lakes of western Rajputana passed through it on its way to the south-east. But it was merely an entrepot, having no staple article of trade of its own.⁴

It is interesting to note that some of the important commercial marts of Rajputana enjoyed special political privileges. Bhilwara and Pali had each a currency of its own. These two towns, as well as Jhalrapatan and some others belonging to the same class, had the right of electing their own magistrates, both for

¹ During the period 1784—1801 the market-price of the crude opium from the cultivator ran from 16 to 21 *Salim Shahi* rupees per *durri* (i.e., five *pucca seers*). In 1809 it rose to 42 rupees. In 1820 it stood at 38 or 39 rupees. (Tod, *Personal Narrative*).

² See *ante*, pp. 183-184.

³ See *ante*, pp. 200-201.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1781-1784.

municipal administration, and the arbitration of all matters connected with commercial pursuits.¹

RELIGION

Hinduism has always been the predominant religion in Rajputana. The following figures show the proportion of the Hindus in different States in 1901 :—

Mewar—Hindus, 75 per cent. ; Animists, 13 per cent. ; Jains, 6 per cent. ; Muslims, 4 per cent.

Dungarpur—Hindus, 56 per cent. ; Animists, 34 per cent. ; Jains, 6 per cent. ; Muslims, 4 per cent.

*Banswara*²—Hindus, 31 per cent. ; Animists, 63 per cent. ; rest, Jains and Muslims.

*Partabgarh*³—Hindus, 61 per cent. ; Animists, 21 per cent. ; Jains, 9 per cent. ; Muslims, 7 per cent.

Marwar—Hindus, 83 per cent. ; Animists, 2 per cent. ; Jains, 7 per cent. ; Muslims, $7\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.

Bikaner—Hindus, $84\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ; Jains, 4 per cent. ; Muslims, 11·3 per cent.

Sirohi—Hindus, 72·7 per cent. ; Animists, 11·7 per cent. ; Jains, 11·1 per cent. ; Muslims, 3·8 per cent.

*Jaisalmer*⁴—Hindus, 71 per cent. ; Animists, 2 per cent. ; Jains, 11 per cent. ; Muslims, 25 per cent.

As the line of distinction between the Hindus and the Animists is admittedly very thin, Hinduism may not incorrectly be described as *the* religion of Rajputana.

Tod has left for us an account of the *Religious Establishments, Festivals, and Customs of Mewar*,⁵ but unfortunately he has not added similar accounts concerning the religious life of the people in other States. In Mewar the Hindus were either Saivas or Vaishnavas. Siva is the tutelary divinity of the Guhilots ; hence Saivism may be regarded as the original religion of Mewar. The temple of Ekalinga, situated in a defile about six miles north

¹ See Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

² The high percentage of Animists in Banswara was due to the high percentage of Bhils (63 per cent.) in that State.

³ In Partabgarh the Bhils constituted 22 per cent. of the population in 1901.

⁴ It is significant that the two States (Jaisalmer and Bikaner) adjoining two predominantly Muslim provinces (Sind and the Punjab) contained the largest proportion of Muslims in Rajputana.

⁵ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 589-759.

of Udaipur, was the most important shrine of the Saivas of this State. The Ranas were the *dewans*, or vicegerents, of Siva. When they visited the temple they superseded the high priest in his duties and performed the necessary ceremonies. The shrine was endowed in Tod's days with 24 large villages from the *Khalsa* besides plots of land from the chiefs.

The steadily increasing influence of Vaishnavism¹ affected the hold of Saivism² over Mewar. Tod says that the predominance of the mild doctrines of Krishna over 'the dark rites of Siva' was doubtless beneficial to Rajput society. Vaishnavism disapproved female infanticide and *Sati*, and thus exercised a humanising influence on the martial Rajputs. Nathdwara, 22 miles north-north-east of Udaipur, on the right bank of the Banas, was the principal Vaishnava shrine in Mewar. It owed its celebrity to the image of Krishna, said to be the same that had been worshipped at Mathura for centuries. It is said that at the time of the desolation of Mathura by Aurangzib Rana Raj Singh brought the sacred image to his own State. The endowments for Krishna far exceeded in value those assigned to Ekalinga. Raja Man Singh of Marwar, the rulers of Kotah and Bundi, and Zalim Singh, Regent of Kotah, were devotees of Krishna. But Vaishnavism was primarily the religion of the commercial classes. Tod says, "...it is my pride and duty to declare that I have known men of both sects, Vishnu and Jain, whose integrity was spotless, and whose philanthropy was unbounded".

Among the other principal gods and goddesses who were worshipped in Mewar in Tod's days he refers to the sun, Ganga and Ganesa.³ "At Udaipur", he says, "the sun has universal

¹ An inscription dated 1274 A.D. compares Guhila with Vishnu. An inscription dated 1285 A.D. describes Samara Simha as an incarnation of the Boar, "who rescued.....the submerged land of Gurjara from the ocean-like Turushkas". Rana Kumbha composed a well-known commentary (*Rasika-priya*) on the beautiful Vaishnava lyric, Jayadeva's *Gita-Govindam*. Mira Bai is even now remembered as a great Vaishnava. An inscription dated 1676 A.D. begins with salutations to Ganesa and Krishna.

² The hold of Saivism over Mewar is old. An inscription dated 971 A.D. refers to the worship of Ekalinga and the blessing of Sankara. A mutilated inscription found in the temple of Hastamata at Udaipur says that Suchivarman 'burnt his foes like Siva'. An inscription dated 1274 A.D. begins with homage to Siva and Ganapati, and describes several Princes of Mewar as worshippers of Siva. Another inscription dated 1285 A.D. begins with salutations to Siva and Hanuman. Salutations to Siva and Ganesa are repeated in an inscription dated 1489 A.D.

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 658-660, 670-671, 686-689.

precedence ; his portal (*Suryapol*) is the chief entrance to the city ; his name gives dignity to the chief apartment or hall (*Suryamahāl*) of the palace ; and from the balcony of the sun (*Suryagokhra*) the descendant of Rama shows himself in the dark monsoon as the sun's representative". He also refers to the peculiar rite of *khadga sthapana* or sword worship.¹

Tod did not notice any "sectarian intolerance" in Rajputana. He says, ".....as far as my information goes, the ministers of Vishnu, Siva and Buddha view each other without malignity ; which feeling never appears to have influenced the laity of either sect, who are indiscriminately respectful to the ministers of all religions, whatever be their tenets". Mewar always afforded a refuge to the Jains,² and some of the Ranas gave them special privileges, as inscriptions quoted by Tod show. In the towns of Rasmi and Bakrol, for instance, "in compliance with their peculiar doctrine, the oil-mill and the potter's wheel suspend their revolutions for the four months in the year when insects most abound". Tod records an interesting instance which passed immediately under his own eye : "In the midst of a sacrifice to the god of war, when the victims were rapidly falling by the scimitar, a request preferred by one of them (*i.e.*, Jains) for the life of a goat or a buffalo on the point of immolation, met instant compliance, and the animal, become *amara* or immortal, with a garland thrown round his neck, was led off in triumph from the blood-stained spot."³ The holy places of the Muslims were protected and respected. At Merta in Marwar a mosque, which was erected on the ruins of a Hindu temple by Aurangzib, was not destroyed by the victorious Rathors after his death. "Such is Hindu toleration", says Tod, "that a marble is placed, inscribed both in Hindi and Persian, to protect the mosque from violence."⁴

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 679-680.

² An inscription dated 971 A.D. describes its composer as 'the medicine for the disease of the Syadvad' (*i.e.* Jainism). This probably indicates antipathy towards Jainism. An inscription dated 1438 A.D. shows that during Rana Kumbha's reign a merchant established a Jain idol in a Jain temple at Nagada. Another inscription dated 1598 A.D. refers to the construction of a well by a Jain.

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 603-606.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 855-856. Tod ascribes this "mark of liberality" to Dhonkal Singh who was anxious to "catch golden opinions from the demoralized Pathans, by whose aid he hoped to regain his rights." He might have placed the tablet, but the mosque could survive Aurangzib's death only because the Rathors were tolerant.

Religious endowments consumed a large portion of the cultivable land. "There is scarcely a State in Rajputana in which one-fifth of the soil is not assigned for the support of the temples, their ministers, the secular Brahmans, bards, and genealogists."¹ The Brahmans did not hesitate even to forge charters in order to increase the resources of their shrines. Tod says, "There is not a doubt that the grand charter of Nathdwara was a forgery, in which the prince's butler was bribed to aid". Superstition and indolence, according to Tod, combined to support such deception. For instance, with regard to the "grand charter" of Nathdwara he heard reports alleging that "the Rana secretly favoured an artifice which regard to opinion prevented him from overtly promulgating".² In Kotah, says Tod, everything "appertains to Kanhaiya. The prince has but the usufruct of the palace, for which £12,000 are annually transmitted to the shrine".³

SOCIETY

The Brahmans constituted a substantial portion of the population of Mewar; in 1901 their number slightly exceeded that of the Rajputs. As indicated above, they enjoyed enormous grants of land from the Princes and the chiefs. They also received petty tithes from the agriculturists, and a small duty from the traders, corresponding with the scale of the village temple.⁴ In the eighteenth century the territorial assignments to the Brahmans sometimes included the prerogative of dispensing justice and of levying transit duties. Those Brahmans who did not exercise priestly functions could hold lands as 'vassals' like the Rajput chiefs, and they were entitled to hold political and administrative appointments. Nor were they wanting in energy or courage; "the sword was as familiar to them as the *mala* (chaplet)."⁵ The Prince, says Tod, "is often surrounded by lay Brahmans as confidential servants, in the capacities of butler, keeper of the wardrobe, or seneschal, besides the *Guru* or domestic chaplain, who to the duty of ghostly comforter sometimes joins that of astrologer and physician. These *Gurus* and *Purohits*, having the education of the children, acquire immense influence".⁶ A remarkable

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 589.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 595-596.

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 618.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 597.

⁵ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 594.

⁶ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 594-595.

instance of the political influence of the Brahmins is found in the history of the reign of Man Singh of Marwar.¹ "The prince of Marwar", says Tod, "went mad from the murder of the high priest of Jalandhara, the epithet given to Kanhaiya in that State."²

Although the Jains were not numerically strong in any Rajput State they occupied a very important place in commercial and political life. Tod says about Mewar, "The officers of the State and revenue are chiefly of the Jain laity, as are the majority of the bankers, from Lahore to the ocean. The chief magistrate and assessors of justice, in Udaipur and most of the towns of Rajasthan, are of this sect; and as their voluntary duties are confined to civil cases, they are as competent in these as they are the reverse in criminal cases, from their tenets forbidding the shedding of blood".³

Throughout history Rajput women have been famous for their courage, but we know very little about their accomplishments. Like their sisters in modern orthodox society they were condemned to seclusion, but they were not altogether shut out from the light and warmth of life. Tod says, "In spite of this seclusion, the knowledge of their accomplishments and of their personal perfections, radiates wherever the itinerant bard can travel. Though invisible themselves, they can see; and accident often favours public report, and brings the object of renown within the sphere of personal observation. . . . Placed behind screens, they see the youths of all countries, and there are occasions when permanent impressions are made, during tournaments and other martial exercises".⁴ Tod knew that the position of Rajput women was not determined by the injunctions of Manu. He says, ". . . . from the knoweldge I do possess of the freedom, the respect, the happiness, which Rajput women enjoy, I am by no means inclined to deplore their state as one of captivity".⁵

Female immolation was one of the worst features of Rajput society. For *Sati*, or the burning of the wife on the funeral pyre of her husband, the authority of Hindu scriptures could be cited, but religion did not authorise infanticide. Tod rightly says that the laws which regulated marriage amongst the Rajputs power-

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 618-619.

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 603-604.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 735.

⁵ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 710-712.

fully promoted this horrible custom. "Not only is intermarriage prohibited between families of the same clan (*Khanp*), but between those of the same tribe (*got*); and though centuries may have intervened since their separation and branches thus transplanted may have lost their original patronymic, they can never be regrafted on the original stem. . . . Every tribe has therefore to look abroad, to a race distinct from its own, for suitors to the females".¹ Naturally the demand for dowry went on increasing, till many Rajputs found it impossible to provide as much as was required for marrying their daughters to their equals in family pride. They escaped degradation by killing their infant daughters.

Even before Lord William Bentinck's reforms some enlightened and humane Rajput Princes had tried to eradicate female infanticide, but the Rajputs were never 'sufficiently enamoured of despotism' to accept State control over their private affairs. Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur submitted to the Prince of every Rajput State a decree, which was laid before a convocation of their respective 'vassals', in which he regulated the *daaja* or dower, and other marriage expenditure, with reference to the property of the girl's father, limiting it to one year's income. In Mewar this excellent plan was frustrated by the vanity of the Salumbar chief,² "who expended on the marriage of his daughter a sum even greater than his sovereign could have afforded, and to have his name blazoned by the bards and genealogists, he sacrificed the beneficent views of one of the wisest of the Rajput race". Those who could create public opinion against lavish expenditure on marriages—the whole class of *mangtas* (mendicants), bards, minstrels, jugglers, Brahmins—found their interest in simulating it, for they profited from liberality on these occasions.³

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 741.

² It seems that the Salumbar chiefs adopted a more humane attitude later on. In 1859 Captain Brookes wrote that in Mewar infanticide was 'certainly not encouraged by the sovereign or higher nobles, as both the great chiefs of Suloombur and Deogurh have grown-up unmarried female members of their families'. (*History of Meywar*, p. 97).

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 740-742.

Captain Brookes wrote in 1859, "Notwithstanding the numerous attempts made by the late Colonel Sutherland in Rajpootana, to check, on occasion of marriages, the influx of charuns and Bhats from the neighbouring states, yet nothing has been accomplished for this desirable object; and the expenses of marriage are as great as ever. Till these are reduced, we may expect that female infanticide will continue". (*History of Meywar*, p. 97).

The practice of *Sati* was common in Rajputana.¹ Bhim Singh, Rana of Mewar, who died in 1828, was followed by four wives and four concubines. His successor, Jawan Singh (1828-1838), was followed by three wives and six concubines.² Rana Sardar Singh (1838-1842) was followed by one concubine. On the death of Rana Sarup Singh (1842-1861) all his wives refused to burn themselves; at last, a concubine was persuaded to follow the ancient custom. This is the last known case of *Sati* in Mewar.³ Raja Bishen Singh of Bundi, who died in 1821, ordered before his death that his wives should not follow him to the pyre.⁴ We have already referred to the influence of Vaishnavism on the decline of this inhuman custom.

Widow marriage was not unknown in Rajputana, although the Rajputs did not favour it. Zalim Singh of Kotah imposed a heavy tax on widows who remarried.⁵ The Mers, an aboriginal tribe inhabiting that portion of the Aravalli Range which lies between Kamalmer and Ajmer, a space of about 90 miles in length and varying in breadth from 6 to 20, practised widow marriage on a large scale.⁶ The facilities for separation were as simple as the marriage rites. Divorce was practised also by Jars, Gujars, Ahirs, Mallis and other Sudra tribes.⁷

Addiction to opium was one of the most demoralising factors in Rajput society. Tod says, "For the introduction of opium we have no date, and it is not even mentioned in the poems of Chand. This pernicious plant has robbed the Rajput of half his virtues; and while it obscures these, it heightens his vices, giving to his natural bravery a character of insane ferocity, and to the countenance, which would otherwise beam with intelligence, an air of imbecility". Opium to the Rajput was more necessary than food, and a suggestion to the Rana of Mewar to tax it highly was most unpopular. But Tod, that gallant friend of the Rajputs, exacted

¹ This practice is referred to in an inscription dated 1598 A.D.

² The Governor-General wrote, "The British Government cannot regard with friendly feelings those by whom such cruel sacrifices are countenanced and encouraged."

³ Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. II-A, pp. 26-27.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1518.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 224.

⁶ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 789-797.

⁷ Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

promises from the rising generation that they would resist initiation in this vice, and many grew up in happy ignorance of the taste of opium.¹

CULTURE

In Tod's days all Rajputs were fond of music.² "While the Maratha delights in the dissonant *drupad* which requires a rapidity of utterance quite surprising, the Rajput reposes in his *tappa*, which, conjoined with his opium, creates a paradise."³ Every Rajput chief had his band, vocal and instrumental. Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar was a great patron of music; but his resources were crippled, for Daulat Rao Sindhia carried away the most celebrated vocalists of Mewar.

The Princes and chiefs of Rajputana were not unlettered warriors like the barons of old England. To most of them arms and letters were alike familiar. Zalim Singh, the son of Raja Bijay Singh of Marwar, was deprived of his heritage by domestic quarrels. He settled in Mewar, where an estate was assigned to him by the Rana, a relative of his on the maternal side. Tod says, "Without neglecting any of the martial amusements and exercises of the Rajput, he gave up all those hours, generally devoted to idleness, to the cultivation of letters. He was versed in philosophical theology, astronomy, and the history of his country; and in every branch of poesy, from the sacred canticles of Jayadeva to the couplets of the modern bard, he was an adept. He composed and improvised with facility, and his residence was the rendezvous for every bard of fame."⁴ Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar had "unlimited command of his pen," and his letters were admirable. Tod says, "The prince who in Europe could quote Hesiod and Homer with the freedom that the Rana does on all occasions Vyasa and Valmiki, would be accounted a prodigy; and there is not a divine who could make application of the ordinances of Moses with more facility than the Rana of those of their great lawgiver Manu."⁵

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 749-750.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 752-755.

³ Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 764.

⁵ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 756.

But, says Tod, "the cultivation of the mind, and the arts of polished life, must always flourish in the ratio of a nation's prosperity, and from the decline of the one, we may date the deterioration of the other with the Rajput". There was no patron like Sawai Jai Singh to whom the Rajput astronomer could look for reward. All those who could provide shelter and stimulus to bards and scholars lay prostrate under the heels of the Maratha and Pathan raiders.

III

MEWAR

MEWAR AND THE MUGHALS

The death of Rana Raj Singh, Aurangzib's resourceful antagonist, in 1680 was the signal for the decline of Mewar. His son and successor, Rana Jai Singh (1680—1698), concluded a treaty with Aurangzib, and instead of trying to improve the administration of the State, passed his days in voluptuous indolence. His eldest son, Amar Singh, "supported by three-fourths of the nobles", raised the standard of rebellion. A compromise was made possible by "the knowledge that the Rathors fostered the quarrel with a view to obtain Godwar". Tod says, "..... documents which yet exist afford little reason to doubt that in his latter years a state of indolence, having all the effects of imbecility, supervened". The change between the glorious days of Raj Singh and the degenerate days of his successor was too obvious to be missed by Tod. He says, "The reigns of Raj Singh and Jai Singh illustrate the obvious truth, that on the personal character of the chief of a feudal government everything depends. The former, infusing by his talent and energy patriotic sentiments into all his subordinates, vanquished in a series of conflicts the vast military resources of the empire, led by the emperor, his sons, and chosen generals; while his successor, heir to this moral strength, and with every collateral aid, lowered her to a stage of contempt from which no talent could subsequently raise her".¹

Rana Amar Singh II (1698—1710), says Tod, "had much of the gallantry and active turn of mind of his illustrious namesake; but the degrading conflict with his father had much impaired the moral strength of the country, and counteracted the advantages which might have resulted from the decline of the Mogul power".² The decadence of the Mughal Empire was utilised by the contemporary rulers of Marwar and Amber (Ajit Singh and Sawai Jai Singh) for self-aggrandizement, but the weak and short-sighted successors of Raj Singh failed to make proper

¹ See Crooke. Vol. I. pp. 456-460.

² Crooke, Vol. I, p. 460.

use of this excellent opportunity for the restoration of their former pre-eminence.¹ Sir Jadunath Sarkar says, "The Maharana, who had ever since the coming of the Mughals filled the highest place in the public eye among the Hindu chiefs of India, now fell back into complete isolation and obscurity. His unrivalled social status and the mythical glamour of his blood still remained; but in the political field, from the beginning of the 18th century onwards, the primacy among the Rajputs was contested between the Kachhwah and the Rathor".² Tod ascribes the political degeneration of Mewar during this period to two causes. "She dreaded amalgamating with the imperial court, and preferred political inferiority to the sacrifice of principle". Secondly, "the internal feuds of her two great clans" also operated against her aggrandizement".⁴ Her rulers had not the foresight to understand that the traditional "dread" of "amalgamating with the imperial court" had lost much of its meaning in the context of the obvious decline of the Empire. Nor were they strong enough to suppress the "internal feuds" of the "two great clans".

After Aurangzib's death the rulers of Mewar, Marwar and Amber formed "a triple league". Tod is obviously wrong in saying that this league "laid prostrate the throne of Babar".⁵ In 1710 Bahadur Shah concluded peace with the Rajput Princes. According to Irvine, it was "the unwelcome news of a rising of the Sikhs in the north of Sarhind" which "forced on a speedy solution of the difficulty with the Rajputs". "It was seen", says he, "that a popular rising, such as that of the Sikhs, in a portion of the Empire so near the capital, might have much more serious and far-reaching consequences than the then pending quarrel with the Rajputs, who even if left in quiet possession of their hereditary country, were not likely to be thereby encouraged to further aggressions".⁶

¹ ".....while Amber appropriated to herself the royal domains almost to the Jumna; while Marwar planted her banner on the battlements of Ajmer, dismembered Gujarat, and pushed her clans far into the desert, and even to 'the world's end'; Mewar confined her ambition to the control of her ancient feudatories of Abu, Idar, and the petty States which grew out of her, Dungarpur and Banswara." (Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 476-477).

² *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.

³ The Saktawats and the Chundawats.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 477.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 465-466.

⁶ *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, pp. 72-73.

The "triple league" did not long survive the restoration of peace with the Mughals, for political unity was not a characteristic of the Rajput States system. Tod praises Amar Singh as "an active and high-minded prince".¹ His successor, Sangram Singh II (1710—1734), is described as "a patriarchal ruler, wise, just, and inflexible, steady in his application to business, regulating public and private expenditure, and even the sumptuary laws".² But he completely failed to anticipate danger from the rising power of the Marathas, even though the Maratha conquest of Malwa had begun in his time.³ "The Maratha penetration of the province of Malwa supplied them with a most convenient starting point for raids in Rajputana".⁴

MEWAR AND THE MARATHAS

The exploitation of Mewar by the Marathas began in Rana Jagat Singh's reign (1734—51). Although he was a patron of arts,⁵ he was not fitted by character to safeguard the real interests of his State in those stirring times. Tod says, "Addicted to pleasure, his habits of levity and profusion totally unfitted him for the task of governing his country at such a juncture; he considered his elephant fights of more importance than keeping down the Marathas."⁶

In April, 1734, Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia attacked Bundi. The whole of Rajputana was alarmed, and in October, 1734, Sawai Jai Singh of Amber summoned a conference⁷ of all the Princes of Rajputana to devise measures for the protection of their territory. But the Rajputs had ever been strangers to unity; so the conference failed to produce any tangible result,⁸ and

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 471.

² Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 477-478.

³ Girdhar Bahadur, *Subahdar* of Malwa, was defeated and killed by Chimnaji Appa on November 29, 1728.

⁴ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 136.

⁵ "Like all his family, he patronized the arts, greatly enlarged the palace, and expended £250,000 in embellishing the islets of the Pichola." (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 495.)

⁶ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 495.

⁷ It was held at "Hurra (*i.e.*, Hurda near Agaunch), a town in Mewar on the Ajmer frontier". (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 482).

⁸ Sir Jadunath Sarkar seems to ascribe the failure of the conference to "the moral decay of the Mughal nobility", without whose co-operation the Rajputs could not "keep the Deccani spoilers out of their fatherland." (*Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 140).

Rajputana became a helpless prey to Maratha aggression. Tod says, "Unity of interests was the chief character of the engagement, had they adhered to which, not only the independence, but the aggrandisement, of Rajasthan was in their power, and they might have alike defied the expiring efforts of Mogul tyranny, and the Parthian-like warfare of the Maratha. . . . but difficult as it had ever proved to coalesce the Rajputs for mutual preservation, even when a paramount superiority of power, both temporal and spiritual, belonged to the Ranas, so now, since Amber and Marwar had attained an equality with Mewar, it was found still less practicable to prevent the operation of the principles of disunion".¹

In January, 1736, Peshwa Baji Rao personally appeared at the southern frontier of Mewar, and the terrified Rana² welcomed him at Udaipur.³ "A treaty followed," says Tod, "stipulating an annual tribute,⁴ which remained in force during ten years, when grasping at the whole they despised a part, and the treaty became a nullity."⁵

A civil war began in Jaipur after Sawai Jai Singh's death, which took place in September, 1743. Rana Jagat Singh played a prominent part in that protracted conflict. Sawai Jai Singh was succeeded by his eldest son Ishwari Singh; but Madho Singh, Jai Singh's son by a Mewar princess, claimed the *gadi* in accordance with the terms of the marriage treaty concluded between Jai Singh and Rana Amar Singh.⁶ Rana Jagat Singh supported his nephew's claim and advanced towards Jaipur. Ishwari Singh secured the support of the Marathas, who compelled the Rana to retreat to his own capital in 1745. Madho Singh then purchased the support of Malhar Rao Holkar. In

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 483-484.

² "His visit created great alarm" in Mewar. (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 491). The Rana wrote to Biharidas Pancholi, "Malhar came last year, but this was nothing—Bajirao this, and he is powerful. But if God hears me he will not get my land." (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 492).

³ See Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 145-146.

⁴ To cover the tribute the *Banhada pargana* was ceded.

⁵ "The amount was 160,000 rupees, divided into three shares of 53,333-0-4½ assigned to Holkar, Sindhia, and the Puar. The management was entrusted to Holkar; subsequently Sindhia acted as receiver-general. This was the only regular tributary engagement Mewar entered into". (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 494).

⁶ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 493-494.

⁷ See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 465-466.

March, 1747, the combined forces of Mewar, Bundi and Holkar were severely defeated by the Jaipur army at Rajmahal (near Deoli cantonment). The Sesodias, says Tod, "did not evince in the battle of Rajmahal that gallantry which must have its source in moral strength: they were defeated and fled. The Rana vented his indignation in a galling sarcasm; he gave the sword of state to a common courtesan to carry in procession, observing 'it was a woman's weapon in these degenerate times': a remark the degrading severity of which made a lasting impression in the decline of Mewar".¹ The flourishing commercial mart of Bhilwara was plundered. The whole of Rajputana was then suffering from a terrible famine.² Unable to continue the war³ Jagat Singh concluded a humiliating peace. Even after this rebuff he continued his efforts to secure the *gadi* of Jaipur for his nephew. In December, 1750, Ishwari Singh committed suicide in order to escape from the galling yoke of the Marathas, and Madho Singh sat upon the *gadi* of Jaipur; but this war of succession made the Marathas the arbiters of Rajputana.

During the reign of Rana Pratap Singh II (1751—1754) Mewar had to pay heavy contributions to the Marathas.⁴ He was disliked by a group of *sardars*, who tried to depose him and set up his uncle Nathji.⁵ Thus began a stormy period of disputed successions which made the Marathas the umpire in the family disputes in Mewar. It was probably in the reign of Pratap Singh that Rampura, an important "fief" of Mewar, was assigned to Malhar Rao Holkar by Madho Singh of Amber, who had received it as an appanage from the Rana. This was "the first limb severed from Mewar".⁶

During the reign of Rana Raj Singh II (1754—1761) the repeated depredations of the Marathas "so exhausted this country, that the Rana was compelled to ask pecuniary aid from the

¹Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 494-495. Tod is not correct in saying that Jagat Singh and Ishwari Singh personally took part in the battle of Rajmahal.

²Men could not get water even for washing their faces. The Rana decided to leave Udaipur and go to the bank of the Dhebar lake. (*Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXI, letter no. 19).

³See *Vamsa Bhaskar* for details.

⁴See, for instance, *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. II, letter no. 34.

⁵See, for instance, *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXI, letter no. 58.

⁶Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 496-497. See *ante*, pp. 73-74. See also *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, p. 14.

Brahman collector of the tribute, to enable him to marry the Rathor chieftain's daughter".¹ Raj Singh was a minor when he ascended the *gadi*, and he died before attaining majority. This naturally aggravated the internal chaos in Mewar and made her a defenceless prey to the Marathas.²

Malhar Rao Holkar left Rajputana in January, 1760. The third battle of Panipat was fought on January 14, 1761. The terrible disaster suffered by the Marathas encouraged the Rajputs, and Madho Singh of Jaipur made half-hearted attempts to crush Maratha influence in Rajputana. Mewar, distracted by minority rule and civil war, impoverished by the heavy contributions imposed by the Marathas, failed to utilise this opportunity. The Marathas did not take long to recover their lost prestige. Within a few months of the battle of Panipat Malhar Rao Holkar took upon himself the task of restoring Maratha authority in Rajputana and Malwa.

As Raj Singh II died without issue, his uncle Ari Singh II (1761—1773) succeeded him. For four years after his accession he was not troubled by the Marathas. In 1765 Mahadji Sindhia realised five *lakhs* from him, and in 1766 he had to promise payment of Rs. 26,30,221 in four years.³

Ari Singh's "ungovernable temper"⁴ and "insolent demeanour" alienated the nobility and caused a disastrous war of succession⁵ which offered the Marathas a fresh opportunity of squeezing money out of impoverished Mewar. Only five out of the 16 great chiefs of Mewar⁶ remained loyal to him. The disaffected nobles set up a "youth" named Ratan Singh, declared to be the posthumous son of Raj Singh II, as a rival candidate for the throne. Although there were strong grounds to question the legitimacy of this pretender, yet his cause was supported by Bijay

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 496.

² In March, 1757, Raghunath Rao took a ransom of one *lakh* from Jawad and plundered Ranikheda. In 1758 Jankoji Sindhia imposed an extra contribution on the Rana. In 1759 the Peshwa directed Malhar Rao Holkar to put pressure on the Rana for prompt payment. (Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 191, 196).

³ For details see J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 515-518. Tod's statements on these transactions (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 497) are contradicted by contemporary Marathi sources and must be rejected.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 496.

⁵ See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 497-499.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 121.

Singh of Jodhpur and Prithvi Singh of Jaipur.¹ In 1769 Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar appeared near Udaipur to put the pretender on the *gadi* of Mewar.² But differences soon arose between these two Maratha chiefs, as a result of which Tukoji Holkar left Mewar. Mahadji Sindhia thought it better to give up the cause of Ratan Singh, who had no money, and to support Ari Singh, who was prepared to pay. At last Ari Singh agreed to pay 64 lakhs.³ "The attempt to take 64 lakhs of Rupees in cash from the kingdom of Mewar in its then condition was as hopeful of success as a plan to draw blood out of stone. It only left a sore perpetually open between the Maharana and the house of Sindhia."⁴

After Mahadji Sindhia's departure Ari Singh continued the civil war, lost the "rich province of Godwar" (which was taken by Bijay Singh of Jodhpur),⁵ and fell a victim to a Hada prince's lance in 1773. He was succeeded by his minor son Hamir Singh II (1773—1778), whose proud and ambitious mother was "determined to control affairs during his minority". She was supported by the Suktawats and opposed by the Chundawats, whose chief had been murdered by Ari Singh. The mercenary Sindhi troops⁶ joined the feud. Tod says, ".....the demoralization of Mewar was complete: her fields were deluged with blood, and her soil was the prey of every paltry marauder". The rebellion of one of Chundawat chieftains in 1774 compelled the queen-mother to invoke the assistance of Sindhia, who recovered the crown-lands usurped by the refractory noble and imposed on him a fine of twelve *lakhs* of rupees. But Mewar had to pay a high price for this service: some valuable districts fell under the occupation of Sindhia and Holkar. Besides territorial sequestration,

¹ *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. xxxviii, letter no. 185.

² Tod's story of Zalim Singh's intrigue and the "battle at the Sipra" (Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 499-500) have been rejected as unhistorical by Sir Jadunath Sarkar (*Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 518-519).

³ He had to pay 33 *lakhs* immediately; for the balance the districts of Jawad, Jiran, Nimach and Morwan were set aside, to be jointly administered by Rajput and Maratha officers. This arrangement continued till 1774, when Sindhia dismissed the Rana's officers and took these districts under his sole management. Later on Morwan was made over to Holkar, who seized Nimbahera as well. (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 504).

⁴ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 521.

⁵ See *Poona Presidency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, p. 14.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 71-72.

large contributions were also realised from Mewar by the Marathas during Hamir's reign.¹

In 1778 "Hamir died before he had attained even Rajput majority"² and his younger brother, Bhim Singh (1778—1828), succeeded to "the little enviable title of Rana". Tod knew him well and has left for us a shrewd estimate of his character.³ He was not fitted by character or training to rescue Mewar from the depth of weakness and misery into which she had sunk.

At the time of Mahadji Sindhia's first invasion of Jaipur (1786) after his assumption of the Regency of Delhi the Rana's minister, Somchand Gandhi, tried to organise an anti-Maratha coalition of the Rajput States. After Mahadji Sindhia's discomfiture at Lalsot (1787) the united forces of Mewar and Kotah occupied Nimbahera, Nakump, Jiran and Jawad; at the same time Rampura and Singoli were also recovered. The occupation of Nimbahera "drew upon them the energetic Ahalya Bai, the regent-queen of the Holkar State, who...coalesced with Sindhia's partisans to check this reaction of the Rajputs". In February, 1788, the troops of Mewar were "defeated with great slaughter". The Marathas soon recovered their recently lost possessions.⁴

After this military disaster the internal feuds broke out again with fresh ferocity. In October, 1789, Somchand Gandhi, the loyal and able minister, was murdered by the Chundawat chief Arjun Singh of Kurawad almost in the Rana's presence. "The Rana, unable to punish the insolent chief, branding him as a traitor, bade him begone; when the whole of the actors of this nefarious scene, with their leader Salumbar,⁵ returned to Chitor. Sheodas and Satidas, brothers to the murdered minister, were appointed to succeed him." The new ministers, supported by the Saktawats, declared open war against the Chundwats. The Rana remained a helpless spectator. The result could not but be disastrous to the State. Tod says, "The agriculturist, never certain of the fruits of his labour, abandoned his fields, and at length his country; mechanical industry found no recompense, and commerce was at the mercy of unlicensed spoliation. In a

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 505-509.

² Crooke, Vol. I, p. 510.

³ See *ante*, p. 94.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 513-514.

⁵ Rawat Bhim Singh of Salumbar.

very few years Mewar lost half her population, her land lay waste, her mines were unworked, and her looms, which formerly supplied all around, forsaken. The prince partook of the general penury; instead of protecting, he required protection; the bonds which united him with his subjects were snapped, and each individual or petty community provided for itself that defence which he could not give. Hence arose a train of evils: every cultivator, whether fiscal or feudal, sought out a patron, and entered into engagements as the price of protection. Hence every Rajput who had a horse and lance, had his clients; and not a camel-load of merchandise could pass the abode of one of these cavaliers without paying fees."¹

Meanwhile Mahadji Sindhia had recovered his prestige in Rajputana by his resounding victories in the battles of Merta and Patan (1790). Acting on the advice of Zalim Singh of Kotah,² "the Rana and his advisers at length determined to call in Sindhia to expel the rebellious Chundawats from the ancient capital". Mahadji Sindhia was at that time very anxious to consolidate his power in Rajputana. Zalim Singh, accompanied by the Rana's ministers, saw him at Pushkar in March, 1791. It was decided that a fine of 64 *lakhs* was to be imposed on the Chundawats, out of which three-fourths would go to Sindhia and one-fourth to the Rana.³ A contingent of Sindhia's army under Ambaji Ingle accompanied Zalim Singh to Mewar and captured Hamirgarh from the Chundawats. In June, 1791, Mahadji Sindhia himself came to Mewar. Chitor was surrendered by the Chundawats in November, 1791.⁴

It was soon discovered by the shrewd Maratha chief that to crush the Chundawat rebellion was not enough; it was necessary to make some permanent arrangement for the administration of Mewar, for the Rana was totally incapable of governing his State. "Ambaji Ingle was left to govern the country in the

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 514-515. See *ante*, pp. 46-48, 74.

² The ostensible object of this crafty chief was the restoration of the Rana's authority over his nobles, but his secret desire was to secure permanent influence in Mewar. He calculated that the combined forces of Kotah and Mewar would bestow upon him "the lead in Rajasthan". But his plans were frustrated by Ambaji Ingle's shrewdness.

³ Rawat Bhim Singh actually paid 12 *lakhs* and a contribution of 50 *lakhs* was imposed on the Rana.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 516-520.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 62-66.

name of the Maharana, but with full civil and military power as Sindhia's representative,—exactly like an 'Agent to the Governor-General' in British Indian history. Ten thousand Deccani cavalry and four battalions of trained infantry (of Begam Samru's force) were posted under him to enforce his authority, and Zalim Singh was appointed as his local adviser".¹ Thus Mewar virtually came under Maratha administration. Tod is not correct in saying that from Lakhwa Dada's appointment as Sindhia's viceroy in 1799 "must be dated the pretensions of Sindhia to consider Mewar as tributary to him".²

Ambaji Ingle³ governed Mewar for eight years (1791—1799), and Tod has not left for us a wholly unfavourable impression about his administration.⁴ He says, "Ambaji remained eight years in Mewar, reaping its revenues and amassing those hoards of wealth which subsequently gave him the lead in Hindustan, and enabled him nearly to assert his independence. Yet, although he accumulated £2,000,000 sterling from her soil, exacting one-half of the produce of agricultural industry, the suppression of feuds and exterior aggressions gave to Mewar a degree of tranquillity and happiness to which she had long been a stranger." Malcolm's testimony is not different. He says, "Ambaji Ingliā, who was one of Sindhia's principal officers employed in Rajputana, though he oppressed the princes and chiefs of that country, was kind and considerate to the inhabitants. It was on his departure that the scene of devastation commenced."⁵

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the period of Ambaji's administration was a period of unbroken peace or prosperity. "So completely", says Tod, "were the resources of the country diverted from their honest use, that when, in S. 1851, a marriage was negotiated between the Rana's sister and the prince of Jaipur, the Rana was obliged to borrow £50,000 from the

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 67.

² Crooke, Vol. I, p. 528.

³ Broughton wrote on February 26, 1809, "Ambajee is a tall, hale-looking man for his age, which is said to be upwards of eighty: his complexion is dark; and there is much good humour and intelligence in his countenance. His dress was remarkably plain, almost amounting to meanness; consisting of a common chintz jacket, quilted with cotton, a coarse red shawl, and a white turban." (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, p. 51).

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 520-527.

⁵ *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 129.

Maratha commander to purchase the nuptial present". Ambaji's lieutenant, Ganesh Pant, was a rapacious partisan of the Rana's ministers. "The now humbled Chundawats, many of whose fiefs were confiscated, took to horse, and in conjunction with lawless Sindhis scoured the country." Soon, however, they were able to purchase Ambaji's support, and the Salumbar chief "again took the lead at court". Agarji Mehta,¹ the new minister, supported the Chundawats. Ten *lakhs* of rupees were raised from the Saktawat estates and paid to Ambaji. Moreover, two "fiefs of note"—Hintha and Semari—were confiscated.

In November, 1797, the Resident with Sindhia reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Mewar, Marwar and Jaipur had "resolved to bear the yoke of the Marathas no longer, and agreed to compel the forces of Ambaji to quit the territories wrested from them by the late Mahadji Sindhia".² Within a few months Daulat Rao Sindhia's right to the *gadi* was challenged by Mahadji Sindhia's widows,³ who were supported by the Shenwi Brahmins. In the so-called "Bais' War" which followed Ambaji remained loyal to Daulat Rao Sindhia and Lakhwa Dada (who had become Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan in 1794) supported the widows. Emboldened by Daulat Rao Sindhia's troubles, Rana Bhim Singh made an attack on those possessions in Ajmer which he had been forced to cede to Mahadji Sindhia. Early in 1799 his troops were defeated "after a sharp conflict" by Ambaji's troops and some new levies raised by Gulabji Kadam, an officer in the latter's service. But Lakhwa Dada sent reinforcement to the Rana, and in April, 1799, the Rajputs defeated Gulabji "with great slaughter".⁴ Soon afterwards Lakhwa Dada himself came to Mewar, and, in Tod's words, "Mewar now became the arena on which the rival satraps Ambaji and Lakwa contested the exalted office of Sindhia's lieutenancy in Hindustan".⁵

This contest lasted for several months (April—November,

¹ "This person", says Tod, "was nominated the chief civil minister on the author's arrival at Udaipur, an office to which he was every way unequal". (Crooke, Vol. I, p. 522).

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, pp. 92-93.

³ Mahadji Sindhia died on February 12, 1794, and was succeeded by Daulat Rao Sindhia who was then a boy of 15.

⁴ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 131, 133.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 525-526.

1799) and ended in Ambaji's defeat.¹ In October, 1799, Lakhwa Dada was restored to favour in Sindhia's court and publicly proclaimed as Daulat Rao's supreme agent in North India. Ambaji had to relinquish Mewar. George Thomas, whom he had hired for operations in Mewar, was discharged with effect from November 2, 1799.²

With Ambaji removed from the field, Lakhwa Dada had no longer any softness for the distressed Rana. Early in 1800 he reduced the strong fortress of Jahazpur belonging to the chief of Shahpura in Mewar. He also squeezed five *lakhs* from the Rana. In April, 1800, he defeated the Jaipur forces at Malpura. But Sindhia's court was a battle-ground of conflicting interests. In May, 1800, Lakhwa Dada, knowing that his arrest was contemplated, fled from Jaipur towards Mewar, where he stayed for about three months for the purpose of collecting money. Ambaji Ingle once again became Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan. In October, 1800, Lakhwa Dada again came to Mewar and extracted two *lakhs* from the Rana. The "Bais' War" had broken out afresh. After a desperate attempt to defeat Daulat Rao Sindhia's forces in North India Lakhwa Dada took shelter in Mewar and died there on February 7, 1802.³

Meanwhile war had broken out between Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar. The latter took to a roving life after his defeat at Indore on October 14, 1801. In January, 1802, he appeared in Mewar and plundered the celebrated shrine of Nathdwara. He was so hotly pursued by Ambaji's brother, Bala Rao, that he could not visit Udaipur. The Rana was thus temporarily saved from his exactions; but his pursuers came to Udaipur and realised three *lakhs* of rupees which the Rana had to "raise by the sale of household effects and the jewels of the females of his family". Moreover, Bala Rao, acting in co-operation with Zalim Singh of Kotah, fostered the ancient feud between the Chundawats and the Saktawats. When Holkar came again 40 *lakhs* were demanded. "The palace was denuded of everything which could be converted into gold; the females were deprived of every article of luxury and comfort: by which, with

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 525-527.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 155-158.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 185.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. IX, Nos. 2, 10, 11, 18, 19, 22-24, 236, 250-252.

contributions levied on the city, twelve lakhs were obtained ; while hostages from the household of the Rana and chief citizens were delivered as security for the remainder, and immured in the Maratha camp".¹ At this stage the fortunes of Mewar became entangled in the vicissitudes of the Second Anglo-Maratha War.

MEWAR AND THE SECOND ANGLO-MARATHA WAR

The beginning of the Second Anglo-Maratha War in August, 1803, vitally affected the fortunes of the Rajput Princes. We need not enquire into the circumstances leading to that war, nor is it necessary for our present purpose to describe the British operations against Sindhia, Bhonsle and Holkar. But it is necessary to remember that, while General Wellesley and his lieutenants were destroying Sindhia's power beyond the Narmada, Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief, was seizing his territories in Hindustan.² Both Bhonsle and Sindhia concluded peace in December, 1803. By the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon (December 30, 1803)³ Daulat Rao Sindhia ceded to the East India Company his territories between the Jumna and the Ganges and all districts situated to the northward of the Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad States ; but the territories lying between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and to the southward of the former place, were reserved. Thus, although this treaty considerably curtailed Sindhia's power in Northern India, it did not liberate Mewar.

Holkar was so suspicious of Sindhia that during the progress of hostilities he remained a passive spectator, utilising Sindhia's pre-occupation to raise large contributions in Malwa. After Sindhia's submission to the British, he challenged the latter and threatened to over-run the Company's territory with his army which he compared with "the waves of the sea". Lord Wellesley replied to Holkar's indiscreet threats by declaration of war (April 13, 1804). For several months Sindhia offered lukewarm support to the British Government ; his commander, Bapu Sindhia, was sent to co-operate with Lord Lake with a body of 10,000 horse. The rise to power of Sindhia's father-in-law, Sharza Rao

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 529-532.

² See Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 281-337.

³ Articles 2, 7, 11.

Ghatge,¹ prepared the way for an open breach with the British Government. In April, 1805, Sindhia threw off the mask and openly joined Holkar.

During this period of troubles and uncertainties the British Government occasionally toyed with the idea of liberating Mewar from Sindhia's yoke. On May 13, 1804, Webbe, Resident with Sindhia, wrote to Lord Lake that it would be inexpedient at that time to demand from Sindhia relinquishment of his right to the tribute of Mewar.² The war with Holkar had just begun, and Bapu Sindhia had just been sent to assist Lord Lake ; it was certainly the "most unfavourable" moment to ask Sindhia to recognise the independence of a State with which the British Government had no direct concern. A month later (June 18, 1804) Webbe informed Colonel Murray that Sindhia would "entertain great jealousy of any communication which you (*i.e.*, Colonel Murray) might be induced to open directly" with the Rana of Mewar.³

When Rajputana became the battle-ground of the British and Maratha armies Sindhia and Holkar, says Tod, became "anxious to shelter their families and valuables in the strongholds of Mewar."⁴ On June 19, 1805, Captain Sturrock, Resident at Jaipur, wrote to Malcolm that Sindhia had asked the Rana "to deliver up the fort of Kamalmir to him, for him and Holkar to put their families in".⁵ An attempt was also made to induce the rulers of Jaipur, Marwar and Mewar "to form a combination against the British Government". Captain Sturrock suspected that the Rajput Princes were willing to form an anti-British coalition "from an ill-grounded apprehension that they have more to dread from its (*i.e.*, British Government's) encroachments than

¹ Broughton describes him as "the most unprincipled, sanguinary and daring public man that has for many years figured in Hindustan". "He was", according to Broughton, "bold and hasty in conception but..... little scrupulous in the means by which he endeavoured to attain his end..... Wanton cruelty was another principal feature in his character, and he is supposed to have caused more innocent and respectable blood to be shed than any Minister who ever conducted the affairs of a Mahratta State". (*Letters Written in a Mahratta Camp*, letter xx).

² Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 6.

³ Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 21.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 533.

⁵ Secret Consultations, July 11, 1805, No. 2.

from the Maratha chiefs whose views are principally directed to the collection of tribute".¹

Captain Sturrock's apprehensions were probably not altogether groundless. Ambaji Ingle, who had betrayed his master² in 1803, was restored to favour in July, 1805, and he dominated Sindhia's council till March, 1806. "His rancour to the Rana was implacable, from the support given in self-defence to his political antagonist, Lakhwa, and he agitated the partition of Mewar amongst the great Maratha leaders."³ But his plan was frustrated by the intervention of Holkar. "Even the hostile clans (*i.e.*, the Chundawats and the Saktawats) stifled their animosities on this occasion". At their request Holkar persuaded Sindhia to preserve the integrity of Mewar. Tod says that Baiza Bai,⁴ Sindhia's wife, also exercised her influence in favour of Mewar. Holkar's motive was probably two-fold. His jealousy had been excited by the growth of Sindhia's power in Mewar, and he knew that any scheme of partition would throw the lion's share into his rival's hands. Secondly, he was aware of the strategic value of Mewar's strongholds.⁵

The Rana was shrewd enough not to put his trust in the Marathas. Convinced that their demands for money would be repeated at the next favourable opportunity, he sent a *vakil* named Bhairon Bakhsh to Lord Lake, who was then at Mathura (June, 1805). In his letter to the Commander-in-Chief he referred to "the distress which this Government has suffered from the invasion of that race from the South who for the last 35 years have made repeated incursions". He added that he had refused to surrender Kamalmir to Sindhia "from regard for the kindness of the English Company". Sindhia, "being angry in his heart" at this refusal, was preparing his troops for plundering Mewar. Under the circumstances the Rana was prepared "to co-operate with the English Company".⁶

Lord Lake welcomed this offer of co-operation from Mewar. He thought that "considerable advantages may be expected from

¹ Secret Consultations, July 11, 1805, No. 2.

² Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 274-277.

³ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 533.

⁴ Daughter of Sharza Rao Ghatge.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 534-535.

⁶ Secret Consultations, July 4, 1805, No. 21.

granting aid and encouragement to the Rana" in case of open war with Sindhia. He considered "this direct overture at a moment when the British troops are at such a distance and those of the Marathas so near his territories, as a complete proof of the Rana's sense of the strength of the British power".¹ But the Governor-General was less enthusiastic than the Commander-in-Chief. Under Lord Wellesley's orders the Rana was informed that the British Government had "no intention of proceeding to hostilities against Daulat Rao Sindhia or of acting in any manner contrary to the treaty of peace unless that chieftain's measures preclude the possibilities of maintaining peace with him".² After the arrival of Lord Cornwallis as Lord Wellesley's successor the policy of non-intervention in Rajputana was confirmed. The Rana was thus left to the tender mercy of Sindhia's troops. Tod says that "a contribution of 16 lakhs was levied...on Mewar".³

KRISHNAKUMARI

We now come to the tragic story of Krishnakumari. Tod's romantic story⁴ is fairly well known, but it is not possible for the historian to accept it in toto.⁵ Krishnakumari, one of the numerous daughters of Rana Bhim Singh, was reputed to be extremely beautiful.⁶ She was first betrothed to Raja Bhim Singh of Jodhpur. After the latter's death in 1803 she was betrothed again to his successor, Raja Man Singh. Man Singh offended the Rana by depriving his relative Kishwar Singh of his appanage of Khalirao. The Rana thereupon offered his daughter's hands to Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur. Raichand, the ambitious *Dewan* of Jaipur, wanted to utilise this marriage for the extension of his master's political influence over Mewar.⁷ It was also likely to enhance the social prestige of the Kachchhwahs. Malcolm says, "The Sisodiya Kings of Mewar enjoyed the highest rank among the Princes of Rajasthan and an alliance with it was esteemed

¹ Secret Consultations, July 4, 1805, No. 20.

On September 2, 1805, Jenkins wrote to Malcolm that "the Rana is prevented by the vicinity of such a force from entering into engagements unfavourable to the interests of Daulat Rao Sindhia." (*Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, p. 208.)

² Secret Consultations, July 4, 1805, No. 22.

³ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 535.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 535-542.

⁵ See N. B. Roy's article in *Modern Review*, April, 1942.

⁶ Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 341.

⁷ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 136.

the greatest honour to which a Prince of that tribe could aspire.”¹ In his eagerness to confirm the proposal Raichand sent an army to Udaipur (July-September, 1805).² Raja Man Singh considered it necessary to prevent the consolidation of an alliance between the Rana and his hereditary rivals—the Kachchhwahs. Naturally he appealed to Daulat Rao Sindhia for assistance.

Sindhia, anxious for the consolidation of his influence in Rajputana, could not ignore this excellent opportunity. At first he tried to bring about an amicable settlement between Jaipur and Jodhpur. Mercer, Resident with Sindhia, reported to the Governor-General on April 22, 1806, the following statement from Sindhia himself: “...that he (*i.e.*, Sindhia) had used every endeavour to bring this matter to a settlement by proposing that these two chiefs (*i.e.*, Jagat Singh and Man Singh) should each have one of the Rana’s daughters in marriage, or, that they should both give up their pretensions for the present, or, finally, that they should consent to an arbitration of the neighbouring Rajas on the subject.” All these proposals had been “rendered nugatory” by the presence of the Jaipur troops in Udaipur “who held the Rana in control”. Sindhia promised that he would retire from Mewar and “leave the parties concerned to settle the dispute between themselves” if the Jaipur troops were withdrawn.³ But neither Jagat Singh nor Bhim Singh accepted this arrangement.⁴ Sindhia naturally took offence and sent two detachments under Jagu Bapu and Jaswant Rao Bhau to invade Mewar from two directions (April, 1806). The Jaipur troops “remained inactive in the city of Udaipur” and the Rana’s troops offered but “a feeble opposition”. Mewar’s capital lay prostrate at Sindhia’s feet.⁵

Mercer wrote to the Governor-General on April 28, 1806, “This success, which has been more complete and rapid than appears to have been expected by Daulat Rao Sindhia, will necessarily throw into his hands the entire control over the Rana of Udaipur and his affairs”. Sindhia declared to the British Resident that “his ultimate object is the dismissal of the Jaipur troops and that, on this being effected, he will leave the Rana in the

¹ *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 330.

² Secret Consultations, December 31, 1805, No. 2, 14, 18.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI. No. 162.

⁴ Secret Consultations, May 8, 1806, No. 30.

⁵ Secret Consultations, May 22, 1806, No. 23.

quiet possession of his country and relinquish any further interference in the dispute between the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas". But Mercer shrewdly suspected that "Sindhia's conduct (towards Mewar) would be regulated more by the measures he may deem it expedient to pursue in regard to Jaswant Rao Holkar than by any predetermined resolution on the subject." Holkar claimed half of the Udaipur tribute, and Mercer thought it was hardly likely that he would "without a contest leave the whole of the authority and resources of that State in the hands of Sindhia". Although at that moment Sindhia was "anxious to avoid an immediate rupture with Holkar" yet it did not seem likely to the British Resident that Daulat Rao "will gratuitously relinquish the complete ascendancy which he has now nearly attained over the Udaipur State".¹

Mercer was right. The helpless Rana offered "entire submission" to Sindhia's wishes, met him in two friendly interviews (May 5 and 7, 1806) and dismissed "the greater part of Jaipur troops".² Sindhia took advantage of the situation and made an offensive demand which united both the Chundawat and Saktawat clans.³ He wanted to marry Krishnakumari, forgetting in his triumph that the proud Rana of Mewar could not be expected to tolerate the idea of entering into matrimonial relations with one whom he regarded as a low-born Maratha.

At this crisis Jaswant Rao Holkar indirectly saved Mewar. He was plundering Jaipur territory and demanding tribute from Mewar. The approach of Sindhia's rival encouraged the Rana and compelled Sindhia to withdraw the marriage proposal. Sindhia now pursued a fluctuating policy. He agreed to withdraw from Udaipur at the request of the Jaipur *vākils*, who promised to pay him four *lakhs*. This arrangement was, however, soon set aside by an offer from the Jodhpur *vākils* of a larger sum. Sindhia retreated from Udaipur⁴ towards the end of May, 1806, leaving Jagu Bapu and Madhuji Huzure to realise contributions from Mewar. These zealous lieutenants were unable to get money; so they seized some Mewar chiefs and carried them to Sindhia's camp.⁵

¹ Secret Consultations, May 22, 1806, No. 23.

² Secret Consultations, May 29, 1806, No. 20; June 5, 1806, No. 55.

³ Secret Consultations, June 19, 1806, No. 34.

⁴ Secret Consultations, June 26, 1806, No. 34.

⁵ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 173, 178.

Meanwhile Holkar's threat had driven Jagat Singh into the arms of Man Singh. Mercer wrote to the Governor-General on May 12, 1806, "In Jaipur the Raja had applied to Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur for his interference to settle the amount of tribute to be paid to Holkar, which Raja Man Singh has accordingly undertaken. Raja Man Singh has also desired to settle with the Jaipur Raja the adjustment of tribute Sindhia claims from the State".¹ It was also agreed that Man Singh would marry Jagat Singh's sister and Jagat Singh would marry Man Singh's daughter.² But Jagat Singh did not give up his plan of marrying Krishnakumari.³

The internal condition of Mewar was growing worse year after year. The troops of Sindhia and the Pindari followers of Holkar and Amir Khan indiscriminately ravaged her territory. The Rana remained a helpless spectator. On October 6, 1806, Mercer reported to the Governor-General that Sharza Rao Ghatge had plundered Bhilwara and "subsisted his people by exactions" from villages near Chitor.⁴ Gradually he established great influence in the Rana's council, and in accordance with his advice the Rana applied for military assistance to the British Resident in Delhi. His letters on this subject were intercepted by Sindhia, who demanded an explanation from the British Resident at his court. Mercer assured him that the British Government would not interfere in the affairs of those States "to which it was not bound by defensive alliance".⁵ In 1808 Holkar's irregular troops plundered two *parganas* near Udaipur. Influential chiefs like Sangram Singh of Lawa, Gokul Das of Deogarh, and Padam Singh of Salumbar disturbed internal peace by their bitter rivalry for power.⁶ The Rana received some assistance from Zalim Singh of Kotah and Ambaji Ingle,⁷ but his difficulties went on increasing. In 1809 he became so helpless that he had to take a daily allowance of Rs. 500 from Sindhia's viceroy in Mewar for the maintenance of his family.

¹ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 168.

² *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldier of Fortune*, p. 299.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 204.

⁴ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, p. 299.

⁵ *Political Consultations*, January 29, 1807, No. 22, 23.

⁶ Broughton, *Letters Written in a Mahratta Camp*, p. 207.

⁷ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 264.

During the years 1807-1810 Amir Khan gradually made himself the most powerful man in Central India. In 1807 he brought Man Singh of Jodhpur under his control. In 1809 he established his influence in Bhopal. In 1810 he took advantage of Jaswant Rao Holkar's madness and became the *de facto* ruler of the Holkar State. His influence almost eclipsed that of Sindhia.¹ His first task after these successes was the realisation of tribute from Jaipur and Mewar.

In May, 1810, Amir Khan appeared in Mewar at the head of a large army for the collection of tribute.² His progress was checked for a few weeks by internal troubles within his camp,³ but everybody knew that it was absolutely impossible for the Rana to resist him. The Resident in Delhi became nervous. He wrote on July 8, 1810, "It is greatly to be feared that Amir Khan will at length succeed in getting possession of Udaipur and thereby putting an end to the sovereignty of the most ancient and most venerated of the Rajput Chiefs. The country is so strong and so easily defended that, if once the Pathans were in possession of the strongholds and passes, it would be next to impossible to dislodge them, and in its productiveness they would find immense resources. It would, moreover, insure and facilitate to Amir Khan the conquest of Jaipur where it would appear that the greatest alarm prevails."⁴

On his arrival near Udaipur Amir Khan informed the Rana that he was prepared to recover the important fortress of Kumbhalgarh from Sindhia's general, Jaswant Rao Bhau, if the Rana promised to pay him 12 *lakhs* of rupees as tribute. He also suggested that a body of his own troops should be entertained by the Rana in his service.⁵ Naturally Bhim Singh refused to accept these proposals. Amir Khan then wanted an interview with the Rana, but he "persisted in declining to admit Amir Khan into Udaipur or to visit him in a camp."⁶ But Amir Khan was not the man to take a refusal. He forced his way to Udaipur and dictated his terms to the unfortunate Rana. Bhim Singh agreed to engage in his service a body of Amir Khan's troops,

¹ Mercer to Lord Minto, April 16, 1810.

² Mercer to Lord Minto, June 20, 1810.

³ Political Consultations, July 21, 1810, No. 38.

⁴ Political Consultations, August 6, 1810, No. 77.

⁵ Mercer to Lord Minto, June 20, July 7, 1810.

⁶ Political Consultations, August 6, 1810, No. 78.

and to satisfy the pecuniary demands of the Pathan Chief. But Amir Khan did not want peace in Rajputana. Although both Jagat Singh and Man Singh had already decided to "relinquish all thoughts" of marrying Krishnakumari, Amir Khan was very anxious to revive that source of contest.¹ He asked the Rana to celebrate his daughter's marriage with Man Singh. The Rana refused.

With regard to the final act of the tragedy our sources of information cannot be reconciled. According to Tod, Amir Khan gave the Rana a choice between two evils: "either the princess should wed Raja Man, or by her death seal the peace of Rajwara." The Rana preferred the death of his daughter to a marriage which he considered dishonourable.² Tod's story is in substantial agreement with Amir Khan's own version of the affair as given in *Amir Nama*. But Busawan Lal, the author of *Amir Nama*, says that the Rana agreed to contrive to get rid of his daughter, provided Amir Khan pledged to wrest Khalirao³ from Man Singh. A modern writer has unreservedly accepted this interpretation of the Rana's conduct and remarked, "The crime was not excused by any sensitive regard for family pride that marked the high-mettled Rajputs of old. It was the result of a sordid bargain."⁴ It is difficult to believe that the Rana was in a position to "bargain" with Amir Khan. Tod says, ".....the Rana was made to see no choice between consigning his beloved child to the Rathor prince, or witnessing the effects of a more extended dishonour from the vengeance of the Pathan, and the storm of his palace by his licentious adherents,—the fiat passed that Krishnakumari should die." In an official letter dated August 4, 1810, the Resident in Delhi clearly says that Amir Khan was "responsible for the murder" and adds: "It is stated that the nobles of Udaipur, rendered desperate at the idea of the Rana's being forced by Amir Khan to sanction an alliance which would dishonour the tribe to which he belonged, held a solemn consultation in which it was determined as the only means of avoiding infamy to take off the young lady by poison, which with the

¹ Malcolm (*Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 339) indicates that Amir Khan's purpose was to promote reconciliation between the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur.

² Crooke, Vol. I, p. 539.

³ See *ante*, p. 297.

⁴ *Modern Review*, April, 1942, p. 374.

concurrence of the unhappy father..... was actually carried into effect."¹ According to this version of the story, the decision to murder the princess was adopted by the nobles and carried into effect with the concurrence of the Rana. There can be no question, therefore, of "a sordid bargain." The princess, then a girl of sixteen, took the fatal cup of poison on July 21, 1810.²

Although the Rana humiliated himself so much, he received no protection from Amir Khan. In August, 1811, Bapu Sindhia appeared in Udaipur and took up his residence in the city. The Rana found himself obliged to receive him with an appearance of friendship, "in opposition, no doubt, to the real state of his feelings." The inevitable demand for money followed. Another object of the Maratha general was the suppression of the Pindaris, for Daulat Rao Sindhia was afraid of their rising power.³

LORD MINTO'S POLICY

While Amir Khan and Sindhia were thus struggling for mastery in Mewar,⁴ Lord Minto remained a silent spectator. He was a believer in the policy of Non-intervention. Roberts says that he found himself obliged from time to time to abandon the strictest interpretation of a *laissez faire* attitude.⁵ So far as the Rajput States are concerned, however, there was no departure from the policy laid down by the authorities in England. All applications for British protection invariably received the reply that the Company did not want entangling alliances. The successive Residents in Delhi, Seton and Metcalfe, were in favour of taking the Rajput States under protection, but they knew they could not change the determination of the higher authorities. Perhaps Lord Minto himself felt that a change of front was necessary, but he wanted to carry his superiors with him. Malcolm observes, "The Government of Lord Minto had no result more important than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home, of the utter impracticability of perseverance in the neutral policy they had desired to pursue." Thus Lord Minto prepared

¹ Political Consultations, August 25, 1810, No. 50.

² Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya Ka Itihasa*, p. 698. There is a reference to her death in an official letter dated August 4. (Political Consultations, August 25, 1810, No. 50).

³ Political Consultations, September 20, 1811, No. 1.

⁴ See Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 546-547.

⁵ *History of British India*, p. 261.

the ground for the bold and comprehensive plan adopted later on by Lord Hastings.

Meanwhile the policy of Non-intervention worked havoc in Rajputana, a common prey to the Marathas and the Pindaris.¹ With regard to Mewar Tod says, "Mewar was rapidly approaching dissolution, and every sign of civilisation fast disappearing; fields laid waste, cities in ruins, inhabitants exiled, chieftains demoralized, the prince and his family destitute of common comforts."²

POLICY OF LORD HASTINGS

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris he found it necessary to take all Rajput States under British protection.

"The Pindaris were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Malwa, somewhat to the east of Ujjain, north of the Narbada, and between Bhopal and the dominions of Sindhia and Holkar; to accomplish this it had been decided to surround them on all sides—on the north and east, from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan, and on the west from Gujarat—and to keep the native States in check." Naturally the attitude of the Rajput Princes would be a very important factor in determining the nature of the operations against the Pindaris; and it was not difficult to anticipate that they would gladly co-operate with the British Government in the extermination of their oppressors.

The Rana had already sent "a direct application for the protection of the British Government with an offer of a fourth of the estimated revenue of the country." In October, 1817, Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an engagement with Udaipur. The instructions contained two important points. In the first place, it was "desirable to obtain as large a portion of the revenue of

¹ The following description of the character of the atrocities committed by the Pindaris is taken from H. T. Prinsep's *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings* (Vol. I, p. 39) published in 1825:

".....every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money was immediately put to most horrid torture, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice: it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away: and, in the wantonness of barbarity, to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents....."

² Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 546-547.

Udaipur as might be practicable on account of subsidy." Secondly, the question of the tribute due by the Rana to Sindhia and Holkar was "to be treated as one between the British Government and the two latter powers exclusively, so that all direct intercourse and connection between the Rajput States and Marathas should cease."¹

Metcalf began negotiations with the Rana's *vakils*, of whom the principal was Thakur Ajit Singh, in November,² 1817. The treaty³ was signed in Delhi on January 13, 1818, and ratified by Lord Hastings on January 22, 1818.

Article 1 provided for "perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests between the two States from generation to generation." By Article 2 the British Government engaged "to protect the principality and territory of Udaipur." By Article 3 the Rana promised to "act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government and acknowledge its supremacy," and not to have "any connection with other Chiefs or States." Metcalfe had anticipated some objections to this Article due to the "high pretensions" of the Rana. He wrote to the Supreme Government, "..... the Ranas of Udaipur have always boasted of never having acknowledged the sovereignty of the Mahomedan Dynasty in India, and one of the titles they have assumed is 'King of the Hindus' and another 'The Enemy of the King of Delhi.' The rank of the House of Udaipur is also generally acknowledged and the war between Jaipur and Jodhpur in 1807 on account of the Rana's daughter is a recent proof of the honour attached to a close connection with this family." Metcalfe was prepared to modify this Article, but the *vakils* of the Rana offered no objection.⁴ One of them proposed in the course of discussions that "an Article should be inserted to provide that the mission of an envoy to Delhi and the submission of the Rana to the Company should not be drawn into a precedent for his allegiance to the

¹ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

² Secret Consultations, November 14, 1817, No. 50; December 19, 1817, No. 112; February 20, 1818, No. 67.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 30-31.

⁴ "It seems strange that the Udaipur envoy should have failed to secure better terms for his State, which Metcalfe was prepared to concede. It is possible that Thakur Ajit Singh was not disinterested enough in the execution of his duty".—M. S. Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 135.

Mahomedan Dynasty, and that the British should not make him over at any time to any other Power." Metcalfe gave an assurance that "though not expressed in the treaty the spirit of the proposal would remain in force."¹

By Article 4 the Rana promised not to "enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government." Article 5 provided that all disputes between Mewar and other States would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.

Article 6 provided that the tribute from Mewar would amount to one-fourth of her revenue for the first five years, and to three-eighths "after that term, in perpetuity."² The *vakils* presented to Metcalfe a memorandum on the Rana's claim for the restoration of territories which had "fallen by improper means into the possession of others"—Sindhia, Amir Khan, Holkar, and the rulers of Jodhpur and Kotah.³ Article 7 of the treaty referred to this matter and laid down the following arrangement: "...the British Government, from a want of accurate information, is not able to enter into any positive engagement on this subject, but will always keep in view the renovation of the prosperity of the State of Udaipur, and after ascertaining the nature of each case, will use its best exertions for the accomplishment of that object, on every occasion on which it may be proper to do so. Whatever places may thus be restored to the State of Udaipur by the aid of the British Government, three-eighths of their revenues shall be paid in perpetuity to the British Government."

In fixing the amount of tribute Metcalfe was guided by two considerations—the then distracted condition of Mewar, and her prosperity in normal times. Metcalfe wrote, "It is understood that the country of Udaipur is a most productive country, that the soil is fertile in the greatest degree, and that the inhabitants are uncommonly industrious and devoted to agriculture. It is known that the power and revenue of the State are at present reduced to a wretched extreme, but it is expected that the latter will revive with astonishing capacity after the establishment of security in the country. On account of the actual poverty of

¹ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 107.

² Originally Metcalfe proposed three-eighths and Thakur Ajit Singh offered one-fourth. (Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 107).

³ Secret Consultations, February 20, 1818, No. 29.

that State it was impossible to procure the payment of an adequate tribute in a fixed sum. The present arrangement will perhaps produce little in the beginning of our connection ; but there is ground for hope that eventually the tribute will be considerable, and constantly increasing. At the same time, we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that every increase of the tribute paid to us, so far from being burdensome to the tributary, must be attended in greater degree with an augmentation of the wealth and resources of Udaipur, so that our advantage will advance hand in hand with the prosperity, security and happiness of a fine country under our protection".¹

In addition to the tribute the Rana agreed that "the troops of the State of Udaipur should be furnished according to its means at the requisition of the British Government."² Article 9 provided that the Rana should always remain the "absolute ruler of his own country" and that British jurisdiction should not be introduced into his principality.

The following extract from Adam's letter to Metcalfe,³ dated February 2, 1818, shows that the latter's diplomacy met with the full approval of the Supreme Government :

"The manner in which you have arranged the amount of tribute to be received by the British Government from the State of Udaipur is extremely judicious and secures to the Hon'ble Company a fair and just proportion of the resources of the State which is henceforward to be protected and supported by its power. The caution observed by you in drawing the seventh Article which relates to the recovery through the assistance of the British Government of any of the alienated territories of the State of Udaipur and the stipulation securing to us 3/8 of the revenue of the recovered territory are characterized by your usual judgment and discretion. Every motive referring either to the wish which must be felt to repair the dilapidated resources and degraded condition of the ancient Government of Udaipur or to the direct interests of the British Government involved in the return to prosperity and wealth of that distracted and impoverished country will prompt the Governor-General to employ the power and influence

¹ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 107.

² Article 8.

³ Secret Consultations, March 6, 1818, No. 5.

of this Government in recovering for the Rana such of his alienated territories as can be resumed without injustice to the powers into whose possession they may have come."

TOD IN MEWAR

In February, 1818, Tod was deputed to the Court of Udaipur as the first British Political Agent in Mewar.¹ He arrived there on March 8, 1818, and he had to resign four years later because "he resented the deliberate reduction of his status and authority and the unmerited censure which Lord Moira's Government deemed fit to pass on a devoted servant. His admiration for Rajput chivalry was no secret and some of his actions partook in the eyes of less informed persons of the complexion of partisanship. His disregard of official etiquette also exposed Tod to the criticism of his superiors and things came to such a pass that despite his brilliant record as a diplomat and administrator Tod had to leave the country and the people he loved so well."²

At the time of Tod's arrival at Udaipur³ the condition of Mewar was deplorable.⁴ The alliance with the Company removed the Maratha terror,⁵ but the Rana and his advisers were unfit to deal with the difficult work of reconstruction which now confronted them. Tod says that Rana Bhim Singh was 'naturally defective in energy' and 'swayed by faction and intrigue'. Elsewhere he observes, "He was ever the tool of that faction that had the ascendancy at the moment, and ever ready to be swayed by any one who could practise on his credulity, or administer to his prodigality". The nobles had lost that patriotism and courage which had distinguished them in the long struggle against the Muslims. They were now engaged in factions, intrigues and selfish feuds. The State could not keep them under control, for it was too weak. Tod says that the "Rana had not fifty horse to attend him, and was indebted for all the comforts he possessed to the liberality of (Zalim Singh of) Kotah". There were many aspirants to high office, but, according to Tod, "The

¹ Secret Consultations, March 6, 1818, No. 7.

² "Why Tod Resigned?"—*Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, 1944.

³ See *ante*, pp. 84.89.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 90.92.

⁵ Raipur and Kumbhalmer were recovered from the Marathas. See *ante*, p. 85.

only man about the court at once of integrity and efficiency was Kishendas, who had long acted as ambassador, and to whose assiduity the sovereign and the country owed much ; but his services were soon cut off by death". Agarji Mehta was nominated the chief civil minister (*Pradhan*) on Tod's arrival at Udaipur, but Tod found him in 'every way unequal' to that important office.¹

Such were the materials with which Tod had to begin the work of reform. He was directed by the Supreme Government to take the whole control of affairs into his own hands and to interfere, if necessary, even in minute details.² This was, of course, a clear violation of Article 9 of the treaty ; but this was the only way of raising Mewar from the depressed condition into which she had sunk.

Tod says, "The first point to effect was the recognition of the prince's authority by his nobles ; the surest sign of which was their presence at the capital, where some had never been, and others only when it suited their convenience or their views. In a few weeks the Rana saw himself surrounded by a court such as had not been known for half a century". The Political Agent required them to settle their feuds, to redeem usurpations, both on the crown and each other, and to discharge their traditional duties to their sovereign. "All dreaded the word 'restitution', and the audit of half a century's political accounts ; yet the adjustment of these was the corner-stone of the edifice, which anarchy and oppression had dismantled". After 'harassing and painful discussions' Tod secured the conclusion of an agreement (*Kaulnama*) between the Rana and the chiefs of Mewar (May, 1818). The most important clause ran as follows : "All *Khalsa* villages seized by the chiefs in times of trouble and commotion shall be restored". The chiefs also promised to perform personal service at Udaipur with the quota of troops with which they were by ancient custom bound to serve, to restore all customs and other duties seized from the State, and not to harbour thieves and

¹ Crooke, Vol. I, p. 522.

² Lord Hastings recognised that "in this actual state of the Court of Udaipur, some more active interference on your part than would be justifiable in a more wholesome condition may not only be excusable but actually indispensable for the success of the measures in view." But Tod was directed to interfere "with utmost moderation, caution, and discretion and in the form of private advice, not of authority". (Secret Consultations, May 15, 1818, No. 25).

robbers. The Rana promised to respect their ancient rights and privileges. Captain Brookes says, "The accomplishment of this unpalatable measure, without the employment, or even the exhibition of force, is evidence, if such were needed, of the great personal influence of Captain Tod, and the authority our attitude, and the presence of our armies in Central India, gave at the time to all our officers employed at Foreign Courts".¹ Tod himself observes that it was a matter for just pride that "the complicated arrangements arising out of this settlement were completed without a shot being fired, or the exhibition of a single British soldier in the country, nor, indeed, within one hundred miles of Udaipur."

The recall of the exiled population was a measure simultaneous with the assembling of the nobles. "Wherever a subject of Mewar existed, proclamations penetrated." The feeling for the *bapota* (ancestral land) was strong in every Rajput breast. So the restoration of order in Mewar attracted many of her exiled sons and daughters. Measures were also taken for the economic recovery of the State. Proclamations were issued by the Rana and the Political Agent, inviting foreign merchants and bankers to establish connections in the chief towns of Mewar. The result was satisfactory: "branch-banks were everywhere formed, and mercantile agents fixed in every town in the country." All restrictions on external commerce were removed. The old chains of stations for the collection of transit duties were abolished; all taxes on goods in transit were confined to the frontiers. The scale of duties was revised; "they underwent a reduction of from thirty to fifty per cent." As a result of these wise and comprehensive measures "the transit and custom duties of Mewar made the most certain part of the revenue, and in a few years exceeded in amount what had ever been known." The commercial duties rose from Rs. 96,683 in 1819 to Rs. 2,17,000 in 1822, and they were farmed for three years from 1822 for Rs. 7,50,000. The increasing prosperity of the State was also reflected in the increase of population in some of the chief towns.

The revenues of the *Khalsa* lands showed commendable improvement. The spring harvest of 1818 yielded Rs. 40,000; in 1821 it yielded Rs. 10,18,478. That this improvement was largely due to Tod's "active superintendence" is proved by the fact that,

¹ *History of Meywar*, p. 24.

when that superintendence was withdrawn in 1822, the spring harvest yielded Rs. 9,36,640. But the improvement was also due to the extension of the area of the *Khalsa* lands. Kamalmir, Raipur, Rajnagar and Sadri-Kunero were recovered from the Marathas. Jahajpur, which had been taken possession of by Zalim Singh of Kotah in 1806, was recovered as a result of Tod's negotiations in February, 1819. Owing to the weakness of the Rana's administration, this district was managed by the Political Agent, and was subsequently assigned for the liquidation of the arrears of tribute to the British Government in 1821. The district of Mhairwara¹ was subjugated. Moreover, Tod's *Kaulnama* had secured the restoration of many *Khalsa* villages so long occupied by recalcitrant chiefs. From the increasing revenues of the *Khalsa* lands and the expanding commercial duties, says Tod, an income was derived "sufficient for the comforts, and even the dignities of the prince and his court, and promising an annual increase in the ratio of good government; but profusion scattered all that industry and ingenuity could collect; the artificial wants of the prince perpetuated the real necessities of the peasant, and this, it is to be feared, will continue till the present generation shall sleep with their forefathers."

Indeed, Tod's efforts to restore the prosperity of Mewar were frustrated largely by the opposition of those for whom he laboured. The Rana was not only inefficient and averse to business. Tod says, "Vain shows, frivolous amusements, and an ill-regulated liberality alone occupied him. . . . He had little steadiness of purpose, and was particularly obnoxious to female influence."² The

¹ This district was inhabited by a wild race, which was nominally subject to Mewar and Marwar, but which paid no revenue to either of these States. In 1819-20 British troops suppressed a rebellion of the Mhairs, and the district was taken under British management. On May 18, 1823, Sir David Ochterlony wrote to the Political Agent in Mewar that, if the Rana did not agree to transfer his share in Mhairwara to British management, the Rana's officers in that district would be forcibly expelled. This unnecessary offence to the Rana was not justified by the Supreme Government. Metcalfe observed, "The mode of transfer has occasioned the Governor-General much concern, as being totally at variance with the instructions, the wishes, and the views of Government. . . ." But the transfer was an accomplished fact.

² There may be some truth in the following statement of Brookes: "It is probable that the very state of dependence, in which the Rana was placed, chafed his spirit, and induced many of those evils of which the Agent complained." (*History of Meywar*, p. 27).

Rana's daily allowance for household expenses amounted to Rs. 1,000. This sum was paid by a banker, who was guaranteed the amount, together with 18 per cent. interest, by the Political Agent. "With the prodigality usual in a Native Prince, the Rana, to extend this allowance to the utmost, endeavoured to burden the State accounts with items which ought to have been defrayed out of the liberal income furnished to him. Instead of this, he sent to the districts which had been set apart for the payment of the tribute, extra establishments, as a means of providing for needy dependents and followers, and to make up the deficiency, other Pergunnahs had to be assigned."¹ Even when the Rana agreed to measures suggested by Tod, they were thwarted by the ladies in the household. "Every man too in the city", the Agent complained, "from the pettiest cloth-seller to the Rana, discusses public affairs, and every person from the *Pradhan* to the *Passwan* who drives away the flies, assumes the privilege of giving advice."

LAST YEARS OF BHIM SINGH

In 1821 Tod, acting under the instructions of the Supreme Government, began to relax his control over the internal administration of Mewar. Next year he left India, making over charge of his office to his assistant, Captain Waugh. The British guarantee to the banker who paid the Rana's allowance for household expenses was withdrawn. The banker stopped payment. The unfortunate Rana had to pawn his jewels and silver sticks. His horses and elephants seldom got their rations more than twice per week. The Rana believed that the cancellation of the old arrangement was due to the intrigues of his minister, Shah Shewlal, who exercised considerable influence over the new Agent. He dismissed the minister, who was, however, restored at the insistence of Captain Waugh and Sir David Ochterlony.² Although Article 9 of the treaty recognised the Rana as the "absolute ruler of his own country", he was not free even to dismiss an obnoxious minister.

Captain Cobbe worked as Political Agent in Mewar for a fairly long period (April, 1823—January, 1831). On his arrival at

¹ Brookes, *History of Meywar*, p. 28.

² Ochterlony to Political Agent, Mewar, May 10, 1823.

Udaipur he found confusion all around.¹ The Rana's interference in the administration of the State and the collection of the taxes had disorganised everything. Captain Cobbe reported, "The Rana regards his debt as a mere nominal obligation, and the exaction of tribute, a great hardship. The Government is a tissue of cheating and oppression : from the Prince to the peasant, all are robbers." The arrears of tribute due to the British Government amounted to Rs. 7,90,747, besides that for the current year 1822-23. Once again the Political Agent assumed complete control over the internal administration of Mewar. For his household expenses the Rana was to receive, as before, Rs. 1,000 per day, paid by a banker under British guarantee, on which interest at 18 per cent. was charged. Thus Tod's system was revived within little more than a year after his departure. Under Captain Cobbe's management the financial position of Mewar improved.² For the regular payment of the tribute and for the liquidation of arrears certain *parganas* were reserved.

In November, 1826, Captain Cobbe went on temporary leave, and Captain Sutherland officiated as Political Agent in Mewar for one month. He proposed that the tribute payable to the Company should be a fixed amount, and not a fluctuating sum dependent on the realisation of the revenues, for the system of enquiry it necessitated was injurious to the dignity and interests of Mewar. He also proposed that the districts reserved for payment of tribute should be restored to the Rana. These proposals were approved by Sir Charles Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi, who expressed the hope that "eight or nine years of our protection will at least have operated so far beneficially, as to enable us to permit the Rana to rule his own dominions."³

About this time Metcalfe visited Udaipur. The Rana presented him a memorandum of 10 Articles. The first Article expressed the Rana's desire that the tribute should be reduced to a fixed sum. Metcalfe recommended to the Supreme Government that the tribute should be fixed at Rs. 3,00,000 a year. He was aware that the British Government would lose largely if Mewar ever acquired the wealth which her soil was capable of producing ; but he thought it was desirable to put an end to the vexatious

¹ Cobbe to Ochterlony, September 21, 1823.

² Cobbe to Resident at Delhi, February 28, 1825 ; March, 1826.

³ Metcalfe to Sutherland, December 8, 1826.

system of scrutiny and interference. The second Article demanded a reduction from the arrears of tribute. Metcalfe disapproved this demand and suggested that the arrears might be paid in instalments, or the Rana might raise a loan for this purpose under British guarantee. The Rana's third request was that his administrative authority should be restored. Metcalfe observed, "This is his undoubted right. A part of the country has been under the management of our Agent, together with the whole of the revenue from customs, as pledges for the payment of our tribute. Throughout the remainder of the country, chuprassies have been stationed in every village, bearing the badges of the British Agent,¹ badges also of the insignificance and subjection of the nominal sovereign". The Rana's fourth request related to the exorbitant interest charged by the banker who provided the allowance for his household expenses. A new banker was found, who did not charge more than 6 per cent. The remaining Articles referred to the Bhil country,² Mhairwara, restoration of the lost portions of the ancient territories of Mewar, etc. No definite decision was

¹ Captain Sutherland recommended the withdrawal of these badged servants in his letter to the Resident at Delhi, November 13, 1826.

² British officers had no clear idea about the relations of the Bhils with the Rajput *Thakurs* and the Rana of Mewar. The Bhils realised, by prescriptive right rather than by legal authority conferred by the Rana, certain taxes on their neighbours: (1) *Bolai* or tax levied on the transit of commodities and travellers, for whose safety the Bhils assumed responsibility; (2) *Rakh-wali* or blackmail, paid by villagers to neighbouring Bhil communities, as a protection against plunder. Those Rajput chiefs who had received grants of Bhil villages were entitled to a share (*Bishwah*) of the *Bolai*. Soon after his arrival at Udaipur Tod, with the purpose of increasing the Rana's revenues and encouraging trade, tried to resume these taxes. The Bhils naturally refused to surrender their income and prescriptive right, and they were screened by the Rajput *Thakurs* who were simultaneously threatened with the loss of their *Bishwah*. The Rana punished these *Thakurs* by confiscating their lands, but it was difficult to control the plundering Bhils who were responsible for many robberies and local disturbances. In 1823 British troops were employed against the Bhils, but permanent peace could not be established. In a despatch dated November 10, 1824, the Court of Directors laid down a cautious policy: ".....before our own troops are employed in reducing the refractory subjects of princes in alliance with us, the circumstances under which application is made for their interference should be clearly investigated". Two years later Metcalfe wrote to the Political Agent in Mewar (January 27, 1827): "To engage in the suppression by force, of disturbances which have been excited by oppression or misrule, is a most unsatisfactory proceeding." But the policy of sending British troops against refractory Bhils was continued for several years. The formation of the Mewar Bhil Corps in 1841 marked the beginning of a new order in the Bhil country.

formed by Metcalfe on any of these points, although he granted the Rana's desire (Article 10) that an Agent representing Mewar might reside with the Resident at Delhi. On the whole, Metcalfe was quite satisfied with his visit and formed a high opinion about the heir-apparent.¹

On his return from leave in December, 1826, Captain Cobbe gave effect to the policy of Captain Sutherland and Sir Charles Metcalfe. The *chuprassies* were recalled; the reserved *parganas* were made over to the Rana. Indeed, the interference of the Political Agent in the internal affairs of the State was 'completely and finally withdrawn'. The immediate results were not very satisfactory; neither the Rana nor his ministers and officers could make a proper use of the liberty suddenly conferred upon them. Shah Shewlal was dismissed in 1824, re-instated in 1826, and dismissed again in 1827. The Political Agent reported to the Resident at Delhi "on the oppressions committed by the *Kamdars* of the minister, by the revival of obsolete or liquidated claims, and the renewal of old causes, civil and criminal, formerly investigated". The Rana's orders were not obeyed by the *Kamdars*, who considered themselves as the servants of the minister. Robberies were 'of almost endless occurrence': two or three cases occurred daily in the town of Udaipur.²

SUCCESSOR OF BHIM SINGH

Rana Bhim Singh died on March 31, 1828, and was succeeded by his son, Jowan Singh. He died ten years later (August 30, 1838). In his youth he was a promising prince. Metcalfe wrote about him in 1826: "The heir-apparent is a prince in appearance, and a gentleman in manners. He bears a high character, and manages his own affairs well".³ After his accession, however, he sank into debauchery and intoxication. "The expenses of his court soon doubled those of his father, and did not fall short of Rs. 50,000 a month. From the effects of bad government, the land revenue rapidly declined".⁴

¹ Metcalfe to Secretary to Supreme Government, December 26, 1826.

² Captain Cobbe to Resident at Delhi, June, 1827.

³ Metcalfe to Secretary to Supreme Government, December 26, 1826.

⁴ Brookes, *History of Meywar*, p. 35.

Such was the condition of Mewar after her submission to the East India Company. Her misery was largely due to the vicissitudes through which she had passed in the eighteenth century, and her rulers were obviously unworthy successors of their great ancestors. But a close study of contemporary British official documents seems to make it clear that the new political system which she entered in 1818 was to some extent responsible for her distress. The Rana was protected against external invasions and internal rebellions; but he could not choose his own ministers, British *chuprassies* realised revenues in his territories, and he had to depend upon the favour of the Political Agent for the supply of his household expenses. Such conditions do not strengthen the character and sharpen the sense of responsibility of rulers of men. Nor did the restrictions imposed upon the nobles of Mewar by zealous Political Agents make them better guardians of the interests of the State. A medieval political organisation dominated by semi-feudal ideas could not be transformed into a modern benevolent bureaucracy in the course of a few years by the half-hearted application of inconsistent remedies. The condition of Mewar in the years following the treaty illustrates the truth of Sidney Owen's observations: "...the native Prince being guaranteed in the possession of his dominions, but deprived of so many of the essential attributes of sovereignty, sinks in his own esteem, and loses that stimulus to good government, which is supplied by the fear of rebellion and deposition. He becomes a *roi faineant*, a sensualist, an extortionate miser, or a careless and lax ruler... The higher classes, coerced by external ascendancy, in turn lose their self-respect, and degenerate like their master; the people groan under a complicated oppression which is irremediable."

IV

MARWAR

MARWAR AND THE MUGHALS

Two factors played a decisive part in the history of Marwar during the eighteenth century. One was the traditional rivalry between the Rathors and the Kachchhwahas¹; the other was the continuous interference of the Marathas in the affairs of Rajputana. The origin of that rivalry is to be traced to the contest for pre-dominance in the Mughal Court. The interference of the Marathas was rendered possible by the fall of the Mughal Empire.

During the early part of Aurangzib's reign Jaswant Singh of Marwar was "the leading Hindu peer of the Mughal Court" and Marwar was the foremost Hindu State of Northern India.² Jaswant Singh's death was followed by a long and bitter struggle with the Mughals (1679—1708). "A generation of time passed in Marwar in ceaseless conflict, captures, and recaptures". Peace was restored after Bahadur Shah's accession, but Ajit Singh's shifting policy could not consolidate his position in the Mughal Court.³

Ajit Singh's eldest son and successor, Abhay Singh (1724—1749), served for two years as Governor of Gujarat in Muhammad Shah's reign. "His courage", says Tod, "which may be termed ferocious, was tempered only by his excessive indolence....."⁴ Success made him proud. He declared war on Bikaner on a slight pretext. His younger brother, Bakht Singh, who governed "the castle and three hundred and sixty townships of Nagor", induced Sawai Jai Singh of Amber to espouse the cause of Bikaner. As soon as war began between Marwar and Amber Bakht Singh stood against Jai Singh for the vindication of Rathor honour. Jai Singh was defeated in the battle of Gangwana (May, 1741).⁵

A war of succession broke out in Marwar after Abhay Singh's death (June, 1749). His son and successor, Ram Singh (1749-

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.

² Sir J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 324.

³ See Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1052.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1047-1052.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 156-158.

1751), inherited his arrogance and combined it with the impetuosity of the Chauhans, his mother's clan. He offended his powerful and jealous uncle, Bakht Singh, who had lately (1748) been nominated Governor of Gujarat by the Imperial Government. With the assistance of the Imperial *Mir Bakhshi*, Salabat Khan, Bakht Singh declared war against his nephew. Ram Singh secured the support of Ishwari Singh of Jaipur. After some indecisive engagements Salabat Khan concluded peace with Ram Singh, leaving Bakht Singh in the lurch (April, 1750). But a few months later Bakht Singh defeated his nephew and compelled him to take shelter in Jaipur. In July, 1751, Jodhpur received Bakht Singh as its ruler, but he died in September, 1752. He was succeeded by his son, Bijay Singh (1752-1792).¹

MARWAR AND THE MARATHAS

Bijay Singh's fairly long reign may be described as a continuous struggle against the Marathas. In May, 1752, the Marathas under Jayapa Sindhia espoused the cause of Ram Singh and invaded Jodhpur territory, but Bakht Singh compelled them to retreat to the Deccan. In June, 1754, Jayapa Sindhia was sent by the Peshwa's uncle, Raghunath Rao, to restore Ram Singh to the *gadi* of Marwar. Although the Peshwa was not in favour of keeping a large Maratha army confined in Marwar for any length of time, Jayapa Sindhia was obsessed by the idea of crushing Bijay Singh and winning the whole kingdom for Ram Singh. After securing some successes the Maratha general was murdered in his camp by Bijay Singh's envoy (July, 1755). Bijay Singh wanted to utilize this opportunity to drive the Marathas out of North India altogether. Madho Singh of Jaipur joined him. But the Marathas found an able leader in Jayapa's brother Dattaji, who defeated the armies of the allied Rajput Princes and compelled them to make peace (February, 1756). Bijay Singh agreed to cede Ajmer to the Marathas, to pay a war indemnity of 50 *lakhs* in three years, and to make over to Ram Singh the city of Jalor and half the territory of Marwar. "None of these terms except the first one was ultimately fulfilled." But Marwar became "the special hunting-ground of the Sindhia family." As Bijay Singh found it impossible to pay the large war indemnity forced upon

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1054-1058.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 171-179.

him in 1756, he was constantly in dread of Maratha invasions. Moreover, his inveterate enemy, Ram Singh, had found shelter in Jaipur,¹ and Madho Singh often threatened to restore him by force. Under these circumstances Marwar passed through a long period of uneasy peace.²

The long rivalry between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh ruined Marwar. It was civil war in the worst sense of the term, for some of the most valiant Rathor families remained loyal to Ram Singh, who possessed some of the qualities attractive to the Rajputs. Tod says, "His person was gigantic; his demeanour affable and courteous; and he was generous to a fault. His understanding was excellent and well cultivated It is universally admitted that, both in exterior and accomplishments, not even the great Ajit could compare with Ram Singh....."³ Bijay Singh was weak and unwarlike. A Rathor bard contrasted the character of the two rivals in the following words: "Fortune never attended the stirrup of Bijay Singh, who never gained a battle, though at the head of a hundred thousand men; but Ram Singh, by his valour and conduct, gained victories with a handful."⁴ Civil war, foreign invasion and royal weakness conspired to increase the power and stimulate the ambition of the nobles. At the beginning of Bijay Singh's reign "the crown-lands were uncultivated, the tenantry dispersed; and commerce had diminished, owing to insecurity and the licentious habits of the nobles, who everywhere established their own imposts, and occasionally despoiled entire caravans."⁵ Unable to keep them in check, Bijay Singh tried to keep them engaged by finding them occupation. He carried his arms against some desert tribes and occupied Amarkot, "the key to the valley of the Indus."⁶ He also occupied the rich district of Godwar, which had been ruled by the Ranas of Mewar for nearly five centuries.⁷

In 1787 Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur, then threatened by Mahadji Sindhia, concluded a defensive alliance with Bijay Singh.

¹ Ram Singh died in 1773.

² Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 173-188, 193-194, 521-523.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1065.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1066.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1066.

⁶ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1073.

⁷ Reu, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, pp. 186-188.

The Lalsot campaign gave the Rajputs a temporary respite but "no final deliverance". While on his retreat after that campaign Mahadji Sindhia had sworn to reduce Jaipur and Jodhpur to ashes. His chance came in 1790. In that year Ismail Beg induced the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur to join him against Mahadji Sindhia. Sindhia detached an army under the command of Gopal Bhau and De Boigne to punish Ismail Beg and crush the Rajputs. A decisive battle was fought at Patan (in the Shekhawat territory) on June 20, 1790, in which De Boigne's skilful generalship secured a great victory for his master.¹

When the news of this battle reached Sindhia at Mathura, he determined to press home the advantage, and complete the subjugation of the Rajput States, which had asserted, and maintained, their independence since the battle of Tunga or Lalsot. He now ordered De Boigne to invade Jodhpur, and reduce the Raja to submission. De Boigne invested Ajmer "which, lying, as it did, half way between Jaipur and Jodhpur, was the key of the country"; but, finding that it was not possible to take it by a *coup de main*, he left a detachment to continue the siege, and marched with the rest of his army towards Jodhpur. Anxious to wipe out the shame of Patan, Bijay Singh summoned to his standard every Rathor between 14 and 60 years of age capable of wielding a sword. About 30,000 Rathors met De Boigne at Merta², a large walled city, nearly 30 miles to the east of Ajmer. Again De Boigne's skill and presence of mind secured a decisive victory³ (September 10, 1790). The terms imposed on Bijay Singh were severe, and included, in addition to a contribution of sixty *lakhs* of rupees,⁴ the cession of the district of Ajmer⁵. For about ten years Jodhpur did not again venture to challenge the Marathas⁶.

Tod says that the last years of Bijay Singh's life were "engrossed by sentimental folly with a young beauty of the Oswal tribe, on whom he lavished all the honours due to his legitimate

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 19-26.

² "Merta has been rightly called the Gateway of Marwar, and here every invader of the Rathor Kingdom has been first opposed".—Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Modern Review*, January, 1944.


³ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 27-39.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1074.

⁵ Ajmer fort was surrendered to Sindhia on March 7, 1791.

⁶ See Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 57-60.

queens".¹ According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, she was a religious mate² rather than a concubine, and "their union may fairly be called a morganatic marriage." In any case, Bijay Singh's infatuation for her created many troubles, not the least harmful of which was a disputed succession. She controlled the administration through a horse-tamer named Bhairo Sani. She secured for her son Tej Singh the important "fief" of Merta. After his death in 1785 she intrigued to secure the *gadi* for Man Singh, whom she "put into her lap" (*i.e.* adopted as her son). The nobles, whom her tyranny had already alienated, refused to accept this arrangement for the perpetuation of her control. Their choice fell on Bhim Singh.



Now began an era of terror and murder. The aged and faithful minister, Khub-chand Singhavi, was murdered, along with his brother and eldest son, by the all-powerful "beauty". She also poisoned Guman Singh. Her enemies—the discontented nobles—murdered her paramour, a minister named Bijay Singh, in January, 1792, and four months later they murdered her. Bijay Singh, old and infirm, was shut out of the capital for about a year (April, 1792—March, 1793). He died on July 8, 1793. At the time of his death this miserable Prince left "his dominions curtailed, his chiefs in rebellion, his sons and grandsons opposed to each other".³

Bijay Singh was succeeded by his grandson, Bhim Singh (1793—1803), who superseded the legitimate claim of his uncle,

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1075.

² Bijay Singh was a Vaishnav of the Vallabhachari sect. He treated the "young beauty of the Oswal tribe" as his Radha.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1075-1077.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 53-57.

Zalim Singh. The latter was "defeated and forced to seek shelter at Udaipur where, with an ample domain from the Rana, his relative on the maternal side, he passed the rest of his days in literary pursuits". All other rival claimants to the throne were removed in the Mughal fashion. Of Bijay Singh's other surviving sons, Sardar Singh was murdered and Sher Singh was blinded. Sometime later Sher Singh 'released himself from life by dashing out his brains.' Sur Singh, a grandson of Bijay Singh, "fell a sacrifice with the others". A single claimant alone remained to disturb Bhim Singh's repose—Man Singh, placed beyond the usurper's reach within the walls of Jalor. That stronghold remained under siege for about ten years, and at the very moment when Man Singh's surrender was becoming inevitable, Bhim Singh died.¹

During Bhim Singh's reign Daulat Rao Sindhia's officers in Northern India frequently threatened the Rajput States. On April 23, 1796, William Palmer, Resident with Sindhia, wrote to the Governor-General about Lakhwa Dada: "His present intention is to proceed to Jodhpur, Jaipur, and Kotah, probably only for the purpose of levying contribution. But the Rajahs of those countries seem to be apprehensive that his designs are to make permanent acquisitions of territory, subvert their Government, an enterprise too arduous in the present state of the Maratha force on this side of India, and while Daulat Rao is engaged in a serious contest in the Deccan."² In 1796—97 the Rajput rulers talked half-heartedly of organising coalitions against Sindhia.³ Lakhwa Dada overran Mewar in 1799 and defeated the Jaipur-Jodhpur coalition in the battle of Malpura on April 16, 1800.⁴ He was, however, suddenly dismissed by Sindhia. On May 30, 1800, Collins, Resident with Sindhia, reported that "Lakhwa has entered into most solemn engagements with the vakils of Raja Bhim Singh to defend the Jodhpur dominions should they be invaded by Mr. Perron, either on account of arrears of tribute or any other pretext." Lakhwa Dada's family and property found a safe shelter at Jodhpur. His agreement with Bhim Singh was

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1077-1080. It was suspected that Man Singh's cause was supported by "the high priest of Marwar, the spiritual leader of the Rathors", who poisoned Bhim Singh.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, p. 56.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, pp. 65, 92-93.

⁴ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 159-162.

not unknown to Perron. Collins wrote on June 9, 1800 : "Mr. Perron, who is fully apprized of the engagements which the vakils of Raja Bhim Singh have entered into with the disaffected Maratha Chiefs, has commenced his march towards the Jodhpur territories with force for the purpose either of detaching the Raja of that country from his connexion with Lakhwa, or of punishing him should his admonitions to this effect be disregarded by the Rajput Prince". A month later he reported that Perron had successfully "intimidated the Jodhpur Raja into an acceptance of his own terms". Within a fortnight, however, he was "obliged to relinquish his objects in Jodhpur, and to march for Saharanpur in order to quell some disturbances" created by Lakhwa Dada's followers there. After Perron's departure Bhim Singh continued his intrigues with Lakhwa Dada.¹

CHARACTER OF MAN SINGH

Man Singh, whom the sudden death of Bhim Singh placed on the *gadi* of Marwar, was a remarkable man. During his long reign of about forty years (1803—1843) he passed through many vicissitudes of fortune. Tod, who knew him personally, has left for us a vivid description of his appearance and character. "In person," says he, "the Raja is above the common height, possessing considerable dignity of manner, though accompanied by the stiffness of habitual restraint. His demeanour was commanding and altogether princely ; but there was an entire absence of that natural majesty and grace which distinguished the prince of Udaipur,² who won without exertion our spontaneous homage. The features of Raja Man are good : his eye is full of intelligence : and though the *ensemble* of his countenance almost denotes benevolence, yet there is ever and anon a doubtful expression, which, with a peculiarly formed forehead, gave a momentary cast of malignity to it. The biography of Man Singh would afford a remarkable picture of human patience, fortitude, and constancy, never surpassed in any age or country. But in this school of adversity he also took lessons of cruelty : he learned therein to master or rather disguise his passions ; and though he showed not the ferocity of the tiger, he acquired the still more dangerous attribute of that animal—its cunning. I received the most convincing proofs

¹ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. IX, pp. 20, 22, 30, 33,

² Rana Bhim Singh.

of his intelligence, and minute knowledge of the past history, not of his own country alone, but of India in general. He was remarkably well read..... Whether the first gratification of vengeance provoked his appetite, or whether the torrent of his rage, once impelled into motion, became too impetuous to be checked, so that his reason was actually disturbed by the sufferings he had undergone, it is certain he grew a demoniac; nor could any one, who had conversed with the bland, the gentlemanly, I might say gentle, Raja Man, have imagined that he concealed under this exterior a heart so malignant as his subsequent acts evinced."¹ Such was the man who presided over the destiny of Marwar in the tumult and strife of the early years of the nineteenth century.

MARWAR'S FIRST TREATY WITH THE COMPANY

Man Singh's position at the time of his accession was extremely critical. Sawai Singh of Pokaran, one of the leading chiefs of Marwar, who had to avenge the murder of his grandfather by Bijay Singh², "put himself in hostility" to the new ruler. In Tod's picturesque language, he held his sword "suspended over the head of Raja Man from his enthronement to his death hour". He discovered a rival candidate for the *gadi* in a posthumous son of Bhim Singh. The infant was named Dhonkal Singh. For the time being, however, Sawai Singh's plot did not succeed, for the child was born under suspicious circumstances, and his legitimacy was not generally acknowledged.³

Meanwhile the Second Anglo-Maratha War had begun, and Lord Wellesley had decided to use the Rajput States as "a barrier against the return of the Marathas to the northern parts of Hindustan".⁴ Accordingly treaties were concluded with Jaipur and Jodhpur in December, 1803. Man Singh's position was then so critical owing to internal troubles created by Sawai Singh's intrigues that he did not hesitate to take advantage of an alliance with the rising British power. The terms of the treaty⁵ were similar to those granted by Lord Lake to Jaipur. "A firm and permanent friendship and alliance" was established between the two States, and it was agreed that "the friends and

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 823, 849.

² See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1070-1071.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1080-1082.

⁴ Secret Consultations, September 6, 1804, No. 6. Cf. Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1368.

⁵ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 157-158.

enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both." Jodhpur was thus definitely implicated in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The Company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jodhpur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If "any enemy" (*i.e.*, the Marathas) "evinced a disposition to invade" British territory, the ruler of Jodhpur would "send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army and.....exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy." As the Company guaranteed "the security of his country against external enemies," Man Singh agreed also to submit to the British Government any "misunderstanding" that might arise between him and any other State. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to "the obstinacy of the opposite party," the Company would grant military assistance to Jodhpur, provided the Jodhpur Government paid "the charge of the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindustan." He would also "act, during the time of war or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the commander of the English army.....employed with his troops." Moreover, he would not "entertain in his service, or in any other manner give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Company's Government."

Although Lord Wellesley ratified this treaty, Man Singh refused to ratify it and proposed another. He also entered into negotiations with Jaswant Rao Holkar and even helped him by giving shelter to his family. The British authorities were naturally exasperated, and the treaty was cancelled in May, 1804.

Soon, however, Man Singh was confronted with a serious difficulty. Daulat Rao Sindhia demanded contributions from him. Unable to defend himself against Sindhia's powerful army, Man Singh appealed for help to Lord Lake. Lord Wellesley decided that the Company had no obligation to help the Raja, for the treaty had not come into force at all. Under the circumstances the Company had no right "of withholding Daulat Rao Sindhia from the prosecution of any demands upon the Raja of Jodhpur excepting only in the event of their being prosecuted under the denomination of tribute payable to the Emperor Shah Alam," for "such exactions on the part of Sindhia would be a violation of the 12th article of the treaty of peace by which Sindhia renounced

all concern in the affairs of the Emperor." Major Malcolm, acting Resident with Sindhia, was, therefore, requested to demand from Sindhia "an explanation of the nature and extent of those demands, or at least a disavowal of any intention to make those demands under the denomination of tribute to the Emperor"¹ (May, 1804). Sindhia adopted a policy of hesitation. Man Singh, free from immediate danger, instructed his *vakils* to inform Lord Lake that he did not want military assistance from the Company "in the event of either internal commotion or external attack." Yet he was anxious for a treaty. Malcolm wrote in September, 1805, that "his sole object seemed to be the attainment of the avowed countenance of the British Government, and to have the security of written engagement for its never adopting the cause of his enemies."²

In May, 1806, Man Singh sent a *vakil* to Mercer, Resident at Sindhia's court, with the object of concluding a treaty of alliance with the Company.³ This proposal was rejected by Sir George Barlow on two grounds: "By the 8th Article of the treaty concluded with Daulat Rao Sindhia in the month of November, 1805, the British Government is pledged not to contract any treaty with the State of Jodhpur; but independently of that consideration the system of policy adopted by the British Government in regard to all the Chiefs and States with which we are unconnected by defensive alliance opposes the expediency of extending our connection with any of those Chiefs and States beyond the limits of mere amity and concord."⁴

STRUGGLE BETWEEN JODHPUR AND JAIPUR

Meanwhile Sawai Singh's persistent intrigues had borne fruit: Man Singh had become involved in a desperate struggle with Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur. Both of them wanted to marry Krishnakumari, a princess of Mewar. Behind this matrimonial rivalry there loomed larger questions of social prestige and balance of power. Daulat Rao Sindhia's intervention in the dispute created new complications. A temporary compromise was made in August, 1806, but Jagat Singh did not give up his plan of marrying Krishnakumari.

¹ Secret Consultations, September 6, 1804, No. 6.

² Secret Consultations, September 9, 1805, No. 63.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, Nos. 182, 185, 186.

⁴ Secret Consultations, June 26, 1806, No. 33.

Soon afterwards the old feud between Jodhpur and Jaipur flared up again at the instigation of crafty Sawai Singh. With a view to bring the administration of Jodhpur under his own control he tried to depose Man Singh with the assistance of Jagat Singh and to get his nominee Dhonkal Singh recognised as the legitimate ruler of Jodhpur. Sawai Singh was a very shrewd man. He posed as a friend of Man Singh and at the same time tried secretly to endanger his position by bringing about a renewal of the struggle with Jaipur. He requested Jagat Singh to marry Krishnakumari as soon as possible ; at the same time he "intimated to Raja Man that he would be eternally disgraced if he allowed the Prince of Amber to carry off the betrothed". As Tod says, "The bait was greedily swallowed by Man Singh". Preparations were at once undertaken for war. The bait was swallowed also by Raichand, the ambitious *Dewan* of Jaipur, who hoped that "if Man Singh could be deposed, then his influence would rule both the principalities, besides having the ascendancy at Udaipur through the marriage of the Raja with the Princess".¹ Raichand was an able man. He succeeded in enlisting the support of Sindhia,² Sharza Rao Ghatge (who was at this time the *de facto* ruler of Mewar), Amir Khan and Surat Singh of Bikaner. A powerful group of Jodhpur nobles, led by Sawai Singh, joined him.³

The policy of Jaswant Rao Holkar was uncertain, as usual. Man Singh appealed to him for assistance. At first he wanted to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Jaipur and Jodhpur. In December, 1806, Mercer, British Resident with Sindhia, wrote to the Governor-General that Holkar "had written to the Rana of Udaipur dissuading him from encouraging the Jaipur Raja's views, but declaring at the same time, that he himself was not engaged to assist either party".⁴ It was confidently believed by the British authorities that "if his endeavours (for peace) were ineffectual, he would take part with Man Singh, of whose services, in giving an asylum to his family during the late war with

¹ Prinsep, *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldier of Fortune*, p. 312.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 208.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 216.

Secret Consultations, March 19, 1807, No. 3.

Political Consultations, January 29, 1807, No. 32.

⁴ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 209.

the British Government, he seems to entertain the most grateful sense." He sent a *vakil* to Jaipur "to dissuade the Raja from going to war." In reply, Jagat Singh entreated him to take no part in the contest and offered him four *lakhs* of rupees as the price of his neutrality. Then Holkar made what British officials described as 'a proposal of desperate nature.' In January, 1807, he sent a *vakil* to the British Resident in Delhi with the proposal that, "if the British Government would give its consent to the measure, assist him with two battalions of sepoys, and settle what his share of the conquest was to be, he would take possession of the country of Jaipur, which produced a revenue of nearly a crore of rupees."¹ The Resident was directed by the Government to express "an unqualified rejection of this proposal in mild and amicable terms."² This rebuff led to an unexpected change in Holkar's policy; he made terms with Jaipur. Tod says, "Raja Man had only the gratitude of Holkar to reckon upon for aid, to whose wife and family he had given sanctuary when pursued by Lord Lake to the Attock. But here Sawai again foiled him; and the Maratha, then only eighteen miles from Man, and who had promised to join him next day, made a sudden movement to the south. A bribe of £100,000..... effected this desertion."³

After some hesitation⁴ Jagat Singh assumed the leadership of the anti-Jodhpur coalition. In January, 1807, Dhonkal Singh was brought to Jaipur and publicly acknowledged as the legitimate ruler of Jodhpur.⁵ Seton, Resident in Delhi, was anxious to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, for, he thought, "an amicable

¹ Secret Consultations, January 29, 1807, No. 13.

² Secret Consultations, January 29, 1807, No. 16.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1084. A British officer reported on March 1, 1807, that Holkar "has certainly taken money from both and made fair promises to both." (Secret Consultations, March 19, 1807, No. 3). On February 24, 1807, the Resident in Delhi received reliable information to the effect that Holkar had joined Jaipur. (Secret Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 2).

⁴ Mercer reported on November 29, 1806, ".....the known imbecility of the Jaipur Court renders it improbable that the Raja will persevere in this object at the risk of a war with Raja Man Singh assisted by Holkar." (Political Consultations, January 1, 1807, No. 32). On January 15, 1807, the Resident in Delhi wrote to the Supreme Government, "The Raja of Jaipur appears to want steadiness, which renders it difficult to form a judgment of what he may ultimately determine upon." (Political Consultations, February 5, 1807, No. 126).

⁵ Political Consultations, February 5, 1807, No. 127.

accommodation between the two Rajas would in a political point of weight be beneficial to our interest, since their going to war might eventually tend to increase the power of the Marathas."¹ When the preparations for war were complete he informed the Supreme Government that "the circumstance of so large a force being collected in the vicinity of our dominions could not be received with perfect indifference."² But the policy so long pursued by the British authorities had to be given up if active efforts were to be made for bringing about "an amicable accommodation" between Jagat Singh and Man Singh. For such a change the authorities were not yet ready.

Man Singh prepared himself for the impending contest and marched at the head of his army to Parbatsar (January, 1807) to resist the pretender's supporters.³ While he was waiting there for the arrival of the Jaipur army, Sharza Rao Ghatge, re-inforced by a body of Jaipur troops led by Jiwan Chela, attacked Jodhpur territory from the south and advanced as far as Pali.⁴ He was, however, defeated and repulsed from Jodhpur territory. For a moment Man Singh became cheerful, but the discovery of "a treacherous communication between his *Thākurs* and those attached to Dhonkal Singh" completely un-nerved him.⁵ Four chieftains alone remained loyal to him. He was induced by his friends to "trust to the fleetness of his steed."⁶ "The Raja remarked, he was the first of his race who ever disgraced the name of Rathor by showing his back to a Kachhwaha."⁷ He reached Merta in safety, but deeming it incapable of long resistance, he continued his flight and reached Jodhpur with a slender retinue. After his departure from Parbatsar the place was plundered by Amir Khan and Bala Rao Ingle, one of Sindhia's commanders.

While these incidents were happening in Rajputana, the Resident in Delhi was informed by the Rao Raja of Kotah that Sindhia, Holkar and the Raja of Jaipur had entered into a secret

¹ Political Consultations, January 29, 1807, No. 32.

² Secret Consultations, March 19, 1807, No. 3.

³ Political Consultations, February 5, 1807, No. 92.

⁴ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, Nos. 211, 224.

⁵ Political Consultations, April 23, 1807, No. 25.

⁶ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 225.

⁷ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1084.

league to attack the Company's dominions.¹ Seton forwarded the Rao Raja's letter to the Governor-General with the following observations : "It does not appear to me that the Raja of Jaipur can be so blind to his interest, nay to his safety, as wantonly to engage in a war of aggression which, whatever its result, must involve him in distress, since the aggrandisement of the Marathas would confirm his dependence, and the success of the British Government might cause the loss of his capital, and eventually that of his dominions." He added that a cordial co-operation between Sindhia and Holkar was 'hardly to be expected.'² The Supreme Government agreed with this conclusion and observed that 'in every point of view' the Rao Raja's report 'exceeded the limits of reasonable contemplation.'³ Mercer officially expressed his "entire disbelief of the information given, unsupported as it appears to be by either collateral evidence or probability."⁴ The matter ended there.

Jagat Singh left his capital in January and slowly proceeded towards Jodhpur territory.⁵ Holkar's attitude was still uncertain.⁶ Jagat Singh's plan was to occupy Jodhpur, to place Dhonkal Singh on the Rathor throne and then to proceed towards Udaipur for the celebration of his marriage with Krishnakumari.⁷ Holkar's support was probably purchased early in February.⁸ The Resident in Delhi informed the Supreme Government in March : "It is stated that Holkar's *Sardars* are both amazed and discontented at his abandonment of Man Singh, and that the circumstance is likely to cause desertion in his army."⁹ Towards the end of February Raichand, the Jaipur *Dewan*, purchased Amir Khan's support by the prompt payment of a *lakh* of rupees.¹⁰ The Pindaris attached to his camp at once "received orders to proceed

¹ Secret Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 2A.

² Secret Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 2.

³ Secret Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 5.

⁴ Secret Consultations, June 11, 1807, No. 12.

⁵ Political Consultations, February 5, 1807, Nos. 127, 128 ; February 12, 1807, Nos. 94, 95, 96.

⁶ Political Consultations, February 12, 1807, No. 96.

⁷ Political Consultations, February 12, 1807, No. 97.

⁸ Political Consultations, February 26, 1807, Nos. 26, 29.

⁹ Political Consultations, March 19, 1807, No. 21. On March 28 Mercer wrote, "Holkar's conduct towards Raja Man Singh is reprobated even in this *Durbar*, and his influence and authority with both parties has certainly suffered by it". (Political Consultations, April 23, 1807, No. 25).

¹⁰ Political Consultations, March 19, 1807, No. 21.

into the country of Jodhpur, for the purpose of laying it waste." The Resident in Delhi heard a rumour to the effect that Holkar had it "in contemplation to assist Raja Man Singh indirectly by permitting certain of his *Sardars* to join that chieftain provided the Raja agreed to pay him seven *lakhs* of rupees, it being understood that Holkar was not to appear to countenance the conduct of his *Sardars*."¹ Naturally the Jaipur *Durbar* delayed payment. Holkar tried "to force a speedy conclusion of it" by plundering some villages in Jaipur territory.²

It is extremely difficult to give a consistent account of the movements of Holkar and Sindhia at this juncture. Neither of them pursued anything like a consistent policy. In February Mercer wrote to the Supreme Government, "I am fully convinced that the views of both Sindhia and Holkar are confined at present to the object of obtaining money from both parties and that neither of them are inclined to engage in actual hostilities with the other; yet it appears difficult to surmise how this object can be prosecuted by both without the risk of an open rupture. The consequence of Holkar's retiring from an interference in the present dispute, on the receipt of a sum of money from the Jaipur Raja, would be a decided superiority of influence and authority with all the Rajput States in favour of Sindhia, who would remain the sole arbiter."³

We have already referred to Man Singh's flight to Jodhpur. His enemies expected that, instead of holding out in the capital, which had no means of defence, he would take shelter in Jalor. But at the suggestion of a loyal officer Man Singh decided to defend the capital. He collected troops and "formed a garrison of five thousand men, on whom he could depend."⁴ The *Sardars* who still stood by him took a special oath of loyalty, and this "greatly revived the drooping spirit of the Raja."⁵

Meanwhile the Jaipur army was advancing unopposed through Jodhpur territory. Everywhere the *Sardars* were won over and "the name and authority" of Dhonkal Singh were imposed.

¹ Political Consultations, March 19, 1807, No. 37. Some troops were allowed by Holkar to join Man Singh, but they took no part in the operations. (Political Consultations, April 23, 1807, No. 25).

² Political Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 38.

³ Political Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 38.

⁴ Political Consultations, April 9, 1807, No. 25.

⁵ Political Consultations, March 26, 1807, No. 38.

Naturally the influence of Sawai Singh was found most useful. The city and fortress of Nagor were occupied. On April 1 the main body of the army, under the command of Amir Khan and Chand Singh, reached Jodhpur. On the following day the erection of batteries began.¹ Two weeks later Man Singh evacuated the town of Jodhpur and retired into the fort.²

Then the troubles of the besieging army began. In the Jaipur camp there was "the utmost distress for want of money and provisions of every description." Some of those Rathor *Sardars* who had espoused the cause of Dhonkal Singh were so much exhausted by their sufferings and disgusted with the depredations committed in their country by the invaders that they deserted Jagat Singh with their followers. Jagat Singh's troubles were increased by the arrival of a detachment of Sindhia's troops at Ajmer. It was rumoured that Sindhia wanted to set up a rival claimant to the throne of Jaipur if Jagat Singh refused to pay him a large sum of money without delay.³ Twelve *lakhs* of rupees were paid to Ambaji Ingle, and for the time being Sindhia was pacified.⁴

But misfortune now obstructed Jagat Singh at every step. When his troops clamoured for pay, he requested Sawai Singh and other Rathor Chieftains to contribute to military expenses. "This appeal proved a test of their zeal." They proceeded direct to the camp of Amir Khan. "It required no powerful rhetoric to detach him from the cause (of Jaipur) and prevail upon him to advocate that of Raja Man; nor could they have given him better counsel towards this end, than the proposal to carry the war into the enemy's country: to attack and plunder Jaipur, now left unguarded."⁵ As soon as Amir Khan's hostile intentions became clear, Jagat Singh directed his Commander-in-Chief, Sheolal, to attack him. After a defeat near Kishangarh Amir Khan fled towards Jaipur, hotly pursued by Sheolal. "Astonished at his own success, and little aware that the chase was in the direction projected by his enemy, Sheolal deemed he had accomplished his orders in driving him out of Marwar." He left his camp and repaired to the city of Jaipur "to partake of its festivi-

¹ Political Consultations, April 30, 1807, No. 28.

² Political Consultations, May 7, 1807, No. 22.

³ Political Consultations, June 11, 1807, No. 16.

⁴ Political Consultations, September 1, 1807, No. 6A.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1087.

ties.”¹ Amir Khan “availed himself of the imprudent absence of his foe,” inflicted a crushing defeat on Sheolal’s troops, and captured their camp, guns, and equipment (August 18, 1807). He followed up this victory by a hurried march to Jaipur, and the capital of Jagat Singh was “dismayed by the presence of the victor at her gates.”²

This unexpected development at once broke up the confederacy against Man Singh. The Raja of Bikaner marched home ; Jagat Singh raised the siege of the Jodhpur fort and started for Jaipur. He knew that his retreat was likely to be intercepted. So he bribed Sindhia’s commanders, Bapu Sindhia, Bala Rao Ingle, and Jean Baptiste, to escort him in safety to his capital. Even Amir Khan was bribed, so that he might not attack him on his way. In order to speed up the retreat Jagat Singh burnt his tents and equipage at every stage. At length he had to kill with his own hand his favourite elephant, which, says Tod, “wanted speed for the rapidity of his flight.” In spite of these humiliating precautions Jagat Singh was defeated near the frontier of Marwar by some Rathor Chieftains.³ He reached Jaipur in October.⁴

Amir Khan now held the destiny of Rajputana within his grip. Those Rathor Chiefs who had intercepted Jagat Singh’s retreat thought that it was necessary for them to secure the continuance of Amir Khan’s aid and, with the financial assistance of the Raja of Kishangarh, who belonged to the Rathor clan, two *lakhs* of rupees were paid.⁵ Towards the close of August Amir Khan reached Merta at the head of these Rathor Chiefs, and invited Man Singh, who was still at Jodhpur, to join him in order that with their united forces they might capture Nagor, where Sawai Singh had taken shelter with Dhonkal Singh. Amir Khan’s treachery towards Jagat Singh and his insatiable greed for money had filled Man Singh’s mind with anxiety and distrust.

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1087.

² Political Consultations, September 1, 1807, Nos. 6A, 14A : September 8, 1807, No. 13A. The Rani of Jaipur appealed to the Rao Raja of Kotah for help and took measures for the defence of the capital. (Political Consultations, September 8, 1807, No. 24 ; September 15, 1807, Nos. 3, 5).

³ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1088.

⁴ Political Consultations, October 26, 1807, No. 21 ; November 16, 1807, No. 1.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1089.

He replied that owing to want of money and provisions it was not possible for him to leave Jodhpur at that time. The Resident in Delhi reported, "It is probable that the Raja thinks it safer to trust to the effects of time and to the efforts of his countrymen than to place himself in the power of one so capricious and so devoid of good faith as Amir Khan....."¹

But Man Singh found himself compelled to surrender to Amir Khan. The fortress of Nagor, protected by a double chain of walls and garrisoned by Sindhia's battalions, was too strong to be occupied by Jodhpur troops alone. It was absolutely necessary to occupy it, for Dhonkal Singh was there. So Man Singh concluded an agreement with Amir Khan,² received him at Jodhpur with "distinguished honours", and interchanged turbans with him.³ From Jodhpur Amir Khan marched towards Nagor, which he had decided to occupy by treachery unparalleled even in the history of that faithless age. His intrigues compelled Jean Baptiste and Bapu Sindhia to withdraw their protection from the fort.⁴ Then he met Sawai Singh, threw out hints on Man Singh's ungrateful return for his services, and induced the Rathor Chief to conclude an agreement with him in favour of Dhonkal Singh. On an appointed morning Sawai Singh visited Amir Khan's camp, attended by the chief adherents of Dhonkal Singh and about 500 followers. The tragedy may be best described in Tod's words: "A spacious tent was pitched in the centre of his camp for the reception of his guests, and cannon were loaded with grape ready to be turned against them. The visitors were received with the most distinguished courtesy; turbans were again exchanged, the dancing-girls were introduced, and nothing but festivity was apparent. The Khan arose, and making an excuse to his guests for a momentary absence, retired. The dancing continued, when at the word '*dhaga*', pronounced by the musicians, down sank the tent upon the unsuspecting Rajputs, who fell an easy prey to the ferocious Pathans" (March, 1808).⁵

Dhonkal Singh was now altogether helpless. He saved himself by a hasty flight from Nagor. That city was plundered by

¹ Political Consultations, October 26, 1807, No. 20.

² Prinsep, *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldiers of Fortune*, p. 348.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1089.

⁴ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 243.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1090.

Political Consultations, August 29, 1808, No. 58.

Amir Khan and the spoils, including 300 pieces of cannon, were sent to his strongholds. After this terrible feat he returned to Jodhpur, and realised ten *lakhs* in cash and two large towns yielding thirty thousand rupees per year "as the reward of his signal infamy." Man Singh took vengeance on all followers of Dhonkal Singh, including the Raja of Bikaner,¹ who surrendered after bitter fighting (May-December, 1808).²

After the fall of the pretender and the submission of Surat Singh, Man Singh sought Sindhia's aid. Close, Resident with Sindhia, wrote to Lord Minto on December 24, 1808: "The Raja's attention is now anxiously directed to revenge the injuries formerly offered to him by Raja Jagat Singh and to renew with Sindhia's support the subject of his marriage with the Rana of Udaipur's daughter. Large offers are accordingly made to Sindhia to engage him in his views, but it appears to be the present policy of this Government to temporize with a view to reap advantages from both the Rajput States." Close was right; Sindhia's only desire was to fish in troubled waters.³

AMIR KHAN'S ASCENDANCY IN MARWAR

One reason for Man Singh's failure to pursue the feud with Jaipur was the growing influence of Amir Khan in his own State. He found that he was no longer the master of his own dominions. As Tod says, Amir Khan was now "the arbiter of Marwar." He stationed his garrisons in strong fortresses like Nagor and Nawa. He partitioned the lands of Merta among his followers. Man Singh found himself in an intolerable position.⁴ After some years of suffering he requested Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, to revive the treaty of 1803. Metcalfe gave a straight refusal, saying that "independently of the policy by which the British Government in India was guided, and which led it generally to avoid such alliance, there were now additional obstacles to a treaty with Jodhpur founded on certain articles of our treaties with Sindhia and Holkar"⁵ (April, 1814). The unfortunate

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1090-1091.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 270.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, Nos. 270, 272, 281, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

⁵ *Political Consultations*, April 22, 1814, No. 11.

Raja was then compelled to agree to pay Amir Khan 18 *lakhs* of rupees by instalments.¹

In October, 1815, Amir Khan murdered a minister and the chief priest of Man Singh² in return for seven *lakhs* of rupees paid by their enemies.³ Metcalfe reported that "either the Raja or some powerful party in the Fort (of Jodhpur) must have been accessory to the murder of the ministers."⁴ According to Tod, some people thought that Man Singh had consented to the murder of the minister, but when he found that the minister's death "incidentally involved" the death of his chief priest, his reason was affected: "He shut himself up in his apartments, refused to communicate with any one, and soon omitted every duty, whether political or religious."⁵ So the Chiefs of the State compelled him to transfer full political authority to his only son, Chhattar Singh, to be exercised by the latter as Regent. Although this arrangement was "compulsory", Man Singh "went through the ceremony necessary on the occasion, in public, with apparent willingness".⁶ The helpless ministers were trying in vain to maintain a balance between Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia,⁷ both of whom were plundering Jodhpur territory. They did not renew overtures for an alliance with the Company, probably on account of "the systematic discouragement" with which the Resident in Delhi had received former proposals.⁸

MARWAR'S ALLIANCE WITH THE COMPANY

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris he found it necessary to take all Rajput States under British protection. In October, 1817, Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an engagement with Jodhpur. The Secretary to the Supreme Government observed, "Jodhpur is understood to be a country of small pecuniary resources, but the proverbial bravery of its inhabitants will enable that Government to bring forward a powerful body of

¹ Political Consultations, October 20, 1815, No. 47.

² Political Consultations, November 10, 1815, No. 14. See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 825.

³ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

⁴ Political Consultations, November 10, 1815, No. 16.

⁵ Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1091-1092.

⁶ Political Consultations, June 14, 1817, No. 13; August 15, 1817, No. 40.

⁷ Secret Consultations, June 11, 1816, No. 28; June 15, 1816, Nos. 10, 11; October 12, 1816, No. 16.

⁸ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

auxiliaries for the service of the British Government and the allied States. This should accordingly be the principal description of aid to be required from Jodhpur in the event of our establishing an intimate connection with that State. A pecuniary contribution, however, towards the expenses of the protecting force ought, if attainable, to be required from Jodhpur".¹

Although negotiations were opened by Metcalfe as soon as he received these instructions, no properly authorised *vakil* came to him even in November.² Then some *vakils* came, negotiations were carried on, and a treaty³ was concluded on January 6, 1818. It was ratified by Lord Hastings on January 16, 1818.

Article 1 provided for "perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests" between the two States. By Article 2 the British Government engaged "to protect the principality and territory of Jodhpur". By Article 3 Man Singh promised to "act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government", to acknowledge its supremacy, and not to "have any connection with other Chiefs and States." By Article 4 he promised not to enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government. Article 5 provided that all disputes between Marwar and other States would be submitted to "the arbitration and award" of the British Government.

With regard to the tribute payable by Man Singh, it was decided that the tribute hitherto paid to Sindhia (1,08,000 Jodhpur rupees) was to be paid in perpetuity to the Company, and that the engagements with Sindhia respecting tribute should cease. (Article 6). Man Singh declared that he had never paid any tribute to any other Power except Sindhia; so "if either Sindhia or any one else lay claim to tribute (from him) the British Government engages to reply to such claim". (Article 7). "This article", Metcalfe wrote on January 15, 1818, "is intended to give us a claim to any other tribute that Jodhpur may have paid to other States besides Sindhia, if any such has been concealed from us."⁴ The sums paid to Amir Khan were "not acknowledged to be in the way of tribute."⁵

¹ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817. No. 26.

² Secret Consultations, December 19, 1817, No. 112.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 159-161.

⁴ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 102.

⁵ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 102.

Article 8 ran as follows : "The State of Jodhpur shall furnish 1,500 horse for the service of the British Government whenever required ; and when necessary the whole of the Jodhpur force shall join the British army, excepting such a portion as may be requisite for the internal administration of the country". Metcalfe wanted "to obtain the services of a larger body of horse", but the *vakils* "protested solemnly that this was the utmost that the resources of the State could furnish in a condition of efficiency". The *vakils* demanded an assurance that the Jodhpur contingent should not be employed in the Deccan. Metcalfe agreed.¹

Article 9 provided that Man Singh would remain "absolute ruler" of his country and that the jurisdiction of the British Government should not be introduced into Jodhpur. The *vakils* requested Metcalfe to promise that the British Government would not listen to the Raja's relatives or Rajput *Thakurs* of the State if they submitted "self-interested proposals". Metcalfe replied that this was "understood" in the ninth article of the treaty.²

The *vakils* of Jodhpur also pressed some other demands, but they had to remain satisfied with Metcalfe's verbal assurances. Man Singh wanted to resume the *jagir* given under coercion to Amir Khan, to recover the fort of Amarkot occupied by an Amir of Sind, and to retain the *pargana* of Godwar secured from Mewar some years ago. Metcalfe promised that the British Government would not obstruct the Raja in these matters.³

At the time when this treaty was concluded the government was in the hands of Chhattar Singh,⁴ but he died soon after the

¹ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 102. Tod says that Man Singh disapproved "the article relating to the armed contingent of his vassals to be at the disposal of the protecting power, in which he wisely saw the germ of discord, from the certainty of interference it would lead to". No explicit reference was made in the final treaty to the contingents of the vassals.

² Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 102. In his letter to the Supreme Government, dated January 15, 1818, Metcalfe observed that some of the Chiefs of Marwar were disaffected against the government of the Prince Regent. If the latter applied for British assistance against those Chiefs, Metcalfe suggested that the application should be refused. He pointed out that "the *Thakurs* have rights as well as the Raja, and we could not undertake to enforce obedience, without ascertaining that we were not about to become the instruments of oppression".

³ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 102.

⁴ Secret Consultations, February 6, 1818, No. 102.

ratification of the treaty. He was a dissolute youngman quite incapable of dealing with the critical situation in which he was placed. He submitted himself to the guidance of evil counsellors who administered to his follies and accumulated wealth. Tod says : " youth and base panders to his pleasure seduced him from his duties, and he died, some say the victim of illicit pursuits, others from a wound given by the hand of one of the chieftains, whose daughter he attempted to seduce."¹

LAST YEARS OF MAN SINGH

At the time of Chhattar Singh's death the government was actually managed by an oligarchy headed by Salim Singh² of Pokaran, one of the principal *Sardars* of the State, who was closely associated with the Dewan, Akhai Chand. Tod says, "All the garrisons and offices of trust throughout the country were held by the creatures of a junto, of which these were the heads." After the death of Chhattar Singh "the Pokaran faction," dreading Man Singh's resumption of government, tried to adopt the only son of the Ruler of Idar as their sovereign. The Ruler of Idar refused to accept this offer unless it was supported by all the *Sardars* of Marwar. Such unanimity was found unattainable, for many *Sardars* disliked the "Pokaran faction." That "faction" had, therefore, no alternative except the restoration of Man Singh.

Even after his restoration Man Singh took no active interest in the affairs of the State. Tod says, "He listened to all with the most apathetic indifference." Salim Singh continued to control the administration with the title of *Bhanjgarh* and Akhai Chand retained his office of *Dewan*. Man Singh seemed to have forgotten their previous hostility to himself during the Regency of his son. He acted "as an automaton, moving as the Dewan pleased." All the garrisons were occupied by troops under the control of the "Pokaran faction"; all offices of trust were filled by their followers. "The name of justice was unknown." The Pathan mercenaries³ did not receive their pay; "they were to be seen begging in the streets of the capital, or hawking bundles of forge on their heads to preserve them from starvation." The

¹ Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1091.

² He was the son of Sawai Singh, who had set up Dhonkal Singh as the rival of Man Singh.

³ At one time Man Singh had a corps of 3,500 foot, and 1,500 horse, with 25 guns, commanded by Hindal Khan, a native of Panipat.

nucleus of an opposition to the selfish and oppressive "Pokaran-faction" had been already formed by Fatehraj, the brother of the murdered minister Induraj, the victim of Amir Khan's treachery; but for the time being what appeared to be the blind support of Man Singh enabled Salim Singh and Akhai Chand to act as they pleased.

"The total disorganization of the government" in Marwar did not escape the notice of the British authorities. In December, 1818, a British officer named F. Wilder, who was at that time Superintendent of the district of Ajmer, was deputed to report on the actual condition of Marwar. He was instructed to offer the assistance of the British Government for the restoration of peace and order in the State. In a private interview with Man Singh Mr. Wilder offered to place troops at his disposal. The crafty Raja declined this offer, for he knew quite well that the employment of British troops for internal administration would inevitably lead to British "dictation and interference" in the internal affairs of the State. He told Mr. Wilder that he placed "reliance on himself to restore his State to order." At the same time he "failed not to disseminate the impression amongst his chiefs" that British troops were ready to come to his rescue. Tod aptly remarks, "He felt that the lever was at hand to crush faction to the dust: and with a Machiavellian caution, he determined that the existence of this engine should suffice; that its power should be felt, but never seen; that he should enjoy all the advantages this influence would give, without risking any of its dangers if called into action."

Unable to convince Man Singh that "his affairs were irretrievable without the direct aid of the paramount power," Mr. Wilder returned to Ajmer in February, 1819. In the same month Tod had the political duties of Marwar added to those of Udaipur, Kotah, Bundi and Sirohi. He reached Jodhpur in November, 1819, and found matters in nearly the same state as on Mr. Wilder's departure. During his stay of nearly three weeks Tod repeatedly assured Man Singh of the full support of the British Government and requested him to utilise it for the welfare of the State. Man Singh's response was the same as it had been in the case of Mr. Wilder's exhortations. The problems which confronted the Raja at that time were thus summarised by Tod:

- "1. Forming an efficient administration.

2. Consideration of the finances ; the condition of the crown lands ; the feudal confiscations, which, often unjust, had caused great discontent.

3. The re-organisation and settlement of foreign troops¹ on whose service the Raja chiefly depended.

4. An effective police on all the frontiers, to put down the wholesale pillage of the Mairs in the south, the Larkhanis in the north, and the desert Sahraes and Khosas in the west ; reformation of the tariff, or scale of duties on commerce, which were so heavy as almost to amount to prohibition ; and at the same time to provide for its security."

Instead of trying to solve these problems the *de facto* rulers of Marwar—Salim Singh and Akhai Chand—proceeded "to gratify ancient animosities" by striking at those *Sardars* who were not their camp-followers. Ghanerao, one of the eight principal "fiefs" in Marwar, was put under sequestration, and only released by a fine of more than a year's revenue. Several minor "fiefs", including Chandawal, which was one of the sixteen second class "fiefs", suffered in the same manner. At length Akhai Chand had the audacity to put his hand on Awa, the chief "fief" of Marwar ; but the proud Champawat *Sardar* defied the *Dewan*. Man Singh took shelter behind his "sequestered habits." Nobody knew whether he really approved the anti-feudal policy pursued by the "Pokaran faction." Tod says, "Gloom, mistrust, and resentment pervaded the whole feudal body. They saw a contemptible faction sporting with their honour and possessions, from an idea they industriously propagated, that an unseen but mighty power was at hand to support their acts, given out as those of the prince." This position was quite intolerable to the proud *Sardars* of Marwar.

In 1820 Man Singh threw off the mask of insanity and in-

¹ Tod says, "The Rajas maintain a foreign mercenary force upon their fiscal revenues to overawe their own turbulent vassalage. They are chiefly Rohilla and Afghan infantry, armed with muskets and matchlocks ; and having cannon and sufficient discipline to act in a body, they are formidable to the Rajput cavaliers. . . . At one period the Raja maintained a foreign force amounting to, or at least mustered as, 11,000 men. of which number 2,500 were cavalry, with 55 guns, and a rocket establishment. Besides a monthly pay. lands to a considerable amount were granted to the commanders of the different legions. By these over-grown establishments, to maintain a superiority over the feudal lords. . . . , the demoralisation and ruin of this country have been accelerated."

flicted terrible punishment upon the "Pokaran faction." Among those treacherously killed were Akhai Chand, Nagji and Mulji Dandal. They, and other victims of the Raja's cruel wrath, were compelled to disgorge the wealth which they had accumulated. The attempt to kill Salim Singh, however, failed. But Surtan Singh of Nimaj, "his constant associate," was killed. In a letter addressed to the Government on these events, dated July 7, 1820, Tod pointed out the danger of these reckless measures.

After the murder of Akhai Chand the Raja installed Fatehraj in the post of *Dewan* and relentlessly pursued the policy of crushing all the feudal chiefs irrespective of their loyalty or treachery in the past.¹ His "treachery and cold-blooded tyranny completely estranged all the chiefs." But, as Tod points out, they could not resist the Raja's "mercenary battalions", nor could they defy his "connection with the British Government." The helpless chiefs fled from Man Singh's tyranny to seek refuge in Kotah, Mewar, Bikaner, and Jaipur. In 1821 they tried to obtain the mediation of the British Government.²

That Government was reluctant to interfere in this delicate quarrel. Aid was refused to the exiled *Sardars*; but an accommodation was effected in 1824 (after Tod's departure from India) through the mediation of the British Agent.³ The estates of the *Sardars* of Awa, Assore, Nimaj and Rass were to be restored within six months from the date of the engagement, *i.e.*, February 25, 1824; but the *Sardars* of Chandawal and Budsu were not "desirous of being recommended to favour." This engagement was guaranteed by the Political Agent, Mr. Wilder.

Peace was, however, not restored in Marwar. In 1827 some disaffected nobles of Marwar decided to place the pretender Dhonkal Singh on the *gadi*. They assembled their followers in Jaipur territory, and with the connivance, if not the active support, of the Jaipur *Darbar* prepared to invade Marwar. The British Government censured the Maharaja of Jaipur and asked Dhonkal Singh to dissociate himself from the disaffected *Sardars*. "At the same time (the British) Government declared that although it might perhaps be required to protect the Maharaja

¹ Amar Singh of Ahor, who had loyally served Man Singh as his "chief shield" throughout his reign, was obliged to seek refuge in exile.

² See *ante*, pp. 66-68.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 167.

(Man Singh) against unjust usurpation, or wanton but too powerful rebellion, there was no obligation to support him against universal disaffection and insurrection caused by his own injustice, incapacity, and misrule.”¹

Even after the failure of the confederacy of the disaffected *Sardars* to put Dhonkal Singh on the *gadi* of Jodhpur further evidence of Man Singh’s “incapacity and misrule” was forthcoming. Between the years 1824 and 1835 he had to make over to the British Government 28 villages in the *parganas* of Chang and Kot-kirana in Merwara with a view to bringing the lawless Minas and Mers into complete submission. Only 7 of these villages were resumed in 1843 ; the others remained permanently under the administrative control of the British Government. In 1836 the district of Mallani was taken under the superintendence and control of the British Resident, for Man Singh was unable to maintain order there. In 1898 the district was restored to the Jodhpur *Darbar*. In 1832 Man Singh was required, under Article 8 of the treaty of 1818, to furnish a contingent to co-operate with a British force against freebooters who had occupied Nagar Parkar. As this contingent proved altogether useless, the obligation to furnish a contingent was commuted in 1835 to an annual payment of Rs. 1,15,000 towards the expenses of the Jodhpur Legion.²

The climax came in 1839. The lingering disputes with the nobles paralysed the administration. Man Singh was rendered impotent for good or evil by his complete subjection to priestly influence. The British Government could no longer postpone interference. A British force occupied Jodhpur for five months. On September 24, 1839, Man Singh was compelled to execute an Engagement³ to ensure future good government. The following Articles deserve special notice :—

“1st.—Now for the government of the country mutual deliberation having been agreed upon the Maharajah and Colonel Sutherland⁴ and the Sirdars and Uhal-i-kars and the Khuwas Pasbans of the Raj will meet and institute rules for the govern-

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 141.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 140-141, 161-166.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 168-170.

⁴ Political Agent.

ment of the country which are to be acted upon now and henceforward ; they will also define and settle the right of the several chiefs and of the officers of the Government and of others depending upon it according to ancient usage."

"2nd.—The British Political Agent and the Uhal-i-kars of the Raj of Jodhpore having counselled together will conduct the affairs of the government according to these rules and after having consulted the Maharajah."

"4th.—The Colonel Sahib has said that a British garrison shall be placed in the fortress of Jodhpore, and to this the Maharajah agrees....."

"7th.—Those whose rights have been sequestrated shall be repossessed in accordance with the principles of justice, and the incumbents shall perform liege service to the Durbar."

This Engagement practically placed the administration of Marwar under the control of the British Resident. But it was binding on Man Singh alone, not on his successors. He died on September 5, 1843, and the long chapter of anarchy and tyranny in Marwar came to an end.

V

JAIPUR

JAIPUR AND THE MUGHALS

"The once third-rate and obscure house of Amber", says Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "had risen in the course of a century and a half to the front rank by the most brilliant and valued service to the empire in far apart fields, thanks to the signal capacity for war and diplomacy displayed by four generations of its chieftains,—Bhagwan Das and Man Singh under Akbar, Mirza Rajah Jai Singh under Shah Jahan and Aurangzib, and Sawai Jai Singh under the later Mughals".¹

Sawai Jai Singh (1698-1743) was a remarkable man. Tod says, "As a statesman, legislator, and man of science, the character of Sawai Jai Singh is worthy of an ample delineation, which would correct our opinion of the genius and capacity of the princes of Rajputana, of whom we are apt to form too low an estimate." But this gifted ruler lacked some of the essential qualities of a Rajput chief. Tod says that "his reputation as a soldier would never have handed down his name with honour to posterity; on the contrary, his courage had none of the fire which is requisite to make a Rajput hero; though his talents for civil government and court intrigue, in which he was the Machiavelli of his day, were at that period far more notable auxiliaries".²

Sawai Jai Singh "mixed in all the troubles and warfare of this long period of anarchy, when the throne of Timur was rapidly crumbling into dust".³ In the civil war which followed Aurangzib's death he took up the cause of Azam. Bahadur Shah punished him by recognising his rival brother, Bijay Singh, as the legitimate ruler of Amber. Jai Singh thereupon formed an alliance with Rana Amar Singh of Mewar and Ajit Singh of Marwar, and succeeded in re-establishing himself on the *gadi* of Amber. During Farrukh-siyar's reign he governed Malwa and fought against the Jats, but he could not distinguish himself as a soldier or general in the field. His relations with the Sayyid

¹ *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.

² Crooke, Vol. III, pp 1341-1342.

³ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1341.

brothers were not satisfactory. He supported the cause of Nekusiyar against Rafi-ud-daulah, the weak nominee of the Sayyids. After the accession of Muhammad Shah he was restored to imperial favour and entrusted with the government of *sarkar* Surat in the *subah* of Ahmedabad. After the fall of the Sayyids he became governor of Agra and led another expedition against the Jats. In 1729 the governorship of Malwa was conferred upon him. In this capacity he was probably guilty of collusion with the Marathas, who were at that time establishing themselves in Malwa and Gujarat. If the Emperor's cause against the Marathas had been served, says Sir J. N. Sarkar, "with the courage, enterprise and fidelity of.....Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, instead of Sawai Jai Singh's love of sensual ease, misappropriation of the imperial chest of military defence, and treacherous subserviency to the enemies of the country, the Marathas would have been successfully kept out of Northern India, and Rajputana would have been spared the horrors of Maratha domination". This severe verdict on Jai Singh's career can hardly be challenged. He could not have saved the Mughal Empire; probably he could not have kept the Marathas out of Northern India for ever. But he could have kept them out of Rajputana, and probably out of Malwa, for some time.

The disruption of imperial authority provided ample scope for the ambitious vassals of Delhi, and the minor Princes of Rajputana suddenly found themselves at the mercy of their powerful neighbours. Tod says, "Amber was yet circumscribed in territory,¹ and the consequences of its princes arose out of their position as satraps of the empire. He (*i.e.*, Jai Singh) therefore determined to seize upon all the districts on his frontiers within his grasp, and moreover to compel the services of the chieftains who served under his banner as lieutenant of the King (*i.e.*, Emperor of Delhi)".²

The first victim of this policy of aggression was Budh Singh

¹ "At the accession of Jai Singh the *raj* of Amber consisted only of the three *parganas* or districts of Amber, Daosa, and Baswa; the western tracts had been sequestered, and added to the royal domains attached to Ajmer. The Shekhavati confederation was superior to, and independent of, the parent State, whose boundaries were as follows. The royal *thana* (garrison) of Chatsu, to the south; those of Sambhar to the west, and Hastina to the north-west; while to the east, Daosa and Baswa formed its frontier". (Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1351).

² Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1498.

of Bundi, who was dethroned by Jai Singh in 1729. The *gadi* of Bundi was transferred to Dalil Singh, on condition of his acknowledging the Raja of Jaipur as his overlord. For about twenty years (1729-1748) Budh Singh and his son, Ummed Singh, continued the struggle against Jaipur. Ummed Singh finally succeeded in occupying his ancestral *gadi*.

Sawai Jai Singh also interfered in a dispute between Jodhpur and Bikaner and suffered a serious reverse in the battle of Gangwana (May, 1741).

JAIPUR AND THE MARATHAS

Maratha intervention in Rajputana had begun in Sawai Jai Singh's life time. It became persistently aggressive after his death, and his own State became its immediate victim. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Ishwari Singh (1743-1750), whose claim was disputed by Madho Singh (Jai Singh's son by a Mewar princess) in accordance with the terms of the Mewar-Amber treaty of 1708. Rana Jagat Singh of Mewar supported Madho Singh's claim, but he was not strong enough to place his nephew on the *gadi* of Jaipur. The peculiar tragedy of this fratricidal conflict lay in the fact that both sides invoked, and secured at heavy prices, the armed assistance of the Marathas.

In March, 1747, Ishwari Singh defeated his enemies in the battle of Rajmahal and for the time being his position seemed assured. But his cowardly retreat from the battle of Manupur (March, 1748), where he had gone to resist Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasion at the request of Emperor Muhammad Shah,¹ ruined his military prestige and encouraged his enemies. The Marathas entered Jaipur territory (May, 1748) and demanded a heavy contribution which Ishwari Singh could not pay. A Maratha army under Malhar Rao Holkar defeated him in the battle of Bagru (August, 1748). He purchased temporary respite by giving five *parganas* to Madho Singh and also restoring Bundi to Ummed Singh.

Ishwari Singh might have enjoyed peace for some time if he had been able to pay his dues to the Marathas, but he merely put off payment from day to day.² All his experienced ministers

¹ See Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 161.

² *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. II, letter no. 15.

were gone one by one, and the half-witted Prince submitted himself to the guidance of a barber and an elephant-driver. Towards the close of the year 1750 Malhar Rao Holkar again invaded Jaipur; Ishwari Singh, unable to resist him, committed suicide (December, 1750). The Marathas occupied the city of Jaipur and placed Madho Singh on the *gadi*. In addition to money, they demanded that one-fourth of the territory of Jaipur should be made over to them. Madho Singh courageously resolved to free himself from the control of his inconvenient supporters. He tried to poison the Maratha chiefs, but failed. Then the citizens of Jaipur took the matter into their own hands. A riot broke out in the city; some 1,500 Marathas were killed and about 1,000 wounded. Madho Singh disclaimed all previous knowledge or share in this massacre and conciliated the Marathas by promises of money. Early in 1751 the Marathas left Jaipur.¹

No Rajput Prince ever paid money to the Marathas except under military pressure. As the Marathas were otherwise engaged for about three years after their departure from Jaipur, Madho Singh became a defaulter. A large Maratha army under Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar appeared in Jaipur towards the close of 1753. Madho Singh averted the desolation of his territory by agreeing to pay 16½ *lakhs* of rupees. More than ten *lakhs* were paid in 1755; the remaining portion was left unpaid. After the murder of Jayapa Sindhia by a Rathor envoy, Madho Singh joined Bijay Singh of Marwar and made a serious attempt to expel the Marathas from Rajputana. A Jaipur army suffered a severe defeat in October, 1755, and the allied Princes made peace with the Marathas in February, 1756. In 1757 Raghunath Rao again came to Jaipur, laid siege to Barwada (which belonged to the Shekhawats), and demanded from Madho Singh 40 to 50 *lakhs* in cash and the cession of an important slice of his territory. Madho Singh refused to accept these exorbitant demands and made excellent preparations for war. Raghunath Rao then lowered his demands and agreed to accept 11 *lakhs*, six *lakhs* to be paid immediately. In 1758 Jankoji Sindhia compelled Madho Singh to promise 36 *lakhs*, payable in four years. In 1759 Malhar Rao Holkar came to realise money from Jaipur and secured some military successes against the Rajputs; but the news of Ahmed

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 165-171.

Shah Abdali's arrival in the Punjab compelled him to leave Rajputana for Delhi (January, 1760).¹

Madho Singh was now in a very favourable position. "Jaipur was now the strongest power in Rajputana, and its master, safely sheltered within his strongly fortified capital, could laugh an invasion to scorn." Most of the villages of Jaipur had protective walls and a martial population.² After the third battle of Panipat Madho Singh made a systematic attempt to dislodge the Marathas from Rajputana. He tried to organise an anti-Maratha coalition; with this end in view he invited the co-operation of Ahmed Shah Abdali, Emperor Shah Alam II, Najib Khan and the Rajput Princes. Although there was no effective response from the Muslims, many Rajputs promised to join him. But a large Jaipur army was defeated by Malhar Rao Holkar in the battle of Mangrol (November 29, 1761). This decisive victory destroyed Madho Singh's fond hope of uprooting Maratha power from the North. He took measures for the defence of Jaipur city against the apprehended Maratha attack. Holkar arrived within 40 miles of this city, but the sudden invasion of Bundelkhand by Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-daula of Oudh compelled him to leave Rajputana.³ Madho Singh's failure to take advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas was due to his "lack of character, quarrels with his feudal barons, and above all chronic antagonism to Bijay Singh of Marwar,⁴ the only Rajput Prince that counted for anything."⁵

Tod points out that Madho Singh's failure against the Marathas was due to the rise of the Jats.⁶ The Jat rulers of Bharatpur were nominally vassals of Jaipur, but Suraj Mal, the founder of the Jat power, was a far abler and more powerful prince than Madho Singh. Yet "so great was his moderation, that inspite of his immense wealth and military force, he used to go to Jaipur every year at Dasahara and offer his homage and customary tribute as an humble vassal to Madho Singh. It was only a few years before his death that he gave up this practice in

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 171-172, 174, 183-198.

² Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 196.

³ See A. C. Banerjee, *Peshwa Madhav Rao I*, pp. 133-134.

⁴ Ram Singh, Bijay Singh's rival, was a protege of Madho Singh.

⁵ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 503.

⁶ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1357.

fear of treachery from his overlord.”¹ His successor, Jawahir Singh (1763-1768), invaded Jaipur territory in 1765. Madho Singh invoked the assistance of the Marathas; the arrival of a Sindhia contingent compelled the Jat Raja and his Sikh allies to retreat. In December, 1767, Jawahir Singh again invaded Jaipur territory and won a ‘Pyrrhic victory’ in the battle of Maonda. Madho Singh then invaded the Jat country and defeated the Jats in February, 1768. A large Sikh force now arrived for Jawahir Singh’s rescue; the Rajputs retreated to their own country.² The Jat Raja was assassinated in July, 1768. Internal dissensions broke out in the Jat Kingdom, and the intervention of the Marathas completed the ruin of the State created by Suraj Mal’s genius.³ But the Jat menace compelled Jaipur to adopt a pro-Maratha policy. Madho Singh conciliated the Marathas through Holkar, whose *Diwan* was probably bribed for the accomplishment of this purpose.

Madho Singh died in March, 1768. “He built seven cities, of which that called after him Madhopur, near the celebrated fortress of Ranthambhor, the most secure of the commercial cities of Rajwara, is the most remarkable. He inherited no small portion of his father’s love of science, which continued to make Jaipur the resort of learned men, so as to eclipse even the sacred Benares.”⁴

Madho Singh’s death was followed by prolonged anarchy and turmoil in Jaipur. He was succeeded by his minor son Prithvi Singh (1768-1778), a boy of five. The Regency was held by the minor Prince’s step-mother, who was advised chiefly by four persons: her father, Jaswant Singh Chundawat, the ruler of Deogarh in Mewar; an able Brahmin minister named Khush-hali Ram Bohra⁵; a common soldier named Raj Singh; and a Muslim elephant-driver named Firuz.⁶ The chief nobles of the kingdom resented their exclusion from power and intrigued for

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 453.

² Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 512-513, 476-480.

³ For details, see A. C. Banerjee, *Peshwa Madhav Rao*, Chap. VI.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1361.

⁵ Originally he was a porter of Ganges water under Madho Singh, but he was a very able man.

⁶ Sir J. N. Sarkar (*Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 331) rejects Tod’s statement (Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1361) that Firuz was the queen-mother’s “paramour” and guide.

the overthrow of the queen-mother's authority. These internal dissensions were utilised by Pratap Singh Naruka, the ambitious ruler of Macheri, who ousted Jaswant Singh from the administration, arrested Firuz and confined Khush-hali Ram. But towards the second half of the year 1777 the hostile feelings of the citizens of Jaipur compelled him to leave that city. Once more Khush-hali Ram became Prime Minister of Jaipur.

Pratap Singh Naruka, a Jaipur vassal, had been banished by Madho Singh "for some fault."¹ He had found shelter in the court of Jawahir Singh, the Jat Raja. Later on he deserted his protector and fought against him on behalf of Jaipur. Madho Singh restored him to his favour and to the "fief" of Macheri. After Prithvi Singh's death he began to dream of territorial expansion and independence. The decline of the Jat power made it easy for him to occupy Alwar and Lachmangarh. His ambitious activities excited the suspicion of the Imperial Government, and Mirza Najaf Khan, who was at that time a powerful officer under Emperor Shah Alam II, invaded his territory. Pratap Singh had to save himself by paying a large indemnity (1778).

Prithvi Singh was succeeded by his brother, Sawai Pratap Singh (1778-1803), a boy of thirteen. Khush-hali Ram temporarily checkmated the aggressive activities of Pratap Singh Naruka by forming a coalition with Mirza Najaf Khan (1778). In 1779 the Emperor in person marched to Jaipur territory; Khush-hali Ram avoided hostility by agreeing to pay twenty *lakhs* as tribute. Unfortunately, some rivals of this able minister won the Raja's confidence and persuaded him to throw Khush-hali Ram into prison (1779) on the charge of embezzlement. As the Jaipur Government was hopelessly in default of payment, Mirza Najaf Khan, who had in the meantime become Regent of the Empire, sent two of his officers to invade Jaipur territory. Khush-hali Ram was released from prison and vested with supreme authority (October, 1780). The imperial troops failed to coerce the Jaipur Raja for two reasons. In the first place, they failed to capture Jaipur fort, which was then considered impregnable. Secondly, Mirza Najaf Khan was not able to pay his troops regularly. Sir J. N. Sarkar says, "Mirza Najaf's finely conceived strategy, though punctually carried out by... two able subordinates, in the end broke down on the rock of finance. The delaying tactics of the Jaipur

¹ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1360.

ministers succeeded, as the craven Rajah shut himself up in his capital, leaving all his realm outside open to Mughal spoliation." Early in 1781 Mirza Najaf Khan's officers returned to Delhi. After the departure of the imperial generals Sawai Pratap Singh again threw Khush-hali Ram into prison. In 1786 he was restored to power, but he was dismissed within a year. As his life was constantly in danger, he sought refuge with Mahadji Sindhia.

The troubles of Jaipur were due primarily to the character of the reigning Prince. Sir J. N. Sarkar says, "Sawai Pratap Singh had no brains, but was not harmless and quiescent like most other imbeciles; his folly burst out in capricious violence. Anticipating the decadent Nawabs of Oudh, he used to dress himself like a female, tie bells to his ankles and dance within the harem. His time was mostly devoted to drinking and attending songs and dances.... Sometimes he would sally forth at night with the ruffianly companions of his wine-cup, raid the houses of the bankers and jewellers, beat them and snatch away their money! In addition to his unkingly and unmanly vices, his reckless speech and violent temper alienated the proud Rajput nobility and they left his capital for their seats in shame and disgust".¹ The administration became inefficient and corrupt. The Shekhawat nobles seized Jaipur territory near their estates. Attempts were made to dethrone Pratap Singh and to put on the throne a minor Prince named Man Singh, the son of Prithvi Singh.² The ruler of Macheri continued to pursue his aggressive and disloyal policy.

When Jaipur was thus on the brink of dissolution, Mahadji Sindhia, then the *Mir Bakshi* of the Empire, invaded this unfortunate kingdom for realising the tribute due to the Emperor and to the Marathas (1786). Khush-hali Ram avoided war by agreeing to pay 63 *lakhs*. But Sawai Pratap Singh stopped payment after Sindhia's departure. Moreover, he sent a confidential agent to Lucknow (1786) to intrigue for hiring an English contingent for use against the Marathas. Khush-hali Ram was dismissed

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 337. Tod gives a different view of his character. He says: "He was a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgment....." See also Captain Pillet's remarks in *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 1. Collins described him as 'a compound of pride, meanness, cunning and avarice'. (*Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 172).

² Man Singh lived at Brindaban, where he enjoyed a *jagir* granted by Mahadji Sindhia.

in January, 1787; he found shelter in Sindhia's camp. Sawai Pratap Singh concluded a defensive alliance with the Raja of Jodhpur and openly prepared for war. Mahadji Sindhia realised that nothing but the annexation of a portion of Jaipur territory would enable him to secure payment from the obstinate Prince. He again invaded Jaipur in March, 1787. An indecisive pitched battle was fought at Tunga¹ in July, 1787. The Rajputs claimed it as a great victory, and Tod tells us that the Jaipur Raja spent the sum of 24 *lakhs* in charity² to commemorate it. But they were not able to expel the Marathas from the field, and their casualty list was much heavier than that of their enemy. On the other hand, Sindhia was not able to crush the Rajputs or to accomplish the purpose for which he had undertaken the offensive campaign. Within a few days of the battle he retreated from Jaipur territory.³

After the retreat from Jaipur Mahadji Sindhia found himself opposed by a host of enemies, of whom two Muslim Chiefs, Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir, were the most powerful. He gradually restored his power by cautious military operations, in which he was substantially aided by De Boigne's battalions. Ismail Beg was finally crushed in the battle of Agra (June, 1788). Ghulam Qadir, who had become Regent of the Empire in September, 1787, and blinded Emperor Shah Alam in October, 1788, was expelled from Delhi and tortured to death in March, 1789. Mahadji Sindhia became the guardian of the blind Emperor and the *de facto* ruler of Delhi.

Ismail Beg and Bijay Singh of Jodhpur had assisted Jaipur in the battle of Tunga. These three allies again joined their forces against Sindhia, but De Boigne's battalions crushed them in the battle of Patan (June 20, 1790). The defeat of the Rajputs was followed by the disruption of the alliance between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and Rajputana was left at the mercy of De Boigne's triumphant brigades.⁴ The Shekhawat territory was ravaged and brought under Sindhia's control.

At this stage the intensification of the old rivalry between Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar introduced further compli-

¹ Also called battle of Lalsot.

² Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1364.

³ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 340-345, 349-392.

⁴ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 17-27.

cations in the political situation of Northern India. The creation of De Boigne's army and his victories in the battles of Patan and Merta (September 12, 1790) disturbed the balance of power in Hindustan. Holkar realised his danger and began to strengthen himself by raising a disciplined corps under the command of a Frenchman named Dudrenec.¹ The quarrel reached its climax in the battle of Lakheri (June 1, 1793). "Holkar's defeat was complete and the battle decided the Sindhia-Holkar rivalry for domination over Hindustan."²

For about ten years (February, 1792—October, 1801) "no Sindhia was present in Hindustan in person..... Mahadji did not live to revisit his conquests in the north,³ and his successor, Daulat Rao, a dull-brained, ignorant, pleasure-seeking youth, lingered on for years in Maharashtra, pursuing the vain dream of controlling the Peshwa's Government. Hence, during this long and eventful decade the interests of the House of Sindhia in Hindustan were left to the care of agents, and these agents did not form a happy family..... Indeed, the absentee master's authority in the north during these years was saved through the loyalty and efficiency of his French corps,—commanded successively by De Boigne and Perron..... This military efficiency, built upon the stable basis of financial security, enabled De Boigne and Perron to collect the due tribute from the Rajput States with tolerable ease and not more than the usual amount of irregularity, and there was, on the whole, no regular trial of

¹ Edwardes, Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, pp. 216-217. The following remarks of Malcolm (*Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 132) are quite interesting: "The government of Holkar had been expelled from all share in the territories north of Jeypoor. Its title to the tribute of that country, however, was still recognized; but this, as well as the preservation of its possessions in Malwa, was owing, in the latter years of Madhaje Sindhia, less to any power the Holkar family possessed of maintaining its rights, than to the ties which still subsisted between Mahratta Chiefs, and which were not forgotten, even in the hour of battle. This national feeling gave a peculiar feature to their occasional contests with each other, which frequently terminated in a way that was unintelligible to those who did not understand the character and constitution of the confederacy. The value of this disposition to reunion, when apparently in the most broken and divided state, had been fully appreciated by Madhaje Sindhia; and he maintained, sometimes by great sacrifices, all those bonds and relations upon which it depended."

² Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 87-96.

³ In 1794 Mahadji Sindhia kept two armies in Jaipur territory. (*Poonā Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, p. 3).

arms between the Rajputs and the Marathas from the battle of Merta (1790) to that of Malpura (1800). The local discontent simmered, but did not burst into a flame for one full decade."¹

In 1799 the Marathas, assisted by George Thomas,² the notorious adventurer of Hariana, invaded Jaipur territory and defeated the Rajputs in the battle of Fatehpur.³ A year later Lakhwa Dada, restored to Sindhia's vicerealty in Hindustan, invaded Jaipur for realising the arrears of tribute. Pratap Singh made elaborate preparations to resist him. A powerful Jaipur army was joined at Sanganer by 10,000 Rathor cavalry from Jodhpur; but the Jaipur *Darbar's* attempt to win over George Thomas proved unsuccessful. A decisive battle was fought at Malpura on April 16, 1800. Although the Rathors cut the Maratha cavalry to pieces, the slaughter in the ranks of the Jaipur army was terrible.⁴ Compton says, "Pratap Singh never recovered from the blow to his power and prestige which was dealt him on this eventful day. Of the eighty pieces of cannon which he brought into the field, he lost seventy-four, together with all his camp, baggage and warlike stores."⁵ Within three weeks of this crowning victory Lakhwa Dada lost his position in Sindhia's court and became a rebel. General Perron came to Jaipur. Pratap Singh realised the futility of further resistance and made peace on payment of 25 *lakhs* of rupees (May, 1800). The Raja of Jodhpur accepted the verdict of Malpura and paid up the arrears of tribute due from him, amounting to 12 *lakhs* of rupees.⁶

BEGINNING OF JAIPUR'S CONTACT WITH THE COMPANY

Jaipur's contact with the East India Company began in the reign of Sawai Pratap Singh. The condition of Jaipur territory in 1794 is thus described by J. Pillet, a French military adventurer in his service: "Their country having been devastated and depopulated by the (Maratha) armies which eat up their produce, although immense, it has destroyed all the branches of commerce which made it flourish, and has left for their subsistence only

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, Introduction, p. iii.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 213.

³ Crooke. Vol. III, p. 1409. *Modern Review*, July, 1943.

⁴ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 158-162.

Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, Introduction, p. x.

⁵ *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan*, p. 240.

⁶ Compton, *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan*, pp. 237-241.

what escapes the activity of these armies. Nearly 25 years of such calamities leave their ruinous effects to be easily judged....". This enterprising well-wisher of Jaipur wrote a letter to Colonel John Murray, Military Auditor-General in Bengal, proposing a protective alliance between his patron and the British Government (June, 1794). He observed, "I see nothing except a well-formed alliance between the Jaipur Rajah and the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the East India Company—if they see their interest in it—that can avert the deluge ready to descend on the Rajah's head, already preceded by a frightful tempest." The Jaipur Raja's requirements were thus defined by Pillet :

"First, a defensive and offensive treaty between him and the Company.

Secondly, one of the Company's representatives at his Court.

Thirdly, the supplying by the British of 7,000 fusils, etc., 2,000 musketoons for a corps of cavalry, and as many pistols, sabres or swords, banderoles, etc.

Fourthly, the uniforms necessary for that corps.

Fifthly, permission to raise or recruit (troops) in your territory or in that of the Nawab Wazir (of Oudh)."

Pillet assured Colonel Murray that the acceptance of these terms by the British authorities would enable the Raja of Jaipur to support them with 50,000 cavalry, besides the resources of his territory, "without asking for any return save a firm protection on the part of the Company and full liberty to enjoy his dominions in peace."¹

Colonel Murray's view was that "the Northern Rajahs ought to be held up in their independence of the Marathas as a counterpoise.....but this is chiefly to be effected by the Rajahs, through their own wisdom, by uniting to resist encroachments and by resolution to guarantee each other in their respective dominions."² In a letter to Sir John Shore, dated July 10, 1794, he suggested the desirability of sending a Resident to the court of Jaipur. He observed, "The countenance of our Agent from the Government, to the Northern Rajahs, without any ties whatever, would serve to encourage them to unite and coalesce among themselves,

¹ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. I.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 2.

by showing that the English wish them well, and have not any particular exclusive partiality for the Marathas, and if these last should understand that this Government does not wish that the Rajahs should be crushed, there is some chance that the power of the Rajahs might, in the course of a little time, be so consolidated, as to enable them to resist the depredations of the Marathas."¹ But Sir John Shore was not prepared to assume new responsibilities.

The victory of the Marathas over the Nizam in the battle of Kharda increased the apprehensions of the Rajput Princes. Under the impression that this success "will afford leisure and ability for a design long meditated to extirpate their Government entirely", the rulers of Jaipur and Kotah sent express messengers to Major Palmer, British Resident with Sindhia, for the purpose of soliciting the Governor-General's intervention "to avert the impending danger" and intimating their "readiness to enter into engagements of mutual defence" with the British Government. Major Palmer informed them that the Governor-General was "so connected with the Maratha State by alliance, and by the ties of mutual friendship and good offices", that he could not "with any regard to public faith, or private sentiment, interfere in their proceedings with other States, unless they infringed the rights or security of the Company or its allies."²

The court of Jaipur came into direct contact with the British Government in 1799 in connection with the surrender of Wazir Ali, ex-Nawab of Oudh. In January, 1799, he murdered Cherry, British Resident at Benares, and some other Europeans. He then collected an army of several thousand men and made a desperate attempt to establish himself in Oudh, but the strong opposition of a British detachment compelled him to take refuge in Jaipur territory (June, 1799). The Jaipur Government prevented him from pursuing his journey towards Kabul, and confined him in the fortress of Amber. At the instance of the Governor-General (Lord Wellesley) Colonel Collins, Resident with Sindhia, went to Jaipur and requested Pratap Singh to surrender the "assassin." Pratap Singh agreed, but he demanded, and received, from Colonel Collins a written guarantee that Wazir Ali's life would be spared and he would be condemned to perpetual imprison-

¹ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 3.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 19.

ment without chains. In one of his conversations with the Resident the Raja "described, with much feeling, the oppressions and injuries that his subjects daily sustained from the rapacity and injustice of the Maratha Chieftains, and concluded his speech with affirming that it was the earnest desire of himself, and several other Rajput Sardars, to form an alliance with the Honourable Company." Colonel Collins replied that he was not authorized by the Governor-General "to enter upon any subject of importance, which involved matters foreign to the object of his present mission". Wazir Ali was surrendered (December, 1799) and sent to Calcutta.¹

Pratap Singh, however, did not "altogether relinquish his ill-founded hopes of obtaining either protection or assistance" from the British Government. He carried on negotiations with Collins in July-August, 1800, but he received no assurances whatsoever. Further negotiations took place in February-March, 1801, and May, 1802. The Jaipur minister, Dinaram Bohra, met Collins on May 31, 1802, and from his "discourse" the British Resident "discovered.....that his master is now more desirous than ever of engaging in a treaty of defensive alliance with the British Government." He replied that he "possessed no authority whatever, even to enter into any discussion of the kind."²

CHARACTER OF JAGAT SINGH

Pratap Singh was succeeded in 1803 by Jagat Singh, whom Tod describes as "the most dissolute prince of his race or of his age." He was infatuated with an "Islamite concubine" called "Ras-kafur" whom he "formally installed" as queen of half his dominions and actually "conveyed to her in gift a moiety of the personality of the crown, even to the invaluable library of the illustrious Jai Singh, which was despoiled, and its treasures distributed amongst her base relations." Coins were struck in her name. The Raja not only rode with her on the same elephant, but demanded from his nobles those forms of reverence towards her, which were paid only to his legitimate queens. Heavy fines were imposed on those nobles who refused to respect her as a queen. The end of this powerful concubine was pathetic.

¹ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 183, 184, 186—191A, 193—198.

² *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. IX, Nos. 18, 18A, 18B, 18C, 20, 20A, 20B, 62, 236, 236A, 246, 246A, 246B, 246C.

The Raja lent his ear to "a report injurious to the fair fame of his Aspasia," and condemned her to 'the castle' allotted for criminals.' The nobles "held both his authority and his person in utter contempt" and entertained serious thoughts of deposing him. The condition of the country was miserable. Tod says, "The lofty walls which surrounded the beautiful city of Jai Singh were insulted by every marauder; commerce was interrupted and agriculture rapidly declined, partly from insecurity, but still more from the perpetual exactions of his minions."² Such was the Prince who "continued to dishonour the *gadi* of Jai Singh" until his death (December 21, 1818).

JAIPUR'S FIRST TREATY WITH THE COMPANY

Tod speaks enthusiastically of "the enlarged and prophetic views of Marquess Wellesley, which suggested the policy of uniting all the regular Governments in a league against the predatory powers".³ The "predatory powers" were, of course, the Marathas, specially Sindhia and Holkar, whose relations with the Pindaris were well-known. The "league" of "regular Governments" was, naturally, to be organised and led by the East India Company. Virtually this meant the imposition of the system usually described as 'Subsidiary Alliance' on the "regular Governments". The Governor-General wrote to his brother, General Arthur Wellesley, on June 27, 1803, "In the event of hostilities (with the Marathas), I propose to dispatch proper emissaries to Gohad, and to the Rajput chiefs. You will also employ every endeavour to excite those powers against Sindhia. I propose to engage to guarantee their independence and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require. The independence of the Rajput chiefs would constitute a power which would form the best security to our north-western frontier in Hindustan."⁴

This policy was responsible for the conclusion of a treaty with Jaipur in 1803. Continually ravaged by the troops of Sindhia and Holkar, Jaipur willingly accepted the guarantee of protection which "a firm and permanent friendship and alliance" with

¹ Prison of Nahargarh.

² Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1364-1366.

³ See *ante*, p. 155.

⁴ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. IX, p. 294. See also pp. 298, 365, 368.

the East India Company seemed to imply. The treaty¹ was "settled" by General Lake, signed by him on December 12, 1803, and ratified by Lord Wellesley on January 15, 1804.

Sawai Jagat Singh agreed by this treaty that "the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both", thus clearly entangling his State in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The Company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jaipur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If "any enemy" (*i.e.*, the Marathas) "evinced a disposition to invade" the Company's territory in Hindustan, Jagat Singh would "send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and.....exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy." Military co-operation was hardly to be distinguished from subordination, for Jagat Singh consented to "act, during the time of war, or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the Commander of the English army.....employed with his troops". He would not "entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Company's Government". All disputes between Jaipur and any other State were to be submitted to the British Government. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to "the obstinacy of the opposite party," the Company would grant military assistance to Jaipur, provided the Jaipur Government paid "the charge of the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindustan." In exchange for these concessions, the ruler of Jaipur received the Company's guarantee of "the security of his country against external enemies."

Although there were complaints from the British side,² yet it seems that, on the whole, Jagat Singh loyally fulfilled the demands preferred by the Company's officers engaged in hostilities against Holkar. Tod, who had an intimate personal knowledge of British relations with the Rajput Princes, says, ".....we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating the treaty upon our ally." It must be recognised that Holkar's movements in Hindustan placed the Jaipur Government in a very difficult

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 102-103.

² Secret Consultations, July 11, 1805, No. 2.

situation. In June, 1805, Holkar threatened that "as the Raja (of Jaipur) did not join him in endeavouring to reduce the British power within its limits.....he would destroy his country." This letter was shown to Captain Sturrock, Acting Resident at Jaipur, in order to convince him that the Jaipur Government did not "hold any improper correspondence with the enemy." But the Resident was not convinced. He reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur were willing to form an anti-British coalition.¹ This suspicion was strengthened a few months later (October, 1805), when Jagat Singh hesitated, on various pretexts, to send his troops to join a British detachment. Captain Sturrock plainly told him that "his professions, contradicted by his actions, would not obtain credit with the British Government, which had experienced his insincerity and the little reliance that could be placed on his assertions." The Raja was also accused of allowing Holkar to draw supplies from his territory. This charge he "denied with much earnestness," but in vain. The Resident concluded a not very pleasant interview with the Raja by declaring that "if he pursued a different line of conduct in future, to that which good faith and a regard to his own interests required," the British Government would "abandon an alliance which from its nature must prove either very useful or very burdensome."² A few days later the Raja was assured that, "although the treaty would be dissolved by any delay or evasion on his part in performing the conditions of it, Government entertained no intention of attacking him, or deviating in any manner from the general friendship which has long subsisted between the two States."³

One of the excuses on which Jagat Singh evaded the duty of sending military assistance to the East India Company was the despatch of Jaipur troops to Udaipur in connection with his plan to marry princess Krishnakumari.⁴ As these troops "held the Rana in control," Daulat Rao Sindhia found it difficult to realise his tribute from Mewar.⁵ Sindhia then called upon the British Government to compel its ally, the Raja of Jaipur, to

¹ Secret Consultations July 11, 1805, No. 2.

² Secret Consultations, December 31, 1805, No. 2.

³ Secret Consultations, December 31, 1805, No. 14.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 298.

⁵ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 162.

withdraw his troops from Mewar, or, in the alternative, to allow him to "act against the Raja of Jaipur as an enemy." Lord Lake thought that there were "just grounds for the appeal made by Daulat Rao Sindhia," and instructed Captain Sturrock to bring the matter to Jagat Singh's notice. The Resident explained to the Raja the implications of the treaty concluded by the British Government with Sindhia: neither the British Government nor any of its allies could offer any assistance to the Rana of Udaipur or any of Sindhia's tributaries. Jagat Singh agreed to recall his troops from Udaipur.¹ This promise was speedily fulfilled and "a considerable force" from Jaipur was sent to join the Bombay army under the command of Major-General Jones.² These troops rendered satisfactory service and returned to Jaipur³ in December, 1805.

In November, 1805, Jagat Singh proposed that Lord Lake should request Daulat Rao Sindhia to agree to his (Jagat Singh's) marriage with Krishnakumari. He was "particularly anxious that the intended marriage should take place at some intervening period between the beginning of next year and the commencement of the next rainy season." Captain Sturrock expressed the opinion that no diversion of energy should take place during the war, and advised the Raja to delay his preparations for the marriage "until a more favourable time appeared for its accomplishment."⁴ But Jagat Singh's repeated requests⁵ could not be evaded. Lord Lake wrote a letter to Sindhia but at the same time warned Jagat Singh against "the adoption of any measures which include the smallest risk of creating any dispute, either with Sindhia, or with the Chiefs of the Rana of Udaipur."⁶

In January, 1806, Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur, who was one of the suitors for the hand of Krishnakumari, sent some *vakils* to Jaipur "to renew his remonstrances" and ordered the mobilisation of his troops. Captain Sturrock found Jagat Singh determined to push his claim. He advised the Raja to come to an amicable settlement with his rival or to submit the dispute to the British Government in accordance with Article 5 of the treaty

¹ Secret Consultations, December 31, 1805, No. 18.

² Secret Consultations, December 31, 1805, No. 48.

³ Secret Consultations, January 16, 1806, Nos. 42, 44.

⁴ Secret Consultations, December 31, 1805, No. 57.

⁵ Secret Consultations, January 16, 1806, No. 42.

⁶ Secret Consultations, January 16, 1806, No. 43.

of 1803. This advice was followed by the usual threat that "if he did not adhere to the conditions of the treaty.....he could not expect to benefit from its protection."¹ But the negotiations opened by the Jodhpur *vakils* proved abortive, and Captain Sturrock reported on February 3, 1806, "Both parties are preparing for hostilities in the event of their not being able to settle the point in dispute to their mutual satisfaction and an appeal to arms becoming necessary."²

While matters were heading towards a crisis Lord Lake decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh (who had applied for permission to send a *vakil*) should be given "a hope that the British Government will consent to arbitrate their present difference."³ This policy was strictly adhered to by Captain Sturrock, who plainly told the Jodhpur *vakils* that, the dispute between the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur being of a "private and family nature," the British Government would "avoid interfering in it as much as possible."⁴ Even after this Jagat Singh sent a *vakil* to Delhi, who pressed John Malcolm for intervention, throwing out a dark hint that the non-interference of the British Government "would lead to an appeal to others, who would instantly come forward from interested motives." Malcolm merely repeated Lord Lake's formula.⁵ In an interview with Captain Sturrock on February 17, 1806, Jagat Singh referred to Article 5 of the treaty of 1803 (which provided for British mediation and assistance in case of dispute with any other State). The Resident replied that the Article "could not be fairly construed to mean that the British Government was to go to war to aid him in the accomplishment of an object of a private and family nature."⁶ The steady refusal of the British Government to interfere in the dispute probably induced the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur to conclude an agreement in April, 1806. It was decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh would marry Krishnakumari, nor would they allow the Rana of Udaipur to select her husband without their approval. Further, the union between the two States would be cemented by the marriage of Man Singh

¹ Secret Consultations, February 27, 1806, No. 41.

² Secret Consultations, February 27, 1806, No. 42.

³ Secret Consultations, March 13, 1806, Nos. 15, 17.

⁴ Secret Consultations, March 13, 1806, No. 16.

⁵ Secret Consultations, March 13, 1806, No. 25.

⁶ Secret Consultations, March 13, 1806, No. 26.

with Jagat Singh's sister and the marriage of Jagat Singh with Man Singh's daughter.¹ Unfortunately this agreement could not prevent Sindhia from invading Mewar in April-May, 1806. Although the crisis seemed to be averted by the *rapprochement* between Jaipur and Jodhpur and the retreat of Sindhia from Mewar in May, 1806, there were troublesome persons who did not want peace, and within a few months they succeeded in reviving the struggle between Jaipur and Jodhpur.

Meanwhile the British Government had repudiated the treaty with Jaipur. It is well-known that during his brief tenure of office Lord Cornwallis reversed Lord Wellesley's policy and decided to withdraw British protection from the trans-Chambal States.² This policy of withdrawal was approved and enforced by Sir George Barlow, who succeeded Lord Cornwallis as temporary Governor-General in October, 1805. The alliance with Jaipur was already strained by Captain Sturrock's unfavourable reports. Yet Sir George Barlow protected Jaipur against Holkar's claim for tribute (January, 1806).³ But the alliance was broken up in July, 1806, and "the principal States of India" were "apprized of the grounds" on which this decision of the Governor-General was based.⁴ That these "grounds" did not satisfy some of the most well-informed and efficient officers of the Company is clear from the following statement of Tod: "The Jaipur Court retained a lively, but no grateful remembrance, of the solemn obligations we contracted with her in 1803, and the facility with which we extricated ourselves from them when expediency demanded, whilst we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating the treaty upon our ally."⁵

The charges officially levelled against the Raja were answered by him in a letter received by the Government on January 12, 1807. He was accused of "intentional delay and neglect" for his failure to co-operate with his troops at the siege of Bharatpur. He replied that during the siege he had not received any communication from the Commander-in-Chief requiring the assistance of his troops. The Commander-in-Chief merely asked him to

¹ Secret Consultations, May 8, 1806, Nos. 96, 97.

² Cf. Tod's remark on the "timid, temporizing policy" of Lord Cornwallis, *ante*, p. 155.

³ Secret Consultations, February 27, 1806, No. 25.

⁴ Secret Consultations, February 13, 1807, No. 68.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 154.

station his troops on the frontier, and "in the event of any attempt on the part of the enemy to pass through Jaipur territory, to appear and arrest his progress." As Holkar did not proceed towards Jaipur, the Jaipur troops stationed on the frontier could do nothing. When Holkar came to Rajputana, after some delay, Jagat Singh remained inactive in accordance with the advice of Major-General Jones. This "political connivance" was later on considered "in a wrong light" by the Commander-in-Chief. With regard to the charge of supplying provisions to Holkar's army, Jagat Singh pointed out that he had stationed his officers in different posts "to furnish supplies, whenever they were procurable, for the British troops." In conclusion he observed, "With the utmost sincerity of heart, I have fulfilled every obligation of my alliance with the British Government and I have positively rejected the propositions of the Southern chiefs who sought an alliance with me."¹ This explanation did not satisfy the British authorities in Calcutta.

LORD MINTO'S POLICY

We have already seen how the long struggle with Jodhpur proved disastrous to Jaipur.² After his flight from Jodhpur Jagat Singh appealed for assistance to Holkar, but Holkar had already sunk to the position of a weak adventurer. In February, 1808, Mercer reported to the Governor-General that Holkar's army consisted merely of seven battalions of infantry.³ Sindhia naturally resented Jagat Singh's overtures to Holkar. During the years 1808-9 his troops mercilessly ravaged Jaipur territory. In June, 1808, Rai Chand Singh, the Jaipur commander, was severely defeated by Sindhia's troops. Broughton gives a pathetic picture of several Jaipur districts, of "crops all laid waste, the beams and thatch of the houses carried away, the doors and door-posts broken down, and of villages smoking in ruins."⁴

Unable to secure any assistance from Holkar, Jagat Singh turned once again to the British Government. In August, 1808, the Resident in Delhi received a visit from Bakhshi Bal Mukund, who was then on his way to Calcutta "in the double capacity of *vakil* on the part of Holkar and the Raja of Jaipur." The

¹ Political Consultations, January 15, 1807, No. 82.

² See *ante*, pp. 332-333.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XI, No. 246.

⁴ *Letters written in a Mahratta Camp*, pp. 75, 81, 83.

vakil suggested that a new defensive treaty might be concluded between Jaipur and the British Government. Seton told him that "the former treaty had been annulled in consequence of its not having been found to produce the expected advantages, and that it was not easy to assign a good reason for renewing an arrangement which upon trial had proved altogether useless." One of Bal Mukund's statements sounds almost as if it fell from the mouth of Lord Wellesley: "As the actual power as well as the dignity of the ancient sovereigns of India were now possessed by the British Government, the weaker States, when oppressed, had a sort of right to look up to it for protection." Seton replied that "the British Government did not pretend or wish to be considered as the arbiter of the differences between independent States." At last the *vakil* said that "upon the present occasion all that was now solicited on the part of the Raja (of Jaipur) was the mediation of the British Government to procure a fair and amicable adjustment of the difference between him and Sindhia." Seton replied that "even the exercise of mediatorial interference would be a deviation from the system of the British Government."¹ Seton's replies were approved by the Supreme Government.²

Towards the close of the year 1808 Jaipur became a helpless prey to the battalions of Sindhia and the Pindaris of Amir Khan. Jagat Singh was "totally devoid of energy and destitute of good advisers." Nothing could be expected from Holkar, whose "occasional intellectual malady" was gradually developing into "a confirmed derangement." Amir Khan paid frequent visits to Holkar, with the aim of "obtaining the military and political management of Holkar's affairs."³ In May, 1809, Jagat Singh concluded an agreement with Sindhia. The sum of 15 *lakhs* of rupees was to be paid by the Jaipur *Darbar*, and, in return, Sindhia agreed to withdraw his troops from the Jaipur territory.⁴

Even after this Jagat Singh continued to pray for British assistance. In July, 1809, the Resident in Delhi reported that the *vakils* of Jaipur and Jodhpur were continually pressing him to secure a treaty of alliance from the Governor-General. Seton was favourably inclined towards this proposal, for he wrote on

¹ Political Consultations, September 12, 1808, No. 28.

² Political Consultations. September 12, 1808, No. 30.

³ Political Consultations, January 16, 1809, No. 93.

⁴ Political Consultations, June 3, 1809, No. 30.

July 15, 1809, "I am very sensible of the political advantage of conciliating the Chiefs of the Rajput States to the westward of the British possessions, more especially those situated towards the Indus. If the powerful Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur—supposing the government of the latter country to be once more organised,—and the petty Chiefs of Bikaner and Jaisalmer and the ruler of Bahawalpur were cordially attached to us, a barrier might be formed against invasion....."¹ But Lord Minto was not prepared to extend the system of alliances.

In April, 1810, Amir Khan made himself the *de facto* ruler of Holkar's territories. Jaswant Rao Holkar was now completely mad, and his ministers were unable to resist the Pathan Chief.² That adventurer had already established his authority in Jodhpur as well as in Bhopal. He now became the most powerful man in Central India; even Daulat Rao Sindhia was overshadowed. As Holkar's deputy he demanded tribute from Mewar and Jaipur. His *vakil* at Jaipur used "some very strong expressions with respect to the tribute due from that State." Once again the helpless Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur tried to avert disaster by mutual reconciliation. Towards the middle of the year 1810 they decided "to relinquish all thoughts" of marrying Krishnakumari and to cement their alliance with matrimonial relationships.³ Even then they were anxious to secure the protection of the Company. In June, 1810, their *vakils* told the Resident in Delhi that "the countries of Jaipur and Jodhpur would never be secure from invasion until they were taken under the protection of the British Government."⁴ Seton merely repeated the old reply.⁵ Both Jagat Singh and Amir Khan tried to secure the direct or indirect countenance of the British Government for their respective causes, but Seton turned a deaf ear to their requests.⁶

After the submission of the Rana of Mewar and the murder of Krishnakumari (July, 1810) Amir Khan came to Jaipur, exacted from Jagat Singh a promise to pay 10 or 16 *lakhs* of rupees, and left his territory (June, 1811). During his stay in the vicinity of Jaipur he was exposed to "the severest insult and oppression"

¹ Political Consultations, August 5, 1809, No. 1.

² Political Consultations, July 7, 1810, No. 37.

³ Political Consultations, June 21, 1810, No. 42.

⁴ Political Consultations, June 21, 1810, No. 42.

⁵ Political Consultations, July 7, 1810, No. 37.

⁶ Political Consultations, July 7, 1810, No. 37.

by his soldiers. Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, reported to the Supreme Government, "He was sometimes deprived of his food, sometimes of his tent, and he was almost daily exposed for hours to the violent heat of the sun. It affords a very striking proof of the weakness of the Jaipur Government when an army in such a state could make it tremble for its existence." But the condition of the Jaipur army was no better. No wonder Jagat Singh continued his applications 'for a connection' with the British Government.¹

Metcalfe observed, "It is impossible to live in this part of India and to see the scenes which pass before our eyes without regretting that the Rajput States are not under our protection. A confederation of the Rajput States under the protection of the Central Government must be a favourite object with every man who has any charge of political duties in this quarter..... It would connect the Bengal and Bombay territories by a country that might then be considered for all political and military purposes our own..... It would deprive the vagabond armies of India of their principal resource for ravage and plunder..... The intervention of the Rajputs under our influence would prevent any co-operation between those Northern and Southern powers that we have reason to suppose ill affected towards us." But Metcalfe was not "insensible of the difficulties" involved in the project. He added, "Existing treaties must be set aside and the policy of Government must be deviated from before it can be contemplated, and even if circumstances should arise to warrant the undertaking, perhaps it could not be accomplished without military operations of a very extensive nature, involving probably the complete establishment of British control over every part of India....."² But Lord Minto was not prepared to deviate from the policy of non-intervention: "no consideration of advantage, however alluring," could tempt the British Government to depart from "a scrupulous adherence to the obligations of its engagements."³

In July, 1811, Khush-hali Ram Bohra⁴ once again became the chief minister of Jaipur in place of Megh Singh. The latter

¹ Secret Consultations, July 12, 1811, No. 1.

² Secret Consultations, July 12, 1811, No. 1.

³ Secret Consultations, July 12, 1811, No. 2.

⁴ See Broughton, *Letters written in a Maharatta Camp*, p. 92.

was completely overawed by Amir Khan; consequently he advocated compliance with all his demands. Metcalfe reported on July 23, 1811, ".....Amir Khan regards the departure of Megh Singh from the councils at Jaipur as equivalent to the loss of a partisan, and in consequence deems it necessary to prepare to gain some of his objects in Jaipur by more formidable measures than those which he has hitherto pursued."¹ Jagat Singh was still continuing through several *vakils*, who acted independently of each other, his efforts to secure British protection. One of the *vakils* suggested that the British Government should mediate a treaty between Jaipur and the Marathas, by which the Raja of Jaipur would agree to pay an annual tribute to the Marathas, and the Marathas should bind themselves not to enter Jaipur territory under any pretext. Another *vakil* suggested that Jaipur should cut up all connections with the Marathas and pay tribute to the East India Company. Another *vakil* said that "a declaration of the British Government taking Jaipur under its protection would not only be sufficient to drive away the Marathas and the Pathans, but would actually impart to Jaipur itself, without any further assistance, such a degree of strength as would enable it to do wonders against all its enemies." Metcalfe reported these suggestions to the Supreme Government because he was convinced that the destruction of Jaipur by the Marathas or the Pathans or by both was sure to affect the interests of the British Government.² He was informed that, although the Governor-General was "far from insensible of the actual and prospective evils resulting fromthe state of affairs in the north-western quarter of Hindustan," he was not prepared to "enter upon the extensive and complicated field of military and political operations necessarily involved in the adoption" of the policy of intervention.³

The able management of Khush-hali Ram Bohra rapidly restored order in the affairs of Jaipur. He wanted to make a definite settlement about the contribution demanded by Amir Khan and threatened the outbreak of hostilities in case the Pathan Chief refused to agree to a final arrangement. The vassals of Jaipur placed so much confidence in him that they were prepared to co-operate with his plans.⁴ Amir Khan at first agreed to accept

¹ Secret Consultations, August 16, 1811, No. 1.

² Secret Consultations, August 16, 1811, No. 1.

³ Secret Consultations, August 16, 1811, No. 2.

⁴ Political Consultations, September 20, 1811, No. 10.

15 *lakhs*, to be paid in three instalments, but later on raised his demand to 20 lakhs, to be paid in two instalments. Megh Singh, the former minister of Jaipur, was in the Pathan camp. Khush-hali Ram refused to be bullied and began hostilities (August, 1811). But Jagat Singh was not prepared to tolerate a powerful minister. Towards the close of the year 1811 Khush-hali Ram was appointed "at his own desire as manager of affairs in the Shekhawati country."¹

After the dismissal of the minister Jagat Singh found it difficult to resist Amir Khan. Naturally the negotiations with Metcalfe were renewed. Jagat Singh's *vakils* offered to pay to the British Government the sums which Sindhia and Holkar extorted from him. The money might be paid in 'annual tribute or territorial cession'. Metcalfe could not openly encourage these proposals, but he wrote to the Supreme Government in January, 1812, ".....from the ruinous state of affairs at Jaipur and from the apparently utter impossibility of retrieving them except by our aid, there is a good reason to conclude that an advantageous treaty might now be made with the court of Jaipur....."²

As the Supreme Government made no response, Jaipur suffered. The country was a prey to the Pindaris. The city was continually infested with robbery. Megh Singh was trying to recover his office with the help of the Pindaris. There was "an appearance of the apathy of despair" in the Raja's proceedings. The prevalence of disorder in the Jaipur State could not be overlooked by the British Government. In December, 1812, Metcalfe reported that the military tribes of the Shekhawati country had repeatedly plundered the frontier of Hariana. On the other hand, some allies of the Company, like the Raja of Bharatpur, were anxious to aggrandize themselves at the cost of Jaipur, and nothing but the strong remonstrance of the Resident in Delhi restrained them. Metcalfe wrote, "The Jaipur Government bore many years of distress and devastation without being so reduced as to become an object of contempt to comparatively petty States³ and to its own subjects. It preserved a certain deference

¹ Political Consultations, December 26, 1811, No. 26.

² Political Consultations, January 25, 1812, No. 31.

³ The Rao Raja of Macheri occupied some Jaipur forts and villages. Both Metcalfe and the Supreme Government took a serious view of this aggression, and compelled the Rao Raja to restore them. (Secret Consultations, June 25, Nos. 26, 27, 30, 31, 32; October 1, 1813, No. 99; October 8, 1813, No. 18).

and respect, longer perhaps than might have been expected under such circumstances, and it has been only lately that, worn out, at length, by a protracted series of miseries, it has fallen into a condition of extreme degradation....."¹

Early in 1814 Jagat Singh concluded a "regular engagement" with Amir Khan. The Jaipur *Darbar* agreed to pay him "a small fixed sum," and the Pathan Chief undertook to withdraw his military posts from that portion of Jaipur territory which he had occupied. Very soon, however, trouble came from another side. Bapu Sindhia marched from Mewar, invaded Jaipur and began "to plunder the districts and levy collections from the forts." Jagat Singh reported the matter to the Governor-General and solicited his "advice".² In reply he was informed that there were some "obstacles to a more intimate union of interest between the British Government and the State of Jaipur."³ Some time later Bapu Sindhia returned to Mewar, but Amir Khan began his depredations again. Metcalfe wrote on October 15, 1815, "Of the forces which obey Amir Khan, three armies are now plundering and taking possession of different districts in the Jaipur country;The Chiefs assembled at Jaipur, for the defence of the country against the common enemy, have increased the distress of the State by violent dissensions."⁴ Unable to deal effectively with this crisis Jagat Singh proposed that "the treaty of alliance which was concluded during the administration of Lord Wellesley should be revived."⁵ (December, 1815). The request was repeated a few months later (March, 1816).⁶ The *vakil* of Jaipur told Metcalfe that "there were no terms to which his master was not willing to accede". He offered either tribute, or territorial cessions, or even "the entire management of the country, the appointment of the ministers, and the complete obedience and subserviency of the court in every way."⁷ But the time was not yet ripe, and Jaipur had to wait.

LORD MOIRA'S POLICY

Lord Moira initiated a new policy on the eve of the Third

¹ Political Consultations, January 15, 1813, No. 6.

² Political Consultations, July 12, 1814, No. 14A.

³ Political Consultations, July 12, 1814, No. 16.

⁴ Political Consultations, November 10, 1815, No. 13.

⁵ Secret Consultations, March 16, 1816, No. 60.

⁶ Secret Consultations, March 16, 1816, No. 61.

⁷ Secret Consultations, April 15, 1816, No. 45.

Anglo-Maratha War. He was not prepared to hand over Jaipur to Sindhia or to Amir Khan. In a Minute dated April 13, 1816, he observed, "Amir Khan would, as sovereign (of Jaipur), add to the native strength of Jaipur an army better composed, higher disciplined, and more fashioned to service than is possessed by any other chieftain in India. The very structure of this army, and all its circumstances, make our opulent provinces the object." It was injudicious to expect that the mutual jealousy so long existing between Amir Khan and Sindhia would prevent their co-operation against the Company. "The conferences," Lord Moira remarked, "which took place between Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia early in the Gurkha War were sufficient indications of their good understanding". Sindhia, the Governor-General thought, would not openly object to the conclusion of an alliance between the Company and Jaipur, at a time when the British "force is at liberty, when it is in the most efficient condition, and when its quality is displayed in a light so impressive to the native sovereigns, by its having trodden under foot the hitherto invincible Gurkhas." Metcalfe, the Resident in Delhi, was, therefore, to be authorised to conclude a treaty with Jaipur at once.¹

Among the members of the Council Edmonstone opposed the Governor-General's proposal. His views were explained in detail in a Minute, dated April 16, 1816. In the first place, he drew a distinction between the 'organized troops of the Pathan leaders' and the Pindaris. "The former," he observed, "consist chiefly of infantry and artillery regularly formed and disciplined, to which is added cavalry such as is usually found in the ranks of native armies. These troops, it is true, have been employed in overthrowing.....the States of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur and, especially in the dominions of the latter, have spread into the interior of the country, exacting contributions and practising those outrages which are systematic among native troops..... In the sense above described they may perhaps be justly termed predatory troops, but they are not, as the Pindaris are, mounted robbers without organization or discipline; nor do they go forth, as the Pindaris do, in bands to distant quarters for the purpose of committing robbery and plunder indiscriminately in all the territories accessible to their incursions." It was clear, therefore,

¹ Secret Consultations, April 20, 1816, No. 1.

that the weakening of Amir Khan's 'organized troops' was not a necessary step in the immediate expedition against the Pindaris. Secondly, the plan of overthrowing Amir Khan's hold on Jaipur was a part of Lord Moira's comprehensive programme for "the general settlement of Central India." Edmonstone was convinced that the conclusion of an alliance with Jaipur "must of necessity lead, by an uninterrupted and unavoidable gradation of procedures and events, to that extended system of paramount sway" which the Governor-General wanted and the authorities in London prohibited. The Secret Committee in London had observed in a despatch relating to the question of revising the system of alliances: "We are chiefly desirous that by prudent management our affairs should be maintained in the same relative state under which our possessions have now for ten years continued in a state of tranquillity".¹ Edmonstone pointed out that "the continued exclusion of the State of Jaipur from the range of our political alliances is essential to the maintenance of that system to which the Hon'ble Committee refers."²

Seton, the former Resident in Delhi, was now a member of the Supreme Council. He carefully read the Minutes of Lord Moira and Edmonstone, and observed in a Minute dated April 17, 1816, "Our alliance with Jaipur should be renewed, and in consideration of the present critical state of that country, it is extremely desirable that the preliminary measures necessarily connected with the arrangement should be adopted with the least practicable delay". The principal grounds in favour of this view were thus stated by him. In the first place, an alliance with Jaipur would prevent the occupation of that country by Amir Khan. "In my judgment", Seton observed, "this is by no means a mere negative advantage, since Jaipur can in no case remain neutral. If its resources are not with us, they must be employed against us. If not thrown into our scale of influences, they must be thrown into that of our enemies. There is no medium". Secondly, as a protected State Jaipur would virtually become an advanced British military cantonment in Western India, "forming a species of connecting link between the western frontier of the Presidency of Bengal and the province of Gujarat". Thirdly, "by the exercise of well-directed influence" British

¹ Letter dated September 29, 1815.

² Secret Consultations, April 20, 1816, No. 2.

officers might "restore the once flourishing country of Jaipur to its former state of prosperity and happiness." Finally, the renewal of the alliance would remove "the somewhat unfavourable impression which attached to our dissolution of the former treaty". Against these advantages three objections might be raised. In the first place, it might be argued that it was unwise to offend so powerful a military Chief as Amir Khan. Seton replied that sooner or later the Company must check Amir Khan's progress, and it was better that he should be checked before he succeeded in securing absolute control over Jaipur. Secondly, Amir Khan might plead the right of Malhar Rao Holkar (Jaswant Rao Holkar's successor) to the privilege of levying tribute from Jaipur. Seton suggested that the British Government might recognize the validity of this claim and provide for the regular payment of the sum decided upon.¹ Thirdly, Edmonstone had referred to the prohibitory order in the Secret Committee's letter, but Seton argued that the revival of the alliance with Jaipur was not directly prohibited by it.²

After these deliberations it was decided that an alliance should be immediately formed with Jaipur, and Metcalfe was entrusted with the delicate task of carrying the negotiations to a successful end. It was apprehended that Sindhia would not "regard without dissatisfaction the conclusion of an alliance between the British Government and the State of Jaipur and that he would willingly throw every impediment in his power in the way of it." But the Governor-General believed that "it must be an object affecting him very near that would rouse him with active hostilities against the British Government". Close, who was at that time Resident with Sindhia, was instructed to 'meet any enquiry' on the matter. He was asked to say that the British Government could not refuse to respond to the Raja's repeated applications for protection, that the Maratha Powers had no claim

¹ Seton observed, "As far as I comprehended the meaning of the *vakil*s of the Raja of Jaipur, when discussing this subject with them at Delhi, they did not absolutely deny the right of Sindhia and of Holkar to a pecuniary payment, as a species of tribute. But what they bitterly complained of, and with too much cause, was that under the pretext of levying this tribute, armies were stationed in their master's dominions. . . . It has frequently been hinted to me. . . . that the Raja would be happy if the stipulated sum could be paid through the medium of the British Government." (Secret Consultations, April 20, 1816, No. 3).

² Secret Consultations, April 20, 1816, No. 3.

on Jaipur, and that the British Government had been loyally and sincerely observing the terms of the treaty of 1805 with Sindhia.¹

METCALFE'S NEGOTIATIONS

Metcalfe was fully aware of, and in full sympathy with, the new policy initiated by Lord Hastings. The instructions issued to him on April 20, 1816, were bold as well as precise. The negotiations with Jaipur were to be "conducted in such a manner as to render evident to the Raja that it is his interest and not that of the British Government that is principally concerned in their success, that we are yielding to his solicitations and not seeking our own advantage". He was to be solemnly warned that "to deserve the benefits of our alliance" he must "enter into it with a firm resolution to adhere in all events to the British Government." The price demanded by Lord Hastings from the Raja of Jaipur was: "the establishment of a British force in the country, the whole or a large proportion of the expenses of which is to be borne by the Raja; a control over the conduct of the exterior relation of that Government; exclusion from Jaipur territory of all foreign influence and power; and the disposal of the military power and resources of Jaipur for all purposes connected with the alliance and the general welfare of the two States." The British Government must have the right "to introduce into Jaipur territory at all times any number of troops it may deem requisite for the furtherance of the common interests of the two States, but it should be declared that the Raja will not be subjected to any additional charge on this account, except when the troops are augmented at his express solicitation or for objects exclusively his own." The amount of subsidy was to be fixed with reference to the financial condition of Jaipur; it was not to be fixed "at such a rate as would render the punctual discharge of it a matter of difficulty". In addition to the subsidiary force, the Raja should be asked to maintain a body of troops "to be at the disposal of the British Government for purposes of common interest." With regard to the control of external relations, the British Government must regulate the payment of tribute, if any, by Jaipur to Sindhia or Holkar. Lord Hastings thought, however, that neither Sindhia nor Holkar could justly demand tribute from Jaipur, for they had

¹ Supreme Government to Close, April 20, 1816.

relinquished all claims on the allies of the British Government. The British Government, on its part, would defend the Raja of Jaipur against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and guarantee the integrity and "independence of his territory."¹

Lord Hastings expected that Metcalfe would be able to conclude the alliance without involving the British Government in actual hostilities with Amir Khan and his confederate Chiefs. But precautionary measures were necessary. Two detachments of troops, 18,000 effective fighting men, were posted at Rewari and Mathura under the command of Major-General Ochterlony. A corps of reserve waited at Cawnpore. Measures were also taken for the protection of the British frontier against the sudden movement of the "predatory hordes". If the conclusion of the alliance was followed by any trouble created or encouraged by Amir Khan, war would be declared against him; "in such an event his retreat from Jaipur will no longer be sufficient", and operations against him would be continued until he should be deprived of all his possessions.²

Sindhia was naturally anxious to keep both Amir Khan and the British Government away from Rajputana. As soon as he heard that negotiations would be opened with Jaipur by Metcalfe he ordered Bapu Sindhia "to conciliate the Rajputs by every means in his power, and not to discourage them by any conduct which may interrupt the harmony that Sindhia wishes to preserve with them." At the same time re-inforcements were sent to Bapu Sindhia.³ Close thought that Amir Khan was not strong enough to secure "the double object of subduing the Jaipur Government and of resisting the army under Bapu Sindhia." He was, therefore, expected to leave the field open to Sindhia, who would then "be at liberty to regulate his proceedings according to the disposition which he finds prevalent in the Jaipur *Darbar*."⁴ On the whole, however, Close was confident of Metcalfe's success. He

¹ Secret Consultations, April 20, 1816, No. 6.

² Secret Consultations, April 20, 1816, No. 6.

³ Close wrote to Metcalfe in a letter dated May 19, 1816, "As the march of Sindhia's troops may inspire the Raja (of Jaipur) with some confidence of success against Amir Khan without submitting to the sacrifices he must make to obtain our effectual assistance, I should consider it a most desirable point to prevent or retard their advance into Jaipur...." (Secret Consultations, June 11, 1816, No. 27).

⁴ Secret Consultations, May 25, 1816, No. 32.

observed, "We cannot from past experience imagine that Sindhia will remain silent under the prospect of his dominions being so nearly approached in their most vulnerable points by the power of the British Government, or perhaps even that His Highness will altogether abstain from movements of a menacing appearance with a view to make a last effort to deter us from advancing ; but as to any act of hostility, I am of opinion that the measures which your Lordship has resolved to pursue are precisely those which must discourage Sindhia from making any such attempt".¹

As soon as the intention of the British Government became public, Amir Khan began to press Jaipur more closely than before and brought re-inforcements to invest the capital. Bapu Sindhia failed to conciliate the Rajputs. The Jaipur *vakils* in Sindhia's camp complained of "the inadequacy and futility of the exertions" made by him in their favour. Close suspected that Sindhia really "wished to effect his purpose by intimidation rather than by force." Amir Khan opened secret negotiations with Sindhia² and apparently succeeded in convincing him that they should act jointly for securing their common purpose—the exclusion of British influence from Jaipur.³ Sindhia calculated that his acquiescence in the policy pursued by Amir Khan towards Jaipur would "frighten the Raja and deter him from putting his seal irrevocably to any treaty" with the Company. Naturally Amir Khan increased the vigour of his operations against Jaipur.⁴ The position of Jaipur became very critical, for no assistance was available from Bapu Sindhia.⁵

In the meantime Metcalfe had opened negotiations with Jaipur. These negotiations were disturbed (June, 1816) by alarming rumours originating from unknown sources regarding the impending march of British troops upon Jaipur from Mathura and Rewari.⁶ At first Jagat Singh was rather lukewarm about Metcalfe's proposal, for he expected relief from Sindhia. Metcalfe wrote to Close on May 26, 1816, "The conduct of the court of Jaipur since it received intimation of the disposition of our Govern-

¹ Secret Consultations, June 11, 1816, No. 28.

² Secret Consultations, June 15, 1816, No. 10.

³ Secret Consultations, July 13, 1816, No. 12.

⁴ Secret Consultations, June 15, 1816, No. 11.

⁵ Secret Consultations, June 21, 1816, No. 25.

⁶ Secret Consultations, June 15, 1816, No. 10 ; June 29, 1816, No. 12 ; September 7, 1816, No. 5.

ment to negotiate a treaty of protection and alliance has not corresponded with its former eagerness in pressing its own overtures".¹ Towards the close of June the change in Sindhia's attitude and the intensification of Amir Khan's pressure restored the "former eagerness" of the Jaipur *vakils*. The terms were settled and the draft of the treaty was ready for signature. All on a sudden, however, the Jaipur *vakils* adopted an uncompromising attitude and the work done so far was undone. This sudden change was due to Amir Khan's retreat from Jaipur. Metcalfe wrote on July 3, 1816, "What he is to receive does not appear, and there is some reason to suppose that his necessities made him retreat". In spite of this unexpected disappointment Metcalfe did not despair, "for the distress of the Jaipur Government is of a permanent nature and the only permanent relief is in our protection". A few days later the negotiations were resumed, but they were suddenly interrupted again by "a most preposterous proposition"—the claim of the Jaipur *vakils* that Tonk and Rampura should be restored to their Government. Metcalfe wanted to keep these places for the Company: "The fort of Rampura is a post of which we know the value by experience, and the district yields four or five *lakhs* of annual revenue".²

When Metcalfe's reports were brought to the notice of the Governor-General-in-Council it was decided that the "delusive character" of the Raja of Jaipur "entitled him to no consideration". Metcalfe was instructed to inform him that if he did not "immediately recover the false step he had taken and conclude the alliance on the terms already proposed, he must consider the negotiations at an end and abide by the consequences of this decision in the ruin and devastation of his country without an effort on the part of the British to save him". (July, 1816).³

In a long despatch dated August 7, 1816, Metcalfe submitted to the Supreme Government a detailed report of his unsuccessful negotiations with the Jaipur *vakils* in Delhi. At first their response to his proposal was very unsatisfactory. Probably the ministers of Jaipur had not yet made up their minds as to the terms on which they should enter the proposed alliance. For a few days the *vakils* even omitted their ordinary visits on stated

¹ Secret Consultations, June 15, 1816, No. 8.

² Secret Consultations, August 3, 1816, Nos. 3, 4.

³ Secret Consultations, August 3, 1816, No. 5.

days, which they had never before "omitted for years, as if ashamed of the apparent inconsistency of their own Court." Later on they re-opened the negotiations with a proposal that "an English gentleman" should be sent to Jaipur. Amir Khan was then advancing in full force against Jaipur. "The mission of an English gentleman would have pointed out to him the determination of the British Government to protect Jaipur, and would have had nearly the same effect as a treaty in deterring him from violent measures. The mission of an English gentleman would also have shown our anxiety to accomplish the alliance and would to all appearance have reversed the relative positions of the two States in the negotiations". The proposal was, therefore, rejected by Metcalfe, although he was quite aware of the possibility that "the mission of an English gentleman to Jaipur might have tended to expedite the conclusion of a treaty from the advantage of direct intercourse with the Raja and his principal ministers".¹

Amir Khan was in the meantime collecting his troops and advancing to attack the city of Jaipur. Metcalfe believed that he "wished to anticipate the connection (between Jaipur and the Company) that he apprehended, and sought by a decisive blow completely to prevent it, either by bringing the Raja entirely within his own power or by effecting at least a change in the Ministry and putting in men connected with himself. It was only after Amir Khan had begun the siege of Jaipur that the *Darbar* sent a *vakil* with full powers to conclude a treaty. This *vakil* was a respectable banker named Sankar Das. The *vakils* residing in Delhi were associated with him, but he was "made the principal and most responsible person".²

After preliminary conversations it was decided that the expenses of the subsidiary force to be stationed at Jaipur would amount to 25 *lakhs* of rupees per annum and that the whole of this sum should be paid by the Raja of Jaipur if the resources of his territory could afford it. It was well-known, however, that the revenues of Jaipur were not sufficient for the payment of so large a sum, "either under present circumstances or in past years of prosperity". Metcalfe proposed that the treaty should contain an article "establishing the principle that 25 *lakhs* ought to be

¹ Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 5.

² Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 5.

paid, and should be paid whenever the resources of the country should admit of it, and that in the meantime the British Government should take a less sum, being as much as could be given according to a fair and just consideration of the resources of Jaipur, on which point the British Government should be the sole judge." The Jaipur *vakils* apprehended that the inclusion of such an article in the treaty would "prove a warrant for insisting on the full payment of that sum hereafter." They showed "so decided a repugnance" to Metcalfe's proposal that he abandoned it and suggested that 15 *lakhs* should be agreed upon. Even then the *vakils* pleaded the inability of the Raja to pay so large a sum. Metcalfe thought that their argument was not absolutely without justification: "The devastation which has affected the territory of Jaipur for many years, and the actual occupation of a considerable portion of the country by enemies, afford the *vakils* a reasonable ground for alleging that the payment of any considerable sum at first would be impracticable." The following arrangement was finally agreed upon: "for the first year nothing to be paid in consequence of the ruined state of the country, for the second and third years five *lakhs* each, for the fourth and fifth years ten *lakhs* each, ever afterwards fifteen *lakhs* annually."¹

Everything was now ready for the preparation of a draft treaty, which was to be signed on the following day. When the next day came and the draft² prepared by Metcalfe was read to

¹ Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 5.

² The draft treaty consisted of 16 articles. Article 1 provided for "perpetual alliance and unity of interests between the contracting Powers." Article 2 contained the promise of the British Government to protect Jaipur territory "against all enemies." Article 3 related to subsidiary force. Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 regulated money payments. Article 9 provided that "the subsidiary force should be stationed at points to be hereafter determined in concert and that a fort should be assigned for the magazines and depots of the force." Article 10 provided for the maintenance of a force by the Raja "to be in constant co-operation with our troops and to be subject to our inspection." Article 11 stipulated that "on any invasion of the Jaipur country the British army should have admittance into any fort, the occupation of which might be expedient for the defence of the country." Article 12 provided that in time of war the Jaipur army should be subject to the orders of the British Government. Article 13 provided that the Raja would not enter into any negotiation with foreign Chiefs and States without the concurrence of the British Government. Article 14 provided for the exclusion of Americans and Europeans from Jaipur territory. Article 15 stipulated that the British Government would not interfere in the internal management of the Jaipur State or with the Raja's dependants. Article 16 provided that duties should not be levied on articles for con-

the *vakils*, they "commenced their observations upon it in an altered tone." They objected to the arrangement about payment previously decided upon. After some delay Metcalfe agreed to take eight *lakhs* (instead of ten) per year, for the fourth and fifth years. Then the *vakils* demanded the restoration of Tonk and Rampura, which were at that time in the nominal possession of Holkar and actual control of Amir Khan. Metcalfe pointed out that Tonk and Rampura had been separated from Jaipur for a long period, and "that these districts had been for two years (1804-1806) in our possession during the former alliance, without such a demand being made on the part of Jaipur." But the Jaipur *vakils* plainly declared that they were "not at liberty to sign any treaty without obtaining a satisfactory promise with regard to Tonk and Rampura."¹ The negotiations were thus abruptly terminated. But Metcalfe was still sanguine. He wrote on August 7, 1816, "It is perhaps most probable that the Court of Jaipur has not really determined what course to pursue, and that there are at present two parties at work, one recommending an alliance with us on the terms insisted on, and the other objecting either to the terms or to the alliance, and urging an arrangement with the plunderers of the country."²

In August, 1816, it became clear that the Jaipur *Darbar* wanted to protract the negotiations with the British in order to secure better terms from Amir Khan and Sindhia.³ Metcalfe was informed that a minister would soon be deputed to him for the final adjustment of the terms of a treaty. Metcalfe was convinced that this proposal was nothing but an excuse for further delay. So he publicly "declared the negotiations to be at an end on account of the persevering evasion of the court of Jaipur."⁴

Although "the deceitful and evasive conduct of the court of Jaipur necessarily excited the disgust" of the Governor-General,

sumption in the British cantonments. (Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 5).

¹ Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 5.

² Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 5.

³ Close wrote from Sindhia's court on August 13, 1816, "The Jaipur question is now very little thought of. Bapuji Sindhia of his own accord lately.....advanced into Jaipur; he has again retired, but neither his advance nor retreat has excited any attention in the *Darbar*." (Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, No. 9).

⁴ Secret Consultations, September 7, 1816, Nos. 6, 7.

he was fully conscious of the fact that the advantages of an alliance with Jaipur were not "immaterial" to the British Government. He was prepared, therefore, "to receive and discuss any new proposition that may be made without animadverting on what has passed." Metcalfe was authorised to conclude a treaty if the *vakils* of Jaipur accepted all the terms formerly agreed upon, as well as an additional condition to the effect that the British Government would be the arbitrator of any demand preferred by any State on Jaipur.¹ This arrangement was intended to "form the basis of our resistance to the objections which may eventually be opposed by Sindhia or other Powers to the treaty on the pretence that it invades their rights with relation to Jaipur." Metcalfe received unqualified praise for "conducting the negotiations with the same ability, zeal, firmness and address which have uniformly distinguished your official conduct in the many arduous and important transactions in which you have been engaged."

The position of Jaipur was becoming worse day by day. Amir Khan was collecting revenue from the villages of Jaipur and one of his lieutenants was strengthening a fort within Jaipur territory which he had occupied. Bapu Sindhia did not obstruct Amir Khan's movements. There was no unity even in the capital of Jagat Singh. Rai Chand Singh, the principal commander of his troops, was pro-British. When the negotiations with Metcalfe were given up he resigned his command and left Jaipur in disgust. His successor, Ganesh Narain, "was undoubtedly most anxiously bent on the formation of an alliance with the British." Metcalfe wrote on September 25, 1816, "Affairs are proceeding at Jaipur in that course which is likely, in my opinion, though at what period I cannot pretend to say, to lead to a further application for our protection, with entire submission to our terms."²

¹ Metcalfe was fully aware of the importance of including this stipulation in the treaty, and the first draft prepared by him contained the following article: "All disputes between the Raja of Jaipur and other powers and all claims on the Raja by other Powers shall be submitted to the arbitration of the British Government." The Jaipur *vakils* displayed extreme apprehension and reluctance against this stipulation, and Metcalfe considered it unnecessary to insist on its acceptance. He thought that "the exercise of the power of arbitration in all disputes between Jaipur and other Powers, and on all claims brought forward on that State, was inseparable from the character of protector which the alliance would give us, and did not absolutely require any specific stipulation." (Secret Consultations, November 2, 1816, No. 1).

² Secret Consultations, October 12, 1816, No. 16.

In November, 1816, some Jaipur *vakils* led by Shankar Das came to Delhi and renewed negotiations with Metcalfe. The question of Tonk and Rampura was revived. The *vakils* no longer insisted on the insertion of any stipulation on that subject in the treaty; they were ready to be satisfied if Metcalfe promised in writing that he would try "to prevail on the Governor-General to comply with their wishes, if, by any event, Tonk and Rampura came into the possession of the British Government." Metcalfe expressed his inability to make any such promise. The *vakils* gave up their demand as if it had been "made with a previous conviction that it would not succeed." Then they wanted *jagirs* or pensions for themselves. Metcalfe "got rid of this most preposterous proposal by exposing its absurdity and laughing it off in a manner that was likely to be least offensive." The third request of the *vakils* was that the Resident at the court of Jaipur should be a man of "mild and kind disposition and deportment." Metcalfe gave them full assurance on this point. Then Metcalfe proposed the additional stipulation about arbitration. The *vakils* obstinately opposed it on the ground that "they did not know to what extensive and indefinite demands they might be subjecting themselves, should they bind themselves to abide by British decision on every claim that might be brought forward against them." Metcalfe tried to remove their suspicions and agreed to put the article in the most harmless language. He suggested that the right of the British Government to arbitrate on all claims preferred by other Powers against Jaipur should be limited to claims, if any, advanced by Holkar and Sindhia relating to matters arising since the dissolution of the British alliance with Jaipur in 1806, for he suspected that the alarm of the *vakils* was particularly directed towards some bonds given by Jagat Singh to Holkar and some Pindari leaders before 1806. The *vakils* accepted this compromise, and everything was ready for the formal conclusion of the treaty. A strange difficulty was, however raised at the last moment. The *vakils* were not sure whether the treaty would be ratified by the Raja. They asked Metcalfe "to be satisfied for the present with a treaty signed by themselves." Metcalfe naturally rejected this 'extraordinary proposal', and unwilling to tolerate further delay, cut off the negotiations. He observed in his report to the Supreme Government, "A protracted and open negotiation is attended with many advantages to the Raja of Jaipur. It overawes his enemies and enables him to make better

terms with them. It does not bind him to anything, and it puts it in his power to close with the terms offered in a case of necessity. It is attended with some of the advantages, without any of the sacrifices and restraints, of an actual alliance. And it keeps open the chapter of accidents in which the politicians of this country delight to put their trust.”¹

Soon after the termination of the negotiations the chief minister of Jaipur publicly declared that he had never authorized Shankar Das and other *vakils* to agree to any stipulation for the payment of money to the British Government. When Metcalfe confronted the *vakils* with this declaration, they said that the minister was afraid to acknowledge ‘the extent of the payment to which he had agreed’ lest he should be driven from office by those chiefs who were opposed to the British alliance. Metcalfe accepted this explanation as worthy of belief and wrote a letter of protest to the Raja and the minister. He remarked, “Either the negotiators had agreed to those stipulations in disobedience of their instructions, in which case they deserved punishment and were not fit to be employed, or the Court, after giving assent to those stipulations, had uttered a falsehood in denying it. . . . in either case it would be difficult to place any confidence in the future negotiations of the Court.”² The Raja sent an evasive reply, which appeared to imply that the agents had “agreed to more than they had authority for,” but it was recognized that the sum of money to be paid was the principal subject of discussion.³

In March, 1817, Metcalfe reported to the Supreme Government that Amir Khan was again advancing towards Jaipur. His progress created alarm in Jaipur, and Metcalfe found “some light indication of a desire” to revive negotiations for British protection.⁴ Before the negotiations were formally resumed Lord Hastings had arrived at his final decision to crush the Pindaris. Sindhia, Holkar and Amir Khan were the three principal persons whose co-operation or submission was an essential preliminary to the success of this plan. Holkar was asked “to abstain from all interference or connection with the States of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Kotah and Bundi.” Amir Khan, who had already opened

¹ Secret Consultations, December 17, 1816, No. 2.

² Secret Consultations, February 4, 1817, No. 1.

³ Secret Consultations, April 19, 1817, No. 2.

⁴ Secret Consultations, April 19, 1817, No. 2.

negotiations for a settlement with the British Government, was required to withdraw his troops from all Rajput States and to restore Rajput forts occupied by him. With regard to the Rajput States the Governor-General's plan was "to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures then (October, 1817) in progress." Agreements were to be concluded with them "on conditions which should give to the British Government the entire control over their political relations and proceedings with each other and with foreign States, secure to them the enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the independent exercise of their internal administration under our protection and guarantee, and render their resources available for defraying the charge that will be incurred in the establishment and support of this system."¹

There were two alternative methods of giving the new "system" a concrete shape. The three principal Rajput States—Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur—might be combined in a common league under the paramount authority of the British Government, or separate agreements might be concluded with each State "on the conditions best adapted to its peculiar circumstances and situation." The Secretary to the Supreme Government observed in a letter to Metcalfe, dated October 8, 1817, "There are some points of view in which the advantages of the former might be found to preponderate, but it may be apprehended that, notwithstanding the similarity of features which in some respects they all exhibit, there are yet such distinctions as to render it difficult to frame any system of general confederation which would adapt itself to the circumstances of all. It is possible also that feelings of pride or jealousy might lead them to prefer a separate alliance with the British Government, by which each would preserve the appearance and form of a substantive power, to an union which would bring their common dependence on the British Government too prominently forward."²

With regard to Jaipur Metcalfe was instructed to conclude a treaty containing the stipulations previously agreed upon, with one exception: the article relating to the right of the British

¹ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 13.

² Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

Government to decide the pecuniary claims of other States on Jaipur was to be omitted. Lord Hastings was by this time convinced that neither Sindhia nor Holkar was justly entitled to claim tribute from Jaipur. It was, therefore, quite unnecessary to insist on a stipulation which had "proved to be so repugnant to the wishes and alarming to the fears of the Government of Jaipur." Moreover, the amount of the subsidy originally demanded might be reduced, and "the unqualified demand of a fort for stationing British troops" might not be necessary.¹

In October, 1817, Metcalfe was ready to receive the *vakils* of Jaipur, but Jagat Singh still "persevered" in a very perverse policy² and continued unaccountable, and judging from the past, interminable and mutually faithless negotiations with Amir Khan. Towards the close of November Metcalfe decided that an advance of Ochterlony's army towards Jaipur would "bring the procrastinating council of the Raja to a decision in favour of the immediate conclusion of the alliance." A treaty had already been concluded with Amir Khan (November 9, 1817), and Major-General Donkin was proceeding towards Kotah. At this favourable moment Ochterlony might appear near Jaipur and utilise the implied threat of military operations for the purpose of coercing Jagat Singh into submission. Metcalfe wrote to him on November 25, 1817, "On your advance the negotiations with the several western States, which I was instructed to undertake, will devolve on you, with the exception of such as in consequence of the progress already made in them, it may be proper for me to conclude."³

The advance of Major-General Ochterlony "caused considerable sensation and alarm" in Jaipur. Some *vakils* were sent to his camp "to ward off apprehended hostilities," and a deputation advanced in a hurry towards Delhi. Amir Khan had in the meantime retreated from Jaipur territory, but he reoccupied some districts as soon as he heard that negotiations with Metcalfe had

¹ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

² Tod says, ".....there were abundance of private and individual motives arrayed in hostility to the British offer. For example, the ministers dreaded the surveillance of a resident agent, as obnoxious to their authority and influence; and the chieftains, whom rank and ancient usage kept at court as the councillors of their prince, saw in prospect the surrender of crown lands, which fraud, favour, or force had obtained for them." (See *ante*, p. 156).

³ Secret Consultations, December 19, 1817, No. 112.

not yet begun. Naturally Metcalfe expected that his object would be accomplished without further delay. Unfortunately the progress of the *vakils* sent to Delhi was retarded by the intrigues of a chief named Thakur Lachhman Singh, a partisan of Amir Khan. In January, 1818, Metcalfe began to negotiate separately with some tributary Chiefs owing allegiance to the Raja of Jaipur. "My object," he wrote on January 29, 1818, "is twofold : either to alarm the Court of Jaipur and stimulate them to the conclusion of a suitable alliance, by showing that we are not entirely dependent on their will but are able and willing to establish order without their concurrence ; or if the Court should continue so senseless as not to be moved by the prospect of the dissolution of its power over the dependent States connected with it, to lay a foundation for the conclusion of separate engagements which should bring all those States under our protection."¹

TREATY OF 1818

As a result of Metcalfe's shrewd diplomatic pressure the Jaipur *vakils* came to Delhi. The tribute question protracted the negotiations. Even on March 8, 1818, Metcalfe was not confident of success.² He wanted fifteen *lakhs* ; the *vakils* offered two *lakhs* and forty thousand. At last the following arrangement was agreed upon : "The first year—in consideration of the depopulated state of the country—nothing . The second year—four *lakhs*. The third year—five. The fourth year—six. The fifth year—seven. The sixth year and ever afterwards—eight, until the Raja's revenue should exceed forty *lakhs*, when, in addition to eight *lakhs*, we should receive five-sixteenth of all the revenue above forty *lakhs*."³ Tod observes, "The Jaipur Court justly deemed one-fifth (eight *lakhs*) of the gross revenues of the crown, a high rate of insurance for protection ; but when we further stipulated for a prospective increase of nearly one-third of all surplus revenue beyond forty *lakhs*, they saw, instead of the generous Briton, a sordid trafficker of mercenary protection whose rapacity transcended that of the Maratha."⁴

¹ Secret Consultations, February 20, 1818, No. 26. A conditional engagement was concluded with the Raja of Khetri.

² Political Consultations, March 27, 1818, No. 19.

³ Secret Consultations, April 17, 1818, No. 74.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 155-156.

The remaining articles of the treaty¹ were discussed and arranged without difficulty.² It was signed in Delhi on April 2 and ratified by Lord Hastings on April 15. Article 1 provided for "perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interest" between the two States. The territory of Jaipur was to be protected by the British Government (Article 2). Jagat Singh promised to "act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government," to acknowledge its supremacy, and to maintain no connection with other Chiefs and States (Article 3). He agreed not to enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government (Article 4). All disputes between Jaipur and other States would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government (Article 5). Article 6 regulated the question of tribute. Article 7 provided that Jaipur should 'furnish troops according to its means' at the requisition of the British Government. Article 9 ran as follows: "The Maharaja and his heirs and successors shall remain absolute rulers of their territory and their dependants according to long established usage; and British civil and criminal jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that principality."

THE TREATY IN OPERATION

Tod points out the far-reaching implications of the treaty in the following words: "Both the sixth and seventh articles contain the seeds of disunion, whenever it might suit the chicanery or bad faith of the protected, or the avarice of the protector. The former has already been called into operation, and the 'absolute rulers' of Jaipur have been compelled to unfold to the resident agent the whole of their financial and territorial arrangements, to prove that the revenues did not exceed the sum of forty *lakhs*, as of the sum in excess (besides the stipulated tributary *fifth*) our share was to be *five-sixteenths*."³ As in the case of several other Rajput States, the British Government had to "arbitrate the difference between the Raja (of Jaipur) and his vassals on the subject of the usurpations from the crownlands." Here the arbitration was "easy, and left no unpleasant feeling." "But," says Tod, "when we intermeddled with the intrigues respecting the succes-

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 104-105.

² Secret Consultations, April 17, 1818, No. 74.

³ See *ante*, p. 158.

sion, our ignorance of established rights and usages rendered the interference offensive, and made the Jaipur chiefs repent the alliance which temporary policy had induced their prince to accept."¹

Sawai Jagat Singh died on December 21, 1818, without leaving any natural or adopted heir. On the morning succeeding his death a minor named Mohan Singh,² a distant relative of the ruling family, was installed on the *gadi* by the chief eunuch of the *rawala*³ (seraglio)—a man named Mohan *Nazir*—who at that time held the reins of power in his hands. Tod describes him as "a man of considerable vigour of understanding and not without the reputation of good intention in his administration of affairs." But the selection of Mohan Singh as Jagat Singh's successor "savoured more of self-interest than of loyalty." Tod says, "The youth was but nine years of age and a long minority, with the exclusive possession of power, suggested the true motives of the *Nazir*." The *Nazir* declared that the adoption of Mohan Singh was in conformity with the desire of the deceased Raja; but there was no evidence in favour of this statement. "The selection was in violation of established usage; "there was no previous consultation or concert amongst the military vassals, or the queens." The *Nazir* "acted entirely on his own responsibility." After the installation, however, he tried to secure the approval of the nobles and the British Government. The nobles refused to commit themselves. The Resident at Delhi sent his confidential *Munshi* to Jaipur with instructions to make a thorough enquiry into the question of succession. The *Munshi* reported in favour of the *Nazir*. On February 7, 1819, the confirmation of Mohan Singh by the British Government was publicly declared at Jaipur.

Even the approval of the Paramount Power could not secure the acquiescence of the nobles in this hasty and ill-considered arrangement. The chief queen of Sawai Jagat Singh, sister of Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur, "breathed nothing but open defiance of the *Nazir* and his junta." She was supported by the nobles. Early in March, 1819, the *Rajawat* chief of Jhulaye decided to

¹ See *ante*, p. 156.

² Son of Manohar Singh, Raja of Narwar, "who was chased from his throne and country by Sindhia."

³ "Jaipur and Bundi are the only of the Rajput principalities who, adopting the Moslem custom, have contaminated the palaces of their queens with the presence of these creatures."

appeal to arms in support of his rights as heir-presumptive, and he was soon joined by the chiefs of Sirwur and Esurda. Another party tried to revive the claim of Man Singh, the posthumous son of Prithvi Singh, who had been living for many years in exile at Brindaban. In this crisis the *Nazir* tried to secure the support of Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur and Rana Bhim Singh of Udaipur, but his efforts proved unsuccessful. Civil war seemed imminent, but Jaipur was saved by the timely discovery that one of the queens of Sawai Jagat Singh—the Bhattiani queen—was pregnant. On April 25, 1819, she gave birth to a son, who was called Jai Singh III. He was recognised as heir both by the Jaipur nobles and the British Government, and his mother was recognised as Regent. Mohan Singh was set aside.¹

During the Regency of the Bhattiani queen (1819-1833) "Jaipur was a scene of corruption and misgovernment, and the British Government found it necessary to appoint an officer to reside at Jaipur and to authorise him to interfere in the internal administration of the State, with the view of guarding the interests of Government and securing the payment of the tribute."² This was, of course, a clear violation of the 8th Article of the treaty of 1818. The following observations of Tod were prophetic: "While we deem ourselves justified in interfering in the two chief branches of government, the succession and finances, how is it possible to avoid being implicated in the acts of the Government functionaries and involved in the party views and intrigues of a court, stigmatized even by the rest of Rajwara with the epithet of *jutha darbar*, the 'lying court'? While there is a resident agent at Jaipur, whatever his resolves, he will find it next to impossible to keep aloof from the vortex of intrigue. The purest intentions, the highest talents, will scarcely avail to counteract this systematic vice, and with one party at least, but eventually with all, the reputation of his Government will be compromised."³

On one occasion at least the weakness of the Jaipur *Darbar* made it necessary for the British Government to adopt a strong policy. In 1827 some nobles of Jodhpur revolted against Raja Man Singh and decided to put the pretender Dhonkal Singh on the *gadi*. They assembled their followers and prepared to invade Jodhpur from the Jaipur territory. "By giving facilities for this

¹ See *ante*, pp. 159-164.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 91.

³ See *ante*, pp. 158-159.

attack on Jodhpur, the Jaipur State was considered to have violated its treaty engagements in such a manner as to justify the British Government in adopting any measures which might seem expedient, both for resenting the infraction of a positive engagement, and for preventing its mischievous effects. Strong remonstrances were, therefore, addressed to the Maharaja of Jaipur."¹

The Bhattiani Rani had a paramour named Jota Ram. His influence over the Regent enabled him to acquire great power in the State. Towards the close of Lord Amherst's administration the British Resident banished Jota Ram and conferred the post of Minister on Rawal Bairisal. But Jota Ram's party continued to disturb the State; Rawal Bairisal was dismissed. The Rani succeeded in inducing the British Government to sanction the recall of Jota Ram. The nobles remained hostile to the Rani and refused to accept the rule of an adventurer like Jota Ram. Sir Charles Metcalfe was able, however, to persuade the nobles to agree to the continuation of the Rani's Regency. This arrangement did not work satisfactorily. Jota Ram, who had become Minister with the approval of the British Government, exploited the peasantry and tried to crush the nobility. The privileges of the nobles were curtailed, and an attempt was made to substitute the Raja's troops for theirs in the garrisons of some strongholds. A civil war broke out in 1830. As Lord William Bentinck was in favour of the policy of non-intervention, the rival parties were free to fight out their quarrel without British intervention. A British force was, however, sent against Jota Ram when he threatened the estates of some nobles whom the British Government had guaranteed in their possessions. Jota Ram gave up his plan and soon afterwards his position was weakened as a result of the Rani's death (1833). The young Maharaja Jai Singh III died in 1835, and it was strongly suspected that he had been poisoned by Jota Ram.

Jaipur was now confronted with a serious crisis. The heir to the throne was an infant two years of age—Ram Singh, son of Jai Singh III. Jota Ram was all-powerful. The nobles were assembling at the capital at the head of their armed retainers. Major Alves, the Political Agent, came to Jaipur to make enquiries,

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 141.

reform the administration, and assume the guardianship of the infant heir. Jota Ram made an insincere offer to resign and secretly organised a diabolical conspiracy. "By raising a popular disturbance on the very day of the Political Agent's arrival, and by hiring assassins to murder the English officers, he hoped to embroil the *thakurs* with the Government, so that he might be brought back to power through their being discredited." The Agent was wounded and his Assistant, Mr. Blake, was killed. Enquiries revealed the part played by Jota Ram in organising disturbances and instigating murders. He and his brother were imprisoned for life in the fort of Chunar.¹

Soon afterwards a Council of Regency, consisting of five of the principal nobles, was formed under the superintendence of the Political Agent, and it was decided that all important measures were to be submitted to him for approval. Thus the State was virtually placed under complete British control. The primary object of the British Government was to realise the large arrears of the tribute which had accumulated during the last few years. As the tribute was found to be too heavy for the State, in 1842 a remission was made of 46 *lakhs* of arrears and the annual tribute was reduced to 4 *lakhs* of rupees. This alteration was formally recorded in a treaty² concluded on August 31, 1871. The minority of Ram Singh saw the beginning of an era of peace and prosperity for Jaipur.

¹ See Boulger, *Lord William Bentinck*, pp. 140-144.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 107-108.

VI

MINOR STATES

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris, he found it necessary to take the Rajput States under British protection. Adam, Secretary to the Supreme Government, wrote to Metcalfe on October 8, 1817, "The general object to be attained by forming a connection with these petty States ("of Hindustan, which will be relieved from the thralldom of the military and predatory Powers by the result of our negotiations with Sindhia and Holkar or by the success of our arms, should these Chiefs compel us to wage war against them") is to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures now in progress. With this end in view it is desirable to conclude engagements with the States in question on conditions which should give to the British Government the entire control over their political relations and proceedings with each other and with foreign States, secure to them the enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the independent exercise of their internal administration under our protection and guarantee, and render their resources available for defraying the charge that will be incurred in the establishment and support of this system."¹

KARAULI

Karauli was the first of the minor Rajput States to accept the new system. The ruler of Karauli had long been a tributary to the Peshwa. By Article 14 of the treaty of Poona (June, 1817) Peshwa Baji Rao II surrendered to the British Government all rights and claims over his tributaries in Hindustan and Malwa. This surrender included a tribute of Rs. 25,000 paid by the ruler of Karauli. By a treaty² concluded on November 9, 1817, the Raja of Karauli accepted the supremacy of the British Government and promised not to enter into negotiations with any other Power without its consent. All disputes between Karauli and

¹ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

² Secret Consultations, December 5, 1817, No. 23. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 284-285.

other States were to be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. No tribute was to be paid, but the Raja agreed "to furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means." "Perpetual alliance and unity of interests" was established between the two States. The Raja was recognised as "absolute ruler" of his territory. The jurisdiction of the British Government was not to be introduced into Karauli.

In 1825 the Raja of Karauli supported Durjan Sal in his attempt to usurp the *gadi* of Bharatpur. "After the fall of Bharatpur, however, the Maharaja made humble professions of his submission, and it was not thought necessary to take serious notice of his conduct."¹

KOTAH

After Karauli came Kotah.

When the Hada State of Kotah became a subordinate ally of the East India Company, it was nominally ruled by Maha Rao Ummed Singh, who had ascended the *gadi* in 1771, but the *de facto* ruler of the principality was the famous Minister, Raj Rana Zalim Singh. Tod has left for us a detailed account of the character and career of this remarkable man.² Kotah suffered from the depredations of Holkar and Amir Khan³; but thanks to Zalim Singh's clever diplomacy, her distress was much less serious than that of Mewar, Marwar and Jaipur. Tod says, "Placed in the very heart of India, Kotah was for years the centre around which revolved the desultory armies or ambulant governments, ever strangers to repose; and though its wealth could not fail to attract the cupidity of these vagabond powers, yet by the imposing attitude which he assumed Zalim Singh maintained during more than half a century, the respect, the fear, and even the esteem of all, and Kotah alone, throughout this lengthened period, so full of catastrophes, never saw an enemy at her gates."⁴

The Second Anglo-Maratha War brought Zalim Singh for the first time into contact with the British Government. When

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 264.

² Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1535-1619.

³ Secret Consultations, September 6, 1804, No. 42. Political Consultations, 1807, January 29, No. 32; June 11, No. 16; June 25, No. 41.

⁴ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1569.

Colonel Monson marched through Kotah to attack Holkar, he received from Zalim Singh supplies as well as men. "But when the British army retreated and its commander demanded admission within the walls of Kotah, he met a decided and very proper refusal." Although Zalim Singh refused to invite Holkar's attack on his capital by offering shelter to "a panic-struck, beef-eating army within his walls", he sent his troops to ensure the safety of that army until it left the Mukundara Pass in its rear. Holkar naturally took offence, encamped before the walls of Kotah and realised three *lakhs* of rupees. Under these circumstances Monson's charge of treachery against Zalim Singh is hardly justifiable.

When Lord Hastings invited the Rajput States to accept the protection of the East India Company, "the eagle eye of Zalim saw at once the virtue of compliance and the grace attendant on its being quickly yielded."¹ His Maratha advisers were naturally averse to his leaguening with the English, and he himself was reluctant to give up the independence of his State. But he quickly decided to accept subordination in exchange for the security it afforded. Moreover, it was hinted that at the end of the Pindari War the territories conquered from Holkar in Central India would be distributed among the allies of the British Government.² Zalim Singh sent a corps of 1500 men, infantry and cavalry, with four guns to co-operate with Sir John Malcolm. He also assisted the British Government in capturing several Pindari leaders.

In October, 1817, Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an alliance with Kotah on principles similar to those which were laid down in respect of other States. It was expected that the geographical situation of Kotah as well as "the character of Zalim Singh will render him an useful adherent in the approaching operations against the Pindaris, and an efficient instrument for upholding and promoting the system which had so long desolated the central provinces of India."³ The negotiations were entrusted to Tod, who reached Zalim Singh's camp at

¹ See *ante*, p. 226.

² Four districts ceded by Holkar were made over to Kotah by a *Sanad* dated September 25, 1819. (Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 359, 372-373). "It was at first intended to make a separate grant of these districts to the Minister (Zalim Singh), but he insisted that they should be annexed to the Kotah State."

³ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

Rowtah, about 25 miles S.S.E. of Kotah, on November 23, 1817. and was very favourably received.¹ The treaty² was signed in Delhi by Metcalfe on December 26, 1817. The general conditions of the treaty were similar to those which were incorporated in the treaties with Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur. With regard to the question of tribute, it was decided that the money hitherto paid by Kotah to the Marathas (the Peshwa, Sindhia, Holkar and Puar) should be paid to the British Government (Article 7). It was, therefore, necessary for the British Government to protect Kotah against any future claim from other States. Article 8 of the treaty ran as follows : "No other power shall have any claim to tribute from the principality of Kotah ; and if any one advance such a claim the British Government engages to reply to it." Article 9 provided for military assistance : "The troops of the principality of Kotah, according to its means, shall be furnished at the requisition of the British Government."

There were hereditary Rajput premiers in several States in Rajputana. At the time when the treaty between Mewar and the British Government was being drawn out the Rana's *vakil*, who was a relative of the Rawat of Salumbar, wanted to introduce a clause guaranteeing the position of the *Bhanjgarh* to the Rawat of Salumbar, but Metcalfe merely gave an assurance that "the good conduct of the minister would ensure His Lordship's (*i.e.*, the Governor-General's) approbation." In view of Zalim Singh's great services to, and pre-eminent position in Kotah, he was certainly entitled to demand that his control over administration should be guaranteed. But no such guarantee was demanded from Metcalfe when the treaty was concluded. Tod says, "This excited the surprise of the British representative (*i.e.*, Metcalfe), who, in his official despatch detailing the progress and conclusion of the negotiations, intimated that he not only expected such stipulation but was prepared for admitting it. There was no inadvertence in this omission ; the Regent saw no occasion for any guarantee, for the plenary exercise of the powers of sovereign during more than half a century had constituted him, *de facto*, prince of Kotah. Moreover, we may suppose, had he felt a desire for such stipulation, that a feeling of pride might have stifled its expression."³

¹ Secret Consultations, January 9, 1818, No. 55.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 368-372.

³ See *ante*, pp. 230-231.

On February 20, 1818, a "Supplementary Article"¹ was added to the treaty of December 26, 1817. It provided that Ummed Singh should be succeeded by his eldest son and heir-apparent, Kishor Singh, "in regular succession and perpetuity," and that "the entire administration of the affairs of the principality" should be vested in Zalim Singh and after him in his eldest son Madho Singh, and his heirs "in regular succession and perpetuity." Thus "one person was recognised as the titular chief and another was guaranteed as the actual ruler."² According to Tod, the overture for this supplementary Article originated not with Zalim Singh but with Madho Singh. His comment reveals his political wisdom as well as his insight into Rajput character: "There is not a shadow of doubt that the supplemental articles of the treaty of Kotah, which pledge our faith to two parties in a manner which rendered its maintenance towards both an impossibility, produced consequences that shook the confidence of the people of Rajwara in our political rectitude. They established two pageants instead of one, whose co-existence would have been miraculous."³

This illogical system worked without difficulty during the life of Ummed Singh. Troubles began after his death (November, 1819). He left three sons—Kishor Singh, Bishen Singh and Prithvi Singh. Zalim Singh had two sons—the elder, Madho Singh, legitimate; the younger, Gobardhan Das, illegitimate. Gobardhan Das was regarded by Zalim Singh with more affection, and endowed with almost equal authority with Madho Singh, who was the declared successor to the Regency. Kishor Singh was, in Tod's words, "mild in his temper and demeanour; but being brought up in habits of seclusion, he was more conversant with the formulas of his religion, and the sacred epics, than with the affairs of mankind." Prithvi Singh, an energetic young man, was determined to "enfranchise himself and family from the thralldom in which his father had left them, or perish in the attempt." Gobardhan Das was jealous of Madho Singh and "lived on terms of confidential friendship" with Prithvi Singh.

After Kishor Singh's accession to the *gadi* his counsellors, under the guidance of Prithvi Singh and Gobardhan Das, advised him to repudiate the authority of the Regent. This policy was

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 372.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 360.

³ See *ante*, p. 231.

directed not so much against Zalim Singh, who was very old and quite blind, as against Madho Singh, the would-be Regent. An appeal was made to Article 10 of the treaty of 1817,¹ and it was pointed out that the Regent's authority, being inconsistent with that Article, was illegal. The British Agent informed Kishor Singh "that no pretensions of the titular Raja can be entertained by us in opposition to our positive engagement with the Regent; that he alone was considered as the head of the Kotah State, and the titular Raja no more deemed the ruler of Kotah, than the Raja of Satara the leader of the Mahrattas, or the Great Mogul the emperor of Hindustan." When all remonstrances failed, Kishor Singh was blockaded in his castle. When reduced to extremity he broke through the blockade at the head of 500 horse. He was, however, overtaken by the British Agent and conducted by him back to the castle. Gobardhan Das was banished to Delhi and a public reconciliation took place between Kishor Singh and Zalim Singh. These incidents occurred in May-June, 1820.

Towards the close of 1821 Gobardhan Das was permitted to visit Malwa in connection with a marriage ceremony. His arrival there was immediately followed by the renewal of dissensions at Kotah. The troops of the *Raj Paltan* rose against Zalim Singh and joined Kishor Singh. When Zalim Singh assaulted the castle Kishor Singh fled to Bundi and then went to Brindaban, where he was able to contact Gobardhan Das. He was supported by the vassals of his State² in his struggle against the powerful Regent and the British Government. From Brindaban he returned to Kotah at the head of a force. On October 1 he was defeated by a British force which had been sent to co-operate with the Regent. Prithvi Singh was killed. Kishor Singh retreated to Mewar, but he was soon afterwards persuaded to return to Kotah.

The terms on which the Maha Rao would continue to occupy the *gadi* were laid down in an Engagement³ dated November 22,

¹ "The Maha Rao and his heirs and successors shall remain absolute rulers of their country....."

² "The entire devotion which the vassalage of Haravati manifested for the cause of the Maharao, exemplified.....the nature and extent of *swamidharma* or fealty which has been described as the essential quality of the Rajput character; while, at the same time, it illustrates the severity of the Regent's yoke."—*Tod*.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 373-374.

1821. He promised to "submit cheerfully" to "all that the British Government may command." He recognised the validity of the Supplementary Article of the treaty of 1817 and declared that Zalim Singh and his successors should "conduct the entire administration of affairs." He promised not to entertain any troops beyond the personal guards allowed to him. For his maintenance he was granted an annual pension of Rs. 1,64,877-10 annas only. On February 7, 1822, Tod laid down several Articles¹ defining the position of the Maha Rao. Those Articles are summarised by Tod himself in the following words: "Besides the schedule of the personal expenditure, over which he was supreme, much of the state expenses was to be managed under the eye of the sovereign: such as the charities, and gifts on festivals and military ceremonies. The royal insignia used on all great occasions was to remain as heretofore at his residence in the castle, as was the band at the old guard-room over the chief portal of entrance. He was to preside at all the military or other annual festivals, attended by the whole retinue of the state; and gifts on such occasions were to be distributed in his name. All the palaces, in and about the city, were at his sole disposal, and funds were set apart for repair: the gardens, *rumnas*, or game-preserves, and his personal guards, were also to be entertained and paid by himself. To maintain this ornament inviolate, an officer of the paramount power was henceforth to reside at Kotah."

JHALAWAR

Zalim Singh died in 1824. Madho Singh succeeded him, and in spite of his unfitness and unpopularity he received full support from the British Government. In 1828 Kishor Singh was succeeded by his nephew, Ram Singh. The old disputes between the titular and the actual rulers broke out afresh, for Ram Singh could not co-operate with Madan Singh, the son and successor of Madho Singh. "There was danger of a popular rising for the expulsion of the Minister; and it was therefore resolved, with the consent of the Chief of Kotah, to dismember the State and to create the new principality of Jhalawar as a separate provision for the descendants of Zalim Singh."² By a treaty³ concluded on

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 375-376.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 360.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 376-379.

April 10, 1838, the Supplementary Article of the treaty of 1817 was repealed, seventeen parganas (yielding a revenue of twelve *lakhs* of rupees) were made over to Madan Singh, the tribute payable by Kotah was reduced by Rs. 80,000 (which sum was to be paid by Jhalawar), and the Maha Rao agreed to maintain an auxiliary force at a cost of not more than three *lakhs* of rupees. In 1844 the cost of the auxiliary force was reduced to two *lakhs*. Thus the partition of Kotah solved the problem created by the Supplementary Article of the treaty of 1817.

The relations between the British Government and the new State of Jhalawar were defined by a treaty¹ concluded with Madan Singh on April 8, 1838. In addition to the usual stipulations about subordinate co-operation and protection, the treaty provided that the ruler of Jhalawar would pay an annual tribute of Rs. 80,000 and supply troops according to his means. "It was arranged that he should be placed exactly on the same footing as all the other rulers in Rajputana, and should receive the right of adoption,² if that right should be conceded to other rulers; but the succession was to be limited to the descendants of Zalim Singh."³

BUNDI

From Kotah we turn to Bundi.

The Bundi *Darbar* gave valuable assistance to Colonel Monson during his retreat before Holkar in 1804 and applied for an alliance with the British Government. This application was supported by Lord Lake, and Malcolm wrote to the Supreme Government on July 2, 1805: "In the event of hostilities occurring with that chief (Sindhia) it is His Excellency's (Lord Lake's) opinion that the Raja of Bundi, though his possessions are small, may, from their local position and natural strength, prove an useful dependant to the British Government, and the conduct of that Chief (particularly at the period of the retreat of Colonel Monson's Detachment) was such as to give undivided proof of his sincerity in the wish of meriting the protection of the British Government."⁴ But on December 24, 1805, the British Government concluded a

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 393-397.

² This right was granted in 1862.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 364.

⁴ Secret Consultations, September 12, 1805, No. 133.

treaty¹ with Holkar by which it promised "to have no concern with the ancient possessions of the Holkar family in Mewar, Malwa, and Haravati" (Article 3). Holkar continued his depredations in Bundi. The Bundi *Durbar* appealed for assistance to the British Resident at Delhi, who "thought it his duty to abstain from raising any hope."² On October 20, 1810, the Governor-General informed the Raja,³ in reply to one of his letters, that the conclusion of an alliance was incompatible with the principles which regulated the conduct of the British Government: "It is the fixed principle of the British Government not to interfere in the concerns of other States excepting only in the degree required by the positive and legal treaties already existing.....". In spite of such discouragement the Raja renewed his application in 1814.⁴ But Lord Hastings had not yet decided to modify Lord Minto's policy towards the Rajput States.

When Lord Hastings initiated his new policy the case of Bundi naturally claimed favourable consideration. "The territory of Bundi was so situated as to be of great importance during the war in 1817 in cutting off the flight of the Pindaris." Tod says, "Throughout the contest of 1817, Bundi had no will but ours; its prince and dependents were in arms ready to execute our behest; and when victory crowned our efforts in every quarter, on the subsequent pacification, the Rao Raja Bishen Singh was not forgotten. The districts held by Holkar, some of which had been alienated for half a century, and which had become ours by right of conquest, were restored to Bundi without a qualification; while, at the same time, we negotiated the surrender to him of the districts held by Sindhia, on his paying, through us, an annual sum calculated on the average of the last ten years' depreciated revenue."

In October, 1817, Metcalfe was informed that the Governor-General was willing to afford Bundi the protection of the British Government "on the simple condition of allegiance and of employing its military force with zeal and spirit in the common cause."⁵ Tod was then entrusted with the duty of concluding

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. IV, pp. 194-197.

² Political Consultations, January 29, 1807, No. 121; June 11, 1807, No. 16; August 29, 1808, No. 59.

³ Bishen Singh ascended the *gadi* as a minor. His guardian, Ummed Singh, died in 1804.

⁴ Political Consultations, April 25, No. 44.

⁵ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

a treaty with Bundi.¹ By Article 4 of the treaty of Mandasor² (January 6, 1818) Holkar ceded to the British Government "all claim of tribute and revenues of every description which he has or may have had upon the Rajput princes." Sindhia's claim on Bundi, as calculated by Tod, amounted to about Rs. 80,000 or Rs. 90,000 per year³; but Sindhia claimed Rs. 105,000. At first Lord Hastings was under the impression that Sindhia's share of tribute from Bundi amounted to Rs. 10,000 only. So he was prepared to exempt Bundi from the payment of tribute. But Metcalfe knew better and asked Tod to include in the treaty a condition that Bundi would pay to the British Government the amount which it had so far paid to Sindhia.⁴

Tod's primary object was to induce the rulers of Kotah and Bundi "to make such dispositions of their troops and such arrangements for guarding the principal passages of the Chambal as shall obstruct the flight of the Pindaris who may take that direction on the advance of the British troops." Tod was instructed to lead these two States "to act as much as possible from their own sense of expediency" without interfering in the details of their military arrangements. He was reminded :

"The co-operation of the States of Kotah and Bundi in the measures for the immediate object of destroying the Pindaris will not depend on the previous conclusion of permanent engagements of alliance but is a duty incumbent on them and all other States which the British Government has a right to demand."⁵

Tod arrived at Bundi on February 8, 1818, and a treaty⁶ was concluded two days later. In accordance with the orders of the Supreme Government the conditions imposed on Bundi were "few and simple, providing for protection and guarantee on the one hand, and political dependence and subordinate co-operation on the other."⁷ Tod says that in arranging the terms of this treaty "he assumed the responsibility of concluding it upon the general principles which were to regulate our future policy as determined in the commencement of the war ; and setting aside the views

¹ Secret Consultations, November 28, 1817, No. 5.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. IV, pp. 197-201.

³ Secret Consultations, March 13, 1818, No. 19.

⁴ Secret Consultations, December 19, 1817, No. 105.

⁵ Secret Consultations, November 28, 1817, No. 3.

⁶ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 233-235.

⁷ Secret Consultations, February 13, 1818, No. 21.

which trenched upon these in our subsequent negotiations." The Raja was exempted from the payment of the tribute due to Holkar, but he was required to pay to the British Government "the tribute and revenue" hitherto paid to Sindhia,¹ amounting to Rs. 80,000 per annum. He was also required to "furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means." Raja Bishen Singh felt "intense gratification" for this settlement.

Bishen Singh died on July 14, 1821, and was succeeded by his minor son, Ram Singh. "During the long minority which ensued the British Government had on more than one occasion to interfere in the internal administration of the State."²

BIKANER

Surat Singh of Bikaner, who had succeeded to the *gadi* in 1801, exhausted the resources of his State by participating in the war between Jodhpur and Jaipur regarding the succession of the pretender Dhonkal Singh. In 1808 he had to surrender to Man Singh of Jodhpur after bitter fighting for several months. On this occasion he applied for the protection of the British Government, but "interference on the part of the British Government was contrary to the policy which then prevailed of withdrawing from all connection with the Chiefs to the west of the Jumna."³ In 1812 Surat Singh wanted to open negotiations with the British Government, but he was not encouraged.⁴

Under the instructions of Lord Hastings a treaty⁵ was concluded with Bikaner by Metcalfe on March 9, 1818. Bikaner was exempted from the payment of tribute, "both because that State has not heretofore been subjected to the payment of any fixed tribute and on account of the inadequacy of its resources to meet such a demand."⁶ But the Maharaja engaged to "furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government, according to his means." Apart from the usual clauses regarding protection and subordinate co-operation, the treaty contained three interesting stipulations. By Article 6 the Maharaja undertook to suppress all

¹ For complications regarding the *pargana* of Patan see Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 225-226.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 226.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 337.

⁴ Political Consultations, August 28, 1812, No. 115.

⁵ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 343-345.

⁶ Secret Consultations, May 1, 1818, No. 16.

robbers and plunderers in his territory and to restore the property plundered by his subjects from British territory up to the time of the conclusion of the treaty. By Article 7 the British Government engaged to restore the Maharaja's authority over his rebellious vassals and subjects, provided he paid the expenses incurred by the British Government for this purpose.¹ The following observations were made by the Supreme Government on this Article: "It is manifest that, unless the authority of the Government of Bikaner be firm and efficient, it will not have the means of fulfilling the most important stipulations of the treaty, while, on the other hand, it is strictly equitable that the British Government should be paid any expenses it may incur on this account."² By Article 10 the Maharaja engaged to take effective measures for the protection of all trade routes within his territories, in order that these might be "rendered passable and safe for the transit of trade to and from the countries of Kabul and Khorasan, etc."

Surat Singh died in 1828 and was succeeded by his son, Ratan Singh. In 1829 Ratan Singh violated his treaty engagements by invading Jaisalmer to punish some subjects of the latter for depredations committed by them. "Jaisalmer prepared an army to repel the invasion, and both parties had applied to neighbouring States for assistance when the British Government interfered, and through the arbitration of the Maharaja of Udaipur the dispute was settled, both parties making reparation for the injuries done."³

BANSWARA

The three small principalities of Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur were offshoots from Mewar; but in the nineteenth

¹ The following incident shows that the obligations imposed upon the British Government by Articles 6 and 7 were purely temporary: "In 1830..... preparations were made by the Resident at Delhi to send a force to Bikaner to assist the Chief in reducing some rebellious nobles. The Resident acted under a misapprehension of the tenor of the 6th and 7th Articles of the Treaty of 1818, regarding the claims of the State upon the British Government for assistance. These Articles referred to temporary circumstances and effect was given to their provisions at the time. They gave the Chief of Bikaner no right to call on the British Government for military aid against his disaffected subjects at any future period. Government was of opinion that the case was not one in which they were called on to interfere, and reminded the Resident that military aid should never be given to Native States for the suppression of internal disturbances except under the specific authority of Government." (Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 338).

² Secret Consultations, May 1, 1818, No. 16.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 338.

century the rulers of these States did not acknowledge the authority of the Rana of Udaipur. Pertabgarh was tributary to Holkar. Dungarpur paid tribute to Sindhia, Holkar and the Puars of Dhar. Holkar's claim on these States was renounced in favour of the British Government by the treaty of Mandasor. When Metcalfe concluded the treaty with Mewar, the Rana's *vakil* claimed the restoration of the Rana's sovereignty over the Chiefs of these States.¹ But the British Government had already decided to grant them independent recognition.²

In 1814 Umed Singh, Regent of Banswara, who managed affairs on behalf of his father who had "retired from the cares of government," sent a *vakil* to Metcalfe "to solicit the protection of the British Government." He had already applied for protection to the Governor of Bombay and the Resident at Poona, who had referred him to the Resident in Delhi. The *vakil* proposed that a British force should be stationed in Banswara to protect the Raja against foreign and internal enemies, and that three-eighths of the revenues of the State should be paid to the British Government. The revenue at that time amounted to four or five *lakhs*, but an increase to seven or eight *lakhs* might be expected if peace was restored in the State. It appeared that "the aid principally required at the present moment would be against chiefs and subjects acting in rebellion."³ The Governor-General declined to accept this offer, mainly on the ground that the Raja of Banswara was a tributary of Holkar, Puar and Sindhia.⁴

Umed Singh renewed his proposal in March, 1815,⁵ but no attention was paid to him till October, 1817, when Metcalfe received instructions to bring all Rajput States under British control.⁶ Lieutenant Dyson, an officer working under Sir John Malcolm in Malwa, was deputed to enquire about the conditions prevailing in Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur. His report on these States is a mine of information.⁷

On September 16, 1818, Metcalfe concluded a treaty with the *vakil* deputed by Umed Singh. This treaty was ratified by

¹ Secret Consultations, February 20, 1818, No. 29.

² Secret Consultations, March 6, 1818, No. 7.

³ Political Consultations, April 15, 1814, No. 38.

⁴ Political Consultations, April 15, 1814, No. 39.

⁵ Political Consultations, May 23, 1815, No. 54.

⁶ Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

⁷ See Appendix A.

Lord Hastings on October 10, 1818. Banswara was required to pay "tribute to the British Government to the extent of three-eighths of the revenue" and to "furnish troops on requisition, according to its means, for the service of the British Government." Article 5 was rather unusual, for it provided for British intervention in internal affairs.

But the Maha Rawal denied that he had sent any *vakil* to Delhi with authority to conclude a treaty with the British Government.¹ So the previous treaty was regarded as invalid, and a new treaty² was concluded on December 25, 1818, by Captain Caulfield, an assistant of Sir John Malcolm. In addition to the clauses incorporated in the previous treaty, this treaty contained some important provisions, obviously included at Malcolm's instance. The Maha Rawal had to engage to pay to the British Government all arrears of tribute due to the Puar Raja of Dhar or any other State. Article 9 laid down that the tribute "is to increase annually as the territory of Banswara recovers its prosperity till it rises to whatever amount the British Government may deem adequate to cover the expense incurred by protecting the State of Banswara, provided that such tribute does not exceed three-eighths of the revenue of the country." Article 13 authorised the British Government to collect through an Agent the taxes "levied at the Chubutra and its dependent Nakhas," if the State failed to make punctual payment of the tribute. Article 4 contained the usual provision that the Maha Rawal would remain "absolute ruler" of his territory, but Article 5 authorised British intervention in internal affairs: "The affairs of the principality of Banswara shall be settled according to the advice of the British Government, in which the British Government will pay all practicable attention to the will of the Maha Rawal." This arrangement was probably purely temporary, for Metcalfe wrote to the Supreme Government on September 22, 1818, "The fifth article was introduced in order to secure to us the right of interposing our advice and authority for the settlement of the disturbances which at present prevail in the State of Banswara".³ By Article 11 the Maha Rawal agreed "never to entertain in his service any Arabs, Makranis, Sindhis, or other foreign troops ;

¹ Secret Consultations, October 31, 1818, No. 97.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 67-69.

³ Secret Consultations, October 31, 1818, No. 97.

but that his army shall be composed of the military class of the inhabitants of the country." By Article 12 the British Government engaged "not to countenance the connections or relations of the Maha Rawal, his heirs and successors, who may prove disobedient ; but to afford to the Maha Rawal aid in bringing them under due control."

Agreements were concluded with Banswara in 1820, 1823, 1831 and 1836 regarding the amount of tribute.¹

PERTABGARH

A treaty² was concluded with Pertabgarh on November 25, 1804, by Colonel Murray, who then commanded the British army in Gujarat and Malwa. That treaty was cancelled by Lord Cornwallis in pursuance of his policy of withdrawal from connections with the Western Rajput States. The State suffered much from Holkar's depredations.³ By Article 4 of the treaty of Mandasor (January 6, 1818) Holkar surrendered to the British Government the tribute levied by him on Pertabgarh. On October 5, 1818, a treaty⁴ was concluded with Sawant Singh, Raja of Pertabgarh, by Captain Caulfield, an assistant of Sir John Malcolm.

This treaty had some special features. Instead of the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation we have the following stipulation : "The Raja promises to give up all connection with other States, and to the utmost of his power prove his obedience to the British Government, who, in return, agree to assist him in re-establishing good order throughout his district, and to protect him from the claims and trespass of all other States" (Article 1). All arrears of tribute due to Holkar⁵ were to be paid to the British Government ; the annual tribute so far paid to Holkar was now to be paid to the British Government. If punctual payment was not made, the British Government could collect the dues from the town duties of Pertabgarh through an Agent of its own (Articles 2, 3, 12). By Article 4 the Raja agreed "not to entertain Arabs or

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 24-25, 81-82.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 81-82.

³ Secret Consultations, November 7, 1818, No. 60.

⁴ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 82-85.

⁵ Amounting to Rs. 124, 657—6as. only.

Makranis in his service" but to maintain 50 horsemen and 200 foot soldiers who were to be at the disposal of the British Government. Article 5 gave the British Government the right of interfering in the internal administration of the State "in the settlement of all predatory tribes, and in the re-establishment of tranquillity and good order." By the same Article the Raja engaged not to "levy any unusual duty on the mint or merchants, or on merchandise, throughout his territories." The British Government engaged to help the Raja in maintaining his authority over his subjects (Articles 6, 7, 8, 9).

DUNGARPUR

Captain Caulfield concluded a treaty¹ with Jaswant Singh, Maha Rawal of Dungarpur, on December 11, 1818. It contained the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation. Article 5 authorised British intervention in the internal affairs of the State: "The affairs of the principality of Dungarpur shall be settled according to the advice of the British Government, in which the British Government will pay all practicable attention to the will of the Maharawal." All arrears of tribute due to Dhar or any other power were to be paid to the British Government (Article 8). In addition, the Maha Rawal would pay a tribute which was "to be regulated by the prosperity of his country but never to exceed three-eighths of the actual revenue" (Article 9). If the tribute was not paid punctually, an Agent of the British Government would be appointed to receive the tribute from the town duties of Dungarpur (Article 13). By Article 11 the Maha Rawal engaged "to discharge all Arabs, Makranis, and Sindhis; and to entertain no soldiers but natives of the country."

KISHANGARH

The little principality of Kishangarh was an offshoot from Jodhpur. On March 26, 1818, Metcalfe concluded a treaty² with Kalian Singh, Raja of Kishangarh. No tribute was demanded, for Kishangarh had never paid fixed tribute to any State. But by Article 6 the Raja engaged to "furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means." Metcalfe

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 55-57.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 128-130.

informed the Supreme Government that this Article was framed "with reference to an expectation that the resources of the State, which are at present confined, will hereafter improve."¹ The treaty contains the usual stipulations about perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation. After the conclusion of the treaty Kalian Singh began a protracted quarrel with his *Sardars*, which ultimately led to his abdication in favour of his son, Mokam Singh.²

JAISALMER

The geographical situation of Jaisalmer had saved it from the depredations of the Marathas. In 1809 Maha Rawal Mulraj informed the Governor-General that he was prepared to co-operate with the British Government if a British force was sent against the troublesome Amirs of Sind. Naturally Lord Minto rejected this offer.³ A treaty⁴ was concluded with Mulraj by Metcalfe on December 12, 1818. Apart from the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation, two stipulations deserve notice. Article 2 laid down that "The posterity of Maha Rawal Mulraj shall succeed to the principality of Jaisalmer." Article 3 ran as follows: "In the event of any serious invasion directed towards the overthrow of the principality of Jaisalmer, or other danger of great magnitude occurring to that principality, the British Government will exert its power for the protection of the principality provided that the cause of the quarrel be not ascribable to the Rajah of Jaisalmer." No tribute was demanded, nor was any liability imposed for furnishing troops at the requisition of the British Government.

Mulraj succeeded to the *gadi* in 1761 and died in 1820. He was a puppet in the hands of his ministers: Swarup Singh, "a Bania of the Jain faith and Mehta family," and his son Salim Singh. Swarup Singh was murdered by Rai Singh, the eldest son and heir-apparent of Mulraj, at the instigation of some nobles. Mulraj himself was placed in confinement and Rai Singh was made the ruler of the State. Within a few months, however, Mulraj was restored, Rai Singh was banished, and Salim Singh, only eleven years old at that time, was appointed his father's

¹ Secret Consultations, April 17, 1818, No. 77.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 98-99.

³ Secret Consultations, August 5, 1809, No. 4; November 28, 1809, No. 7.

⁴ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 204-205.

successor as minister. Tod's observations on Salim Singh deserve notice : " Without any of that daring valour which distinguishes the Rajput, he overcame, throughout a long course of years, all who opposed him, uniting the subtlety of the serpent to the ferocity of the tiger. In person he was effeminate, in speech bland ; pliant and courteous in demeanour ; promising without hesitation, and with all the semblance of his sincerity, what he never had the most remote intention to fulfil." He murdered Rai Singh and his two sons. Jait Singh, the second son of Mulraj, was blind ; so was Jait Singh's son, Maha Singh. They were, therefore, incompetent to succeed. Man Singh, the third son of Mulraj, was killed by a fall from his horse. His third son, Gaj Singh, was proclaimed heir-apparent by the all-powerful minister, although two elder brothers of Gaj Singh were living. Tod found them living as refugees in Bikaner territory.

At the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1818 Salim Singh had tried unsuccessfully to incorporate in it a guarantee that the office of minister would be hereditary in his family. But Salim Singh's authority remained unimpaired after Gaj Singh's accession in 1820. Tod says, " Rawal Gaj Singh was fitted, from his years, his past seclusion, and the examples which had occurred before his eyes, to be the submissive pageant Salim Singh required. Isolated, in every sense, from intercourse with the rest of mankind, by the policy of the minister, he had no community of sympathy with them, and no claim upon their aid..... The prince himself, his wives and family, are alike dependents on the minister's bounty, often capriciously exercised." When the minister's " outrages became past all endurance," the British Agent reported to the Government on December 17, 1821, that " he considered the alliance disgraceful to our reputation, by countenancing the idea that such acts can be tolerated under its protection." Salim Singh died in 1824. An attempt was made to secure the succession of his eldest son to the ministership, but Gaj Singh refused to agree to that arrangement, and he was supported by the British Government.¹

ALWAR

The nucleus of the State of Alwar was formed by the fief of Macheri in the Jaipur State. Pratap Singh Naruka, Rao Raja of Macheri during the second half of the eighteenth century, may

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, p. 150.

be regarded as its founder. His adopted son and successor, Bakhtawar Singh, concluded a treaty¹ with the British Government on November 14, 1803. No tribute was demanded, but Alwar troops were to co-operate with the British Government "in the event of any enemy evincing a disposition to attack the countries now in the possession of the Honourable Company or of their allies in Hindustan". The foreign relations of Alwar were to be regulated by the British Government, which, however, engaged not to "interfere with the country of Maha Rao Rajah". For its co-operation with Lord Lake in the second Anglo-Maratha War Alwar received several districts, and Ahmed Bakhsh Khan, its *vakil*, received the grant of Loharu from the Rao Raja and of Firozpur from the British Government.²

In 1811 the Rao Raja of Alwar interfered in the internal affairs of Jaipur and made military arrangements to establish Khush-hali Ram as minister there. Such interference in the affairs of neighbouring States was inconsistent with, but not specifically prohibited by, the treaty of 1803. So a fresh Engagement³ was made on July 16, 1811, by which Bakhtawar Singh engaged "that he will never enter into any engagements or negotiation whatever with any other State or Chief without the knowledge and consent of the British Government." Even after this specific undertaking Bakhtawar Singh occupied the forts of Dhobi and Sikrawa and adjoining territory belonging to Jaipur and refused to restore them when asked to do so by the Resident at Delhi.⁴ "As this was a direct violation of his engagements, it became a question whether to dissolve the alliance with him. To this course there were many objections, and chiefly that the Alwar State would have been left exposed to the invasion of Pindari leaders; it was therefore resolved to compel the Maharao Raja to restore the forts and territory to Jaipur. A force was moved against him, and when the troops were within one march of his capital Bakhtawar Singh yielded, restored the usurped territory, and paid three lacs of rupees as the expenses of the British expedition. It was the intention of Government, had actual hostilities taken place, to

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 322-323.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 323-324; Vol. VIII, pp. 129-130.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 324-325.

⁴ Secret Consultations, June 25, 1813, Nos. 26, 27, 30, 32; October 1, 1813, No. 99; October 8, 1813, No. 18.

have punished the Chief by resuming the districts conferred on him by Lord Lake, and even annexing his entire territories had his conduct justified such a measure."¹

Bakhtawar Singh died in 1815. The succession was disputed by two factions acting on behalf of two minors—his nephew and adopted son Banni Singh, and his illegitimate son Balwant Singh. The former was supported by the Rajput *Sardars*, and the latter by Ahmed Bakhsh Khan. It was finally decided, with the approval of the British Government, that Banni Singh should be the titular ruler while Balwant Singh should exercise actual power. When he grew up Banni Singh repudiated this compromise, imprisoned Balwant Singh, and refused to surrender several persons who had tried to murder Ahmed Bakhsh Khan. In 1826 a British force advanced on Alwar, secured the surrender of the chief conspirators and compelled Banni Singh to make provision for Balwant Singh and his successors. In 1831 Banni Singh opened negotiations with Jaipur for the purpose of doing fealty to the Maharaja of Jaipur. "This correspondence was considered to be a breach of treaty engagements, but not to be in itself of much importance."²

SIROHI

Sirohi was the last of the Rajput States to accept the protection of the British Government. In 1818 Rao Udaibhan, the ruler of Sirohi, was deposed and placed in confinement for tyranny and oppression by the nobles, who placed on the *gadi* his younger brother, Sheo Singh. Man Singh of Jodhpur, who claimed suzerainty over Sirohi, sent a force in 1819 to restore Rao Udaibhan, but the attempt failed. It was during the disturbances arising out of this invasion that Rao Sheo Singh solicited the protection of the British Government. Captain Alexander Speirs concluded a treaty³ with him on September 11, 1823. This treaty recognised Sheo Singh as Regent of Sirohi "during the time of his natural life" and guaranteed the succession to the lawful heirs of Udaibhan, should there be any such on the death of Sheo Singh.⁴ The State was taken under British protection and its

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 315-316.

² Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 316, 325.

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 210-212.

⁴ As Udaibhan died without children in 1847, Sheo Singh was acknowledged as ruler of the State.

foreign relations were brought under British control (Articles 1, 2, 3). Several Articles authorised the British Government to interfere in the internal administration of the State. Article 4 ran as follows: "The jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into the territories of Sirohi, but the rulers thereof shall at all times attend to the advice of the officer of the British Government in the administration of their affairs, and act in conformity thereto." Article 9 authorised the officers of the British Government "to recommend such rates of transit duties and regulations for the collection of customs within the limits of the Sirohi territory as may on further experience be judged expedient, and to interfere from time to time to enforce or amend the same." Article 6 provided for the punishment of disobedient *Sardars* "in concert and concurrence with the officers of the British Government." Article 5 made it obligatory for the Regent "to follow the counsel of the British authority in all his proceedings for the restoration of the prosperity of the country and the introduction of good order and regularity." Article 8 provided for the payment of tribute "at the expiration of three years from the date of this engagement"; the amount was not to exceed three-eighths of the revenues of the State. Article 10 provided for military co-operation.

The weakness of the State and Sheo Singh's inability to suppress the rebellious *Sardars* made it necessary for the British Agent "to exercise an unusual interference in its internal affairs." In 1854 the State was taken under the direct management of the British Government.¹ In 1861 the general control of affairs was made over to the heir-apparent, Ummed Singh. Sheo Singh continued to enjoy the dignities and honours of office, but died shortly afterwards. In 1865 the State was released from British management and Ummed Singh assumed full control.

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 152-153, 212-215.

VII

RETROSPECT

Although Tod was not unaware of the ramifications of the clan system he did not fully understand its far-reaching effects on the historical evolution of the Rajput States. The clan system stood in the way of the political unification of Rajputana. Even in the worst days of the Maratha Empire there was a central authority which symbolised the people's political aspirations and to which at least lip homage was paid by the rulers of the constituent units. In the second half of the 18th century the autonomous Sikh *Misls* recognised the supreme authority of the *Sarbat Khalsa*. Never in the long history of Rajputana did her princes succeed in evolving any central authority like the Peshwaship or even any central deliberative assembly like the *Sarbat Khalsa*. Submission to a common superior was basically inconsistent with the traditions of the clan system. Those traditions crystallised themselves into clan feuds which constitute one of the most sordid features of Rajput history. The jealous rivalry between the Rathors and the Kachchhwahas was, says Sir J. N. Sarkar, "the dominating factor of Rajput society even under British rule".¹ It was, as we have seen in the preceeding chapters, the dominating factor of Rajput history ever since the consolidation of the Mughal Empire. This persistent clan feud was not due to the Mughal policy of *divide et impera*. Rana Sangram Singh of Mewar, whom Rajput chroniclers proudly called 'Hindupat', found at Khanua that the Rajput clans could not serve under a common banner even against a common foe. Babur says: ".....the Rajas and Rais of high degree, who obeyed him in this battle, and the governors and commanders who were amongst his followers in this conflict, had not obeyed him in any earlier fight or, out of regard to their own dignity, been friendly with him."² Sangram Singh was trying to impose on the Rajputs a new type of unity which could not be fitted into the traditional politico-social organisation of the Rajputs.

¹ *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.

² Beveridge, *Memoirs of Babur*, Section III, pp. 561-562.

Sangram Singh's failure to unite the different clans against Babur explains why the martial Rajputs could not play a larger and more fruitful part in Indian history. Not to speak of the Marathas, the Rajputs failed to do even what the Sikhs did. They could not extend their political authority beyond their mountains and deserts. Had any Rajput prince succeeded in creating a compact kingdom comprising the whole of Rajputana it might have stood as a strong barrier against the expansion of the Turkish Empire over practically the whole of Northern India and the Deccan. But the Rajputs were so parochial in outlook and so indifferent to cataclysmic political changes around them that they did not stir out of their secluded forts even after the conquest of Gujarat by Ala-ud-din Khalji. When enterprising Muslim chieftains divided India among themselves in the 15th century the heroes of Mewar exhausted their strength in fruitless contests with the rulers of Malwa and Gujarat. When the Mughals came the Kachchhwahas and the Rathors surrendered practically without fighting, and Mewar's long struggle remained an isolated disturbance from the standpoint of Delhi. In the 18th century the inheritance of the Great Mughals fell to the Marathas, to the Sikhs, to Muslim adventurers like the Nizam and the Nawabs of Bengal and Oudh. The Rajputs spent themselves in civil wars and clan rivalries.

The history of the Rajputs is thus a tragic story of lost opportunities. They could not rise above the parochialism on which the clan system was based. They could not think of India as a whole. They could not place themselves in the wide perspective of history. Deeply rooted in the past, stagnant in ideas as well as in methods, they lost those glittering prizes which history offers to rulers and peoples who can plunge boldly into the unknown in pursuit of great visions.

If the clan system made it impossible for the Rajputs to win spectacular successes on the stage of Indian history, it also created a political system which made internal conflicts inevitable. As the nobles owed their position and property to heredity and not to the prince's favour, they did not easily submit to royal control. In every Rajput State the central authority was perpetually weak. A strong-willed warrior-King might be able to maintain a semblance of order and discipline ; but if circumstances raised minors or weaklings or imbeciles to the *padi*, the inevitable results were strife and chaos. The history of the second half of the 18th

century provides several illustrations of this basic defect of the Rajput political system. Zalim Singh's amazing career shows how an overmighty minister's policy could lead to the carving out of a principality for his family even in the 19th century. There is no analogy between the greedy nobles of the Mughal Court in the days of the Later Timurids and the Rajput nobles who, like the Chundawats and the Saktawats of Mewar or Sawai Singh of Pokaran, defied their rulers with impunity. While the former were adventurers without roots in the soil and dependent on uncertain Imperial favour or the fleeting support of mercenary troops, the latter were hereditary lords of estates with customary rights and devoted followers. No top-ranking Rajput noble could be liquidated in the way in which the all-powerful Syed brothers were swept away from the political stage. The Syeds left no one to avenge their fall; but the murder of Devi Singh of Pokaran¹ left a trail of blood which pursued the rulers of Marwar for many years.

The clan system vitally affected the military organisation of the Rajputs. No standing army could be maintained because the military and social traditions of the Rajputs were inconsistent with such concentration of military power. There were important economic reasons too. There was no money in the royal exchequer to pay the soldiers; assignments on land could not be given because all lands (except the *Khalsa*) belonged to the nobles. The prince had to depend, therefore, on the armed followers of the nobles. To what extent they disliked military reforms is clear from Vikramaditva's cruel fate². This rigid adherence to the past not only made the prince almost a helpless instrument in the hands of selfish and short-sighted nobles. It permanently weakened Rajput military organisation. Blind to the changing techniques of fighting the Rajputs continued to rely on personal valour and ancestral dogmas. Up to the end of the 18th century their arms and method of fighting remained out of date. Meanwhile in the all-round confusion of that age of disintegration non-Rajput mercenaries had begun to be employed. This departure from the clan system did not put the Rajputs on a par with the Marathas. The mercenaries, instead of substantially strengthening the princes' hands, embittered the mutual relations between the princes and the

¹ See Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1070-1071, 1080-1090, 1098-1099.

² See Tod, *Annals of Mewar*.

nobles and became a drag on the scanty financial resources of the States.

The social and economic organisations of the Rajputs were based on the clan system. Clan rivalry and family pride were the dominating forces of social life, and various evils, such as infanticide, were connected with them. A man's place in the social hierarchy was determined by two factors—birth and the area of land owned by him. These two factors were interconnected, for ownership of land was in most cases regulated by birth. Land was sacred, for its possession indicated the owner's place in his clan as well as his economic competence. It embodied the basic principles of social cohesion. It enshrined traditions handed down from generation to generation. The sanctity attached to patrimony led to many crimes, just as the idealisation of clan customs led to many social evils. "There was no crime which a Rajput would not commit for the sake of land. Father killed son and son murdered father. Women of the noblest rank gave poison to their trusting kinsmen. Kings took the lives of loyal ministers".¹ Here, as elsewhere, economic forces strengthened sentiment and tradition. The ruling class in every Rajput State depended primarily on income from land, for trade and commerce—repugnant to their martial traditions—were in the hands of the non-Rajput sections of the population. The sterile soil of Rajputana could not give them princely incomes. Hence land grabbing became a common vice.

The long and intimate contact of the Rajputs with the Mughal Court and Government had far-reaching consequences, some of which have been briefly noticed in the preceding pages. Inevitably the Rajputs learnt many things. They learnt, for instance, the art of writing comprehensive historical chronicles, like the well known *khyat* of Nensi. They borrowed the most exquisite finish of Persian art and created what is known as the Rajput school of painting. Inevitably, also, they contracted many of the Mughal vices, such as addiction to wine and women,² which demoralised their character and sometimes created serious political complications. Politically the Mughals maintained peace in Rajputana and gave the Rajput princes and nobles many opportunities to carve out new estates for themselves.³ The decline of the Mughal

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 131.

² See Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 72.

³ See Crooke, Vol. II, p. 1145; Vol. III, p. 1351.

Empire deprived them of these opportunities. "Cooped up within their small sterile districts", the Rajputs "had no means of advancement left to them except by devouring each other".¹ Thus arose fierce clan contests (like the battle of Gangwana) and disputed successions which, in their turn, invited Maratha intervention.

The Mughal Empire had brought the Rajputs into contact with the big and varied world from the wild hills of Central Asia to the swamps of Assam, from the snow-clad mountains of Kashmir to the mountain forts of Maharashtra. It familiarised them with a vast and complicated administrative and military organisation. It showed them how local patriotism could be submerged beneath a tidal wave of political unity. Unfortunately the parochial Rajput mind reacted unfavourably to this visible demonstration of unity on a vast scale. It yearned for the idealised past—the past of isolation, of petty strife, of suicidal pursuit of family pride. That past came back as soon as the imperial rod was withdrawn. Rajputana sank into a political and moral squalor unparalleled in her long and tumultuous history.

Politically blind, militarily weak, morally and spiritually decaying, the Rajputs could not defend their patrimony against the trained battalions of the Marathas. But they were too deeply rooted in the soil to be completely crushed by the unplanned, fitful excursions of the Peshwa, Sindhia and Holkar. The result was the devastation of Rajputana, but not the complete annihilation of the Rajput States. The Rajputs were opium-eaters² in more senses than one. But they had the shrewdness to understand that their deliverance from the Maratha terror lay in an alliance with the rising British power. The instinct of self-preservation brought them within the expanding circle of British imperialism. Their agony was prolonged because British policy remained shifting and intractable for many years. Tod was openly critical of that policy of non-intervention which indirectly brought so much misery upon his beloved Rajputs. Crooke accuses him of "ignoring the considerations based on the state of the finances of India and the danger of the political situation in Europe which suggested a cautious policy in India."³ Another important factor influencing British

¹ Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, p. 73; Vol. I, p. 131.

² See below, p. 444.

³ Crooke, Vol. III, p. 1368.

policy towards the Rajputs should not be lost sight of. In the early years of the 19th century the fortunes of the Rajputs were inextricably mixed up with those of the Marathas. As long as the shadow of the Maratha Empire survived the Rajputs could not expect British protection, for the East India Company could not offend Sindhia and Holkar by asking them to withdraw their stranglehold from Rajputana. Britain came to the rescue of the Rajputs only when their assistance became necessary in the final war for the extermination of the Maratha power.

The treaties dictated by Lord Hastings established peace in Rajputana, but they created new problems which did not escape Tod's notice during his short tenure of supervisory authority in some Rajput States. The defects of the subsidiary system are well known. In the Rajput States they were aggravated by the peculiar characteristics of Rajput polity. No adjustment was possible between the clan system and the demands of the new age, nor could there be any rational reconciliation of the prince's so-called "absolute power" with the traditional privileges of the nobles and the undefined authority of the paramount Power. The social structure of the Rajputs was shaken to its foundations, and the economic organisation of a semi-feudal age showed steadily widening cracks under the increasing pressure of the modern industrial system regulated by an alien ruling class. The might and majesty of Britain gradually gave a new shape to these problems in those parts of India which were under her direct rule, but Rajputana—where the devitalised past governed the frustrated present—could not emerge into the light of modern civilisation as long as the British flag overawed her castles and paralysed her mind.

APPENDIX A

THREE MINOR STATES OF RAJPUTANA

The petty principalities of Pertabgarh, Dungarpur and Banswara never played any remarkable part even in the history of Rajputana—not to speak of the history of India,—and so the historian of India finds no occasion to refer to their existence. Despite their insignificance from the standpoint of political history their administrative institutions and economic conditions are not without interest to earnest students of Rajput history. The following pages contain some extracts from reports prepared by a British officer named Lieutenant Dyson, who worked under Sir John Malcolm at the time when the Rajput States, hard pressed by the Marathas and weakened by internal anarchy, were submitting to the suzerainty of the East India Company. The reports were submitted to the Supreme Government in 1818. Lieutenant Dyson seems to have been a careful and sober observer; the facts recorded by him, as well as his own observations, are supported by other contemporary sources.

In these reports we find a vivid picture of the havoc created in Rajputana by the long-continued depredations of the Marathas. The old institutions of the Rajput States, which had survived their long contact with the Muslims, were crumbling down on all sides under the shock of the Maratha invasions and extortions. The relations between the prince and the nobles, the land system, the revenue system, the military system—everything had been put out of gear. Trade was naturally a principal victim of anarchy. More serious, perhaps, was the degeneration of national character, culminating in the disintegration of society. It is probably uncharitable to lay the entire blame on the Marathas. Perhaps the loss of liberty and the restraint put upon petty wars during the two centuries of Mughal supremacy had demoralised the warlike and freedom-loving Rajputs and made them incapable of utilising that liberation which the fall of the Mughal Empire brought them unasked. In any case, the confusion which Lieutenant Dyson found in Pertabgarh, Dungarpur and Banswara was not a local product; nor was it a superficial malady. The same confusion, created by

similar causes, prevailed in all parts of Rajputana and Malwa. The strength and majesty of the British Empire, working through enlightened and sympathetic statesmen like Metcalfe, Malcolm, and Tod, took long years to eradicate it. In the new India created by British arms and Western learning the chivalrous Rajput found himself a misfit. Apart from occasional references to Rajput battalions we hardly hear anything about the Rajputs in an age in which the struggle for liberty assumed a new shape and adopted a new ideology.

DYSON'S REPORT ON PERTABGARH

Maratha Depredations—The principal object of the Raja seems to be to get rid of the connection with Holkar. The inconveniences and indignities he and his people suffer from the troops of Holkar are great. He is at a considerable expense for the maintenance of the party of horse who are now at Pertabgarh to demand payment of this tribute, which the Raja really seems unable to discharge, and this is made an excuse for the party to indulge pretty freely in their rapacious habits. The Raja is anxious to be taken under the immediate protection of the English Government as Udaipur, Jaipur and other States have been; they insist on their having always been considered and treated as independent States. The Raja wishes to have no connection with any other State whatever and to stand in the same relation now to the English Government as his ancestors stood to the Emperor of Delhi. The tribute which is now claimed by Holkar he would be happy to pay us.

The ruler and the nobles—The Raja hopes to have the assistance of the English Government in sending away those among the Chieftains of his State who are at present disobedient to his authority, and in compelling those who have usurped any of the villages of the *Khalsa* to restore them. Some of these Chieftains have even begun to levy taxes on all who pass through their districts and many are connected with the Bhils and with them plunder the Raja's villages. He is also desirous that all disputes between him and the neighbouring States may be decided by the British Government and that we may make some arrangement with the Banswara Raja to prevent those engaged in trade between Pertabgarh and Guzerat from being molested by the Raja or by the tribes inhabiting his territories.

It has been an established custom in this principality, when a provision is to be made for the younger sons of the reigning Raja, to do so partly by alienating some of the *Khalsa* lands, and partly by resuming a proportion of the lands held by the nobles of the families which are the oldest and consequently the most remote from the reigning Raja. The Raja hopes that no complaints on this ground may be listened to by the English Government and, generally, that his subjects may not be encouraged to make their complaints to any but himself.

It appears necessary, to restore any degree of prosperity to the principality of Pertabgarh, to deliver it as soon as possible from the visits of Holkar's troops and to repress the depredations of the tribes and Chieftains in the Banswara District, which have been carried to such a length as to have put a stop to the trade of Pertabgarh.

The excesses committed by Holkar's troops have caused a rooted hatred towards them in all ranks; supplies that they require they generally take, whenever they can, seldom paying the full price and frequently nothing. This, of course, falls on the classes who are the least able to afford, people who earn their daily food by selling grass, wood etc., and also on the Banias of the town. Their continual clamour for money drove the Government to the necessity of exacting contributions from the towns, and so much have they been exhausted by the practice that on a late occasion the men of property collectively threatened to leave the place. The Raja appears really not to have the means of paying at present even their demands of sustenance. On an occurrence of this kind about 20 days since, Holkar's men occupied the gates of the town for a whole day; as the town is supplied with water from the outside, the people were reduced to very great distress and in the evening a party arming themselves with sticks forced their way out. This Holkar's troops complained of as opposition on the part of the Raja and threatened to represent it as such to their Government. They appear from all accounts to be irritated at the idea which has prevailed here for some time of Pertabgarh being placed under the English Government and declare that, with the assistance of Baji Rao, they will yet retain possession of their right. They are much displeased by the reports that Baji Rao has come to Sir John Malcolm and vehemently deny the truth of it. From

these trifling circumstances may be inferred the temper with which they are likely to execute the duty on which they are placed here; the mutual hatred and enmity is such that the people, when they mention the Marathas, curse them (to use their own expressions, their souls are on fire), and while the Marathas remain here, they feel as if a knife is ever held to their throat. The amount of tribute demanded annually is 70,000; it was first levied, they say, 70 years ago by Malhar Rao Holkar, and the Raja and his people insist that it was levied with an implied agreement that the district should be secured from all other similar demands and that it should be protected by Holkar. They add that, for about 50 years, that is, till the time of Jaswant Rao Holkar, this was actually the case, and indeed, the situation of that people is rather hard of whose revenue so large a proportion as upwards of $1/6$ is taken by a foreign power without conferring any of those benefits and advantages which are the objects of all Government. It is asserted that at the time the tribute was fixed at 70,000 the revenue amounted to 4,00,000, that it is now far below that sum. On account of the visits of the various Maratha armies that the country has lately been subject to, the Raja claims at least a temporary reduction in the account, and it is said that on this ground the late Jaswant Rao Holkar remitted 80,000 for two years. Exclusive of this, and supposing the district to be restored to the greatest degree of order and tranquillity, the *Khalsa*, the only land that pays the tribute in any considerable proportion, has been so much reduced that what was many years ago a sum they could contrive to pay, can now be paid with great difficulty. On this account the Raja hopes that some permanent reduction may be made. But whether this be decided in the Raja's favour or not, and whatever sum it may be ultimately decided that they are to pay, they say that on account of the distressed state of the country, it is absolutely necessary that some temporary indulgence should be granted, that in the 7th year they expect the country will be so far revived that they can then engage to pay it regularly. They understand that an agreement on this plan has been made with the Jaipur Raja, though I have some idea that at first 3 or 4 years was the period they talked of.

Anxiety for British protection—The inhabitants are delighted at the prospect of being taken under the protection

of the English Government and lament their hard fate in having been so long neglected while other States were enjoying that advantage. The general feeling of the Raja and his subjects seems to be that, whatever arrangements may be made besides, so long as the connection with Holkar exists, nothing essential to their benefit has been effected, but that if the protection of the British Government were substituted for this, they should be secure of every thing else. A great effect has been made on all ranks by a promise made them by some officer, I think Colonel Russell, that no cows should be killed. Notwithstanding what they have suffered, the people seem very much attached to the Raja and to the Kunwar Dip Singh and are satisfied that, were he delivered from the fear of the Marathas, he would not oppress them.

It is now perhaps an object of more importance than ever that some steps should be taken for the relief of the inhabitants, as they would now emigrate with less reluctance to the adjacent States where, they think, they should be certain of finding protection and security. Notwithstanding all they have suffered, there are few towns of this description where the inhabitants appear so rich, and gold and silver ornaments are so much worn by men and women. It is supposed that 50,000,000 have been exacted during the last years, but this is probably an exaggeration, as they say for the few last years about 40,000 has been taken each year.

Disobedient chiefs and Bhils—Some of the dependant Chieftains have taken advantage of the distress of the Government and have thrown off almost all obedience to the Raja; some of them even levy a tax on all merchandise etc. passing their villages, and others are connected with the Bhils etc. and plunder the Raja's villages. Several of them, though they outwardly respect the Raja's authority, share in the profits of those who plunder.

There are only two Bhil Chiefs of any consequence in the District who are in the habit of plundering. These may each be able to collect 1,000 men. There are said to be about 10 Bhil Chiefs of inferior rank who collectively command about 1,000 men.

The Bhils—The connections of these people are very extensive and it is principally to this and the difficulties of the country that they owe their security. However, their dread of

the English power is such that they seem willing to submit on a promise of forgiving past offences and subsistence being made them.

The Bhils are not accustomed to dwell together in any numbers; their villages called 'Pal'¹ consist of huts scattered over the summits of the hills.

It is said by the Rajputs that the reason of their not dwelling together in greater numbers is to avoid being surprised and surrounded. It is more probably owing to their poverty, to the difficulty of procuring subsistence for any number, and to the paucity of their want which do not require the exercise of many acts. They would, if assured of security, easily be persuaded to form villages which would tend to make them drop their predatory habits. They all say that they want subsistence only and that they are at the command of the British Government.

Relations between Prince and nobles—The request of the Raja that the British Government would not listen to any complaints on the part of the dependant Chiefs alluded to a custom that seems to prevail in this and all other Rajput States of resuming at pleasure lands which have been granted by former Rajas to some branch of their families and also to a custom of demanding presents from the Chiefs on the birth or marriage of a son of the Raja, or when on the death of a Chief the son is installed in his father's rank. As this custom of resuming land has prevailed generally and from the first establishment of these States, it may perhaps be considered as an established law, and as the Chiefs know on what terms they receive the land, their descendants can hardly deny the right of the Raja to resume some part. It seems, however, that it is usually done on pretence of some misconduct on the part of the Chief who is deprived of his land and it will probably be found to be productive of frequent complaint. Perhaps the mode of effecting this object might so be managed as to prevent in some degree any bad consequences, by allowing every Chief to retain his lands during life,

*¹ These *Pals* were congregations of detached houses, each built on separate hillocks at some distance from each other. The area under cultivation belonging to a family surrounded the homestead. Each *Pal* thus covered a large area. The jungle on the hills near the *Pals* was allowed to grow, and in case of attack, the Bhils fled into the jungle with their families and cattle. (See Brookes, *History of Meywar*).

and as no one is on the death of his father entitled to the rank of *Thakur* until invested by the Raja, by taking advantage of the ceremony to confer only part of the land on the successor. These lands are given by a deed registered on paper, in distinction to those on copper, which latter are considered as investing the right of property more fully in the receiver and his heirs, who have the power of disposing of land so given by sales.

Distribution of land—It seems to be an established principle in these States, Udaipur etc., to retain $\frac{1}{3}$ of the lands as *Khalsa* and to confer $\frac{1}{3}$ on the dependant Chiefs and $\frac{1}{3}$ on religious establishments. It is, however, probable that the proportion of religious grants is by no means so great in reality as it is stated, though it is doubtless much larger than it should be when it is considered that the land is completely alienated, that according to their own expression it is disgraceful for the Raja even to drink water from the wells of these villages.

Trade and Commerce—Before the present system of disorder and plunder was introduced by the Maratha armies a considerable trade with Guzerat was carried through Pertabgarh, from Udaipur, Jaipur, Kotah, etc., which induced a number of Mahajans to settle here and a great revenue was produced from this trade and from the mint. For some years, however, owing to the unsettled state of these districts, this trade has been carried on by circuitous routes of Ratlam. Lately the Raja, pressed by the demand of Holkar's Government, persuaded the Mahajans to open the trade of the place, and they sent property to the amount of 50,000 which has been seized by the Raja of Banswara, but he restored it after exacting some duty or fine. Since the trade of the place has decayed the Raja has still continued to levy contributions on the people of the town, till at length all the men of any property who remained declared their determination to leave the place. They were dissuaded on a promise that no more should be exacted, and they engaged that, if measures were taken to enable them to trade with safety to Guzerat, the revenue arising from the commerce should equal what was produced by the system of contributions. The produce of the country exported consists of opium, coarse painted cloth, iron, tobacco. *Gur* and some other articles are brought from Mandasor, Rampura, and Jawad. Silk cloth of several descriptions, ivory, silver, *supari*, cocoanuts and spices were imported from Guzerat. Horses were also brought through Pertabgarh

for Hindustan. All merchandise was escorted by one or two Bhils who received a small sum, and in consequence, trade was never molested by this tribe who confine the depredations to the villages of the Raja and travellers.

Character of the Raja and his son—The Raja, Sawant Singh, gives himself up almost entirely to religious duties; the greater part of his time is occupied in worshipping his images and he appears to pride himself more on the degree of merit he has earned by pilgrimage to Dwaraka than on any thing else. By distributing money daily at Dwaraka and by the expenses of his journey there he has run himself in debt for about 50,000 Rupees.

The Kunwar Dip Singh, to whom the executive authority has been transferred by his father, seems sensible and well-disposed. He is anxious to put a stop to all plunder and disorder in his dominions, and to consult the welfare of his subjects and to meet the wishes of the English Government. His principal adviser is a Jain Pandit named Umed Ram. He formerly transacted himself all the business of the revenue etc., but was displeased by the intrigues of the men who now possess the chief authority and a large sum of money was taken from him. He is much esteemed and respected by the people and it is said that during his management the Bhils etc. were kept in check in some degree. Though he was in disgrace at first yet the Raja found himself obliged to take his advice on all occasions. He seems equally desirous with his master to deserve the favour of the English Government. He is a sensible man and has some learning. The Kunwar appears to place great confidence in him. The man who at present holds the chief authority in the town at Pertabgarh named Rana Ram Bhat is much disliked and much dreaded by the inhabitants, who accuse him of exacting from them larger sums than the Raja directs. He alone does not seem to be anxious that the connection with the Marathas should be wholly broken off. He is a dull stupid-looking character and his only recommendation seems to be superior skill in exaction and deceit.

Neither the Raja nor his son Dip Singh are given to the practice of stupefying themselves with opium and appear, on the whole, to possess a degree of civilization superior to Rajputs in general.

DYSON'S REPORT ON DUNGARPUR

History of Dungarpur—The Rawals of Dungarpur were descended from an elder son of one of the sovereigns of Mewar¹ before they assumed the title of Rana, and while the seat of their government was at Chitor, who resigned his right to the throne in favour of the offspring of his father by a second marriage. His descendants, about the year 1300, leaving Chitor, established themselves at Gurea Kot, then in the possession of some Mussulman Chief. By degrees they subdued the Bhils, and acquired possession of this district called Bagar, comprising nearly all that is now subject to Banswara and Dungarpur.

Punja Rawal, who reigned about 1600, formed a connection with the Kings of Delhi, in order to secure himself from the incursions of the Rana. It is said that he was acknowledged at Delhi as an independent Prince. However, titles etc., were conferred on him.

Maratha Depredations—Till the decay of the Delhi Empire they continued to render service to that Government in Guzerat. They were afterwards again exposed for some time to the depredations of the Ranas, who regularly exacted contributions. About 1736 this district suffered much from the invasions of Baji Rao and Malhar Rao. In 1747 Sheo Singh Rawal sent an agent to Poona, where an engagement was concluded, that the country should be secured from all devastations on condition of 35,000 rupees being paid yearly to the three Maratha Chiefs, to whom it was most exposed. Of this, half was to be paid to the Puar Raja of Dhar, one-fourth to Sindhia, one-fourth to Holkar.

Though it is positively asserted by some that the amount of this tribute was 35,000, yet others state that 30,000 was its utmost amount. It does not appear that this was ever paid, or at least but for a short time, in cash; one-half was paid in horses and cloth, both, it is said, received at a valuation double what they were really worth. Here, as well as at Banswara, a very great difference occurs in the accounts given, and it is hardly possible to ascertain satisfactorily what was really the practice. It is most probable that the tribute was originally 35,000 and

*¹ Malcolm says: "The Rajput Prince of Dungarpur claims to be a senior branch of the reigning family of Udaipur; and this right is tacitly admitted by the highest seat being always left vacant when the prince of the latter country dines." (*Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 504).

that some diminution was subsequently made; the same uncertainty exists with regard to the above mode of payment. Whether it existed from the first or not, till 1796 agents to receive payment of the tribute resided here, and were maintained by the Rawal at an expense of from 2,000 to 5,000 rupees yearly. Since that time the district has been exposed as much as possible and the original engagement was considered as cancelled.

About 1802 the late Rawal Tulloch Singh enlisted a number of Arabs and Sindhis. This Rawal was much addicted to drinking and in fits of intoxication was frequently guilty of the greatest excesses; he murdered a pregnant wife and fired at his son, the present Rawal. His mother then placed him in confinement and took the Government into her own hands. When the Marathas took possession of Gurea Kot, under her directions the Rajputs and Arabs expelled them, and on realising 25,000 rupees they agreed to leave the district. The Rajputs released the Rawal, and his mother was poisoned. During the rest of his reign great disorder prevailed, the *Kamdars* constantly quarrelling and intriguing to remove one another. In 1809 he died and was succeeded by the present Rawal, Jaswant Singh, who was then about 9 years of age.

Krishnadas, a Rajput, and Richhulk Tiwari and Jawahir Chand, who had, to save him from his father, carried him from Dungarpur to Gurea Kot and continued with him ever since, had of course the entire control of affairs. By the mother the Arabs, but not the Sindhis, were discharged. Richhulk, having seized Jawahir Chand, extorted 11,000 rupees from him. However, the *Thakurs* being in his interest, he managed to confine Richhulk, with the Rawa' and his mother, but afterwards released them, retaining the Rawal in his power.

In 1810 the Sindhis, calling themselves the servants of Holkar, came to Dungarpur, and those in the service of the Rawal joining them, they took possession of the town, and retained it for eight months, during which time they plundered it, and then exacting a contribution of 1,25,000 rupees abandoned it.

In 1814 they again returned and plundered the town. Jawahir Chand dying, Krishnadas and Richhulk assumed the management of the district. They kept the Rawal under very great privations, even refusing him any particular food that he wished for.

The Rawal, in hopes of meeting with better treatment, joined the Sindhis then at Salumbar. They took possession of Dungarpur, Gurea Kot and other places. Being much harrassed by them Krishnadas, Arjun Singh of Gurea and the other Rajputs, with the assistance of Madho Kunwar, retired from the country; their chief, who was called Shahzada and had assumed the title of King, was killed. The Rawal, finding that he was treated as a prisoner, made his escape from them. About a year since, a man called Moti Seth, and one of his father's wives by whose advice he had placed himself in the power of the Sindhis, are now at Udaipur, where, it is said, they are endeavouring to procure the assistance of the Rana to deprive the opposite party of their power.

While Jaswant Singh was with the Sindhis, the Rana addressed letters to Krishnadas, Richhulk and Arjun Singh, stating that the Rawal had become as a Musulman, among the Sindhis, and urging them to expel them, that as the Rawals of Dungarpur were descended from his family, proposing that they should place his younger son on the throne. They themselves say that they rejected this proposal, alleging their duty to their master Jaswant Singh. They were probably induced to make the exaction they did to recover the district from the Sindhis with a view to the power they should enjoy by taking advantage of the youth of Jaswant Singh and governing in his name.

Character of Rawal Jaswant Singh—They give out that he is mad, and totally incapable of governing, that he voluntarily leaves every thing to them, and that it is absolutely necessary to deprive him of the control of his own expense, as he is in the habit of giving away every thing he can obtain to the servants about him.

The Rawal is about 19 or 20 years of age. He appears shrewd, and by no means as deficient in natural understanding. Having been always kept under restraint by those who have governed in his name, he has, of course, never had an opportunity of applying himself to business in any degree. He has had hardly any companions but his menial servants, and one Rajput chief of the name of Sardar Singh, whom he declares to be the only friend he has about him. With respect to extravagance he has fine opportunities of being guilty of it, having very seldom had the means of bestowing even a trifling reward on any to whose services he considers himself indebted.

He declares that these men never consult him in any affair whatever, but that every thing is carried on not only without his consent, but usually without his knowledge, that his orders, as he has not the power of enforcing them, are disregarded throughout the district, those of the *Kamdars* only being attended to, and that persons who shew him any extraordinary attention are forbidden to do so, persecuted and maltreated.

A daily allowance of one hundred rupees is made him, and the common articles of food are supplied for the use of himself and his household. This allowance is diminished and increased according to the price of grain and frequently provisions are sent only 4 days out of 5.

Clothes of a coarse kind are allowed him, sometimes every month, but often the old clothes are mended. He possesses one horse, but being unable to feed him, a person of the town keeps the horse at his house. On occasions of going out he borrows the arms and ornaments of some of the Rajputs about him. He, of course, complains much of this treatment, says that he has no friends but the English from whom he can claim assistance, that he leaves every thing to them requesting that these people may be made to recognize him as their master. He seems well aware of the state of the country.

His subjects generally speak well of him, and every one confirms the truth of the above statement which there does not seem any reason to doubt.

The Rajputs, it is supposed, have now possession of lands to the value of 20,000 Rupees; this is beyond their lawful estates and has been partly seized by them by force, and partly acquired by grants made to induce them to do their duty, during the weakness of the Government. The present state of affairs is too advantageous to them to suppose that they would exert themselves to restore the Rawal's authority. Though they have been reduced, yet comparatively with the Rawal have not suffered much. It is supposed that they may collect at the present about 1,00,000 rupees.

Rajput Chiefs—There is at present no regular system for collecting the land revenue. Assignments are made to Arjun Singh, and the commanders of the Arabs etc., for their payment, on the different villages; and they exact as much as they can. General report makes 20,000 or 25,000 the amount thus collected,

but nothing certain can be learned without a long examination of the accounts of Arjun Singh and the Arab Chiefs.

Under the management of a Rajput, it is not to be expected that a proper degree of control would be exercised over the *Thakurs*, who, indeed would not, beyond a certain extent, submit the revenue to an authority known to be independent.

The principal *Thakur*, Purbut Singh of Bunkova, is supposed to be extremely jealous of the power of Arjun Singh and Krishnadas.

A relation of the Chief of Salumbar holds about 10 villages, and the Chief of Mungana, 25; some of these were originally mortgaged to them, but the greater number were, through fear of their depredations, conferred on them for service which they have never performed.

Arjun Singh holds one village in mortgage and some more for service. It is supposed that the sums, for which these mortgages were made, must have been repaid, in some cases, many times over, but no accounts have ever been received.

A tribute of 20,000 rupees yearly was paid formerly by the Chief of a District called Khurick situated to the N. of Dungarpur and dependent on some of the Chiefs of Mewar; this has been discontinued for many years, though the right to it is still claimed. It appears to have been originally paid to Sheo Singh who rendered some assistance to the Chief of this district against his superior.

The Bhils—The Bhils in this district are very numerous. The more powerful chiefs plunder travellers and carry off the cattle of villages; they seldom burn the houses, or take the lives of any but those against whom they have any particular enmity. It is said that if they find the horses of Rajputs they will kill but not steal them, being unable to manage horses.

From their numbers and mutual connection and supporting each other, the Rajputs hardly think themselves adequate to suppress them, without some assistance. At present the utmost exertions of their whole force is requisite to compel them to pay their tribute. Some of the Chiefs are wealthy. They do not seem at all persuaded of the possibility of civilizing and conciliating the Bhils by a firm but moderate conduct towards them. There is, however, no reason why a system which, it is confessed, may answer in other Districts, should fail in this. 10,000 is the utmost that they pay at present.

Trade and Commerce—There are besides Dungarpur 5 principal places where duties are collected; articles which have paid at one place, are thence allowed to pass free through the whole district. This is a refinement, however, beyond the usual practice of these States.

A large revenue was also collected at a fair that used to be held annually in the month of November at Dungarpur and which was sometimes continued for three months. It was frequented by merchants from Guzerat, Kotah, Mewar, and Malwa. People were sent by the Raja to give notice in the neighbouring districts. 25,000 have been known to have assembled sometimes on this occasion. About 25 years since the Marathas plundered those who were assembled at the fair and from that time it has not been held. It was solely for purposes of trade and not connected with any religious festival.

The town of Sogwara was the principal seat of commerce in the district. It was very populous and it should have contained 12,000 or 15,000 families, nearly all of whom were engaged in trade; at present there are not more than 100 families. Merchandise of all descriptions was brought from Surat and Ahmedabad along the right bank of the Mahi to Gurea Kot, whence it was sent through the Banswara district to Pertabgarh, and by Kotah to Jaipur. The trade with Udaipur and Ajmer was conducted by the route of Salumbar whence there is a road to Udaipur, and by Shahpura to Ajmer and Jaipur. There was then a road practicable for horse carriages, from Gurea Kot to Pertabgarh. These roads are now from long disuse overgrown with wood and blocked up with stones; the traces of them are still visible in many places where the rock has been cut through.

Generally the nature of the country is more adapted for bullocks and buffaloes than any other mode of carriage; in the hilly parts the roads are so rugged that camels do not travel well.

Gurea Kot has also been a large place; it is on the right bank of the Mahi, about 12 miles S.-E. of Sogwara. There was also a very strong fort there, which since it was occupied by the Sindhis has been dismantled; it is still considered the strongest position in the district. This and all other places where duties are collected are considered as dependent on Sogwara. 40,000 and 50,000 rupees have been sometimes collected. The trade is

already beginning to revive in some small degree. The duties¹ at present collected amount to about 10,000, which, it is asserted, is appropriated entirely to the Rawal's domestic expenses. This assertion can hardly be true. Indeed, in the present state of affairs it can hardly be expected that any true account of the revenue can be obtained, as notwithstanding the public distress, those who have the management of the district are known to have amassed much wealth.

Dungarpur town—Dungarpur is a large town, surrounded except on one side by high and steep hills which are fortified with a trifling wall; to the N.-W. is a plain, but this side is well-defended by a detached hill, and by a marsh. The natural defences of the place are great, though they have not been by any means judiciously taken advantage of. There is some water in the town, but the people are chiefly supplied from a large artificial reservoir to the N.-E. of the town. The town has every appearance of having once been in a very flourishing condition.

Condition of the people—In peaceable times the state of the great body of the people must have been far from wretched; the appearance of their houses, clothing, etc., denotes a people by no means suffering from poverty. The extraordinary number of temples in all the villages, in the construction of some of which large sums must have been expended, are sufficient proof of wealth. This, however, must not be considered as applicable to their present state. For one village that is inhabited, there are two almost entirely desolate. Here, as in the other petty principalities, the people are much affected to the Rawal and to the Rajput Chiefs. They express themselves as equally anxious of the assistance of the English Government on the Rawal's account, as on their own. They complain most bitterly of the Arabs and Sindhis; even women will stop in the streets to ask when the English Government will take pity on them.

It is customary in all disputes to swear persons, against whom any accusation or demand is made, by the Rawal's throne; their reverence for this is such, that none will dare to violate

¹ Ghee, rice, wax, and honey, are the principal articles, the produce of the country, which are exported.

this oath, but rather confess themselves guilty. Bhils alone are excluded from this custom; with them recourse is had to the various modes of ordeal anciently in use among the Hindus.

Soldiers sent in any duty by the Rawal are subsisted by the people of the villages they go to. This is a voluntary act, it is said, and is not practised with any but Rajputs, as Sindhis, Arabs, Gosains, etc.

Probably from long oppression, and being constantly exposed to plunder, the lower classes are extremely dishonest in their petty dealings, and are particularly apt to impose and deceive when they imagine that either inclination, or power to use compulsion, are wanting. They expect on all occasions from those who have the power, the same treatment they have always experienced from the Marathas.

The effects of the system of violence and disorder are equally plain on the higher classes. They do not appear to have any idea relating to government, which is wholly free from exaction, oppression and violence.

Insignia of Royalty—All these chiefs, Pertabgarh, Dungarpur and Banswara, assume the rank of independent princes, and use all the insignia of that dignity usual among the Hindus; the *Singhasan* (Throne), *Chamar*, and *Chhatra* (or umbrella). They are anointed and seated on the throne, with the religious ceremonies prescribed according to the ancient custom.

They do not acknowledge the authority of the Rana, though they consider him entitled to a higher degree of respect as the most ancient of the Hindu princes, and being descended from the family of the Ranas, they consider themselves bound to assist him.

Rajwara—The term Rajputana is utterly unknown in these districts. Rajwara is a name applied to all those countries inhabited by Rajputs, but is not intended to convey the idea of a country subject to one authority, or of a number of confederated States.

Administration—The person who has the management of affairs under the directions of the Rawal is called the *Kamdar*.¹

¹ Archibald Adams (*The Western Rajputana States*, p. 434) wrote in 1899, "The *Kamdar*, or agent, is the principal official (of the Rajput *Thakurs*), and generally a Bania, who turns his tenure of office to profitable account and makes money. His harvest-time is during a minority."

He is usually a Brahmin or Bania; being subject to the clamorous demands of the troops for pay, *Dharna*, and other indignities, what it is considered a Rajput could not endure, this office is never held by any of that caste.

The authority of the Rawal is frequently devolved on one of the principal *Thakurs* to whom the *Kamdar* is subject, and who is then denominated the *Faujdar*.

When other inferior Rajputs are admitted to any share of authority they do not hold any particular office, but are called *Bhanjgarh*, signifying one who gives advice.

By frequent marriages the Rawals are more or less remotely connected with the greater number of the *Thakurs*.

On the death of a *Thakur*, the Rawal goes to his village to perform the ceremony of girding on the sword, by which the son is put in the rank of his father. This is also in some degree considered a mark of respect for the deceased Chief.

Defence—A large portion of these districts consists of the hilly and woody tract inhabited by Bhils.

The natives have a great confidence in the strength of their country which, having sometimes repelled Marathas, they think no troops could penetrate. It is well calculated for the operation of light troops who could meet with no serious opposition. The Bhils never think of resistance but take to flight; the Rajputs attack them on horse-back, and of course they must always be able to escape from infantry, to enable their horses to share the fatigue of ascending the hills. They feed them almost entirely with sugar, ghee, milk and flour, at a great expense. The Bhils are said to be very expert in the use of the bow and arrow.

DYSON'S REPORT ON BANSWARA

Maratha depredations—The whole of the province called Bagar,¹ which includes the districts of Dungarpur and Banswara, was originally subject to the Rawals of Dungarpur. In 1530, on the death of Udai Singh, the province was divided by his sons Prithvi Rai and Jagnal; the latter, having put to death a

^{*1} Bounded on the north by Kantul and Mewar, and on the east and west by Malwa and Gujarat respectively. See Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, Chapter I.

Bhil chief who lived there, built Banswara. His grandson, Pratap Singh, conquered some districts from some of the neighbouring chiefs.

In 1737 Uday Singh succeeded, and the *Thakurs* quarrelling among themselves, some of them invited the Marathas, by whom the district was frequently invaded, and at last a regular tribute was fixed, to be paid to the Puar Rajas of Dhar. It is said by some that this occurred five or ten years earlier. On the death of Uday Singh his brother Prithvi Singh succeeded. During the early part of his reign the Government was completely usurped by the agent of the Dhar Raja, an allowance being made for the support of the Rawal. Prithvi Singh went to Poona to entreat the Peshwa to restore him to his Government, which was done, and some remission of the tribute was made. The Dhar Raja still oppressing him with the assistance of the troops of the Peshwa from Ujjain, he resisted him successfully.

He died in 1786 and was succeeded by Bijai Singh. The tributes were regularly paid till 1792 when Sewa Ram Gada from Baradra demanded the tribute in the name of the Dhar Raja. Rs. 50,000 was paid him. In 1801 Anand Ram of Dhar invaded the district, but with the assistance of Zalim Singh, the *Thakur* of Kushalgarh¹, he was repulsed by Bijai Singh and lost some guns. In 1803 he returned and overpowering the Rawal burned and plundered Banswara. It is supposed that he took away between three or four lakhs rupees. Since 1792 no tribute has been regularly paid. Since 1804 the district has been continually subject to the depredations of the Gaekwar, Holkar, and Sindhia. Sadashiv Bapu on the part of Sindhia remained in the district for three years, plundering; he was at last expelled by the united efforts of the Rajputs and Bhils. Ram Din also frequently exacted large sums, but was obliged to leave the country with some loss. In 1816 Raghunath Bapu came on the part of the Dhar Raja, and received on that and the following year 6,000 rupees.

Ummad Singh—The late Rawal Bijai Singh, after reigning 10 years, conferred some authority on his son Ummad Singh, the present Rawal. In the course of a few years he usurped

*¹ The *Thakur* of this estate was a Rathor Rajput. He had to serve the Rawal with 50 horse and 250 foot.

the whole authority, making his father an allowance for his support.

He appears always to have been extremely jealous of the power of those about him, particularly of the Rajputs; they generally avoided placing themselves in his power, and this he seems to have considered as disobedience. Two *Thakurs* he attacked, and reduced to great distress, he himself acknowledges, more as a measure of precaution than any thing else. Another Rajput Chief, the grandson of Prithvi Singh, he invited to his palace, where he caused him to be shot, and two *Kamdars* were put to death either by him or his father, which happened about three years ago.

Arab mercenaries—He took into his service the Arab chief Syed Hussain, who had been lately discharged at the request or suggestion of his father. This man by degrees attained a great influence, and actually the unlimited control of affairs. He and his men were quartered in the palace, and after the murder of the last *Kamdar* of the Rawals their family interests were entrusted to them. By his means the Rawal plundered and reduced the Rajputs still more, and it became proverbial that though the Arabs enjoyed the revenue of the whole district, the Rawal could not endure that a Rajput should possess even decent clothes. It was with difficulty that in his late distress he could prevail on any of the *Thakurs* to come to Banswara; indeed, without the assurance of Arjun Singh¹ they would probably not have done so. The Rawal acknowledges that at present they are all perfectly obedient and it is not probable, particularly when they are aware that he is protected by the English Government, that any of them will attempt to dispute his authority. The principal among them have come to his assistance with the followers they were able to collect.

Some months since, the Arabs finding, it is said, the country exhausted and that little more could be exacted, persuaded the Rawal to appoint a *Kamdar*. From distrust of the Rawal's character and fear of the Arabs, for some time no one could be prevailed on to accept the situation. At length, however, it

^{*1} He was the Thakur of Udaigarh or Guree, and was the most powerful among the nobles of Banswara. He had to serve the Rawal with 100 horse and 400 foot. He was a Chauhan Rajput.

was in a manner forced on the present man, but not until he had obtained a written promise of protection and support both from the Rawal and the Arab chief. He soon after insisted on a portion, at least, of the Arabs being discharged; as no regular accounts existed either of their numbers at different periods, or of the sums they had received or expended, the sum of 45,000 rupees was mutually agreed on in full satisfaction of all demands. Of this a large proportion was paid, but the Arabs not showing any intention of quitting the Rawal's palace, the *Kamdar* began to take measures for expelling them by force.

The Rawal leaving Banswara proceeded to Guree to effect a reconciliation with Arjun Singh, the *Thakur* of that place. The Arabs, becoming acquainted with the intentions of the Rawal and the *Kamdar*, declared they would not quit the palace, and placed guards over the Rawal's son and women. After collecting 800 or 1,000 men of various descriptions, but not venturing to take any further measures for reducing them by force, and spending a long time in negotiation, during which his family was reduced to great distress, the Rawal by spreading frequent reports of the approach of English troops induced them to leave the palace. Instead, however, of paying only the balance remaining due of the Rs. 45,000, amounting to about Rs. 12,000, it has been agreed that Rs. 16,000 shall be paid them within one month and Rs. 7,000 more within two months and that Syed Hussain shall be retained in the Rawal's service with 50 men. They have also been suffered to retain possession of jewels valued at 5,000 rupees which they had seized in the palace. The 16,000 rupees they will have great difficulty in paying; for this the guarantee of Arjun Singh and of an Arab chief in his service was required. For the rest, they have only the Rawal's promise in writing, and this he scruples not to declare his intention of disregarding altogether. Though by this arrangement the Rawal's family are delivered from their distress yet little else has been gained; the Arabs have still possession of a part of the town, and appear to disregard entirely the authority of the Rawal. They lately dislodged some men of the Rawal's from a house, where they had some people in confinement, under the pretence that the house belonged to a man in their service. Even this insult the Rawal dared not resent.

The general opinion is that they have no intention of leaving the place and that the interference of the English Government

is still requisite to enable the Rawal to get rid of them effectually. Should only 50 of them, however, remain, the dread the people have of their outrages and of their influence over the Rawal will be a great obstacle to the recovery of their country. Their pay is exorbitant and the expense of 50 even will involve the Rawal in constant disputes with them. In the exhausted state of the country they will scarcely be able to support themselves by plundering the people and will, therefore, probably have recourse to seizing merchandise, a system they had actually commenced a few months since. At present, the most essential steps towards restoring the state of the country is to give the people an assurance of security and confidence in the Government; this, while any Arabs remain, they never can have.

Character of Ummed Singh—Even when they are removed the Rawal's character is such that people will not readily trust themselves in his power, more especially the Rajput Chiefs, who have already suffered so much from his caprice and tyranny. Though feared, his character is held in contempt by the people; they declare that he is capable of nothing but treachery, in which he excels not so much from any superior address, as from the utter disregard he has for truth and honour. Indeed, he may be said almost to avow his want of faith, as no expedient for attaining any object appears to occur to him more readily or to be proposed with less hesitation than a direct infraction of his word. He is at all times in the habit of attesting his sincerity by singularly hard imprecations. An extract from a letter which he wrote to the Arab chief Syed Hussain will illustrate his character: "I have a great consideration for you; let me hear what you have done. You write that the men are clamorous and I have promised them their pay again. This is right, I am fully satisfied. I do not know Murari (the *Kamdar*). I agree to whatever you do. I have reprimanded Murari, and destroyed your letter when I had read it. When I left Banswara you promised to follow me soon; you have not come. This is wrong. Come quickly, no one else can do any thing for me. You are my brother, you are my *Kamdar*. I rely on you only; do what you think best. Besides this, they are all traitors, you only are faithful." This was written while he was endeavouring to prevail on Arjun Singh to assist him in expelling the man to whom it was addressed. The Arabs assert that he made

them a promise that both Arjun Singh and Murari should be murdered and their property plundered; this is credited. When a copy of the above letter was shown him, he denied having written it, till Murari informed him, that he had seen the original in his own hand-writing, when he declared that he had written it merely to deceive Syed Hussain. In all transactions with his subjects, he submits to get some person of respectability to become security for the performance of what he promises. He is of a very weak character and shows on all occasions a total want of firmness and resolution, particularly so in his late difficulties. After much persuasion has been used to obtain his consent to any measure, and he has as usual sworn to the sincerity of his consent, the slightest suggestion from another person is sufficient to make him recede.

At present, notwithstanding the disorder that his affairs are in, he pays not the least attention to business of any kind, leaving everything to his servants. He is much given to the use of opium and spends the greater part of his time in eating and sleeping, apparently without a thought of or capacity for any rational employment. He still, however, shows an extreme jealousy of the Rajputs. His son Bhawani Singh is about 18 or 20, and under the tuition of others than his father may yet be brought to attend to the affairs of government. In these petty States it appears to be the custom to confer some degree of authority on the *Kunwar* or eldest son, when of sufficient age¹. This youth has been several times sent on expeditions against the Bhils. However, this Rawal's jealousy of others is so great, or his fear of meeting with the same treatment from his own son, as his father did from him, that so far from allowing him any degree of authority or attempting to draw his attention to business, he will not suffer any one to pay him any mark of respect or salutation.

The man who is *Kamdar* has only held that situation a few months. He was previously a *Mahajan* of the town of Banswara and is totally unused to the business of government. Under the directions of a Raja who exerted himself at all, this man might do tolerably well, but does not alone seem capable of fulfilling

¹Malcolm (*Central India*, Vol. I, p. 547) says that in Central India the eldest son of the ruling prince was "very frequently employed as a vice-gerent by his father."

this duty. All the persons of any respectability who were so, have either left the country or are dead.

Position of the Rajput Thakurs—The general idea seems to be that, though the *Thakurs* hold their lands from the Rawals for military service, yet unless guilty of some gross misconduct they cannot be deprived of them; that while they hold this rank it is their right and duty on all occasions of difficulty to interfere, and even to act independently of him. When any act of the Rawal's is clearly injurious to the State, not being bound in such a case to obey him, they would probably deprive him of authority and conduct the government in the name of the *Kunwar* or some other near relation. Such instances have at any rate occurred in the history of these principalities. Generally the same ideas of arbitrary and absolute power do not seem to prevail here, at least with respect to the Rajputs, to the degree they do in Hindustan. This is probably to be attributed partly to the tribal nature of these Governments, and partly to the ties of caste and relationship which connect the poorest Rajputs with the Raja. They are very particular in a strict observance of the various modes in which the Chiefs of different ranks and the Rawal salute each other. A greater degree of respect than is usual amongst natives towards inferiors, is paid by the Rawal to the *Thakurs*.¹

The most powerful among the Rajput chiefs or *Thakurs* is Arjun Singh of Guree; of him the Rawal seems always to have been extremely jealous. The next most powerful chief is Gambhir Singh of Kushalgarh. He is the head of the Rathor

¹Malcolm (*Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 545-546) says: "He (the ruling prince) is, in general, the chief of his clan, which, in some respects, extends his power, but in others limits and checks it. The principles of his rule over his own tribe and his other subjects, are quite distinct. His relations and kindred, who are termed Thakoors, have in general independent estates, for which they pay a certain sum, or give military service (sometimes both) to their superior. They preserve, however, the exclusive management of their lands, but with limited authority, which does not extend to life; and there is a check on their maladministration, from an acknowledged right of appeal, on the part of their subjects, to the prince or paramount lord. The principle of this part of a Rajpoot principality differs little from the feudal system which formerly existed in Europe, and is liable to the same vicissitudes in the relations and powers of the respective parties. The theory is, that, though the Rajah has general supremacy, the Thakoor owing him service and allegiance is master of his own soil and subjects, with the limitations stated....."

Thakurs as Arjun Singh is of the Chauhan. On account of former services the *Thakur* of Kushalgarh is entitled to some extraordinary distinction in the manner of saluting the Rawal, and he takes precedence of all other Rajputs.

Besides these two there are no Chiefs of any great consequence¹; they have all suffered so much from the oppressions of the Rawal and his Arabs, added to the Maratha invasions, that many of their followers do not possess arms even, and very few have horses.

The Rajputs—The whole of the Rajputs hold lands for military service. The *Thakurs* are expected to be ready at all times with a certain number of followers and these they retain by conferring on them small portions of land which, together with an addition of grain, cloth, etc., is sufficient to maintain them and their families. There are also many who hold lands in this manner from the Rawal immediately, for personal service, and others who hold some villages or part of a village, for the maintenance of one or two horsemen. When called in for service the *Thakurs* and their followers receive nothing from the Rawal; the inferior Rajputs, who hold land for personal service, are, when called in, fed by the Rawal. These never cultivate their lands themselves but hire Bhils or people of low caste to work for them, who are nominally allowed one-third of the crop, but never actually receive more than the subsistence.

It is supposed that at present the utmost number of Rajputs that could be assembled, of all descriptions, would be 1,000, including about 150 horse; but that, if their rent is remitted for one or two years, the original number of 1,800 or 2,000 will be expected of their lands. They are, it is thought, even now, if relieved from all other attacks, capable, under Arjun Singh, of repressing the disorders of the Bhils. In future they should certainly be adequate to all the duties of the district, though not able to repel all external enemies. It will consequently no longer be necessary for the Rawal or any of the *Thakurs* to maintain the number of foreign mercenaries they have hitherto kept; the expense is greater than they can afford. In the time of Prithvi Singh, the grandfather of the present Rawal, each

¹In Lieutenant Dyson's report we find specific mention of 16 *Thakurs*, who, together, could collect 275 horse and 551 foot.

Thakur was obliged to remain for one or two months at Banswara, till relieved by another, so that there was no occasion for keeping any troops in pay. It is customary for these Rajputs, who are maintained immediate by the Rawal, to eat in his presence. And it is told of Prithvi Singh that he always had 200 Rajputs at his meals. A portion of food is also sent from the Rawal to the houses of these men. The same custom is retained by the *Thakurs* with their dependents on occasions of any fighting. Tobacco and opium are distributed by the Rawal to all the Rajputs. They are all given to the excessive use of opium, and are generally under the influence of it; hence they have acquired habits of indolence which unfit them for any mental and almost for any bodily exertion. This laziness prevents their making those exertions and sacrifices of ease which are necessary for conquest or even for the preservation of their own independence. Their bravery will at all times lead them to die in the immediate defence of their families or to sacrifice their lives needlessly at the command of their Chiefs, but active exertion they are incapable of. Whatever their character may have formerly been, opium seems to have been the bane of the Rajput States. The other castes are also addicted to the use of this drug, but not to the degree that the Rajputs are. It is given at visits of ceremony, and at the meeting of friends or relations, and it is considered as a token of sincerity where any reconciliation has been effected, as the *hooka* and betel are among the natives of Hindustan.

The Rajputs, however, appear to have a great attachment to their Chiefs, and no oppression or misconduct of them seems to overcome the sense of the duty they owe to them. Instances there certainly are of the contrary, but they are comparatively few, and this feeling exists among them in a degree unequalled among the natives in general.

Their pride of family is great and they delight in talking of and hearing recited the celebrated actions of those princes from whom they claim their descent.

They are by no means so particular as the Hindus in general are with respect to ceremonial clearness. Thus food is usually dressed by persons of a low caste. Nor do they eat their food in the place where cooked always, and very few of them make a point of bathing before they eat.

The Bhils—The Bhils are found in every part of this district. There are, however, five principal chiefs who plunder.

Since disorder has prevailed these people have seldom paid anything to the Rawal; they have, however, been generally compelled to do so by the *Thakurs* in whose vicinity they are, and have respected their villages more than those of the *Khalsa*. They are all heads of villages, and would, if the Rawal possessed the means to compel them, pay a tribute or rent for their lands. At no period does any regular system with regard to these people seem to have prevailed. The more powerful Rawals every second or third year made a practice of plundering them of all they could, and the Bhils who were strong enough used, of course, to retaliate. They never thought of endeavouring by a firm but moderate treatment to get them to pay a regular revenue, and many ridicule the idea of trying such a plan, when the old system is so much more easy. The more sensible, however, think that it might be practicable and that, if successful, the advantages would be great. All other causes of disorder being removed, it will at any rate be a work of no difficulty to restrain them from plundering. The neighbouring *Thakurs* will be held responsible that nothing of this thing occurs, and one or two examples will probably put a stop effectually to their depredations. Some who have been long habituated to a lawless life of plunder will not be very ready to abandon their predatory habits, but these will most probably be few.

All enquiries that are made tend to confirm the idea that under proper management much may be done to improve the condition of these people and render them quick and civilized. By far the greater number of them are cultivators only, and under a regular system, with an assurance of justice and protection, they would soon pay a much larger sum in the shape of revenue than was ever extorted from them under the former barbarous policy. Their wants are few, and as they know that were they to accumulate any property it would be taken from them, they hesitate to cultivate more ground than is sufficient for their bare subsistence. They sell in the villages the ghee, the produce of their cows and buffaloes, and some small quantity of grain in order to purchase cloth and iron, and the few other articles they require. Their huts are rude; the walls made of bamboos, and tiled. Their villages are usually on the high ground; the houses distant 100, 200 or 300 yards each from

each other. The object of this, they say, is to avoid quarrels in their fits of intoxication. They are much addicted to drinking a liquor.

From the statements of some of the headmen of some Bhil villages, it appears that originally one-fourth, but subsequently never less than one-half of the produce of their lands, was taken from them and to make up this even their working cattle were usually taken.

They are extremely ignorant and have much the manners of savages. They are of a diminutive stature, dark and ugly, but there is nothing peculiar in their features, as the small eyes, flat nose of some other savage tribes. It seems most probable that they are descended from some outcaste Hindus.

Economic condition—In the present unsettled state of the country there is little commerce; that which formerly existed between Gujarat, Marwar, Kotah, etc., is now chiefly conducted by the circuitous route of Rutlam. It is thought by the *Mahajans* etc. of this place that, were there no fear of plunder, a considerable trade would be carried on as formerly through these districts, from Gujarat to the western provinces of Hindustan. The manufactures of Ahmadabad, the silk cloth and other varieties, were formerly brought here. From Surat were brought foreign articles, broad cloth, velvet, etc., with spices, cocoanuts, betel nuts, sandal wood and all articles—the produce of the south of India. Horses were brought in great numbers from Kathiawar. From Hindustan were brought turbans, *duputtas*, and the cloth called *chanderi*; similar articles were also brought from the Deccan. Indigo has been exported; and cotton, but not of a good quality, in some parts of the district Sagar, which thrives with little labour from the richness of the soil, has been exported. Iron of a good quality is manufactured at a place N.-W. of Banswara, called Loharia. It is said that 16,000 rupees' worth has been made sometimes in one year, and that the duty has amounted to 6,000 rupees. It was sent chiefly to Gujarat. From Gujarat the road was formerly travelled by horse carriages, but from having been long neglected, it is now in many places impossible but for cattle. Bullocks and buffaloes only are used for conveyance of goods. Under a Government of a different nature, this road might be opened at a very trifling expense. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is the opinion of people connected with this trade that it will, when it can be done with

safety, revert to this route as being more direct than that of the east.

It is said that the duties formerly amounted to 20,000 rupees, but no documents can be found from which either this or the quantity of articles exported or imported can be discovered.

Revenue System—From extreme jealousy of the Rawal, and his people regarding the duties, and of the *Thakurs* with respect to the number of men to be maintained, and the rent paid by each, and from the total want of system and method, it is not possible but by much enquiry to obtain any satisfactory information on these heads, or indeed on that of revenue in general.

The revenue arises chiefly from the *Khalsa* villages, and a small rent paid by the *Thakurs*. Of that arising from the *Khalsa*, part is the regular land rent and part is what is denominated *Burat*. This is a sum paid by each village at the festival of the *Daserah*. The sum was fixed for each village according to the supposed means of the inhabitants, many years ago; it is not known exactly what sum each individual is to pay. It is settled by the Patel of the village. Latterly some deduction has been made every year on account of families leaving their villages.

Though this is acknowledged to be an irregular exaction, yet as it is a long established custom, the people do not now consider it as any hardship and are perfectly willing to pay it once a year, but lately they say it has been levied whenever the Rawal has been in want of money. The system is irregular, as some villages pay both denominations of tribute, while others pay one only. Both included, the revenue of the district formerly amounted to 1,25,000 rupees. As the *Thakurs* will now have no occasion to maintain any mercenaries, it is intended to make them all pay a regular tribute. Rs. 25,000 is mentioned, but it is not probable that so much will be paid by them.

In former times, plunder, called *Gras*¹, from the adjoining districts and contributions.....on various pretences were considered as regular sources of revenue, the former producing 10,000, the latter about 15,000 rupees yearly.

^{*1}Malcolm (*Central India*, Vol. I, p. 508) says that in Gujarat and Central India *Grassiahs* were "chiefs who, driven from their possessions by invaders, established and maintained a claim to a share of the revenue, upon the ground of their power to disturb or prevent its collection."

Police—For the expenses of the police of Banswara a trifling tax is levied by the *Kotwal* himself, out of which he is to maintain a small party of men. He is also allowed some part of the produce of crimes as all offences are punished by fine.

This office is rented to the highest bidder; the sum given yearly is usually about 200 rupees. From the present Rawal, security is required that the renter shall not be displaced before the expiration of the year.

'Ruinous Government'—It is supposed that, with some forbearance on the part of the Rawal, in three years the revenue may amount to the original sum. The present distress has not been caused altogether by the depredations of the Marathas; the injustice and ruinous government of the Rawal have also tended to produce it.

The persons employed by the Rawal in the different branches of his Government are extremely ignorant of everything relating to the inferior classes. The only object seems to be to obtain money, and as long as this is effected, they give themselves little trouble about any thing else. The accounts given by them are frequently quite contradictory; indeed, they are astonished that any one should think of making such enquiries, of which they cannot comprehend the object, and conceiving that they are made with some ill design, their information often tends to mislead. The people in general are extremely ignorant, and believe the most absurd story about the English.

Land System—Land is considered the property of the cultivator; the portion that any individual holds descends to his children, and no one can deprive him of it. He has the power of mortgaging, but not of selling it; at least no instances are known of land being sold, and consequently they do not conceive that it can be done. Should any cultivator leave the country, his land would in more quiet times probably be occupied by some one else, but on his return, or after his death, his heir can claim it, and on his proving his right before the *Patel*, and a *Panchayat* of the village, it would be restored to him. The case of a man neglecting to cultivate his land they do not conceive possible; except from distress, in which case the *Patel* is to assist him, and if necessary, procures a remission of his rent from the Rawal. Though the idea clearly is that the Raja is entitled to the enjoy-

ment of part of the produce (this is their expression), yet they do not seem ever to have considered the question fully in all its relations. Land becomes the property of any man who first brings it into cultivation; for some years no payment is demanded.

Village Administration—The village officers are a *Patel* and a *Putwari* or accountant. Either of these may be deprived of their offices for misconduct by the Government, but some individual of the family must be appointed to succeed; so far these offices are hereditary. The *Patel* receives no salary, but the authority and influence he possesses are supposed to be a sufficient remuneration; some small remission of rent is usually made him. The *Putwari* receives about 4 rupees per month from the collections. The duty of these two is to arrange the share each family is to pay, to inform the Government of the state of the village, and to represent the case of any who, from losses, may be unable to pay their rent, that a remission may be made in their favour. The only yearly settlement relates to the revenue termed *Burat* which is regulated according to the state and number of inhabitants.

The standing corn is estimated by the village officers and an officer on the part of the Government who is sent to each village for that purpose. According to this valuation $\frac{1}{5}$ or $\frac{1}{7}$ of the value of the crop is taken.

The proportion of *Burat* is uncertain. No information can be obtained on what principles the ancient settlement was based. The Government demand as much as they can extort, and the cultivators resist as much as possible, and thus this oppression produces habits of deceit and dishonesty. The poverty of the cultivators is so great that they are obliged generally to get money advanced by *Mahajans* who, in order to pay themselves, seize the whole produce of the harvest, the cultivators retaining as much as they can while the corn is in the field. The cultivators say that they can afford to pay between $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$, but at present what is barely sufficient for their support only is left them.

Villages are usually rented out by the Government for a sum equal to that usually paid, and it is said that, with attention and good management, by advancing money to purchase seed, cattle, etc., the person who rents the village is enabled to make a large profit, besides paying the Government without distressing the cultivators. At present no one will venture to rent a village

and hence the Government is a loser, as the persons employed to make the collections are generally known to make large sums of money themselves, and the Government never pays so much attention to the condition of the cultivators as an individual whose interest it is to do so.

Of late an extraordinary custom has prevailed that nothing is paid to the Government for land mortgaged to Brahmins, *Charans*, and Rajputs, who pay nothing for the lands they hold in their own right.

Those who hold land by grants registered on plates of copper can dispose of it by sale. These people hire Bhils etc. to cultivate their lands, paying them a mere subsistence. It is estimated that land worth Rs. 20,000 has been bestowed in this mode on religious people, but chiefly on *Charans* and *Bhats*; no accounts whatever are kept of land thus disposed of, which is considered as most irrevocably alienated. No revenue whatever is derived from it from its being registered on copper plates; the term *Tamba Patra* is used to signify land thus bestowed.

Classes of inhabitants—The inhabitants, besides the Rajputs, and *Bhats* and *Charans*, who are very numerous, consist principally of Brahmins, of whom there are about 5,000 families who subsist by agriculture, working themselves. The Brahmins here came originally from Gujarat. It is said that when the Rajputs first established themselves here, the country was inhabited by the Bhils only.

Town of Banswara—The town of Banswara is extensive and the houses are well built, chiefly of brick, and tiled. It has the appearance of having been rich. The inhabitants are Brahmins from Gujarat of the Nagar tribe, who are chiefly engaged in trade, and are connected with Gujarat, and with the principal towns in Hindustan. Banias of the Jain sect are also numerous, as they are in all the towns in this part of India; it is remarked that these people are, generally from their industry, in good circumstances. There are also many of the Musulman sect, called Bohra, engaged in trade between this and the neighbouring towns. There has also been a great deal of employment for blacksmiths, braziers etc. At present the population is very much diminished, and those people who remain are reduced to great poverty.

The houses of the *Thakurs* are built generally with a view to defence, but they cannot be termed forts.

APPENDIX B

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